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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Z.R. v D.H. [2019] IEHC 775 (30 October 2019)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2019/2019_IEHC_775.html
Cite as: [2019] IEHC 775
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[2019] IEHC 775
THE HIGH COURT
IN THE MATTER OF THE HAGUE CONVENTION ON THE CIVIL ASPECTS OF
INTERNATIONAL CHILD ABDUCTION
AND
IN THE MATTER OF THE COUNCIL REGULATION 2201/2003
[RECORD NO. 2019/19 HLC]
BETWEEN
Z.R.
APPLICANT
AND
D.H.
RESPONDENT
Written note dated 8th October, 2019 of the ex-tempore Judgment of Ms. Justice Ní
Raifeartaigh delivered on 30th day of September, 2019
Nature of the Case
1. This is an application for the return of a child from this jurisdiction to Northern Ireland
pursuant to Article 12 of the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child
Abduction (“the Convention”) and pursuant to the provisions of Council Regulation (EC)
No. 2201/2003.
General Background
2. The subject of this application for the return of a child is a boy to whom I will refer as “L”.
His date of birth is 6th October, 2006 (I note that a slightly erroneous date of birth is set
out in the assessment report which is discussed further below). On 6th October, 2019, L
will turn 13 years of age.
3. I propose to set out only a brief background to this application. L’s parents had been
married. They separated in or about 2008, and divorced in 2018. The boy has lived with
his mother (in Northern Ireland) since his parents separated, with access exercised by his
father (although the extent of this was put in dispute by the mother). His father was, as I
understand it, for some time living in Northern Ireland but more recently has been living
in this jurisdiction; he has re-married and set up a home here. Therefore, the situation
from a practical point of view is that the boy’s mother lives in Northern Ireland with her
new partner while the boy’s father lives in the Republic of Ireland with his new wife, and a
daughter. It also appears that an older brother of L (who is not the subject of this
application) had chosen to leave Northern Ireland in 2013 when he was aged 11, and I
understand that while that child may have spent time with his father, he is currently living
with his grandmother in County Down in Northern Ireland but not with his mother.
4. The immediate cause of this application is that the child, on 24th May, 2019, went to his
father for weekend access in this jurisdiction but failed to return to Northern Ireland. The
circumstances and the reasons for his failure to return are in dispute. The father said it
was because the boy himself did not want to return for the reasons he later described to
the assessor (assessment report discussed below). His mother made an application under
the Convention for his return in June of 2019 and a special summons initiating these
proceedings issued on 1st July, 2019. After the usual exchange of affidavits, the matter
came on before me for hearing on 18th September, 2019, during the court vacation. Prior
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to the hearing, the child had been interviewed by a child psychologist (the assessor) and
a report was prepared for the Court in order to communicate the child’s own views to the
Court.
5. There are a number of factual matters in dispute in the affidavits. The first relates to the
father’s (historical) exercise of his access rights; the father asserts that he exercised
access regularly while the mother disputes this. Secondly, there are disputed issues in
relation to the payment of maintenance by the father. There are also numerous issues in
dispute concerning the circumstances leading up to 24th May, 2019, with various
allegations and counter-allegations being made on each side about why the boy did not
return and how the mother and her relatives reacted to this situation. I do not go into the
detail of all of these allegations here as this is a summary proceeding where the Court
should not enter into the detail of factual allegations unless it is necessary to do so, and
in any event, the Court is very hampered in making decisions on factual allegations in the
context of this type of proceeding, in which affidavits are prepared very speedily and the
Court has very limited evidence before it.
6. Two matters of importance and which are not in dispute are as follows. First, the child has
significant difficulties with school-learning; he has dyslexia, and requires considerable
professional support and assistance within the school system for this reason. The
applicant mother averred that she had gone to considerable lengths to secure the
appropriate supports for him in school in Northern Ireland. Secondly, he has a great love
of sports and is actively involved in training and playing rugby matches, a commitment
which requires his attendance at sporting activities several times a week.
7. That is the background and I have set it in a general way without going into detail which I
consider to be unnecessary for this decision.
Legal issues raised on behalf of respondent
8. There were four legal issues raised on behalf of the respondent at the oral hearing.
However, as I indicated at conclusion of the hearing on 18th September, 2019, it seems
to me that there is really only one core issue, and that is the issue of the child’s objection
to return. I will deal briefly with the other issues raised on behalf of the respondent first.
