APPROVED
THE HIGH COURT
JUDICIAL REVIEW
2024 1301 JR
[2025] IEHC 258
BETWEEN:
LINDA ROGERS
APPLICANT
AND
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS & ORS (No. 3)
RESPONDENTS
JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Mary Rose Gearty delivered on the 6th of May, 2025
1.1 This Applicant seeks a recommendation that she be afforded legal representation under the Legal Aid - Custody Issues Scheme ("the Scheme") in respect of a proposed judicial review. She seeks leave to apply for judicial review for over a hundred remedies in respect of a District Court criminal case which Hyland J. refused to prohibit: [2024] IEHC 316. A reserved judgment was delivered on 18th February 2025, confirming that if a solicitor instructed by the Applicant could point to an issue that had not already been litigated, and could not have been litigated, in her earlier judicial review proceedings, Rogers v Cowen & ors [2024] IEHC 474, this Court would recommend the Scheme in this case.
1.2 Thereafter, the matter was listed twice in April 2025 for submissions and no solicitor was instructed on either occasion. The Applicant argued that the judgment dated 18th February, Rogers v D.P.P. (No. 2) [2025] IEHC 94, was not a "decision" and that she was entitled to free legal aid before identifying a point. The Applicant has now contacted a solicitor but was advised that there was a fee for a consultation. The Applicant told me that she could not afford to pay this fee. She submitted that I was obliged to grant free legal aid and asked that I adjourn the case to allow this. For the reasons set out in the earlier judgment and below, I do not agree.
1.3 The Applicant referred to the situation of applicants for international protection who receive legal assistance in certain circumstances and submitted that she, as a person of low income with a JAM card, is similarly entitled to assistance. "JAM" refers to the Just A Minute card, which requests that the bearer be given extra time and space to make a request or, as in this case, to address the Court. The JAM card is a non-statutory initiative but has been supported by the Courts Service for a number of years. No medical evidence was requested as the Court was happy to afford time to the Applicant, once it was used appropriately.
1.4 The criteria for obtaining legal aid in the context of civil proceedings are set out in detail in the Civil Legal Aid Act 1995 (as amended). Eligibility is usually a matter for the Legal Aid Board. An applicant for civil legal aid must have reasonable grounds for instituting, defending, or being a party to, the relevant proceedings. The scheme also requires a consideration of the merits of the proceedings. While this may not be apparent from the form, it is the law. This ex gratia scheme is no different. It cannot be the law that all applicants must be granted the Scheme even if there is no basis for their application.
1.5 The State is entitled to distinguish between applicants for legal aid on objective grounds. Although legal aid is granted, in certain circumstances, to immigrants who seek asylum and to people who are charged with a criminal offence, due in large part to the potential effects of a court order against such an applicant, this does not mean that free legal aid must be granted to every citizen for every case imaginable. The State is entitled to regulate access to legal aid by reference to the underlying merits of the proceedings. The European Court of Justice and the European Court of Human Rights have reached similar conclusions: see Prendergast v The Legal Aid Board [2025] IEHC 257.
1.6 There is no obligation to fund litigation which has no prospect of success. More fundamentally, in this case, the Applicant seeks legal aid for her second attempt at judicial review, having failed in her initial application. The Applicant was entitled to (criminal) legal aid in the District Court in the context of the prosecution against her. She chose to challenge her conviction, by judicial review before the High Court and by an appeal to the Circuit Court. The Applicant pursued her High Court case without representation but now seeks to re-characterise the case and start again. There is no obligation on the State to fund this litigation in circumstances insofar as it attempts to undermine previous High Court decisions against her or rehearses arguments already made or arguments which could have been made in the previous case.
1.7 The Applicant submitted, again, that legal aid is means tested, and that, financially, she meets the criteria. This is so, but does not address all the other difficulties with her application as set out in my judgment in February 2025. The Applicant was entitled to legal aid in the criminal proceedings against her and could also have made this application at the outset of the first challenge she mounted to those proceedings. She did not do so. Nonetheless, I considered this application, asking if she could identify any new material that could not have been argued in that case.
1.8 The Applicant, having repeated her arguments in respect of legal aid, went on to make serious allegations about a Garda investigation against her and the subsequent District Court proceedings. But, as set out in the previous judgment, these matters have already been litigated.
