[2025] IEHC 270
harp graphic.
THE HIGH COURT
Record no. HP 2024 6969
Between:
KEITH DUFFY
Plaintiff
-and -
MSCL LIMITED trading as MEDICA STEM CELLS
Defendant
JUDGMENT of Ms Justice Nessa Cahill delivered on 14 May 2025
Introduction
1. These proceedings concern the use by the Defendant of the Plaintiff's image on billboards erected at various locations in the State to advertise the Defendant's business ("the Proceedings").
2. An interlocutory injunction was granted on 13 December 2024 compelling the Defendant to remove all images of, and references to, the Plaintiff in their billboard advertising campaign pending the determination of the Proceedings ("the Injunction Order").
3. It appears that the Injunction Order has now been complied with (an application for attachment and committal having been issued in the meantime). The Plaintiff's claim for damages remains to be determined.
4. The motion addressed in this judgment is the Plaintiff's motion to join an individual who was and/or is a director of the Defendant as a co-defendant to the Proceedings ("the Motion"). The Motion was opposed by the Defendant. Mr Corcoran was not on notice of, or represented at, the hearing of the Motion.
5. For the reasons set out in this judgment, I am of the view that it is appropriate to grant the relief sought by the Motion.
Background
6. The proceedings concern promotional billboards that were produced and erected by the Defendant at various locations in the State and which bear the image of the Plaintiff.
7. There will be a substantive dispute in relation to the merits of the Proceedings, as is apparent from the affidavit of Mr Pronczak. For the purpose of this Motion, the relevant facts may be briefly stated.
8. On 28 November 2024 the Plaintiff issued these proceedings seeking injunctive relief as well as damages.
9. On 2 December 2024 the plaintiff issued a motion seeking an interlocutory injunction requiring that the Defendant remove all images of, and references to, the Plaintiff in their billboard campaign, as well as related reliefs. This motion was grounded in the affidavit of the Plaintiff.
10. An order for short service of the motion was made on 2 December 2025 and the motion was served on the Defendant in accordance with that order.
11. An appearance was entered on behalf of the Defendant on 5 December 2024. When the matter was listed in the High Court on 6 December 2024 the Defendant (represented by solicitors and counsel) was given liberty to file a replying affidavit by 11 December 2024 and the injunction application was listed for hearing on 13 December 2024.
12. On 12 December 2024 an affidavit was sworn on behalf of the solicitors then on record for the Defendant stating that they had been informed that the Defendant did not wish to find a replying affidavit in the injunction application or to instruct that firm of solicitors in relation to the Proceedings. An order was made on 13 December 2024 granting liberty to the Defendant's former solicitors to come off record.
13. The injunction application was heard on 13 December 2024. There being no appearance on behalf of the Defendant and the Court being satisfied as to the service of the motion, the Court heard the injunction application and granted the Injunction Order. The Injunction Order was served on the Defendant with a penal endorsement. Attempts to serve Mr Corcoran (then registered as the sole director of the Defendant) were unsuccessful.
14. On 13 January 2025, the Defendant lodged a form with the Companies Registration Office ("CRO") to change the director from Mr Corcoran to Mr Pronzczak, with an effective date of 25 October 2024 (the Form B10).
15. A letter was sent on behalf of the Plaintiff to the Defendant on 13 January 2025. In this letter, it was noted that some, but not all, billboards with the Plaintiff's image had been removed and that this was in breach of the Injunction Order. The letter also addressed the Form B10 and referred to the difficulty in effecting service on Mr Corcoran. It is stated in the letter that the matter would be listed in the High Court on 20 January 2025 and a failure to respond would result in the instigation of enforcement proceedings. It specifically mentioned the possibility of personal liability being imposed on Mr Corcoran and other officers of the Defendant.
16. The matter was listed for mention in the High Court on 20 January 2025. There was no appearance on behalf of the Defendant. The Court directed that the Defendant respond to the letter of 13 January 2025. There was no response.
17. The matter was again listed in court on 10 February 2025. There again being no appearance on behalf of the Defendant, the Court ordered that Ciara O'Mahony, the secretary of the Defendant, attend before the High Court on Monday, 17 February 2025.