9. Habitual Residence - The issue of a change of habitual residence was raised on behalf of
the respondent father, but I reject that submission and conclude that the child’s habitual
residence of Northern Ireland did not change in May 2019 nor has it changed since then.
The child had always lived in Northern Ireland, including during the period since his
parents had separated (when he lived with his mother in Northern Ireland), and that was
clearly his habitual residence for a long time. When in May 2019 he stayed on in this
jurisdiction past the permitted access period and subsequently started living here, going
to school, and establishing new networks of friends and activities, there was no consent
from the mother. While the authorities in relation to the Hague Convention do emphasise
that the question of habitual residence is very much a question of fact to be decided on
the facts of each case, the authorities also indicate that a factor which militates heavily
against a change of habitual residence is the absence of consent from one parent who has
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custody rights (see in particular the discussion of Finlay Geoghegan J. in D.E. v. E.B.
[2015] IECA 104 and paras 33-4 where she states her conclusions on this point). Thus,
even if one parent (in this case, the father) had unilaterally decided that he wanted the
child’s habitual residence to change, and even if the child himself wanted the habitual
residence to change, it does not seem to me that as a matter of law it could have
changed in the circumstances of this case, given the absence of the mother’s consent and
the short period of time between the retention of the child in this jurisdiction and the
commencement of these proceedings. Accordingly, my conclusion is that Northern Ireland
is still the child’s habitual residence and that the courts of Northern Ireland alone have
jurisdiction under the Regulation to decide issues of custody and welfare in relation to the
child.
10. Acquiescence - The second issue raised was the question of whether or not the mother
had acquiesced to his retention in this jurisdiction. Again, I propose to deal only briefly
with this point. I do not accept that the mother has acquiesced in the child’s retention in
this jurisdiction within the meaning of the term “acquiescence” as explained, for example,
in decisions such as that of the Supreme Court such as K v. K [2000] 2 IR 416. The main
point relied upon in this regard by the respondent was the fact of an application which the
mother had made in a District Court in this jurisdiction on 25th June, 2019. She avers
that this was to find out where her son was and that it involved an application for a
production order; and it is also the case that she moved quickly to bring the application
under the Hague Convention. The father’s affidavit also indicates that she made plain her
disagreement with his retention of the child in this jurisdiction. It seems to me that all the
indications in this case are that the applicant mother did not acquiesce in the retention of
the child in this jurisdiction and therefore that acquiescence is not established within the
meaning of the Convention.
11. Grave Risk - A third issue raised was the “grave risk” defence under Article 13 of the
Convention. The factual foundation for this submission on behalf of the respondent
consisted of the matters raised by the boy himself when he was talking to the assessor
and (as reported by the father) what he said to his father in May 2019 which led to his
father’s retention of him in this jurisdiction. Thus, the evidential foundation before me in
respect of these allegations was hearsay, and there was no evidence which had arisen
from his previous life in Northern Ireland which corroborated the boy’s assertions. In
brief, his assertions amounted to allegations that his mother and her partner had
mistreated him, both verbally and physically. It is well-established by the authorities on
“grave risk” that the threshold for making out this defence is a high one (see for example
at their height, it does not seem to me that this threshold has been reached. The
approach of the Court, as I understand it from the authorities, is that the Court should
first consider the facts described and then consider if, even on the assumption that they
are true, the risk presented or potentially presented by those facts to the child can be
appropriately dealt with by the authorities and system of the requesting jurisdiction. Here,
we are dealing with Northern Ireland, a neighbouring jurisdiction which has a high degree
of similarity in terms of the practical services and the legal parameters as pertain in this
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jurisdiction. I have no reason to believe that, even if the allegations were true, the
authorities (including the courts in any custody application) in Northern Ireland would not
be able to respond appropriately to the allegations. I also note that the boy told the
assessor that he would be happy to visit his mother on weekends by way of access even if
he were to re-locate to this jurisdiction, and this willingness to some degree undermines
any suggestion of there being a grave risk inherent in his being returned to his mother.
Accordingly, I find that the test for establishing “grave risk” pursuant to Article 13 of the
Convention has not been met.
The Child’s Objection and Article 13 of the Convention
12. Accordingly, it seems to me that the main issue for the Court to consider is the question
of the child’s objection pursuant to Article 13 of the Convention. This issue arises because
of the views expressed by the child to the assessor, namely that he wished to continue
living with his father in this jurisdiction and not to return to live with his mother in
Northern Ireland.