1.9 The Applicant made submissions about the lack of fresh water available in the courts and garda station, she noted that the disability officer had not been in attendance on previous dates in 2024 and 2025. That officer was in attendance on the 29th April, 2025. No request was made of the officer, and it was never clear why the Applicant insisted on her presence in court. No submissions were made to support the proposition that a person with a JAM card is entitled to active assistance from the disability officer in her case and this Court makes no such finding. None of these submissions justifies re-opening this case: all this information was available when the first application for judicial review was made.
1.10 The Applicant reminded me that she seeks a stay on the criminal proceedings against her, that she requests the attendance of specific respondents for what she refers to as the "new judicial review". All of these matters were applied for, and refused, in the last case.
1.11 The Applicant has applied for the digital audio recording of numerous applications, as someone with special audio-visual needs. She seeks free transcripts, saying that requiring a payment for the DAR or a transcript is a barrier to justice. She submits that a previous judge and the company who create the transcript are making money from her but that she, the Applicant, should not have to pay. There was no evidence to support this submission of implied financial irregularity. None of these arguments affects the law which must be applied: all these matters were, or could have been, referred to in her original case. In respect of complaints about unfairness in that case, her remedy is to appeal.
1.12 The Applicant, again, seeks CCTV, custody reports and statements in respect of the original prosecution. It was argued that her application for specific respondents to attend in person is a new aspect to the case, along with complaints in respect of the financial costs of the transcripts. These are not new matters. Henderson v Henderson [1843] 3 Hare 100 and A.A. v The Medical Council [2003] IESC 70, [2003] 4 IR 302 apply. All such issues either were raised, or could have been raised, in her first case.
1.13 This application is similar, factually, to that of A.A. v The Medical Council, in which the applicant sought legal aid in a second set of proceedings against the same respondent. As the Supreme Court held, the issue of legal aid could have, and should have, been addressed in his first case.
1.14 The Applicant also relied on the Aarhus Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision-making and Access to Justice in Environmental Matters. In this regard, she referred to an alleged waste of resources, including references to forestry and plastic cups. None of this is relevant to her case. She was given a final ten minutes to argue her case and used it to read out passages from her submissions, all of which I had read in preparation for the hearing.
1.15 Although I had read these submissions in advance, the Applicant argued that she had a right to read them out in any event. This is not correct. No lawyer or litigant has an untrammelled right to present their cases in whatever manner she wishes, and the Court has a duty to manage its own procedures and resources. The Applicant claimed that her disability rights would be abused if she was not permitted to have at least an hour and a half to read her written submissions, but I do not accept this. The Applicant was given access to the courts on every occasion it was requested and was given ample time to make this second case. It is not an arguable case, and the Applicant did not add anything in verbal submissions that persuaded me to reconsider her application.
1.16 The Applicant said that she was unclear as to where she stood in respect of her leave application notwithstanding my written judgment in February 2025. She asked me not to give another written judgment in relation to her recent submissions but to give a verbal ruling instead. Whatever her reason for asking for a verbal ruling, it is appropriate to give a written judgment in the circumstances, particularly where the Applicant professes to need a JAM card. In ease of the Applicant, this judgment is in writing so that the decision is clear and so that it can be read to her, if necessary, and can be reviewed by her in her own time.
1.17 The issues raised by the Applicant have, in every significant particular, been addressed by two High Court judges. If dissatisfied, her redress is to appeal these decisions to the Court of Appeal, which the Applicant tells me she has already done. Separately, she has also appealed her convictions to the Circuit Court. The Applicant submits that she is entitled to start afresh in these proceedings, noting that the Circuit Court does not address failures of public bodies. But the issue is not the suitability of the remedy of judicial review but the fact that she has already deployed it: that case is over, and it cannot be re-litigated.
1.18 In conclusion, the Applicant is not entitled to leave to seek any relief in respect of the re-framed application as the essential points she raises either have been dealt with, or could have been dealt with, in the original judicial review proceedings. Her application must be refused as there is no arguable case for any of the reliefs sought. Consequently, and having regard to the fact that there is no prospect of success, there is no proper basis on which this court can make a recommendation that the Applicant be provided with legal aid under the Scheme.