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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Wales v Solicitors' Disciplinary Committee & Anor (Approved) [2025] IEHC 281 (11 April 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2025/2025IEHC281.html
Cite as: [2025] IEHC 281

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THE HIGH COURT

[2025] IEHC 281

[Record No. 2019 474JR]

BETWEEN

MATTHEW WALES

APPLICANT

AND

 

THE SOLICITORS' DISCIPLINARY TRIBUNAL

AND

THE LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND

 

RESPONDENTS

 

JUDGMENT of Mr Justice Barr delivered on the 11th day of April 2025.

Introduction.

1.                  The applicant is a solicitor who is facing an inquiry into alleged professional misconduct before the first respondent. 

2.                  The substantive judicial review proceedings in this matter have had a long and tortuous history. In essence, the applicant seeks to prohibit the resumption of the inquiry hearing, which was commenced on 25 June 2019 before the first respondent. 

3.                  In this application the applicant seeks liberty to amend his statement of grounds dated 12 July 2019. This application is strenuously resisted by the respondents. 

4.                  It will be necessary to set out a brief chronology of the main steps taken in the proceedings to date. 

Background and Chronology of the Judicial Review Proceedings.

5.                   The original complaint in this matter, which appears to have been made in or about March 2016, was lodged with the second respondent by a firm of solicitors in Northern Ireland, Squire Patton Boggs (UK) LLP. They claimed that they had instructed the applicant to act as solicitor on behalf of a client of theirs who had obtained judgment against an individual before the courts in Northern Ireland. It is alleged that the applicant was instructed to commence bankruptcy proceedings against the individual before the courts in the Republic of Ireland, on foot of the judgment that had been obtained in Northern Ireland. To that end, it is alleged that the applicant lodged the original of the European Enforcement Order (hereinafter "EEO") in respect of the judgment obtained in Northern Ireland, in the Central Office of the High Court. It is alleged that on 6 July 2015, the Northern Ireland solicitors, requested the applicant to provide a copy of the EEO, so that proceedings could be brought against the individual in Ireland to enforce the judgment against property that he owned here. It is alleged that after some considerable delay, the applicant informed another firm of solicitors in Ireland who had been instructed in the matter, that the relevant document had been lodged in its original form with the Central Office of the High Court. It is alleged by the Northern Ireland firm of solicitors that they requested the applicant on a number of occasions to furnish a letter of release to the Central Office of the High Court, so as to enable them to take up the original of the EEO. It is alleged that the applicant failed to provide such a letter and therefore they were unable to take up the original of the EEO, which their client needed in order to enforce the judgment against property owned by the judgment debtor in this jurisdiction. 

6.                  The firm of solicitors in Northern Ireland stated that despite a letter dated 18 March 2016, informing the applicant that a formal complaint would be made to the second respondent if he did not provide a letter to enable them to obtain the EEO from the Central Office, he failed to provide the requisite letter. In light of his refusal to do so, the complaint was lodged with the second respondent.

7.                   In 2017, the second respondent passed the complaint to the first respondent for its consideration. The first respondent determined that there was a prima facie case made out. They determined that it would be appropriate to hold an inquiry into the complaint against the applicant.

8.                   The first respondent encountered difficulties effecting service of the notice of inquiry and grounding documents on the applicant at his offices. The registrar of the first respondent was subsequently informed by a representative of the second respondent, that the applicant would be at a meeting of a committee of the second respondent at its offices at St. George's Court, Dublin, on 9 April 2019. The registrar of the first respondent served the notice of inquiry and grounding documents on the applicant personally at the offices of the second respondent on that date. The applicant was informed that a hearing would be held by the first respondent into the complaint on 25 June 2019. 

9.                  On 25 June 2019, when the hearing before the first respondent opened, the wife of the applicant delivered a letter to the first respondent, wherein the applicant objected to the manner in which the documents had been served upon him. The first respondent, having heard evidence on service and having considered the matter, ruled that service of the notice of inquiry and grounding documentation was valid. They ruled that the hearing would proceed. However, the first respondent adjourned the hearing to the afternoon to enable the applicant to attend the hearing. 

10.              The applicant duly appeared before the first respondent on the afternoon of 25 June 2019. He complained about the manner in which service of documents had been effected upon him. He also complained that he had not received a full set of papers. 

11.              The first respondent ruled that in view of these matters, it would adjourn the hearing of the inquiry on condition that the applicant would sign for a full set of papers, which would be given to him by a representative of the second respondent that day. On this basis, the hearing of the inquiry was adjourned to 18 July 2019. 

