APPROVED [2025] IEHC 172
harp graphic.
THE HIGH COURT
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPLICATION PURSUANT TO SECTIONS
50, 50A AND 50B OF PLANNING AND DEVELOPMENT ACT 2000,
AS AMENDED
2024 1348 JR
BETWEEN
DAVID REDDAN
APPLICANT
AND
AN BORD PLEANÁLA
RESPONDENT
AND
THE TRUSTEES OF NENAGH GOLF CLUB
NOTICE PARTY
JUDGEMENT of Mr Justice Nolan delivered on the 13th day of March 2025
Introduction
1. This is an application for liberty to bring judicial review proceedings against the decision of the Respondent ("the Board") to grant planning permission to the Notice Party ("the Golf Club") in relation to the construction of a roof over six driving bays on the practice ground at Nenagh Golf Club, Co Tipperary.
2. The Applicant, who relatively recently purchased lands adjacent to practice ground of the Golf Club, says that there have been multiple breaches of the Planning and Development Act of 2000 ("the 2000 Act") as amended, set out in his amended Statement of Grounds. He also challenges the decision under Article 40 of the Constitution and the ECHR, namely the right to liberty and property and the full economic value of his property, the right to safety and peaceful enjoyment of his property without interference or risk and the right to physically enjoy his property. He seeks compensation for nuisance in regard to the interference with his property. However, he has not issued any such proceedings.
Background
3. The Applicant is a long-time member of the Golf Club and was at one stage a professional golfer. The Golf Club submitted a planning application to Tipperary County Council for a roof over six driving bays at the practice area, in order to provide protection for club members from the elements.
4. The structure was designed by a local Architect. The application related only to the construction of the roofed area and did not apply to the landing area of the practice ground, which have been used continuously by members for approximately 30 years. Planning permission was granted by the local authority on the 31st of July 2023, together with increased car parking for thirty vehicles.
5. The Applicant subsequently appealed to the Board in 2023. Following on-site inspection, and the engagement of two Inspectors, it approved the grant of permission on the 5th of September 2024.
6. In his amended Statement of Grounds, he says that the Board received submissions from the Golf Club, which included matters which were not relevant and therefore, this represented a deliberate misrepresentation. He says that false statements were made by a number of parties.
7. He sought leave to bring a judicial review in September of 2024 and believes that his Statement of Grounds contain matters of public importance and have ramifications for every planning application ever submitted.
8. On the 4th of November 2024, the court (Humphreys J.) directed that the Golf Club be made a notice party to the proceedings and for the application for leave be made on notice to both the Board and the Golf club.
9. The court made further directions for an amended Statement of Grounds and an amended affidavit be filed by the Applicant with liberty to apply to both the Board and the Golf Club to file additional affidavits together with submissions. The Applicant did not file submissions but relied upon his affidavits.
The Grounds Seeking Judicial Review
10. The Applicant submits nine grounds which I will set out in detail below. Suffice to say that they relate to whether what is proposed is an authorised development, that balls from the practice area have landed on his land with what he says is increasing frequency and allegations of perjury.
The Board's General Submissions
11. The Board says the Applicant is required to demonstrate that there are "substantial grounds" for judicial review. Section 50A(3)(a) of the 2000 Act, as amended, states that the court shall not grant leave unless it is satisfied that "there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision or act concerned is invalid or ought to be quashed".
12. It relies on the views of Carroll J. in McNamara v An Bord Pleanala (No.l) [1995] 2 ILRM 125 at 130 and Order 84 Rule 20(3), that the onus is on the Applicant to prove at the leave stage that there are substantial grounds to challenge or quash the impugned decision and that remains an onus in an inter partes hearing for an application for leave on notice (see Heavey v An Bord Pleanala [2024] IEHC 480). This is such a hearing.
13. Judicial review proceedings are not an appeal of the merits of the decision but rather are to review its legality and to rectify any identified illegality. The court has no power to intervene on the merits of any decision. This must be done on affidavit. The Board says this has not happened here. It points to the helpful decision of Holland J. in Heavey as to the requirement of pleadings.
