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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> K.J. [Georgia] v International Protection Appeals Tribunal & Anor (Approved) [2025] IEHC 308 (02 May 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2025/2025IEHC308.html
Cite as: [2025] IEHC 308

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 THE HIGH COURT

[Record No. 2024/629JR]

[2025] IEHC 308

BETWEEN

KJ (Georgia)

APPLICANT

AND

THE INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION APPEALS TRIBUNAL

AND

THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE

RESPONDENTS

 

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Barr delivered on the 2nd day of May 2025.

Introduction.

1.                  The applicant is a Georgian national. He claimed international protection in the State on the basis that he had faced persecution and harm in his country of origin due to his sexuality as a gay man. The applicant was refused international protection because the first respondent did not believe that he is a gay man, or that he was in a relationship with another Georgian man in this State. In effect, the Tribunal found that the applicant and his witness had given a 'false narrative'. 

2.                  A hearing was held before the first respondent. As Georgia was designated a safe country, there was no presenting officer at the hearing. 

3.                  The applicant and his witness gave evidence at the oral hearing before the first respondent. The applicant was asked questions by the Tribunal member. The applicant's witness, PT, the man with whom he alleged that he was in a relationship, was not asked any questions. 

4.                  The essential challenge to the decision rests on the assertion that the decision-maker was obliged to put to the applicant's witness the matters which he did not find credible in his evidence, before making any finding that his evidence lacked credibility. The applicant's core argument was summarised as follows at para. 30 of his submissions:

"It is submitted that, in the absence of any representative from the IPO at the oral hearing, it was incumbent on the first respondent to put it to the applicant's witness that his evidence of being in a romantic and intimate relationship with the applicant should not be accepted as credible or reliable. It is contrary to the principles of fair procedure and the right to constitutional justice to find sworn testimony to be a false narrative without first giving the witness the opportunity to deal with the suggestion that their evidence should not be accepted, and observing the manner in which that suggestion is addressed."

Background.

5.                  On 31 May 2022 the applicant presented an application to the International Protection Office (IPO) for international protection under the International Protection Act 2015 (hereinafter "the 2015 Act"). This was made on the basis of his fear of being persecuted in Georgia as a gay man. The applicant completed the written questionnaire on 22 June 2022, which the IPO had translated into English on 17 October 2022. 

6.                  Written submissions were made to the IPO by the solicitor acting on behalf of the applicant on 4 April 2023. Two photographs were submitted showing the applicant and his current partner in Ireland. 

7.                  The applicant attended for his interview at the IPO on 6 April 2023. In the course of this interview, he stated that he had met someone in Ireland. He stated "I cannot call it a relationship, but we are meeting each other". He furnished the name of his partner as PT .  

8.                  In a report dated 14 June 2023, it was recommended by the IPO that the applicant be given neither a refugee declaration, nor a subsidiary protection declaration. It was not accepted as credible that the applicant was a gay man, or that he had been verbally and physically abused in Georgia because of his sexuality. The IPO also made a finding that the applicant's country of origin was a safe country. The applicant's alleged relationship with PT was dealt with as follows: "While the (applicant) submitted photos of himself with another man these photos are not considered to be sufficient alone to corroborate his sexuality. The applicant submitted no substantive proof of his same-sex relationships."

9.                  The applicant appealed this recommendation to the first respondent on 4 August 2023. It was submitted that the IPO had erred in fact and/or in law in finding that the material elements of his claim were not credible. 

10.              The applicant's witness, PT, had also submitted an application for international protection. It was refused by the IPO on 13 January 2023. However, while the applicant's appeal was pending, the appeal brought by PT was heard and was determined by another member of the first respondent. In a decision dated 31 January 2024, it was accepted that PT is a bisexual man, who had suffered a violent homophobic attack in Georgia in September 2020 and that he had suffered bullying and verbal harassment on a frequent basis in Georgia in the period 2020 to 2022. The Tribunal stated that it found PT's evidence to be generally compelling, particularly in relation to his account of how he preferred to present himself and how this caused him daily difficulties in Georgia. There is a record in the decision of PT saying that he had been in a relationship with KJ, which was ongoing. A copy of the appeal decision in PT's case was furnished as part of the appeal brought by the applicant. 