12.              On 15 July 2019, the applicant sought leave to apply for judicial review to seek an order of prohibition preventing the first respondent from re-commencing the inquiry. The court directed that that application should be made on notice. The application for leave on notice commenced on 16 July 2019 and was heard on 17 July 2019, but did not conclude. It was adjourned to enable the applicant to file further affidavits. In these circumstances, the first respondent did not resume the inquiry on 18 July 2019. 

13.              On 31 July 2019, the applicant sought further time to file his affidavits. The court directed that a "telescoped hearing" should take place in the matter on              19 September 2019. 

14.              On 27 August 2019, the applicant applied to vary the hearing date and sought further time to file his affidavits. The court was advised that the Chairperson of the SDT panel would be unavailable after October 2019. The applicant confirmed to the court that if unsuccessful in his application for prohibition, that he would not object to a differently constituted SDT panel hearing the inquiry. On that basis, the hearing date for the telescoped hearing of the judicial review application was vacated, and thereafter affidavits were exchanged.

15.               In February 2020, the applicant applied to file a further affidavit and the matter was adjourned for mention to 31 March 2020, with a direction that the applicant should serve his affidavit in advance. Owing to the onset of Covid 19, the judicial review proceedings were adjourned generally. 

16.              No steps were taken by the applicant to re-list the proceedings. In January 2024, the first respondent brought a motion to strike out the proceedings on grounds of delay. In an ex tempore judgment delivered on 2 May 2024, Hyland J found that the delay by the applicant from 2020, was inordinate and inexcusable; but on the balance of justice, she refused the application to strike out the proceedings. The court subsequently gave directions for the filing of opposition papers by the respondents. 

17.              In response to the statements of opposition, the applicant filed two further affidavits on 10 July 2024. These raised new matters. In particular, in the affidavit sworn by the applicant's wife, allegations of improper conduct on the part of various people at the hearing on 25 June 2019, were made for the first time. 

18.              The respondents then brought a motion to strike out the affidavit sworn by the applicant's wife, on the grounds that same contained inadmissible evidence. An order was made by the High Court on 5 November 2024, that the affidavits were admissible in evidence, but that the respondents could contradict the factual evidence put forward by the applicant's wife therein. 

19.              Following directions that had been given by Hyland J., the applicant issued his motion to amend his statement of grounds on 13 September 2024. Affidavits having been exchanged between the parties, the application to amend the statement of grounds came before this Court for determination in March 2025. 

The Challenge to the Hearing before the First Respondent held on 25 June 2019.

20.               In these judicial review proceedings, the applicant challenges the legality of the hearing held before the first respondent on 25 June 2019. The court has been furnished with a transcript of the hearing before the first respondent that day. While the essence of that hearing has been summarised above, it is necessary to set out what took place before the first respondent in a little more detail. 

21.              The hearing commenced with the taking of appearances. Ms Mary Fenelon, solicitor, appeared on behalf of the Law Society. At that point, the applicant's wife, Mrs Wales, indicated to the Tribunal that she had attended earlier in the morning for the purposes of delivering a letter. She stated that Ms Lynch, the registrar of the first respondent, had very kindly spoken to her at approximately 10.40 hours, but she was not able to help her. Ms Wales proceeded to ask the Tribunal whether they wished her to read the letter. The chairperson stated that it would suffice if she just gave a summary of what it stated. She read as follows: "It is of great importance that it is communicated to the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal that I have not received a form DT4 in relation to the above matter which is record number 2017 DT/05" . She stated that the letter was signed by her husband. 

22.              Ms Wales went on to state that while her husband was aware of the hearing before the first respondent that day, he felt that he could not attend the inquiry as if he did so, that would be deemed as being acquiesced by him in the procedural irregularities in relation to service of the documentation upon him. 

23.              The chairperson then asked Ms Fenelon for her views on the matter. She stated that as far as she was concerned, service had been validly effected on the solicitor. She stated that he was clearly aware of the hearing, as he had sent his wife to deliver a letter on his behalf. She submitted to the Tribunal that it should continue with the inquiry. Ms Wales then stated that it was her husband's view that he had not received the papers in accordance with the rules of procedure governing the Tribunal. She stated that he was unable to defend himself properly in relation to the inquiry. She stated that it was her husband's view that there were serious issues surrounding the validity of the service of documentation upon him. He was of the view that that issue would have to be determined prior to the inquiry proceeding. When asked by the chairperson as to whether the applicant was available to attend the hearing that morning, she confirmed that he was not available, as he was working in court that morning. 

24.              The first respondent then heard evidence in relation to service of the notice of inquiry and grounding documentation on the applicant. This evidence was given by Ms Mary Lynch, the registrar of the first respondent. She stated that she had been informed by Ms Fenelon, that the applicant was going to be in attendance at the offices of the second respondent at St. George's Court, Dublin on 9 April 2019. She was advised that she could serve documents on him at that address. She stated that she attended at that address on 9 April 2019 and served the letter that she had written to him, together with form DT4 and the affidavits furnished by the parties and the booklet of correspondence, which were set out in the form DT4. She stated that they were served by way of personal service on the applicant, together with a copy of the Tribunal's policy on adjournments. 