14. Notwithstanding that the Applicant is a litigant in person, that does not alter the obligation placed upon him to abide by the requirements of particularity.
15. However, the reliefs the Applicant are looking for are vague and have not been particularised nor has any significant public interest being identified. But most importantly, there was evidence before the Board dealing with every single complaint of the Applicant and therefore, there was no basis whatsoever for granting the relief sought.
The Notice Party's General Submissions
16. The Golf Club says the application is not based upon substantial grounds, is frivolous and vexatious and arises out of an animus which has developed since the Applicant bought a parcel of lands adjacent to the Golf Club's boundary in 2019. In those circumstances, it says that the Statements of Grounds do not meet the necessary legal threshold to qualify as substantial grounds. Further, they are full of unnecessary personal attacks on members of the club and their professional advisors.
17. His grounds are far-fetched, devoid of precision and generally take the form of bald statements not supported by background facts or information.
18. An example of this is his assertion that the development is for a commercial purpose. It simply involves the upgrade of the existing facilities for the exclusive benefit of the club members. Further, his allegation that stray golf balls amount to reckless endangerment contrary to law is an example of sensational and irrational claims.
19. They too rely upon the principles set out in McNamara, which was recently approved by McDonald J. in Morris v An Bord Pleanala [2020] IEHC 276.
20. In regard to the argument that the application is frivolous and vexatious, they rely upon at the decision of Feeney J. in Kenny v Trinity College Dublin and another [2011] IEHC 202 and Dunne Stores v An Bord Pleanala [2015] IEHC 716. They also argue that there has been a lack of candor in circumstances where the Applicant must set out a full and accurate picture in order to obtain discretionary relief.
The Law
21. Section 50A(2)(b) of the 2000 Act provides that the court hearing an ex parte application for leave for judicial review may decide, having regard to the issues arising, the likely impact of the proceedings on the Respondent or another party, or for other good and sufficient reason, that the application should be conducted on an inter partes basis and may adjourn the application in such terms as it may direct in order that a notice may be served on that person. That is what happened here.
22. Section 50A(3)(a) provides that the court shall not grant Section 50 leave unless it is satisfied that there are substantial grounds for contending that the decision or act concerned is invalid or ought to be quashed.
23. Order 84 Rule 20(3) of the Rules provide:-
"it shall not be sufficient for an applicant to give as any of his grounds for the purposes of paragraphs (ii) or (iii) of sub-rule (2)(a) an assertion in general terms of the ground concerned, but the applicant should state precisely each such ground, giving particulars where appropriate, and identifying in respect of each ground the facts or matters relied upon as supporting that ground."
24. In McNamara, Carroll J. set out what was meant by "substantial grounds" in the context of an application for leave. She said as follows:-
"What I have to consider is whether any of the grounds advanced by the applicant are substantial grounds for contending that the board's decision was invalid. In order for a ground to be substantial it must be reasonable, it must be arguable, it must be weighty. It must not be trivial or tenuous. However, I am not concerned with trying to ascertain what the eventual result would be I believe I should go no further than to satisfy myself that the grounds are" substantial". A ground that does not stand any chance of being sustained (for example where the point has already been decided in another case) could not be said to be substantial. I draw a distinction between the grounds and the various arguments put forward in support of those grounds. If I consider a ground, as such, to be substantial, I do not also have to say that the applicant is confined to his arguments at the next stage to those which I believe may have some merit".
25. Holland J. in Heavey helpfully summarised the principles flowing from decisions of the courts in respect of the nature of these proceedings and the requirements of the pleadings in judicial review. He said in regards to the pleadings as follows:
"Judicial review is not an appeal on the merits - it rectifies only identified legal error in the impugned decision. The pleadings must identify that legal error.
The rules of pleading in judicial review are clear and unambiguous. They are well-established, clear and mandatory. They are "stringent", allowing "little room for manoeuvre".
Both the importance of the manner in which a claim is pleaded, and the strictness with which that requirement will be enforced, have been consistently stated and restated.
The Rules of the Superior Courts are emphatic in stipulating that "no grounds shall be relied upon or any relief sought at the hearing except the grounds and relief set out in the statement".