11.              An oral hearing was held of the applicant's appeal on 4 April 2024. The IPO was not represented at the hearing. At the appeal hearing, the applicant gave direct evidence under oath of the following: his sexuality as a gay man; his experiences in Georgia as a gay man; his fears of returning to Georgia on account of being a gay man; and his same-sex relationship with PT, which had developed in this State. 

12.              The applicant was questioned by the first respondent, inter alia, about his realisation that he was gay; he was questioned about the discovery by others in Georgia that he was gay; he was also questioned on the number of assaults that he had experienced; the quality of the medical report relating to one assault; his relationship with another man in Georgia; and the circumstances of his relationship with PT, in particular when they met, where they met, where they had their first date, and what anniversaries they celebrated together. 

13.              PT gave evidence at the hearing of his relationship with the applicant. He was not questioned by the first respondent. 

14.              PT was not present while the applicant was giving his evidence to the first respondent. When PT came to give his evidence, the first respondent indicated that he did not intend to cross-examine the witness in circumstances where the IPAT had already assessed his evidence and found him to be credible. It was confirmed by the first respondent that the findings which had been made by the IPAT in PT's case would be adopted by him. However, the Tribunal member asked counsel for the applicant to address any inconsistencies with the witness in the course of his direct evidence. 

The IPAT Decision.

15.               In a decision dated 10 April 2024, the applicant's appeal was dismissed by the first respondent. In that decision, the applicant's credibility was rejected. It was not accepted that the applicant is a gay man. It was accepted that PT is gay, but the witness's evidence of being in a relationship with the applicant was rejected as not credible. 

16.              Overall, the first respondent found that the applicant's account was superficial and vague and lacking in the type of specific, particular or idiosyncratic details that would indicate that he was speaking about actual lived experiences, rather than a learned narrative. The decision noted that the applicant was unable to recollect dates or timeframes with any degree of accuracy. It was noted that while he had been able to give certain dates to the IPO without difficulty in respect of various matters, he had inexplicably resiled from those dates on appeal. 

17.              The Tribunal noted that there were inconsistencies in his evidence, such as that he had given an inconsistent account in relation to what had been found on his phone by boys in the school, which led them to understand that he was gay. In his application for international protection and in his interview, he had claimed that they had found pictures and videos of men on his phone. Whereas on appeal, he had claimed that it was Tinder text messages with his Georgian boyfriend that had been discovered on his phone. 

18.              He had also been inconsistent in relation to the assaults that had been allegedly perpetrated on him in Georgia. He had claimed to have been attacked and injured twice in his interview, but at the oral hearing he maintained that it was only once that he had been attacked. He was unable to explain why he had given details about the previous attack in his interview. 

19.              The Tribunal found that the vagueness of the applicant's claim was even more evidenced by the vague and contradictory details that he and the witness had given about their relationship. The Tribunal accepted that the witness was a gay man from Georgia. However, it noted that that in itself did not prove that the applicant was also a gay man. The Tribunal noted that the possibility that the relationship narrative was false, was consistent with the witness being a gay man and the applicant not being so. 

20.              The Tribunal stated that it had significant concerns about the applicant's claim that he had found out that PT was gay, because of the disclosure that that was the basis of his claim for international protection. The Tribunal noted that the witness had given more credible evidence in this regard, to the effect that from their text messages and interactions they had realised that they liked each other. The Tribunal went on to note that that was significantly different to the applicant's narrative. 

21.              The Tribunal noted that the claim as to when the relationship started and when he and PT considered each other to be boyfriends, was also vague. It was also inconsistent to a certain extent but given that neither of them was willing to commit to a clear timeline, it was difficult for the Tribunal to say that their claims were incompatible as a matter of certainty; the Tribunal could only say that they gave different and vague accounts. The Tribunal noted that while the witness had claimed that the applicant had met his family in the beginning of 2023, when they had been in a relationship in 2022; the applicant described their relationship in April 2023 as follows: "I cannot call it a relationship, but we are meeting each other". The Tribunal found it striking that neither the applicant, nor the witness, was able to give an exact date as to when the relationship started. It was put to the applicant that it was unusual for a couple not to have a date for anniversaries etc ; to which the applicant merely replied that they did not have such a date. The Tribunal was not persuaded that a couple who claimed to be in love and who had broadly the same hopes for the future, would not have been able to articulate, at least as a matter of weeks or even months, for how long they had been in a relationship. 