18. In his affidavit grounding this Motion, Mr Barry Powderly (a partner in the firm of solicitors acting for the Plaintiff), states that, on 17 February 2025, Ms O'Mahony (also known as Ms McCrann) appeared and informed the court that her signature was or may have been forged on the documents lodged with the CRO and that she had no function in or knowledge of the Defendant. It is said that the Court granted liberty to serve a motion seeking attachment and committal of the officers and previous officers of the Defendant.
19. On 3 March 2025, a motion was issued seeking an order under Order 44, Rule 3 of the Rules of the Superior Courts for liberty to issue an order of attachment and committal of the officers and previous officers of the Defendant, namely Mr James Corcoran, by reason of the failure to comply with the Injunction Order and in particular the failure to remove images and references to the Plaintiff from the Defendant's billboard campaign ("the Attachment and Committal Application").
20. That application was grounded on the affidavit of Mr Powderly, in which the foregoing background was set out. The affidavit includes the averment that the Defendant remains in breach of the Injunction Order and in breach of the order of 20 January 2025. It is averred that Mr Corcoran is the person who provided instructions in relation to the proceedings; that he was an officer of the Defendant since its incorporation; and that it was believed he is the person responsible for the Defendant and its failure or refusal to comply with High Court orders. It is said that Mr Corcoran is in deliberate and conscious breach of court orders; that he has ignored all correspondence; and that, despite an attempt to backdate a change in the directorship of the Defendant, it was believed that he continued to be its true director.
21. An affidavit of service of the Attachment and Committal Application was sworn by Tim Healy on 5 March 2025. He describes attending at the home address of Mr Corcoran on 4 March 2025, where he states that he encountered a blue vehicle displaying and carrying posters which contained images of the plaintiff. He said he left the following documents with an individual who identified herself as the wife of Mr Corcoran: an envelope containing, among other papers, the Injunction Order; the order of the 20 January 2025 with penal endorsement; and the Attachment and Committal Application.
22. When the matter was listed in court on 10 March 2025, a solicitor appeared on behalf of Mr Corcoran (BC Law) and the matter was adjourned to 14 March 2025.
23. An important letter was received from BC Law dated 13 March 2025 in which it was stated (a) Mr Corcoran has sought to ensure the billboards in question are taken down; (b) the solicitors were furnishing an undertaking on behalf of Mr Corcoran to procure the removal of any remaining posters or billboards; and (c) if Mr Corcoran is joined to the proceedings, an appearance would be entered.
The Motion
24. The Plaintiff issued this Motion on 14 March 2025 seeking an order pursuant to Order 15, Rule 4 of the Rules of the Superior Courts ("RSC") to join Mr James Corcoran as a co-defendant to these proceedings.
25. The Motion is grounded on the affidavit of Mr Powderly, sworn on 14 March 2025. A replying affidavit was sworn on behalf of the Defendant by Mr Adrian Pronczak on 2 April 2025.
26. Ms Ciara McCann swore an affidavit on the same date making some very significant averments, including that, when she appeared in the High Court on 17 February 2025 "I stated that my signature may have been forged... and that I knew nothing about the Defendant company and had no involvement with it".
27. She continued,
"when I appeared in court on 17 February 2025 I did not realise that I was still Company Secretary for MCSL Limited, however, I now accept that that was the position and that my digital signature was allowed to be used".
28. She states "I accordingly withdraw any assertion that I may have made to this court to the effect that my signature(s) were forged on company documentation lodged with the CRO".
29. The Motion was heard on 6 May 2025. At that hearing, both the Plaintiff and the Defendant were represented by solicitors and counsel. There was no attendance on behalf of Mr Corcoran.
Position of the Plaintiff
30. In the grounding affidavit, Mr Powderly summarises the background to the proceedings and makes a number of averments regarded Mr Corcoran. These were elaborated upon in oral submissions by counsel for the Plaintiff.
31. The factual points may be grouped as follows:
32. First, there are a number of averments regarding the status of Mr Corcoran as director of the Defendant. If it is said that Mr Corcoran was the person who provided instructions in relation to these proceedings to the solicitors previously on record for the Defendant and that he was an officer of the company since its incorporation. Mr Powderly avers that it is believed that Mr Corcoran and not Mr Pronczak is the "true director" of the Defendant and that he is in control of the Defendant.