A court decides grounds of challenge properly pleaded. Applicants are confined to their pleadings.
In pleading in judicial review, "shall not be sufficient for an applicant to give as any of his grounds ... an assertion in general terms ... the applicant should state precisely each such ground, giving particulars where appropriate, and identify in respect of each ground the facts or matters relied upon as supporting that ground": O. 84 r. 20(3) RSC;
"if on the Grounds pleaded there is genuine 'doubt, ambiguity or confusion' an Applicant in Judicial Review cannot have the benefit of it",
While exact specification of every jot and tittle of a case is an impossible standard, an applicant can only be permitted to advance at a hearing a point that is acceptably clear from the express terms of the statement of grounds, subject to the grant of any order allowing an amendment".
Litigants in Person
26. The Applicant has litigated this matter himself. There were a number of procedural anomalies in relation to how he initially presented his case, but he was allowed to submit an amended Statement of Grounds. Therefore, I do not hold against him the procedural problems that have arisen, suffice to say that I have given him a significant amount of leeway and latitude, in the manner in which he moved his application, which he has acknowledged himself, is very much in line with the views of Holland J. in Heavey, which I endorse.
27. I should also say that at all times he has been courteous to the court. It is very clear that he fully believes in the righteousness of his cause. The issue which the court has to determine is whether there is any legal merit in the context of a judicial review, to the issues which he raises. Just because somebody fervently believes in the cause they enunciate, does not mean that the decision of a body, statutorily empowered to make decisions in relation to planning, which comes to a contrary view, is legally incorrect.
The First Ground
28. The Applicant complains that the proposed landing area for the golf balls on the practice ground was not included in the site layout plans, despite him flagging this matter on a number of occasions. In particular, he says that the landing area was not outlined in red. Contours or elevations were not shown and neither was his neighboring property, dwellings or structures. He says that there is a statutory obligation to do so and that that was not abided by. In his oral argument, as opposed to his Statement of Grounds, he points to Regulation 23(1)(a) and (f) of the Planning and Development Regulations of 2001 (S.I. No. 600/2001) ("the 2001 Regulations"). He says that this has implications for every planning application that has ever been submitted, if it was the case that this be permitted, and therefore, it is clearly in the public interest that he raises it.
29. He goes on further to say that he had discussions with senior members of the Golf Club and simply wanted them to change the orientation of the driving bays so that golf balls did not go into his land, which abutted the landing zone. He says that this was ignored.
30. Mr. Brown SC for the Board makes, what could be described as, a number of technical but very relevant points in the context of the jurisprudence, namely that the grounds are not stated precisely and are inadequately particularised. Nor are the Regulations accurately referenced.
31. As far as the allegation is made that the landing area is not properly outlined in red, he says that the planning permission is not for the landing area. Further, the contours are in the elevation drawings, which accompany the application, together with the site layout plan, clearly outlined in red, all of which are exhibited. A site layout plan is also exhibited, which clearly shows the Applicant's neighbouring property, and the structures outlined on it. However, the regulations do not require that to be done.
32. Mr. Leonard BL for the Golf Club says the Applicant purchased the lands in full knowledge of the curtilage and layout of the Golf Club and its purpose, particularly in circumstances where he is such a good golfer and has been a member of the club for years. In fact, the lands where the Applicant lives are owned by a limited liability company, Color Blue Limited, but no procedural point is taken. The Applicant has complained about wayward golf balls but has never substantiated his allegations. He says that his complainants are hyperbolic and grossly exaggerated. He says the club continually tried to engage with the Applicant, but to no avail. In fact, it did change the layout of the practice area and reorientated it within its existing footprint. Further, the planning permission does not relate to the practice area. It simply relates to the driving bays.
Decision on the First Ground
33. I have had the opportunity of looking at all the planning documentation, the correspondence, the decision of the local authority and the decision of the Board. The proposed development is simply to put a roof over the golf bays, to create something that is more attractive and useful to the members, particularly during times of inclement weather. The practice ground had been in being for over 30 years, a fact which the Applicant accepts. The planning permission does not relate to the landing area, it relates to the structure over the driving bays. While the Applicant does not accept this fundamental point, I repeat the planning permission does not relate to the landing area. In those circumstances, there was no reason why the Golf Club should include it in the site layout plan outlined in red and the law does not require it to do so. Nonetheless, the papers are full of photographs, drawings and designs all including the landing area.