22.              The Tribunal noted that that was compounded by the fact that PT had denied that he said in his own appeal that he had been in a relationship with the applicant since August 2023. The Tribunal considered that the witness had deliberately made his claim about the relationship more vague to fit in with the applicant's claim. The Tribunal found that the witness had deliberately contradicted the information that was set out in his own appeal decision. 

23.              The tribunal reached the following conclusions at para. 4.15:

"The Tribunal accepts that the witnesses is a gay man from Georgia. The tribunal also accepts that the witness and the appellant appear affectionate in the photographs that he has submitted. These are positive indicators of the appellant's credibility. As against that, he has been very vague, incoherent and inconsistent in recounting both the events that occurred in Georgia and his relationship with the witness in the State. The Tribunal has weighed all factors in this case and in reaching a conclusion on the balance of probabilities, the Tribunal is not satisfied that the appellant is a gay man, nor that he is in a relationship with the witness."

24.               The tribunal went on to reach the following conclusion at para. 4.18:

"Having regard to all the factors in this case, the Tribunal considers that the appellant has attempted to obtain cross corroboration for his claim with the witness, who went on to establish his own claim and the Tribunal accepts that the witnesses is a gay man. However, the appellant was unable to give a coherent or sufficiently detailed account in his own right to be capable of being believed. Consequently, the Tribunal does not consider that the benefit of the doubt should be extended to him in this case."

Discussion.

25.              As both parties relied on the provisions of the 2015 Act, it will be helpful to summarise the relevant provisions. Section 42 of the Act deals with the oral hearing before the first respondent. Section 42(6) provides that in conducting an oral hearing, the Tribunal shall permit the applicant to be present at the hearing and to present his or her case to the Tribunal in person or through a legal representative. The subsection further provides that the hearing shall be conducted as informally as is practicable and consistent with fairness and transparency. It is also provided that the oral hearing should proceed with due expedition and should allow for the examination and cross-examination of the applicant and any witnesses that are called. 

26.              Section 42(8) of the 2015 Act provides that for the purposes of an oral hearing, the Tribunal can direct in writing that any person should appear before it as a witness. The Act also provides that it can direct any such person to produce documentation. The Tribunal is given the power to give such directions as appear to be reasonable and just. The subsection also provides that the Tribunal can take evidence on oath.

27.              Finally, s.61 of the 2015 Act provides that the Tribunal shall be inquisitorial in nature and independent in the performance of its functions. 

28.              In argument at the bar, Mr Cahill SC on behalf of the applicant laid particular stress on the nature of an inquisitorial hearing. In this regard he referred to the decision of Clarke J (as he then was) in Idiakheua v Minister for Justice, Equality & Law Reform [2005] IEHC 150, where the nature of an inquisitorial process was described in the following way: 

"It should be recalled that the process before the RAT is an inquisitorial one in which a joint obligation is placed on the applicant and the decision-maker to discover the true facts. It seems to me that an inquisitorial body is under an obligation to bring to the attention of any person whose rights may be affected by a decision of such a body any matter of substance or importance which that inquisitorial body may regard as having the potential to affect its judgment."

29.              Clarke J. went on to state that while there may have been differences between an inquisitorial process and an adversarial one, the substantial obligation to afford a party whose rights may be affected an opportunity to know the case against them, remained in both cases. He stated that whatever process or procedure may be engaged in by an inquisitorial body, they must be such as to afford any person who may be affected by the decision of such body, a reasonable opportunity to know the matters which may be likely to affect the judgment of that body against their interest. He went on to state that if a matter was likely to be important to the determination of the RAT, then that matter had to be fairly put to the applicant so that the applicant would have an opportunity to answer it. He stated that if that meant that the matter must be put by the Tribunal itself, then an obligation to do so rested upon the Tribunal. 