13. The authorities have made it clear that when the issue of a child’s objection arises, the
Court should apply a three-pronged test; (1) has the child’s objection been “made out”?
(2) if so, is the age and maturity of the child such that it is appropriate for the Court to
take account of those objections? and (3) if the two previous questions are answered in
the affirmative, how should the discretion be exercised? The most recent authority re-
stating and discussing this three-pronged test and the various factors affecting the
usual manner in which the Court hears the voice of the child in such proceedings is by
way of an assessor’s report, which consists of a report by a child psychologist arising out
of an interview conducted with the child. Such a report was prepared in this case in the
usual manner.
14. I pause to record here that on the morning of the hearing on 18th September, 2019, I
was informed that there would be an application on behalf of the mother to admit certain
evidence which had come into being recently. This consisted of a phone
recording/transcript of a phone call in which the boy was speaking together with a letter
he was said to have written; both had been generated in the previous 24 hours. There
was, understandably, strong objection from the respondent’s counsel to the admission of
these items into evidence at this late stage. In circumstances where the admissibility of
these items would be heavily in dispute, and where there appeared to be strong views by
each parent that the other parent was seeking to influence the child, it seemed to me that
the best way to ascertain the child’s current views would be to speak to him in chambers.
This is an option to which the Court very rarely has resort, but in the circumstances which
had arisen, it seemed necessary and appropriate to do so. Accordingly, the child was
brought in on the afternoon of 18th September, 2019, and I spoke to him for
approximately 15 or 20 minutes in chambers in the presence of the Court’s Registrar. I
reported to the parties after this discussion that the views he had expressed were firm,
and that they were identical to those which he had expressed to the assessor.
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15. I turn now to the first prong of the three-pronged legal test in respect of a child’s
objection. Has an objection been “made out”? The assessor in the case was Consultant
Clinical Psychologist Anne O’Connell and she had interviewed the child on 19th August,
2019, about a month before the hearing. The child told the assessor that for a long time,
his mother and her partner had both been “nasty” to him, and he detailed various
instances of this. He reported among other things that his mother had smashed a phone
and an iPad belonging to him in a temper; that she had shouted at him; and that she had
hit him. He said that he often could not go to school on “swimming day” because he was
afraid that people would ask about the bruises on his body, and he talked about missing a
number of school days in first year. He also said he had no friends in the school in
Northern Ireland. He said that his mother’s partner often shouted abuse at him and that
when he was in Northern Ireland, he called his father and was crying on the phone
because his mother was “ nasty” to him and would not listen to his worries. He said that
he had been thinking about leaving for some time. He said he was “very happy” living in
this jurisdiction, that he liked the atmosphere in his father’s house, that he was playing
rugby for the local team, that he had made friends, and that his father had gone to his
new school to make arrangements for support and assistance for his educational
challenges. The assessor said that he expressed a “clear preference for living with his
father in [this jurisdiction]” and that he was “agreeable to visiting his mother every
second weekend but does not wish to live with her”. She said he had “clear recall for the
rows, verbal abuse, beatings, lack of school support” in Northern Ireland.
16. As I have already noted above, there was clear consistency as between what he said to
the assessor and what the child said to me in chambers about where he wanted to live. I
should perhaps add that the child did not envisage there being a suitable arrangement
living in Northern Ireland other than living with his mother; he mentioned that his
grandmother was elderly and that she lived a long way from the school.
17. Does what the boy stated about his wishes amount to a “preference” or an “objection”?
Sometimes the difference between the two can be a fine one, but fundamentally it should
not be an exercise in semantics; it seems to me that the difference between a preference
and an objection is not so much about the type of words the child uses to the assessor
but rather about the strength of the child’s views. At one end of the spectrum, a child
might have a fairly mild view that he or she does not wish to return, which would amount
only to a preference, while at the other end of the spectrum, the child might have a very
strong view that he or she does not wish to return, which could properly be described as
an objection. The Court’s focus should be on ascertaining the true will and desire of the
child (and the strength or firmness of that desire) and should not become unduly fixated
on the actual words used, because this could become an exercise in semantics which
might focus too much on the words the child used. A child does not speak with the Hague
Convention terminology in mind but rather is using language appropriate to his age,
intellectual ability, articulacy and so on. Bearing all of that in mind, it seems to me that
what was expressed by the child in this case did amount to an objection, and therefore I
am satisfied that the first prong of the legal test has been satisfied; the child does have
an objection to returning to Northern Ireland.