25.              The chairperson then noted that on 14 June 2019, the applicant had written to the first respondent complaining about the manner in which the documentation had been served upon him. He maintained that that service did not comply with the provisions of the rules governing inquiries before the first respondent.

26.               Having adjourned to consider this evidence and correspondence, the Tribunal stated that it was satisfied that service of form DT4 had been properly and validly effected on the applicant. They stated that they would continue with the inquiry. However, in order to give the applicant every opportunity to deal with the matter, they stated that they would adjourn the inquiry until 14.00 hours that afternoon. 

27.              When the inquiry resumed in the afternoon, the applicant was present in person. He complained about the manner in which the documents had been served on him and in particular, he complained about the conduct of the the representative of the second respondent, Ms Fenelon, who had told the registrar of the first respondent, Ms Lynch, that he was going to be at the Law Society's offices in Dublin on a particular date. He also complained that he had not received all the necessary documentation. He stated that he was not in a position to properly defend himself against the allegation of misconduct without a full set of documents. 

28.              In addressing the Tribunal, Ms Fenelon outlined how she had imparted the information to Ms Lynch as to the whereabouts of the applicant, so that Ms Lynch could affect service upon him. She stated as follows:

"I told Ms Lynch that Mr Wales, because I had been in court with Mr Wales and I knew Mr Wales had agreed to attend at the Law Society Offices on a certain date, I told Ms Lynch that he was going to be there because he had made an arrangement with me to be there. So that's where it's at. The Tribunal deals with the service, but it is the obligation of us, the prosecutors, the Society, to give the Tribunal a valid address for service."

29.               The applicant asked Ms Fenelon why she had not obtained an order for substituted service from the President of the High Court. She stated that she had not done so, because she was aware of the fact that the applicant would be at a particular address on a particular date. She had communicated that information to Ms Lynch. The applicant complained that there had been a delay on the part of the first and second respondents dealing with the complaint that had been lodged against him. He stated that there was no excuse for that delay on the part of the respondent as the prosecuting authority. He stated that he had not heard any reasonable excuse as to why it had taken two years to bring the matter to where it was at that time. The applicant went on to state that he did not have any papers. He had not been properly served with the papers. Accordingly, he stated that he was not in a position to deal with the substantive complaint against him. He stated that he had received some papers in person at the offices of the Law Society, but he had not received all the papers. 

30.              The applicant reiterated that as he had not received all the necessary papers; he was not able to engage with the complaint properly at that time. He stated that that was why he was asking for a reasonably short adjournment, either a relisting of the matter or an adjournment whichever was appropriate, in order that the issue could be dealt with. He repeated the assertion that he felt that it was not appropriate for the Law Society and the SDT to be engaging with each other around matters of service. 

31.              Having adjourned for a period to consider the issue, the chairperson ruled that they would give an adjournment of the inquiry hearing, but on condition that the applicant would sign for a full set of papers that he would be provided with that day. The chairperson stated that if the applicant was prepared to sign for the papers that he would receive that day, the hearing would be adjourned to 18 July 2019. The applicant acceded to that condition. The chairperson concluded the hearing by strongly recommending to the applicant that he would obtain legal advice and representation for when the matter resumed at hearing.

32.              The applicant's challenge to the hearing held by the first respondent on 25 June 2019, was set out in his original statement of grounds dated 12 July 2019. In that document he sought the following reliefs: an order of prohibition preventing the first respondent from continuing with the enquiry; a declaration that the respondents had acted in breach of Art. (6)(1) of the European Convention on Human Rights; a declaration that the respondents had acted in breach of the rules of natural and constitutional justice; a declaration that the first respondent had acted ultra vires the provisions of the Solicitors' Disciplinary Tribunal Rules 2017; and a declaration that the first and second respondents had acted ultra vires their role and status as statutory independent bodies. 

33.              The grounds on which these reliefs were sought can be summarised as follows: that there was excessive delay on the part of the first respondent in proceeding with the inquiry bearing record number 2017/DT05. Secondly, that the first respondent had allowed to be introduced into the enquiry and had considered a separate complaint that had been made against the applicant to the second respondent, which complaint was sub judice and was unrelated to the inquiry before the Tribunal. Thirdly, that the second respondent had brought the matter of the separate sub judice complaint to the attention of the first respondent . Fourthly that the first respondent and the second respondent had acted ultra vires by breaching their status as statutory independent bodies. Fifthly that there had been a failure by the respondents to observe the principles of natural and constitutional justice and fair procedures; and sixthly, that the first respondent had acted to make decisions that were res judicata . I t was further alleged that the first respondent had acted to restart an inquiry, which inquiry was sub judice . It was alleged that in breach of Art. 40(1) of the Irish Constitution, the respondents had failed to act in accordance with the following provision "All citizens shall as human persons be held equal before the law". 