30.              Counsel for the applicant also relied on the dicta of Clarke CJ in RAS Medical Ltd v Royal College of Surgeons in Ireland [2019] 1 IR 63, where it was noted that in certain circumstances cross-examination was necessary. In particular, counsel relied on the following dicta at para. 88: 

"Where a party wishes to assert that evidence tendered by an opponent lacks either credibility or reliability, then it is incumbent on that party to cross-examine the witness concerned and put to that witness the basis on which it is said that a witness's evidence should not be accepted at face value. It is an unfair procedure to suggest in argument that a witness's evidence should not be regarded as credible on a particular basis without giving that witness the opportunity to deal with the criticism of the evidence concerned. A party which presents evidence which goes unchallenged is entitled to assume that the evidence concerned is not contested. However, there may, of course, be legitimate debate about whether the evidence, even if accepted so far as it goes, is sufficient or appropriate to establish the facts necessary to resolve the case in favour of the party tendering the evidence in question."

31.              I am not convinced that the decision in the RAS Medical case goes as far as to lay down a proposition that wherever a person's credibility is in issue, there has to be cross-examination. The RAS case concerned a situation where evidence had been given on affidavit by witnesses on behalf of the respondent in relation to which guidelines had been applied at the time when the application had been made by the applicant for CPD accreditation for a particular course. The applicant had attempted to rely on documentation that it had obtained during the discovery process as a means of discrediting the sworn evidence of the respondent's witnesses in their affidavits. It was held that where an attempt would be made to discredit the sworn evidence of witnesses, it was not permissible to do so merely by relying on documents that were not properly proven in evidence. It was in those particular circumstances that it was held that it was necessary for the evidence given by the witnesses to be tested on cross-examination, prior to a finding of lack of credibility being made thereon. 

32.              In argument at the bar, counsel on behalf of the first respondent, Mr Bracken BL, accepted that there was an obligation on the first respondent to hold a fair hearing, notwithstanding that it was holding an inquisitorial process and an informal one under the provisions of the 2015 Act. He accepted that the so-called 'Haughey rights', arising out of the decision in Re Haughey [1971] IR 217, which provide that the person must be made aware of the matters of concern to the decision-maker and must be given an opportunity to address them, were incorporated into the right to a fair hearing before the first respondent. 

33.              It was submitted that having regard to the content of the IPO report at first instance, the applicant was well aware that his sexuality and whether he was in a bona fide relationship with PT, was a matter of concern that arose on the appeal. He knew that the decision-maker at first instance had not accepted that he was gay, or in a relationship with PT. 

34.              To address that deficiency, the applicant had requested that an oral appeal hearing be held. Notwithstanding that Georgia was designated as a safe country, which would normally mean that there would not be an oral hearing on appeal, the first respondent had acceded to that request and had directed that PT should give evidence at the hearing. It was submitted that in these circumstances, the applicant was fully aware of the issues that arose on the hearing of the appeal and had been given an adequate means of addressing them. 

35.              The respondent relied on the decision of Phelan J in ESO v Chief International Protection Officer & Ors. [2023] IEHC 197, as support for the proposition that the right to a fair hearing did not require the decision-maker to engage in cross examination with a witness, where the decision-maker went on to find that the evidence of the witness was lacking in credibility. 

36.              In the ESO case, Phelan J had referred to the dicta of Hedigan J in BNN v Minister for Justice [2009] 1 IR 719, where he had held that the principle of audi alteram partem did not require the determinative body to debate its conclusions in advance with the parties. 

37.              In the course of her judgment, Phelan J had referred to the decision in BW v RAT (No. 2) [2015] IEHC 759, where Humphreys J had set out six categories of credibility finding and had gone on to state that the obligation to put matters to an applicant arose in only two of those categories. The first such credibility finding arose where there was a point where an aspect of the applicant's case was not inherently implausible as a matter of probability, but where an explanation might reasonably be called for. In such a case, the Tribunal might well decide to disbelieve the explanation, once an opportunity for it had been afforded, but it must afford the opportunity if it had not already arisen. An example of such an issue would be where there was evidence given that a person's death had occurred on the same date as had been given as being the date of issuance of the death certificate. It was held that a matter falling into that category, was one that should be specifically put to an applicant if the Tribunal is to rely on it. 

38.              The second area where there could be a credibility finding was where there was a contradiction or confusion on the face of the evidence given by the parties. It was held that it was not, in general, necessary to go back to the applicant to give him a further opportunity to address that matter. The third instance where there could be a negative credibility finding was where the applicant had already had an opportunity to deal with the issue. It was held that it was not normally necessary to give an applicant a specific opportunity to comment on matters of which he or she already had fair warning. 