34. The regulation to which the Applicant referred me to is Regulation 23 of the 2001 Regulations. They do not say what the Applicant says they say. In particular, he brought me to Regulation 23(1)(a) & (f).
35. Regulation 23 is titled 'Regulations for Particulars to Accompany an Application under Article 22'. It reads as follows:
"Plans, drawings and maps accompanying a planning application in accordance with article 22 shall all be in metric scale and comply with the following requirements: site or layout plans shall be drawn to a scale(which shall be indicated thereon) of no less than 1:500 or such other scale as may be agreed with the planning authority prior to the submission of the application, the site boundary shall be clearly delineated in red, and buildings, roads, boundaries, septic tanks and percolation areas, board wells, significant tree stands and other features on, adjoining or in the vicinity of the land or structure to which the application relates shall be shown".
36. As can be seen, these regulations do not say what the Applicant says they say. There is no obligation whatsoever to highlight his property or structure or outline it in any way. Even if it did, which I have found it does not, I am satisfied that the documents which were before the Board included the Applicant's dwelling home and outlying structures which are clearly identifiable.
37. There is nothing in the papers before me which shows that the Board has been in any way remiss or has decided on this issue contrary to the law. Far from it, as will be clear from further matters which arise, the Board gave this matter very serious consideration.
38. Under no circumstances could it be said that this issue is in the public interest. It has nothing to do with the public interest. Further, the issue is not even a good issue, and therefore it could never be said to be a substantial issue, in line with the statute and the jurisprudence.
39. There is no basis in law for challenging the views of the Board, therefore I find that the Applicant has not raised any substantial issue.
The Second Ground
40. In many ways, the kernel of the Applicant's objections comes under this heading. While he did not seem to be aware of it himself, and it was only in discussion with the court that the issue became clear, it seems to be the case that the Applicant is saying that there was no planning permission for the operation that was being run in the practice area from 2018. On that basis, he says that no planning permission was ever granted, for what he calls, a commercially run driving range, where there has been no distinction made between a practice area and a commercially run driving range.
41. Again, he says that this is of significant public interest, particularly in the circumstances that Tipperary County Council seem to have applied some form of commercial rating to the operation. This, he says, gives rise to not only issues relating to the commercial rating but also insurance, liability, legal responsibility and taxable revenue. However, he does not elaborate what these issues are and the court is entirely unclear, both from the Statement of Grounds and his oral submissions, what they may be. His point seems to be that it must be a commercial operation if the County Council have applied commercial rights.
42. The Board says this ground is vague and has not been adequately particularised and nor is it supported by any evidence. It appears to relate to the merits of the decision made and does not identify any legal error in the decision or contain any substantial ground to contend that the decision is invalid or ought to be quashed.
43. The planning file clearly shows that although the proposed covered practice area is to be used by the members, it is to be used as a practice facility only and not as a commercial enterprise. The Board appointed an Inspector who carried out a site inspection in March of 2024 and prepared an Inspector's report in April 2024. Further, information was requested in relation to the planning history of the lands and having considered everything, including the second Inspector's report, described as an Inspector's addendum report, it approved the development.
44. The Golf Club says that the development is simply an additional facility for golf members during inclement weather. There are no further commercial activities going on other than those ordinary activities associated with a Golf Club. It is simply an upgrade of present facilities.
Decision on the Second Ground
45. The first issue to be addressed is whether the activity undertaken by the Golf Club from 2018 onwards could be described as being unauthorised. This matter was considered by the Board not once, but twice. On the 13th of June 2024, having considered the first Inspector's report at its meeting of that date, it decided to defer the case for consideration to a further Board meeting. The file was to be returned to the Inspector for addendum report to consider the planning history on the site, including local authority reference 512-0496, to establish whether the existing use of the site and adjacent area used as a practice area was authorised use.