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18. I hasten to add that I am not thereby making any findings of fact about the alleged
treatment of the boy by his mother and her partner. I do not have sufficient information
before me to make that decision, but it is the case that the reason the child gave for not
wanting to return and the conclusion he had reached in that regard were inextricably
linked in the manner he put forward his views. Also, in the child’s mind, returning to
Northern Ireland was inescapably and inextricably linked with returning to his mother and
he did not believe there was any realistic alternative living arrangement in Northern
Ireland that would work in practical terms. While I have limited evidence on that matter, I
am not satisfied that there is in fact an obvious alternative to living with his mother such
that the connection between return to Northern Ireland and returning to his mother’s
house is displaced.
19. Turning to the second prong of the test, concerning the age and maturity of the child, the
first thing to note is his chronological age. On the one hand, he is not a small child, he is
actually of secondary school-age now; on the other hand, he is not an older teenage
child, he is not a 16 or 17-year-old on the cusp of adulthood. In terms of his
development, I note first of all the views of the assessor. She pointed out that a full
psychoeducational assessment was not possible within the interview she conducted. She
indicated that he related well and cooperated fully, and I pause to add that this was my
experience of him also. Overall, having conducted some limited tests, she concluded his
intellectual ability was well within the average range although she noted that he had a
“significant specific learning difficulty”, which tallied with what I was told on affidavit,
namely that he has dyslexia and that this is a very significant matter in the context of his
education.
20. She went to make the following comment, which was of particular interest to the Court:
“L presents as a teen who is younger than his years and who is somewhat detached from
his feelings. This stunting of emotional growth and inability to express himself is often
seen in children who have been subject to prolonged abuse. He reports a limited capacity
to concentrate on schoolwork at home because of rows and fear of getting in trouble and
has in my opinion developed a pattern of coping by withdrawing into his inner world.” I
note that passage with some concern. However, as I have stated, I am mindful of not
drawing inferences about facts on the limited information before the Court, but it is a note
in the report of a professional psychologist and it does cause me some concern. I also
note the reference in the passage to L being a teen who is “younger than his years”,
which is relevant when considering his maturity for present purposes.
21. As to whether the child had been influenced in his views, the assessor said: “The
language L used, the detail of remembered events and the lack of evidence of any
coercion or rehearsal of stories leads me to believe that these are his own views.” That
was also my own impression; I am obviously much less expert then the psychologist, but
it is of comfort to me to note that my own impression was consistent with what the
assessor said, namely that he seemed to express his views in a way that suggested to me
they were genuinely his own and that he used language and descriptions very
spontaneously to express these views.
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22. The assessor concluded: “L was clear that he would be unhappy living his mother and
believes that the treatment given to him was unfair and unwarranted, he believes a better
life is possible for him in [a location in this jurisdiction] with his father.” She went on to
say that if the necessary learning supports were put in place in his new school, she saw
no reason why he would not settle into this family grouping, by which she meant the
father and his new wife and the child’s stepsister.
23. Taking into account the above, including and notwithstanding the fact that the assessor
cautioned that L presents as younger than his 13 years, my conclusion on the second
prong of the test is that L is of an age and maturity where his views should be given a
good deal of weight, and that he has not been influenced in those views by his father (or
indeed his brother) and that the views are authentically his own.
24. The third prong of the test deals with the discretion of the Court and this is where matters
become extremely difficult for a trial judge in these situations. The authorities are very
clear on the matters to be taken into account, and I refer again to to the most recent
clearly laid out for how the Court should approach the issue of discretion. There is no
presumptive approach; the child’s objection does not presumptively suggest a non-return,
even if the Court has found that he has expressed an objection that is authentically his
own. The matter is much more complex than that. There are, for example, the policies
underlying the Convention and in particular the policy of deterrence, with respect to the
removal or (as in this case) retention of children in jurisdictions other than that of their
habitual residence. There is also the very important policy that the court of the habitual
residence of the child should make decisions about where the child should live and other
matters relating to the child’s welfare. These policies must be taken into account. There is
also the question of the time-frame within which the matter has arisen, and in this case I
note that the retention date was May 2019, and that the case came before the Court by
way of special summons dated the 1 July 2019; therefore this is a case of a recent
retention of the child (bearing in mind the comment of Finlay Geoghegan J. in MS v. AR
that “the further one is from a prompt return, the less weighty the general Convention
policies will be”). The situation and the proceedings started at the end of one school year,
although we have already started into a new school year and to my mind, that is also a
significant fact when one is dealing with a 13-year old child in secondary school.