33. Second, emphasis is placed on the form filed with the CRO for the change of director, including that it was dated 13 January 2025 but was stated to have been effective since 25 October 2024; that it was signed by Ms McCann who informed the Court she was not secretary to the Defendant and did not sign the document; and there was no evidence of a valid meeting to authorise that change. It is also pointed out in submissions on behalf of the Plaintiff that Mr Pronczak's averments that Mr Corcoran "has not had any control or involvement in the management, operations, marketing or accounts of" the Defendant raises serious questions about the management and governance of the Plaintiff.
34. The fact that Ms McCann has sworn an affidavit that directly contradicts answers she gave to the High Court is pointed to as an additional concern. It is suggested that there will be a possible or likely question of fraud and that the position of Mr Corcoran (as the co-signatory of several documents with Ms McCann) will need to be examined.
35. Third, it is said that it appears that Mr Corcoran is responsible for the breaches of the High Court orders and that he may be found to be wholly or partially liable for the unlawful and unauthorised use of the Plaintiff's image and for the breach of those orders.
36. The legal position advanced was that the threshold for joining a defendant is a low one and that all that needs to be shown is that there is a stateable, prima facie case against the intended co-defendant. The judgment of Barrett J. in Glaxo Group Limited v. Rowex Limited [2018] IEHC 648 was opened and emphasis was placed on the statements that the test is whether there is a "stateable case" against the proposed new defendant and that "a liberal approach to the joinder of proposed defendants" should be taken (¶2).
37. The position of the Plaintiff is that it is necessary for the proper prosecution of the Proceedings that Mr Corcoran be joined as a defendant to them.
38. It was said that, if Mr Corcoran was not joined as a co-defendant, there would need to be separate proceedings against him, which would then be joined or consolidated with these Proceedings. This was said not to be in the interests of the efficient conduct of litigation.
39. It was also said that, given the possible issues of fraud that may arise in respect of documents to which Mr Corcoran was a co-signatory with Ms McCrann, it was necessary that he be a party to the Proceedings.
40. A point that was made in reply was that, if Mr Corcoran had no role as a director, he acted beyond the scope of his authority and made himself answerable for damages.
Position of the Defendant
41. The factual position advanced on behalf of the Defendant in the affidavit of Mr Pronczak may be summarised as follows:
42. First, it was said and repeated that Mr Corcoran had a 24-month employment contract and "has not had any control or involvement in the management, operations, marketing or accounts of" the Defendant since 16 May 2024.
43. Second, he explains the background to the acquisition by him of the Defendant and the ownership structure. He states that he is the 100% owner of the shares of the Defendant since 24 October 2024 and that the forms for the change of director from Habiba Developments Limited to Mr Pronczak were dated 25 October 2024 (¶21).
44. Third, Mr Pronczak seeks to explain the circumstances in which the Defendant failed to comply with the Injunction Order, pointing to his own lack of familiarity with the Irish legal process and to the fact that he "gave James Corcoran responsibility for dealing with the legal proceedings" during November and December 2024. He states that Mr Corcoran then travelled to India in December (¶41). In an affidavit previously sworn by him on 27 March 2025, he had apologised for "any apparent failure by the Defendant to comply with previous Orders/Directions" (¶4).
45. Fourth, Mr Pronczak states his understanding was that Ms McCrann was at all material times in the position of company secretary and gave permission for her digital signature to be used.
46. His affidavit also addresses the merits of the underlying Proceedings, but it was accepted at the hearing that these are not matters to be resolved in this Motion.
47. In terms of the legal test, it was agreed that the threshold is a low one and that the Court has a discretion in deciding whether to join a co-defendant. However, counsel for the Defendant submitted that the application was misconceived; that there was no individual cause of action against Mr Corcoran; and that any acts of Mr Corcoran (including the location of posters at his home address) were in his capacity as employee of the Defendant. It was also said that the averments in the grounding affidavit about Mr Corcoran were speculative and did not reach the requisite threshold for his joinder as a party to the Proceedings.
48. Counsel for the Defendant referred to the failure of the Company to properly engage in the Proceedings before now, referring to the averments and explanations of Mr Pronczak in that respect, and stating that the company is now fully and properly engaged and represented in the Proceedings. It was contended that the fact that Mr Corcoran was the person dealing with the matter does not give rise to personal liability.
49. It was said that this application involves an attempt to lift the corporate veil and that the threshold for so doing was not met. Another point made by the Defendant was that the questions of corporate governance raised are not relevant to these Proceedings or this application. It was also said that there was no basis to obtain relief against Mr Corcoran.