34.              It was alleged that the respondents had acted in breach of Art. 40(3)(1) of the Constitution, which provided that the State would guarantee in its laws to respect and as far as practicable by its laws to defend and vindicate the personal rights of the citizen . Finally, it was alleged that the respondents had acted in breach of sub-article 40(3)(2) of the Constitution which stated that "The State shall in particular by its laws protect as best it may from unjust attack and in the case of injustice done vindicate the life, person, good name and property of every citizen". 

35.              In this application, the applicant seeks to amend his statement of grounds by the addition of words and sentences to some of the paragraphs in his original statement of grounds and by the addition of some entirely new grounds. Before coming to the essence of the dispute between the parties, it will be helpful to set out a brief summary of the legal principles applicable to applications to amend pleadings in judicial review proceedings. 

The Law.

36.              Order 84 of the Rules of the Superior Courts deals with judicial review matters. Order 84, r.20(4) provides for amendment by the court hearing an application for leave "on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit". Order 84, r. 23(2) provides for amendment by the court on the hearing of the motion or summons "on such terms, if any, as it thinks fit". 

37.              The test for amendment of pleadings in judicial review proceedings was set down by the Supreme Court in Keegan v Garda Siochana Ombudsman Commission [ 2012] 2 IR 570, where Fennelly J set out the relevant principles at paras. 30 et seq . At para. 32, the judge stated that it was permissible to allow an application outside the permitted time limit for challenging a decision as provided for in the rules, provided the court was persuaded that there was good reason for the delay and that no other party was adversely or unfairly prejudiced. He went on to state that once an applicant had obtained an order granting leave to apply for judicial review, he was confined to the grounds permitted. He may not argue any additional grounds without leave of the court. He stated that if a person applied for an amendment outside the time for challenging a decision, he would have to justify the application. He would have to justify his delay, just as in the case of a late applicant. He stated that the court would expect him to give reasons to explain his failure to include the new proposed ground in his original application. 

38.              The court noted that while there was no obligation on the applicant seeking to amend his statement of grounds to establish that he had only become aware of certain facts after the date on which he had submitted his original statement of grounds, that was not to say that the applicant's knowledge of the facts was irrelevant. The court noted that in some cases the discovery of new facts may be an explanation for the omission to include a ground in the original statement of grounds. In other cases, the applicant may have been aware at all relevant times of the facts relevant to the new ground and this would weigh in the balance against him being permitted to amend his pleadings, without being necessarily conclusive. 

39.              The court stated that where an application for an amendment was being made to expand the grounds for judicial review, the applicant must explain his failure to include the proposed new ground in his original application. The cases showed that the courts were reluctant to admit new grounds which amounted to advancing an entirely new cause of action. The court went on to note that an amendment may be more likely to be permitted where it did not involve a significant enlargement of the applicant's case. The court stated that it might take a different view if the new ground were likely to give rise to the further exchange of affidavits relating to the facts. 

40.              The court also emphasised that the interests of justice were of considerable importance. At para. 2 9, the judge noted that it was apparent from dicta in various cases that the court regarded the power to extend the time for the bringing of an application for judicial review of decisions as being necessary in order to cater for the interests of justice and to protect the constitutional right of access to the court. He stated that the same considerations must be relevant in the case of an application to amend grounds. 

41.              The test set down in the Keegan case has been applied in many subsequent cases. In BW v Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Ors. [2015] IEHC 725, Humphreys J in the High Court stated as follows at para. 4:

"It would appear that on the basis of Keegan, there are three elements that an applicant should address. Firstly, that the point should be arguable (paragraph 38), secondly, that there be an "explanation" for the point not having been pleaded (para 39), and thirdly, that the other party should not be unfairly prejudiced (see paragraph 32), which I consider, given the courts power to remedy any unfairness, would in practice amount to a test that he or she should not be irremediably prejudiced."

42.               While the substantive decision in the BW case in the High Court was overturned on appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the ruling made in the High Court in relation to the amendment of the statement of grounds; see 2017 IECA 296. 

43.              In Hab te v Minister for Justice [ 2019] IEHC 47, Humphreys J stated at para. 17 that the primary principal was "the interests of justice". At para. 24, he rejected the suggestion that BW could be distinguished on the basis that it was a telescoped hearing, stating "No argument was raised in BW that the test for amendment at a telescoped hearing was more generous than that in relation to a post leave hearing". 