46. A new Inspector then examined the matter, the old Inspector having retired. In a three-page report dated the 23rd of August 2024, he noted the planning permission was granted by the then appropriate local authority to the Golf Club in April of 1999. The red line boundary of the application site included the subject lands and the adjacent lands to the west where the practice ground is located. He noted that the master planning application clearly indicated that the subject lands were within the application site location.
47. He noted that having regard to the nature of the planning application and permission granted, it was understood that the subject site and adjacent lands would compromise part of the permitted golf course lands. He went on to identify further planning permissions granted in May of 2021 relating to a replacement septic tank with the red line boundary area which included this site, as well as another grant in 2024. Therefore, he concluded that the subject site and adjacent lands using the practice area had not been the subject of a specific grant of permission as a practice area but did compromise part of the overall authorised Golf Club lands.
48. In those circumstances, it is perfectly clear that there was planning permission for the use of the lands as a driving range.
49. The next point seems to be a point in relation to intensification. The Applicant says that what was there before, namely an informal practice area, is now a commercially run driving range. The evidence before the Board and indeed, before this court, is that the work to be undertaken is simply for the members of the club. Under no circumstances could it be regarded as some form of commercial undertaking, so as to bring it outside of the ambit of the planning permission. The actions of the local authority in relation to rates, of which there was no evidence before the Board or the court, does not change the nature of the proposed development. In those circumstances, I am fully satisfied that there was nothing wrong with the decision of the Board in the manner it applied the law.
50. I am satisfied that the development in question is simply an upgrading of present facilities. It is not run as a commercial enterprise. Under those circumstances, this could not be regarded as a substantial ground, nor is it in any way in the public interest.
The Third Ground
51. The third ground relates to the Inspector's report and in particular, paras. 3.2.4 and 3.2.12. His objection relates to what he regards as the overloading of the sewerage system. He says that the original application was fundamentally flawed and that it should not have been granted. He says that the fact that there were extra car parking spaces being sought, clearly shows that there would be more people using the driving range and that will have an impact upon the sewerage facility.
52. In his Statement of Grounds he said:
"No consideration was given to my concerns that the sewerage system had the capacity to facilitate the extra load generated by more patrons. This is linked to a comment I have made relating to the suspiciously high cancer rate on the circumferential boundary of the golf course and further to my research and correspondence with all relevant authorities including the coroner. I feel that there is a suspiciously high well below average age expectancy mortality rate on the circumferential boundary and thereabouts also this coincide with what I believe is a serious legacy environmental breaches by Nenagh Golf Club."
53. He makes these comments without any supporting evidence of any description. When challenged on this, he says that he has done a lot of his own research. He points to the Inspector's comments that the proposed development would not increase loading of the system. He says this is wrong.
54. The Board refutes the allegations. This ground has not been adequately particularised but appears to raise a merit-based argument in respect of the decision made. The Applicant has also made very serious assertions in respect of public health which is not supported by any evidence and this ground does not reach the threshold of a "substantial ground" to obtain leave to contend that the decision is invalid or ought to be quashed.
55. The Notice Party says that these comments are sensational and fear inducing and are made without a shred of scientific or medical evidence. It says the Golf Club's environmental record is excellent and that the water system of the Golf Course is sourced from a well on the grounds which is regularly tested by the County Council and found to be perfectly in order.
Decision on the Third Ground
56. The comments of the Applicant are entirely inappropriate in an application for judicial review. He has no evidence of any description to support something which on the face of it, is sensational and fear inducing. Further, how any of this could be relevant to the issue in relation to the alleged overload of the sewage system is not explained.
57. As Order 84 makes clear, it is not sufficient for an Applicant to give as any of his grounds, an assertion in general terms. The purpose of pleadings in judicial review is to challenge the decision of the Board and not make outlandish remarks aimed at damaging the reputation of the Notice Party. It simply is not something that should appear in a Statement of Grounds, without the strongest of evidence from an independent recognised and reliable source. None of that appears in this case.
58. Turning to the key issue, namely whether or not it could be said that the Board had made some legal error in failing to take into consideration matters which are simply in the opinion of the Applicant, it is clear that they made no such error. Not only did the Inspector consider the matter, but he concluded that by granting the permission for the proposed development, it would not increase the loading on the wastewater treatment system.