39.              The fourth area in which there could be a negative credibility finding was where the applicant's account was implausible on its face. It was held that a decision-maker was not required to specifically contact the applicant to inform him or her that the account presented was inherently implausible on its face. 

40.              The fifth category was where the decision-maker came into possession of new information. It was held that whether new information needed to be put to an applicant depended on whether it materially changed the picture before the decision maker. If there was such a material change adverse to the applicant, then, as a matter of generality the new information should be put to the applicant. 

41.              Finally, where the finding was one of an absence of evidence. It was held that the onus was on the applicant to submit whatever appropriate and available evidence he or she had. If there was a clear omission in the material furnished by the applicant, a decision-maker was not necessarily obliged to go back to the applicant to point out this omission, unless it was one which did not inherently call for an explanation from the applicant. 

42.              In the ESO case, the applicant had made an argument that was very similar to that advanced on behalf of the applicant in the present case. In that case, the applicant had contended that the failure of the decision-maker, in purported breach of the requirements of audi alteram partem, to advise the applicant that it was considered that his account was vague and implausible in light of the available country of origin information, was a fatal flaw in the decision-making process. The judge was satisfied that that contention did not withstand scrutiny. The applicant had submitted that the first respondent should have informed him that it was believed that his answers were vague and should have pointed to perceived discrepancies in his account to allow him to address these. In rejecting that submission, Phelan J, having referred to the principles set down by Humphreys J in the BW case, stated that she was not satisfied that there was any onus on the decision-maker to put to the applicant that his account was considered vague. She held that the first respondent had discharged his duties in that regard by affording the applicant an opportunity to answer questions and asking questions in a different way where insufficient information had been given. The record of the s.35 interview demonstrated that further questions and reformulated questions had been put to the applicant. 

43.              Counsel for the respondent also relied on the decision in MA v RAT [2015] IEHC 528, where it was held that it was not necessary to put inconsistencies in his narrative to an applicant, due to the fact that an applicant had a full opportunity in an appeal, even in a 'papers only' appeal, to address any inconsistency, contradiction, implausibility, or other problem arising from what has been said during the asylum application process. It had to be assumed that an applicant was aware of what he or she had said during that process. The court went on to find that no negative credibility finding was made based on material unknown to the applicant, because he was taken to be aware of what he had said previously, and because he was aware of the basis of the rejection of credibility in the s.13 report, and he had had an adequate opportunity to address relevant issues during the appeal to the RAT: see paras. 21 - 23.


Conclusions.

44.              Based on a consideration of the background to the challenged decision, the account of the evidence given at the appeal hearing as recorded in the decision of the first respondent, and in light of the relevant case law, I make the following findings of fact and of law: I accept the submission made by Mr Bracken BL on behalf of the respondent that the fact that the hearing before the first respondent is inquisitorial in nature, does not convert the Tribunal member into a person who must question an applicant's witness on every inconsistency between their evidence and that given by the applicant. 

45.              Under the 2015 Act, the hearings before the first respondent can be informal in nature. It is accepted that notwithstanding the informality of the hearing, there is an obligation to ensure that the hearing is fair to the applicant. This means that the applicant must be made aware of areas of likely concern to the decision-maker and he must be given an opportunity to address them.

46.               I find that in this case, the applicant was fully aware that his credibility was an issue in relation to his sexuality and in relation to whether he was in the claimed relationship with PT. The applicant was well aware from the first instance decision that these matters were of concern to the first respondent on the hearing of the appeal.

47.               The second requirement of a fair hearing is that the applicant is given an opportunity to give evidence on his own behalf and to call relevant evidence. That was facilitated by acceding to his request for an oral hearing and by directing the attendance of the witness, PT. 

48.              There was no presenting officer at the appeal hearing. This meant that the applicant had a free run insofar as his evidence was not challenged by cross examination by a presenting officer. The Tribunal member asked the applicant questions about aspects of his evidence of his alleged mistreatment in Georgia on account of his sexuality and his evidence in relation to his relationship with PT. 

49.              PT had been kept outside the hearing while the applicant gave his evidence. That was permissible. No complaint is made by the applicant in that regard. PT was brought through his evidence by the barrister representing the applicant, who had been asked by the tribunal member to deal with any inconsistencies that might arise in the evidence of the witness. 