25. There are, in addition to those general policies of the Convention and how they play out in
this particular case, features peculiar to the individual case. In this case, an important
consideration is the child’s educational challenge by reason of his dyslexia. However,
there is very limited evidence before the Court in this regard; there is some evidence of
what had been recommended for him in the Northern Ireland by way of a report, together
with evidence from the affidavit of the mother as to what she had done to get measures
put in place for her son in Northern Ireland. There was little evidence as to what was in
place in the boy’s school in this jurisdiction, other than an email indicating that the two
school principals had been in touch with each other. The child also mentioned to me in
chambers that he was happy with the current arrangements for him in school in this
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jurisdiction. The limited nature of the evidence is not the fault of any of the parties and
arises primarily from the summary nature of the proceedings.
26. I was also conscious of the necessarily limited nature of the evidence before the Court
concerning any potential living arrangements other than living with his mother, should he
be returned to Northern Ireland. I have a general sense that if he were live with his
grandmother this might not be ideal because she is elderly and that she does not live
close to the school.
27. I am also conscious that L is a child who is very enthusiastic about sports, that he is very
skilled at it, that it is an extremely important focus in his life currently and perhaps will be
a lifelong passion. He currently seems to have settled into training and making friends
through his involvement in this sport in this jurisdiction.
28. I am also taking into account the proximity of Northern Ireland to the location where the
child is currently living in this jurisdiction, which would make potential access on either
side relatively easy - at least from a geographical point of view (if not from the personal
point of view, given the friction between the two sides evident from the affidavits). Of
course, there are no language issues either, unlike some cases, where a child is having to
adjust to living and schooling in a different language (e.g. Polish or Lithuanian to English).
29. The exercise of the discretion in this case is very difficult and the considerations on both
sides are finely balanced. On the one hand, I have a 13-year-old child who in recent times
has been expressing very emphatic views about where he wants to live (i.e. with his
father in this jurisdiction) and I am conscious that he appears to have now settled
contentedly into school and sporting arrangements in this jurisdiction albeit that it is early
in the school year; and, quite separately, I am somewhat concerned at the contents of
the passage I noted above from the assessment report which suggested that the child’s
presentation was consistent with his having suffered “prolonged abuse”. On the other
hand, I have the Convention policy considerations including the deterrence of unlawful
removals and retentions, and I am very aware of the fact that a court of habitual
residence should be making, and is better placed to make, decisions about the child’s
future with the benefit of full information about matters relevant to the child’s welfare. I
am also conscious that despite the child’s firmness of views, he is only 13 and cannot
have a long-term perspective in relation to his own future.
30. Also, because this is a case involving Northern Ireland, Article 11 (6)-(8) of Council
Regulation (EC) No. 2201/2003 comes into play. This means that if I were to decide not
to return him to Northern Ireland, the question of his long-term custody and welfare will
go back to the courts Northern Ireland in any event under the procedure laid down in
those sub-sections. In other words, if I make an order for non-return, the papers are sent
to the Northern Ireland authorities and the parties are invited to make application to the
Northern Ireland courts to rule on questions of welfare and custody into the future.
31. In the first instance, two options therefore present themselves. Option A is to make an
order for non-return; the child would stay here, the papers would go to Northern Ireland
Page 9 ⇓
under the Article 11(6) procedure, and then (upon the request of either or both of the
parents), the Northern Ireland courts would take seisin of the custody/welfare issues and
decide whether the boy stays here or returns there in the longer term, but in the
meantime he would continue to live in this jurisdiction until that decision is made. Option
B is that I make an order for his return to Northern Ireland, and the Northern Ireland
courts would again ultimately decide upon the longer-term custody and access issues
(and no doubt his father will make an application for custody and relocation), but the
difference would be that the child would have to move to Northern Ireland in the
meantime. In the latter case, the move to Northern Ireland for the child pending a
decision from the Northern Ireland court would be an unnecessary disruption if a Northern
Ireland court were ultimately to decide that the boy should be allowed to live with his
father in this jurisdiction.