44.              In Northwest Meath Turbine Action Group v An Bord Pleanála [2022] IECA 126, Collins J held that O.84, r.23(2) did not require that an amendment application must be approached as if it involved a late application for leave. That was the appropriate approach where a substantially new case was sought to be made. A similar statement had been made by the court in the Habte case, where Humphreys J stated as follows:

"If an amendment introduces a new evidential contest, that may be a factor against allowing it, especially if made at a late stage such as to derail a hearing and cause significant delay in finalising the proceedings. In such a case the court's assessment of the balance of justice must factor in any harm to the interests of justice by reason of such delay, but nonetheless, delay is not a bar to an amendment, and the power to amend can be exercised during the trial, after judgment is reserved, or at any time up to perfection of the final order."

45.               In Copymoore Limited v Commissioners of Public Works of Ireland [2014] IESC 63, Charlton J noted that an amendment should not be permitted without an explanation that is sufficient to tilt the balance of rights in favour of considering the proposed new ground for seeking judicial review or for opposing it. He went on to state that the interests of the common good were also relevant when considering whether to allow an amendment. He stated as follows: "I am satisfied, concepts of the public good may be relevant as being prejudiced by protracted and delayed judicial review".  

46.              Finally, the three stage test set down in Keegan and adopted in other cases, was applied by Phelan J in O'Brien v Governor of Cork Prison & Ors. [2024] IEHC 109, where she stated as follows:

"I propose to apply the three stage test identified in the case law to determine if a threshold of arguability is reached, whether there is sufficient explanation for moving the application at this stage of the proceedings, whether there is any issue of irremediable prejudice and where the balance of justice lies having due regard to the paramount interest in permitting access to the court and an effective remedy and the need for the court to determine the real issues in dispute between the parties." 

Discussion .

47.              The parties were agreed that the test set out in Keegan, as explained in subsequent case law, was the applicable test. I accept that that is the correct test to apply in this case. 

48.              I accept the submission made by counsel for the respondents that the Keegan test is applicable even where the application to amend is made in advance of a formal leave application due to it being a "telescoped" hearing. This is supported by the decisions in an BW and Habte .

49.              I also accept the submission that the court has to have regard to the fact that there is a public interest in ensuring that statutory inquiries into disciplinary matters concerning professionals are allowed to proceed in a timely manner. It is not in the interests of the common good to have such inquiries become bogged down by interminable judicial review applications that are allowed to proceed at a leisurely pace. That is not in the interests of justice. In the present case, there has been inordinate and inexcusable delay on the part of the applicant in proceeding with his judicial review proceedings. That has been found by Hyland J in her judgment of 2 May 2024. That finding is binding upon me. 

50.              In the present proceedings, there has been a large volume of affidavit evidence filed by the parties in the various applications that have been brought before the court to date. At some point there has to be an end to litigation. In particular, there has to be an end to multiple interlocutory applications, so that the substantive proceedings can proceed. It has been said in the context of criminal trials that a fair trial does not mean a perfect trial. Similarly, one can say that interlocutory applications which are designed to achieve the fair disposal of a civil trial, cannot be used to defeat that very purpose. 

51.              Bearing the relevant legal principles in mind, I turn now to consider the amendments sought to be made to the applicant's statement of grounds. I propose to deal first with the amendments sought to be made to the grounds on which relief is sought in the judicial review proceedings.

52.              Before coming to the specific amendments that are sought to be made to the statement of grounds, it should be noted that the respondents conceded that they could not argue that the amendments would cause any irremediable prejudice to them. They maintained that the amendments sought to be made did not pass the first two limbs of the Keegan test; namely, that there was an arguable point raised in the proposed amendments and secondly, that an adequate explanation had been given for the inordinate delay in seeking to amend the statement of grounds. 

53.              The amendment sought to be made to ground (2) is very extensive. It covers a number of different matters that the applicant wishes to introduce into his statement of grounds. The original version of ground (2) merely complained that the disciplinary panel conducting the inquiry, had introduced into the inquiry, and had considered, a separate complaint that had been made against the applicant to the Complaints and Client Relations Committee of the second respondent, which complaint was sub judice . The applicant said that it was unrelated to the existing inquiry. 

54.              The first amendment sought to be introduced into this ground alleged a breach of the applicant's rights under the GDPR legislation, based on the fact of a representative of the second respondent having informed the registrar of the first respondent, that the applicant would be attending at the Law Society's Offices at a particular time on a particular date; which information had been conveyed to the registrar of the first respondent for the purpose of enabling her to effect service of the notice of inquiry and grounding documentation on the applicant. 