50.              It cannot plausibly be argued that because the Tribunal member did not ask the witness questions, and in particular, because he did not point out the inconsistencies between his evidence and the various accounts given by the applicant in the course of his application for international protection and in his evidence, that that meant that the decision-maker could not reach an adverse credibility finding against the applicant. 

51.              There are several reasons why that submission cannot succeed: first, it is settled that the decision-maker is not required to debate with the applicant, or his witness, aspects of the evidence that he has given: see the BNN , BW and ESO cases. 

52.              Secondly, when it is necessary for a decision-maker to check and cross-check answers that are given by the applicant against his previous answers given in his questionnaire and at interview, and then cross check those against answers given in evidence by his witness, that is a painstaking exercise that must be carried out after the hearing when the Tribunal member can sit down and carefully consider all the evidence. It is not possible for a decision-maker to start cross-examining a witness during the hearing on inconsistencies between his evidence and the various accounts given by the applicant. That is not the function of the decision-maker in an inquisitorial hearing. 

53.              I am satisfied that fair procedures were afforded to the applicant in this appeal hearing. He knew the issues that he had to deal with in his appeal. Through his lawyers, he made extensive written submissions in advance of the appeal hearing. At his request, an oral hearing was held. He was allowed to give his evidence in chief. He was allowed to call his witness, who was questioned by his barrister. 

54.              The applicant cannot argue that because the Tribunal member did not cross-examine his witness, or put it to him that he found aspects of his evidence to be vague, that that somehow meant that the hearing was unfair, or that it prevented the Tribunal member from considering the applicant's evidence and the witness's evidence and prevented him making a finding that their evidence was deliberately vague and was inconsistent in many respects; and from reaching the conclusion that their evidence therefore lacked credibility. 

55.              I am satisfied that when read as a whole, the challenged decision of the first respondent shows t hat he had had regard to the entirety of the evidence put forward by the applicant. The decision-maker had regard to the previous accounts given by the applicant in his questionnaire and in his interview. He also had regard to the document submitted by the applicant as a medical report in respect of his injuries following his alleged assault in Georgia, which the applicant alleged had occurred on account of his sexuality. 

56.              The first respondent was entitled to have regard to the frailties in this documentary evidence, such as the fact that it was handwritten and was not on headed paper, and the fact that the appl icant could not give a plausible explanation for how he had obtained it. 

57.              The decision-maker was entitled to have had regard to the inconsistencies in the applicant's account, such as in relation to the number of assaults perpetrated on him while in Georgia. He was also entitled to have regard to the vague quality of his evidence in relation to his relationship with PT and in particular, to how he alleged that he had learned that PT was gay .  He was also entitled to have regard to the vague nature of his evidence as to when their relationship started. 

58.              The decision-maker was also entitled to have regard to the fact that the evidence of PT was equally vague in relation to the start date for their relationship and in particular, to the fact that his evidence was inconsistent between the evidence that he had given at his own appeal hearing and his evidence given at the applicant's appeal hearing, in relation to the star t of their relationship. 

59.              The applicant does not argue that any of these findings are unreasonable in the legal sense. He argues that the hearing was in breach of his right to fair procedures because the Tribunal member did not put it to the applicant, or to PT, that the vagueness in their answers and the inconsistencies in their evidence, could lead to a possible finding of their having provided a "false narrative". 

60.              I hold that there is no obligation on a tribunal member to tell a witness that their evidence lacks credibility, before he/she can proceed to make such a finding. That is not required in order for a hearing to be fair. 

61.              All that is required for a fair hearing is that the person the subject of the hearing, knows the issues that they must deal with; that they be given the opportunity to give evidence and to call evidence on their behalf; and that if evidence is given against them, they be given the opportunity to test that evidence by cross examination. 

62.              I find that the requirements for a fair hearing were met in this case. The fact that the first respondent did not ask questions of PT, did not render the hearing unfair to the applicant. The applicant was given every opportunity to present his appeal in the fullest possible manner. That is all that was required for the applicant to get a fair hearing.

63.              For the reasons set out in this judgment, I refuse the reliefs sought by the applicant in his notice of motion dated 5 July 2024 and in his statement of grounds. 

64.              As this judgment has been delivered electronically, the parties shall have two weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise. 

65.              The matter shall be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on 27 May 2025 for the purpose of making final orders.

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