32. A further option was put forward by counsel on behalf of the applicant mother. She
suggested that, if I were inclined to the view that the boy should stay in this jurisdiction
in the short-term while proceedings in Northern Ireland were initiated, I could adopt a
slightly different approach and that instead of making an order of non-return pursuant to
Article 13 of the Convention, I could instead make an order for his return but put a stay
on the return order, which would be another mechanism pursuant to which the child could
stay in this jurisdiction in the short-term until a Northern Ireland court (the court of his
habitual residence) has an opportunity to address his living arrangements for the longer
term.
Conclusion
33. The most important decision I have reached on the basis of the evidence and information
before me is that, in view of the various matters outlined in the first half of paragraph 29
above, the child should stay in this jurisdiction in the short-term until a Northern Ireland
court is seized of the appropriate application which would enable it, the court of the
jurisdiction of the child’s habitual residence, to determine the issues of custody and his
place of residence.
34. Following from that conclusion, the decision to be made then reduced itself into whether I
should (a) make an order of non-return under Article 13 of the Convention based on the
child’s objection, or (b) make an order for return with a stay upon it of a sufficient length
to enable proceedings to be initiated in Northern Ireland. I have decided to follow the
latter course and propose to make an order that the child be returned with a stay upon
the order of 14 days upon the undertaking of the father to initiate proceedings in
Northern Ireland within that time. On 14th October, 2019, I will re-visit the issue of the
whether the stay should be continued for a further period of time or not.
35. There does not appear to me to be any bar to the Northern Ireland court dealing with
issues of custody and welfare relating to the child upon the application of either or both
parents during the period of the stay on my order notwithstanding that this Court has
before it an application pursuant to the Hague Convention; on the contrary, the Northern
Ireland court is the only court with jurisdiction to deal with matters of custody and
welfare because it is the court of the child’s habitual residence. As I have determined that
Page 10 ⇓
the boy’s habitual residence did not shift in or since May 2019, the courts in this
jurisdiction have no power or entitlement to decide issues of custody and welfare relating
to the child and I certainly do not purport to do so now or in the future. The present
proceedings were brought under the Hague Convention and the application did not (nor
could it) request the Court to conduct a custody/welfare hearing in respect of the child.
Rather, I have determined that, having regard to the considerations appropriate to a
Hague Convention application, the appropriate order should be a return order so that
decisions on custody should be taken by the court of habitual residence (Northern
Ireland), but (unusually) I wish to place a stay on that order because of the child’s
objections, the contents of the assessor’s report and the fact that he has settled into
educational and sporting arrangements in a new school year, all of which suggest to me
that it would be better if the child’s living arrangements could be held in a status quo for
a very short period while proceedings are initiated in Northern Ireland and the decision-
making power in respect of custody starts to be exercised by those courts. This
mechanism (a return order coupled with a short stay) is a procedure which has been
employed by this Court on previous occasions without difficulty, although it is fair also to
say that it is employed only in rare cases; usually where the child has expressed a desire
to stay in this jurisdiction and it is considered likely that the court of the country of
habitual residence may be in a position to take seisin of custody/welfare/relocation issues
in early course, and where having regard to all the factors in the case it is felt by the
Court that the child’s living arrangements should not be unduly disrupted pending a
decision on custody/relocation from the court of habitual residence.
36. I can only express the earnest hope that the Northern Ireland courts will facilitate the
initiation of proceedings relating to the custody of the child as soon as possible so that
this Court can bring the stay on the return order to an end in early course. I hope to
dove-tail the length of the stay upon the return order with the timetabling of the Northern
Ireland proceedings in such a manner that the stay ends on the same day that a Northern
Ireland court makes a decision on the child’s living arrangements, even if only on an
interim basis pending a full custody and welfare hearing in Northern Ireland. My intention
is to ensure that medium-and long-term decisions on the child’s living arrangements
should be made by the courts of Northern Ireland, being the only courts with jurisdiction
in this regard, and that a very short-term status quo in terms of the child’s living
arrangements is preserved by my stay on the return order in order to avoid any
(potentially) unnecessary disruption to the child himself, whose best interests must
always be the Court’s guiding consideration.
Result: Order for return made with stay placed on it