55.              The applicant objected to the disclosure of what he alleged was his personal data to the registrar of the first respondent for the purpose of enabling her to effect service of documents on him on 9 April 2019. 

56.              The respondents object to the introduction of this material into the statement of grounds on two grounds: firstly, that the point is not arguable, as there was no disclosure of personal data from the second respondent to the first respondent in the circumstances complained of by the applicant. Secondly, they submit that this is an entirely new allegation based on facts of which the applicant was aware from 25 June 2019, or at the very latest at the end of 2019, when these facts had been deposed to in an affidavit sworn on behalf of the first respondent. They further submitted that insofar as the applicant had sought to argue that he only became aware of these facts upon receipt of the statements of opposition delivered by the respondents in 2024, that was not tenable, due to the facts that had been established in the case as to when he learnt of the information in relation to the disclosure of information from the second respondent to the first respondent for the purpose of effecting service on him. 

57.              There is considerable merit in the objection of the respondents in this regard. It difficult to argue that because one person informs another person that a third person will be at a particular place at a particular time in the future, that that constitutes the disclosure or processing of any personal data of the third person. Information of that kind is transferred routinely from per son-to-person in everyday life.

58.              It is certainly arguable that it was permissible for the representative of the second respondent to inform the first respondent that the applicant would be at the offices of the Law Society on 9 April 2019. That information was transferred to the registrar of the first respondent because she was having difficulty in effecting service of documents upon him. She had retained the services of a summons server to attend at the offices of the applicant for the purpose of serving the notice of inquiry and grounding documentation on him. However, having attended at the offices of the applicant, the summons server had been unable to effect service upon him. In these circumstances, it can be argued that it was reasonable for the second respondent to inform the first respondent that the applicant would be at their offices on a particular date, so that service could be effected. It is difficult to see how that constituted the transfer of personal data which would come within the GDPR legislation. 

59.              In addition, I find as a fact that the applicant was aware on or about 25 June 2019 of the essential facts in relation to the transfer of information leading to the service of documents upon him. This information had been set out in the evidence of Ms Lynch which had been given to the first respondent on the morning of 25 June 2019. While the applicant was not present at the morning session, his wife was present when that information was given. I am satisfied that on the balance of probabilities the applicant's wife would have informed the applicant of the evidence given by Ms Lynch to the Tribunal that morning. 

60.              Even if, for some inexplicable reason, Mrs Wales did not inform her husband of the evidence that had been given by Ms Lynch in the morning session, the applicant was present at the hearing that was held before the Tribunal on the afternoon of 25 June 2019. During that hearing, Ms Fenelon informed the Tribunal of the information that she had imparted to the registrar of the Tribunal about the attendance of the applicant at the Law Society's Offices on 9 April 2019. Her evidence in that regard, has been quoted earlier in the judgment. I find as a fact that the applicant was aware as of 25 June 2019 of the essential facts in relation to the transfer of information from Ms Fenelon to Ms Lynch for the purpose of enabling the latter to effect service on the applicant on 9 April 2019. 

61.              These facts were again brought to the attention of the applicant in the affidavit sworn on 12 December 2019 on behalf of the second respondent, wherein the deponent stated as follows:

"For the avoidance of doubt, I accept and am happy to clarify that the Society could have made an application for substituted service, such as by email. Ultimately however, being aware that the applicant would be attending a meeting at the Society, I provided this information to the Tribunal registrar to enable her to effect personal service."  

62.              The court is satisfied that the essential facts in relation to the transfer of information concerning the whereabouts of the applicant on 9 April 2019 from Ms Fenelon to Ms Lynch, were known to the applicant in June 2019 and were reiterated to him in December 2019. That being the case, there is no reason why the applicant should have delayed from the end of 2019 until September 2024 when he issued his notice of motion seeking to amend his statement of grounds.

63.              Notwithstanding these findings of fact, the case law is replete with dicta to the effect that the interests of justice is the overriding consideration when deciding if an amendment to the statement of grounds should be permitted.

64.              In this regard, there are a number of factors that are in favor of allowing the amendment sought to plead the alleged breach of GDPR legislation. First, there is the concession by the respondents that the making of the proposed amendments would not cause the respondents any irremediable prejudice.

65.              Secondly, I accept the submission made by the applicant that this is not a case of an applicant seeking to make a late amendment to his statement of grounds so as to derail a hearing date for the judicial review proceedings. There is currently no hearing date set for his substantive proceedings herein.

66.              Thirdly, I also accept the applicant's submission that the amendment in relation to the GDPR point will not require additional affidavit evidence. The facts concerning the giving of information by Ms Fenelon to Ms Lynch, have been candidly set out by Ms Lynch in her evidence to the Tribunal on the morning of 25 June 2019 and in the submission made by Ms Fenelon to the Tribunal that afternoon. The transcript is available to confirm what was said. In addition, the facts have been deposed to in the affidavit sworn on behalf of the second respondent on 12 December 2019.