Discussion
Interpretation of Order 15
50. Order 15, rule 4 provides as follows:
"All persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to exist, whether jointly, severally, or in the alternative. Judgment may be given against such one or more of such defendants as may be found to be liable, according to their respective liabilities, without any amendment."
51. It is firmly established that it is a matter within the discretion of the Court whether to join a defendant to existing proceedings. This was confirmed by MacMenamin J in an authority opened by the Defendant, O'Connell v. the Building and Allied Trades Union [2012] 2 IR 371 ("O'Connell"): "A court hearing such applications must always retain a discretion on the question of joinder" (¶24).
52. Order 15, rule 13 enshrines this discretion:
"... The Court may at any stage of the proceedings, either upon or without the application of either party, and on such terms as may appear to the Court to be just, order that the names of any parties improperly joined, whether as plaintiffs or as defendants, be struck out and that the names of any parties, whether plaintiffs or defendants, who ought to have been joined, or whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter, be added."
53. In O'Connell, MacMenamin J (Denham CJ and Fennelly J concurring) confirmed the low threshold imposed by Order 15:
"Order 15, r. 4 of the Rules of the Superior Courts 1986 does not provide that the plaintiff should set out all the circumstances or facts supporting his claim of a right to relief against the Federation. The rule is straightforward. Instead, it simply provides that all persons may be joined as defendants against whom the right to any relief is alleged to have existed, either jointly severally or otherwise." (¶21)
Criteria of Order 15, Rule 4
54. The first question now is whether Mr Corcoran is a person "against whom the right to any relief is alleged to have existed".
55. In this case, no statement of claim has yet been delivered (and no point has been taken in this regard by the Defendant). I would note for completeness that Order 15 does not impose any restriction or formal requirement in this respect, as noted by MacMenamin J. in O'Connell (¶23).
56. This does give rise to a situation where the asserted basis of the right to relief is yet to be pleaded. However, on the basis of the Motion as presented by the Plaintiff, there are assertions for a right to relief against Mr Corcoran based on his personal and concurrent liability for the wrongs of the Defendant (as summarised above).
57. The Defendant's counsel placed some emphasis on the finding in O'Connell that, "It is not suggested that the Director General engaged in any of these actions in his individual capacity. Accordingly, the relief if granted, should be against the Federation and not its Director General..." Counsel for the Defendant submitted that the same finding is apposite here.
58. The situation in O'Connell was that an application was made to join the Director General of the Construction Industry Federation as a defendant to proceedings in which the plaintiff challenged alleged interference with his work as a mason.
59. The High Court refused the application on the basis that the claim against the proposed co-defendant was statute-barred. The Supreme Court overturned the High Court decision, emphasising the low threshold for the joinder of a co-defendant and deciding that it was appropriate to join the Construction Industry Federation (and not its Director General) to the proceedings. The Supreme Court found that there was no suggestion that any of the acts of the Federation complained of were acts of the Director General in his personal capacity.
60. The situation is quite different here. There are several points in the grounding affidavit which are directed towards actions of Mr Corcoran in his individual capacity and clear allegations are made that Mr Corcoran is "the person responsible" for the events in question and that he was "in deliberate and conscious breach of the Orders of this Court". The very fact that the Attachment and Committal Application names, and seeks the attachment of, Mr Corcoran demonstrates that his individual role has been brought into play in these Proceedings.
61. The Defendant's position is that Mr Corcoran has a role as an employee only and that the corporate veil cannot be pierced so as to allow a claim against him personally. For two reasons, I reject this contention. First, it is not part of the Court's role on this Motion to determine the merits of the case. This is demonstrated with clarity in O'Connell, in which the Supreme Court rejected an argument that the joinder of the proposed new co-defendant should be refused on the ground it was statute-barred. The Supreme Court emphasised that there is a discretion to refuse to join a defendant if the application is futile, vexatious or similar, but that a court "should not generally enter into an inquiry" on the merits of a particular defence (the statute of limitations in that case) "on the hearing of a procedural motion seeking to join a defendant" (¶55). If there is any doubt, the defendant should be joined.