59. It could never be said to be a substantial issue, because in my view, it is not even an issue which can be raised on the evidence, or lack of it. It is extremely hard to see how putting a roof over a golf bay would put any significant pressure upon the sewage system. While increasing the size of the car park by thirty cars may have a minor impact upon the system, this was considered by the Inspector and the Board. Therefore, I am satisfied that the Board made no legal error in this matter such as to warrant a judicial review.
60. Therefore, I am satisfied that no substantial issue has been raised and there is no issue that could be regarded as being in the public interest arising from this point.
The Fourth Ground
61. The fourth ground is extremely difficult to ascertain from the papers and therefore, clearly runs afoul of Order 84. It seems to be linked to the second ground; namely, the Applicant's allegation that the development from 2018 onwards was unauthorised. He points to comments made by the Inspector that he wanted to refer the matter for further consideration. This, the Applicant says, shows that the Inspector must have had a doubt as to whether the original development, in the form of a practice area, was authorised. Entirely illogically, he then goes on to say that the language of the Inspector changed in regard to the proposed development. All of this is hard to understand. It certainly could not be the case that from this ground, a court could define the scope of the claim being made, as the jurisprudence dictates, far from it.
62. In his oral submissions, the Applicant says that the Inspector must have had the same concerns as he has in relation to whether the use of the area from 2018 onwards was authorised.
63. He says that since no additional information was furnished yet his description of the proposed development from a modest covered practice area to a covered practice area throughout the report, gives rise to serious suspicions which warrant a judicial review.
64. The Board says the reference to "a comment by the Inspector" has not been clearly identified. The nature of this ground has not been adequately particularised, and it is unclear what is being asserted. Nowhere does the Applicant particularise how it is asserted the Inspector was incorrect or in error and this is not supported by any evidence.
65. The Notice Party supports the submissions of the Board.
Decision on the Fourth Ground
66. I am satisfied, that the original use by the Golf Club of the practice area was authorised, as is clear from the addendum report of the second Inspector. Therefore, I see nothing sinister in the change of wording, nor do I see any statable legal ground, on the basis of a suspicion of the Applicant that the first Inspector shared his concerns. Any alleged concerns have in fact been answered by the addendum report. This is not a substantial ground. Indeed, it is not a ground of any merit whatsoever. Naturally it flows that it is not a matter of public interest.
The Fifth Ground
67. The Applicant says that the Inspector failed to consider that no expert submissions had been provided that disputed his analysis that the golf balls dispersal rate was irratic, as he suggested. He says that the considerations of the Board show a lack of understanding and research by it.
68. The Board says the ground as pleaded is difficult to follow and appears to be a merits-based argument and is not an appropriate matter for judicial review of the decision.
69. The Golf Club agrees.
Decision on the Fifth Ground
70. It is at this point that the Statement of Grounds start to become incoherent. On the face of it, it is an allegation that because the Applicant submitted his views in relation to golf ball dispersal rate and golfer characteristics of the proposed development, an error was made by the Board in failing to take into consideration that the Golf Club did not provide any expert submissions to counter his analysis.
71. In point of fact, this issue was dealt with on a number of occasions in the Inspector's report and therefore, there was ample evidence before the Board. For example, at paras. 6.33, 6.34 and 6.35 the Applicant's views are taken into consideration. The fact that he complained that golf balls were entering his property is noted and it is also noted the mitigation put forward by the Golf Club. Under the heading of health and safety considerations, again at paras. 7.42, 7.43, 7.45, 7.46 and 7.47, all these matters were considered. Therefore, it could not be said that the Board failed to take into consideration these issues.
72. He concludes his view by saying that the Board's decision shows a lack of understanding and research by it. He does not put forward any factual or legal authority to support this assertion, nor in my view can one be found. These issues were carefully considered, acknowledged and decided upon by the Board. In my view, there is no basis for challenging the decision on this ground. Since I do not believe there is an issue at all, it follows that there is not a substantial issue nor is it in the public interest.