67.              Thus, the issue raised is whether the admitted imparting of that information by Ms Fenelon to Ms Lynch for the purpose stated, constituted a breach of the applicant's rights under GDPR legislation. That is a question of law. It can be argued at the trial of the judicial review proceedings. Permitting the amendment, will not add to the volume of affidavit evidence in the case, nor will it mean any deferral of the hearing of the substantive judicial review proceedings, which hearing date has not yet been set.

68.              In so far as the applicant makes the allied submission, that the correspondence passing between the respondents in 2018, shows that the first respondent was aware as of that date, that it could apply to the President of the High Court for an order permitting substituted service of the notice of inquiry and grounding documentation on the applicant, and that the respondents impermissibly delayed in serving the documents until 9th April 2019; that is already covered in the delay ground pleaded in the original statement of grounds.

69.              In these circumstances, I am satisfied that it is in the interests of justice to permit the applicant to amend his statement of grounds so as to plead this aspect of his case in the fullest possible manner. Accordingly, I hold that the interests of justice lie in favour of allowing the applicant to amend ground (2) of his statement of grounds to plead the GDPR point. The court will permit the applicant to add the following to the existing ground (2): "The second named respondent acted in breach of the applicant's constitutional right to privacy and his constitutional right to his good name and reputation, and contrary to its obligations pursuant to GDPR legislation, in particular, but not exclusively, by breaching Arts 5 (b), 33 and 34 thereof, by disclosing information to the first respondent without the consent of the applicant concerning (a) the content of another complaint that had been lodged against the applicant with the second respondent; and (b) that he would be attending at the offices of the second respondent on a particular date and time." I have taken the liberty of reformulating the applicant's proposed amendment in this regard, as it was not set out with clarity in the draft amended statement of grounds.

70.              The amendment sought to be made to this ground also includes an extensive complaint in relation to the way in which the applicant's wife was allegedly treated when she attended before the first respondent on the morning of 25 June 2019. I hold that the applicant's complaints about the way in which his wife was allegedly treated by the Tribunal, is not a ground on which he can rely in his judicial review proceedings. If any cause of action arose out of the interaction between the applicant's wife and the members of the Tribunal, or its servants or agents, that cause of action was at the suit of Mrs Wales. It is not something in respect of which the applicant is entitled to maintain legal proceedings.  

71.              The proposed amendment to ground (2) also complains that Mr Anthony Watson gave information to the registrar of the first respondent, concerning another independent complaint against the applicant, in respect of which Mr Watson was the inve stigator and in respect of which he had instructed Ms Fenelon of the second respondent to make an application to the High Court. The court will not allow this amendment, as it is already pleaded in the initial portion of ground (2), which was contained in the original statement of grounds. Accordingly, it is merely repetitious of that pleading. Insofar as the applicant wishes to allege that the imparting of such information contravened his rights under GDPR legislation, that has been catered for in the amendment already allowed to ground (2) above. For these reasons, the court will not allow this portion of the proposed amendment to ground (2) of the statement of grounds. 

72.              Turning to the proposed amendments to ground (3), the court is satisfied that it is appropriate to allow these amendments to be made, as they are minor in nature and merely elaborate on what is already pleaded in the original ground (3) in the statement of grounds. 

73.              Similarly, with the amendment to ground (4) of the statement of grounds, the court will allow this amendment, as it merely clarifies to which panel of the SDT the applicant is referring to. It does not add any new ground to the existing grounds in the statement of grounds. Accordingly, this amendment is allowed.

74.              For the same reasons, the court will allow the first amendment sought to be made to ground (5) in the amended statement of grounds, as it merely clarifies the panel of the SDT to which the applicant is referring. In relation to the second portion of the amendment, this merely elaborates on what specific breach of the principles of natural and constitutional justice the applicant is referring in this ground. Accordingly, these amendments serve to clarify the pleadings in this regard and will be allowed. 

75.              The court will allow the proposed amendments that are sought to be made to ground (6), on the basis that they are merely elaborating on the existing pleading that has been set out in this ground. They make this matter more specific in the pleading, which is beneficial. Accordingly, the court will allow this amendment. 

76.              The amendment sought to be made to ground (8) is very minor. While it does not add very much, it is not of any major consequence, therefore the court will allow it. The court will also allow the amendment sought to be made to grounds (9) and (10), as the proposed amendments are in a similar vein and do not add much to the existing ground that has already been pleaded. 