62. The second reason for rejecting the Defendant's contention is that this is a case in which questions have already arisen about the accuracy of CRO filings; the Court was told that signatures were forged on such filings; and there have been failures to comply with Court orders. The arguments relied upon by the Defendant based on the "corporate veil" and the scope of delegated responsibility of employees or directors may well be impacted by these circumstances. I make no determinations on any of these points, but they are the type of matters which can impact on questions of legal responsibility and authority. A more thorough examination of the evidence at trial will be required before any findings could be made regarding the availability of the corporate veil or related questions about the imposition of personal liability in this case.
63. In these circumstances, I am satisfied that Mr Corcoran is a person against whom a right to relief is asserted for the purposes of Order 15, rule 4.
Criteria of Order 15, Rule 13
64. The next question is whether Mr Corcoran is a person "whose presence before the Court may be necessary in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved in the cause or matter" (Order 15, rule 13).
65. These Proceedings are at early stage but there is already a significant degree of confusion as regards the management of, and decision-making within, the Defendant. This is illustrated by the following:
(a) Mr Pronczak states on affidavit that the forms for the change of director were for a change from Habiba Developments Limited to Mr Pronczak (¶21). In fact, the exhibit relied upon (Form B10) was signed on 9 January 2025 by Mr Pronczak and shows that the change in director was a change from Mr Corcoran to Mr Pronczak. Habiba Developments Limited was not (and could not have been) a director, and Mr Pronczak's averment is simply wrong.
(b) Mr Pronczak makes the same averment twice (¶10 and ¶17) that Mr Corcoran had no "control or involvement in the management, operations, marketing, or accounts of the Defendant" after 16 May 2024. However, Mr Pronczak also swears that he became director as of 25 October 2024. This creates a very real uncertainty as to (a) the role and responsibility of Mr Corcoran between 16 May 2024 and 25 October 2024 and (b) who Mr Pronczak (on behalf of the Defendant) claims was responsible for the management and control of the Defendant between May and October 2024. Notably, Mr Pronczak himself signed the Form B10 on 9 January 2025 which attested to the accuracy of the information contained therein, including that Mr Corcoran was resigning on the effective date (24 October 2024) and not in May 2024. This clashes with Mr Pronczak's affidavit.
(c) The employment contract of Mr Corcoran that is exhibited to Mr Pronczak's affidavit was executed on 28 October 2024 and states that his appointment takes effect from that date. This again is different to Mr Pronzcak's affidavit: he states the employment was for 24 months from 16 May 2024.
(d) Mr Pronczak states that "I am a Polish national and I am not aware how the court system works in Ireland" and that he consequently gave responsibility for the case to Mr Corcoran in November to December 2024, but Mr Corcoran then went to India (¶41). This is hard to marry with his averments that Mr Corcoran had no involvement in the management or operations of the Defendant at that time and raises a question about the capacity, acts and omissions of Mr Corcoran.
(e) Ms McCrann informed the High Court (Cregan J) that she was not the secretary of the Defendant and that her signature was forged, and now seeks to wholly resile from and contradict that information she gave to the High Court.
66. These inconsistencies and questions that arise from the sworn evidence and answers to Court that have been presented on the Defendant's side, are matters of concern and demonstrate real uncertainty as regards the roles and responsibilities within the Defendant at the material times. It is no part of this Court's function on this procedural motion to decide issues of fact and I cannot and do not decide whether or where any responsibility lies for the facts on which the Plaintiff seeks to rely to ground his cause of action. However, it is apparent to me that questions do arise about the decisions and management of the Defendant and that Mr Corcoran's presence as a party may be necessary to completely and effectually determine such issues.
67. For example, there may well be questions (as suggested by counsel for the Plaintiff) about the scope of Mr Corcoran's authority having been exceeded. If Mr Corcoran had no control or involvement in any management decisions at the Defendant, despite being registered as the sole director of the company, as Mr Pronczak states, that could give rise to questions of personal liability, for which Mr Corcoran's presence as a party is necessary.
68. Further, given the fact that there was a failure to comply with the Injunction Order in this jurisdiction, leading to the issue of the Attachment and Committal Application and to undertakings being offered on behalf of Mr Corcoran, questions of personal liability may well arise (particularly if the Defendant's position is that he was acting without any managerial power or remit). I accept the position of the Plaintiff that this warrants the presence of Mr Corcoran as a co-defendant.