The Sixth Ground
73. Sadly, the incoherence of the Statement of Grounds continues. He commences this issue by saying "I have to question the fact that no reference was made by the Inspector regarding a claim by X architect of the inclusion of a letter from Y trustee outlining details of all measures to appease the applicants concern." In oral submissions, it seems his point is that he believes that when the architect in correspondence referred to a letter from a trustee, the dates were inaccurate.
74. He concludes his submissions by saying that a statement from the Architect is "subordination to perjury". The Applicant says that there was no reference by the Inspector to a claim made by the architect of the inclusion of a letter from a trustee dealing with steps taken to appease him. He says this letter was not submitted and therefore, the statement of the architect is akin to perjury, since no such letter could possibly exist.
75. The Board says this ground, yet again, is insufficiently precise and unclear and does not provide adequate particulars to understand the nature of the ground. Nor is this in any way logical.
76. The Golf Club says it is entirely wrong to make unfounded allegations of perjury against members of the club and the professionals who are employed to assist it.
Decision on the Sixth Ground
77. He commences his Statement of Grounds, by saying as follows:
"I have to question the fact that no reference was made by the Inspector regarding a claim by X architect of the inclusion of a letter from X trustee outlining details of all measures to appease the applicants concern."
78. In oral submissions, it seems his point is that he believes that when the Architect, in correspondence, referred to a letter from a trustee, the dates were inaccurate. However, because he truly believes that there is some form of conspiracy taking place between all the parties, he concludes this submission by using words which are entirely inappropriate. He says that a statement from the Architect is "subordination to perjury". This legal phrase is not familiar in Irish jurisprudence. It seems to derive from either American or Scottish law and is defined as the crime of persuading or permitting a person to commit perjury in the swearing of a false oath to tell the truth in legal proceedings, whether spoken or written. When challenged, he says it was something he discovered during his online research. This sounds like something that derived from an artificial intelligence source. It has all the hallmarks of ChatGPT, or some similar AI tool.
79. This is an extremely serious allegation and I repeat, it is entirely inappropriate to utilise legal proceedings of any description to say things about other people, which would not be said in public, for fear of being sued for defamation. Indeed, I would go further to say it is entirely dishonest. Citizens are entitled to their good name, and one cannot say such things, without the strongest of evidence.
80. In point of fact, an explanation was given in regard to the date on the letter and it seems to be a mistake. I doubt very much if the Applicant will accept that, since he is set on the train of conspiracy. It is not the job of the Board to investigate conspiracies, nor is it the job of this court.
81. Legal proceedings should never be used to make totally unfounded allegations. I note that the papers include complaints to the Gardaí. It seems to me that the Applicant is utilising legal proceedings for the purposes of personal vengeance and a vendetta. To dress up an allegation of perjury by commencing the ground with the words "I have to question the fact that no reference was made by the Inspector regarding a claim of a xyz..." does not in any way excuse what is, in essence, an abuse of process.
82. The absurdity of the ground can be seen by the fact that the complaint made about the Inspector is that he did not refer to the correspondence. How could a failure by an Inspector (and consequentially the Board) be regarded as being legally flawed, if no reference was made to correspondence, which the Applicant believes is perjury. The answer is, it could not be a failure in any circumstances.
The Seventh Ground
83. The Seventh ground reads as follows:-
"Article 40.4 of the constitution of Ireland concerning David Reddan inter alios personal rights. The right to personal liberty and property, the right to safety and peaceful enjoyment of property without interference or risk. A property owner is entitled to full economic value of their property. The property owner has legal claim on those who interfere with their enjoyment. Section 13 non-fatal offences act 1997 as amended. A person shall be guilty of an offence who intentionally or recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of death or harm to another."
84. Other than making those bold assertions he says nothing else.
85. The Board says this ground as pleaded has not been adequately particularised and makes no reference to the Board's decision which the Applicant seek to impugn in the within proceedings.
86. The Notice Party agrees.
Decision on the Seventh Ground
87. This ground looks as if it is a cut and paste from some form of pseudo legal online text. The fact that it contains his name suggests to me that it is being generated by a third party or, as I indicated above, by some form of artificial intelligence tool.