77.              The ground sought to be inserted at ground (11) is totally new. However, it is in very similar terms to the existing ground (1) in the original statement of grounds which complained of delay in proceeding with the inquiry on the part of the first respondent. The proposed amended ground (11) complains of delay in dealing with the inquiry on the part of the second respondent. The court will allow this amendment, as it appears to be merely an enlargement of a ground that was already pleaded in relation to the first respondent. It would have been clear to the respondents at that time that essentially the applicant was complaining of delay the part of both respondents. 

78.              The applicant also seeks to insert a new ground (12), wherein he makes a number of complaints in relation to alleged duress and coercion by the respondents of his wife when she attended before the hearing held by the first respondent on 25 June 2019. The court refuses to allow this amendment on the basis that if there is any complaint to be made by the applicant's wife in relation to the manner in which she was treated by the respondents, or either of them, or their servants or agents, that may give rise to a cause of action which she can institute. It is not a matter that can be relied upon by the applicant in support of his own judicial review proceedings. 

79.              The proposed amendment in ground (12) also contains an allegation that the Chairperson of the first respondent looked at papers in conjunction with the prosecutor nominated by the second respondent and other members of the Tribunal panel. It is also alleged that the prosecutor of the second respondent, Ms Fenelon, and members of the second named respondent examined papers in conjunction members of the Tribunal panel and with Mr Watson. The court will not allow these amendments, because these facts were clearly known to the applicant at or immediately after the hearing held by the first respondent on 25 June 2019. It is clear that he is referring to matters that he or his wife saw or heard in the course of the hearing. Accordingly, these facts were known to him in advance of drafting his original statement of grounds. No explanation has been given for the inordinate delay in seeking to introduce these matters into the proceedings at this late stage, over five years since the date of that hearing before the first respondent. Accordingly, these amendments do not pass the test set down in the Keegan case. The court refuses to allow the amendment sought to be made by the introduction of a new ground (12) to the statement of grounds. Insofar as this may relate to the complaint that the first respondent considered a separate complaint that had been lodged against the applicant, that has already been catered for in the original version of ground (2) and in its amended version.

80.               Finally, in relation to the proposed amendment to ground (13), which is effectively the insertion of a totally new ground, the court is satisfied that the matters pleaded therein are not capable of being pleaded in a statement of grounds, as they are merely vague assertions. They do not constitute grounds on which it could be argued that an order of prohibition should be made preventing the inquiry being carried out by the first respondent. In addition, and insofar as they appear to allege misconduct on the part of the first respondent in its conduct of the inquiry hearing on 25 June 2019, the assertion that there was misconduct on the part of the first respondent appears to be based on facts that were known to the applicant at or immediately after the date of that hearing. In these circumstances, as no adequate explanation has been forthcoming from the applicant as to why he should be allowed amend his statement of grounds over five years later; the court refuses to allow the amendment that is sought to be made by the insertion of ground (13) to the statement of grounds. 

81.              I turn now to deal with the amendments which concern the additional reliefs that are sought to be introduced into the statement of grounds. The court will allow the additional relief sought to be introduced at number (6), on the basis that the court has ruled that the amendment to the statement of grounds concerning the alleged breach of GDPR legislation will be allowed. Therefore, this relief which is based on his claim in that regard, is also allowable.

82.              In relation to the relief sought to be inserted as a new relief at number (7), seeking a declaration that the first respondent and the second respondent have acted in contempt of court and in breach of confidence and in breach of administration of justice; the court refuses to allow this amendment on the basis that it is too vague. There is no good reason for its insertion into the statement of grounds. In addition, no explanation has been forthcoming as to why this relief should be inserted into the statement of grounds some five years after it was originally lodged. 

Conclusions.

83.               For the reasons set out above, the court will allow the applicant to amend his statement of grounds only in the manner indicated in this judgment. Accordingly, the proposed order of the court will be that the applicant shall be allowed to amend the following grounds in his original statement of grounds, being the amendments to the following grounds: (2) (partial amendment); (3); (4); (5); (6); (8); (9); and (10). The applicant will be permitted to insert the proposed new ground (11). The insertion of new grounds (12) and (13) will not be allowed. The additional relief sought to be inserted as relief (6) will be allowed; but the additional relief sought at (7) will not be allowed. 

84.              The court would propose that the following directions would be given by the court: amended statement of grounds to be delivered within two weeks of the date of perfection of the High Court order herein; amended statements of opposition if required, being delivered within two weeks thereafter. 

85.              As this judgment is being delivered electronically, the parties shall have three weeks within which to furnish brief written submissions of not more than 1500 words on the terms of the final order and on costs and on any other matters that may arise. 

86.               The applicant may make submissions on the suggested rewording of the amendment to ground (2) as set out in the judgment herein.

87.              The matter will be listed for mention at 10.30 hours on 16 May 2025 for the purpose of making final orders.

 

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