69. One final issue with Mr Pronczak's affidavit is he refers to the withdrawal of instructions from the former solicitors for the Defendant and states "had I known that the consequence of taking this decision would lead to an ex parte injunction being granted against the Defendant company on 13 December 2024, I would never have taken it" (¶39). I raised this statement with counsel for the Defendant at the hearing, as it contains two inaccuracies (which he fairly accepted): first, the injunction was not an ex parte injunction: it was an application on notice to the Defendant, with which the Defendant was duly served. Second, the injunction was not granted because the Defendant changed solicitors: it was granted because the criteria for the grant of an injunction were met.
70. In all of the circumstances, I do not share the view of the Defendant that the corporate veil is a complete and unassailable answer to Mr Corcoran's role; that Mr Corcoran's joinder is necessarily futile; or that corporate governance questions are necessarily irrelevant to these Proceedings. Accordingly, I am of the view that the low threshold for joining Mr Corcoran has been met and no points raised by the Defendant in opposition to the Motion warrant a different decision.
Position of Mr Corcoran
71. In the letter sent by BC Law on his behalf on 13 March 2025, it was said that "if Mr Corcoran is joined, we will be in a position to enter an appearance". No opposition to that course of action was suggested on behalf of Mr Corcoran and there was no attendance by, or communication from, him in opposition to this Motion.
72. I am mindful of the statement in O'Connell that "it is important to re-emphasise that the Rules of 1986 provide a flexible method whereby the rights of plaintiffs and defendants can be protected and vindicated" (¶22). I consider that the protection of the rights of Mr Corcoran himself is a relevant factor in the particular circumstances of this Motion and that his presence may be necessary to enable questions concerning his own actions to be "effectually and completely" adjudicated upon.
73. Having reviewed the affidavit of Mr Pronczak, the Defendant appears to seek to distance itself from the role of Mr Corcoran (twice relegating him to a role with no "control or involvement in the management, operations, marketing, or accounts of the Defendant") despite Mr Corcoran having been registered as the sole director of the company until 25 October 2024. This is potentially problematic for Mr Corcoran.
74. There are also averments made which appear to lay blame on Mr Corcoran for the failure to appreciate the significance of these Proceedings or to deal with them appropriately (including the thinly veiled criticism at ¶41 that he travelled to India in December, despite having been made responsible for these proceedings).
75. I am particularly troubled that Ms McCrann was ordered to attend the High Court and furnished very serious answers in Court that she had never heard of the Defendant; had no role in that company; and that her signature on documents filed with the Companies Registration Office may have been forged. She has now sought to roundly resile from those answers given to the Court. The change in her evidence goes directly to questions about the execution of documents on behalf of the Defendant, several of which documents were co-signed by Mr Corcoran. I am of the view that her evidence, which has been given in these Proceedings, will need to be addressed further, and is likely to raise questions for Mr Corcoran in his individual capacity.
76. This is another area in which Mr Pronczak's affidavit supports the need to join Mr Corcoran: he states that Ms McCrann "has a long history of working with Mr Corcoran and his brother Sean over many years" and that Mr Corcoran had authorised her to sign his initials on company documentation. If the Defendant is seeking to attribute personal responsibility to Mr Corcoran for these matters, this indicates a further reason why his presence is necessary "in order to enable the Court effectually and completely to adjudicate upon and settle all the questions involved" in these Proceedings.
Prejudice
77. In exercising my discretion in this matter, I also have regard to the absence of any asserted prejudice to the Defendant by the joinder of Mr Corcoran.
Conclusions
78. In all of the circumstances, I am of the view that it is in the interests of all parties, Mr Corcoran included, that he be named as an individual defendant to these Proceedings. This is not a determination of the merits of any issue in the Proceedings, but rather a step that I consider to be appropriate and warranted to ensure the Proceedings are most fairly, completely and efficiently determined.
79. I therefore grant the order sought by the Plaintiff joining Mr Corcoran as a defendant to these Proceedings.
80. I am of the provisional view that the appropriate costs order is an order that the Defendant should be liable for the costs incurred by the Plaintiff in this Motion. If either party wishes to contend for a different costs' order, they may deliver a written submission of no more than 1,000 words before 20 May 2025 and I will list the matter before me at 10.45am on 22 May 2025 to hear any submissions the parties may wish to make on the question of costs and to make final orders.