88. This application is for judicial review proceedings in relation to alleged errors made by the Board. Article 40.4 has no relevance to such an application. It is not alleged that the Board was in breach of the provisions of the Constitution. It seems to be hinted that in some unspecified way, the Golf Club may be. No such proceedings have been instituted under the Constitution.
89. No evidence has been put before this court which would support any such proceedings. In my view, quoting the Constitution in these circumstances is nonsense.
90. Therefore, it is clear to me that this is not a ground at all and clearly not a substantial ground nor in any way is it in a public interest.
The Eighth Ground
91. The Applicant says that the Inspector's report is factually incorrect, where he says that there was an existing six practice areas/driving range in operation for 30 years. In his oral submissions and after a significant interaction with the court, it would seem that the purported difficulty is not in relation to the practice area, but in relation to the six bays. He says there never were any bays and therefore, the Inspector's report is wrong in this regard, thus making the whole report wrong. He points to para. 7.44 of the report. This relates to an observation that occasionally poorly hit golf balls can enter the Applicant's premises.
92. His point seems to be that the Inspector could not have referred to mitigation steps taken by the Golf Club because the letter in the Golf Club's submissions was never submitted because it did not exist. This seems to hark back to the allegation of perjury.
93. He then goes on to say that for the Golf Club to describe itself as a well-run club is "comical in the circumstances".
94. The Board says ground eight does not contain any basis to impugn the decision of the Board and has not identified any legal error.
95. The Golf Club says this is yet another example of the hyperbola and offensive language of the Applicant.
Decision on the Eighth Ground
96. The Applicant has now given up all pretense of trying to keep within the parameters of judicial review. There is sworn evidence before the court that the practice area has been in operation for 30 years. Whether it is 30 years, 35 years or 25 years is not the issue. The issue is whether the putting of a roof over a driving bay, that has been there for a very lengthy period of time, and the manner in which the Respondent granted that permission, is open to legal challenge through the courts. Nor is it in any way relevant that there may not have existed six driving bays, but instead a simple informal area from which players tee off their practice shots.
97. There is nothing in the ground before the court which could warrant review. The ground could not be said to be substantial, nor could it be said to be in the public interest.
98. Judicial review was not designed to allow an Applicant to make unnecessary and to disparaging remarks about other parties. All of this is even more bizarre in circumstances where the Applicant is a member of the Golf Club and no doubt, used the practice area.
The Ninth Ground
99. The Applicant says there was clear bias by the Inspector in relation to his findings, which he does not agree with. However, he doesn't put forward any evidence or examples of bias.
100. The Board says that there is no evidence of bias whatsoever. The Golf Club says that this is more evidence of the frivolous and vexatious manner in which the Applicant has acted.
Decision on the Ninth Ground
101. As I mentioned at the hearing, just because the Inspector does not agree with the Applicant does not mean that there has been an error of law, but more so, it does not mean that the Inspector is biased.
102. There is no evidence whatsoever that he has been biased and indeed far from there being just one Inspector there were two Inspectors. What is not clear is whether it is alleged that both Inspectors were biased. In many ways this shows up the fallacy of this argument. It is wrong that the Applicant continually repeats that people have allegedly committed criminal offences.
103. If there were no other reason for refusing the application, it would be appropriate to do so on that ground alone, so as to act as a deterrent to ensure that applicants do not make totally unfounded allegations of criminality against the Board, local authorities or notice parties and their advisors.
104. It would be very much in the public interest to refuse such relief in those circumstances, so as to send a message that they cannot come to court and make scurrilous and unfounded allegations against other people as part of a vendetta or a dispute.
Conclusion
105. It cannot be said that any of the nine grounds are reasonable, arguable or weighty. On the other hand, it could be said that they are both trivial and tenuous to quote the words of Carroll J. in McNamara.
106. The Applicant has failed to establish to any substantial issue or issues of any nature which would warrant a judicial review of the decision of the Board. I am struck by his motivation which he openly says is to try to force the Golf Club to change the orientation of its practice area. This is a practice area he has known for years, and one which he was fully aware of when he purchased his property in 2019.
107. In all the circumstances, I will refuse his application for leave to issue judicial review proceedings.