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Cite as: [2019] IEHC 664
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THE HIGH COURT
[2019] IEHC 664
2018 No. 4803 P.
BETWEEN
MAJELLA RIPPINGTON
PLAINTIFF
AND
IRELAND AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
PRINCIPAL PROBATE REGISTRY
THE LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND
MURRAY FLYNN MAGUIRE SOLICITORS
SIGHLE DUFFY
ANNE STEPHENSON
(PRACTISING UNDER THE STYLE AND TITLE OF STEPHENSON SOLICITORS)
PETER MAGUIRE
DOMINIC HUSSEY
RITA CONSIDINE
DEFENDANTS
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Garrett Simons delivered on 11 October 2019.
INTRODUCTION
1. This judgment addresses the question of where the liability to pay the costs of the within
proceedings should fall. A number of the defendants had previously brought an
application to have the proceedings as against them struck out on the basis that same
represented an abuse of process and/or were frivolous and vexatious. This application
was determined in favour of those defendants for the reasons set out in a written
judgment”).
2. The successful defendants have since applied for orders directing that the plaintiff do pay
the costs of, and incidental to, the proceedings. Those defendants have also applied to
have the court measure the costs itself, i.e. to order that a sum in gross be paid in lieu of
taxed costs pursuant to Order 99, rule 5 of the Rules of the Superior Courts.
3. The plaintiff, Ms Rippington, who appears as a litigant in person, opposes the application.
Ms Rippington filed (amended) written legal submissions in the Central Office of the High
Court on 29 July 2019. Ms Rippington also made oral submissions to the court at the
hearing on Tuesday, 30 July 2019.
4. Ms Rippington indicated an intention to appeal any costs order which might be made
against her to the Court of Appeal. To this end, Ms Rippington requested that judgment
on the costs application not be delivered during the course of the legal vacation, and that
it instead be deferred to a date early in the new legal term. Ms Rippington explained that
she has previously had difficulty in lodging appeal papers during the course of the legal
vacation. I acceded to this request, and indicated to Ms Rippington at the end of the
hearing on 30 July 2019 that judgment would be delivered on today’s date (11 October
2019).
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5. The determination of the application before the court requires consideration, in sequence,
of the following three issues. First, it is necessary to determine where the liability for
costs should fall. Secondly, in the event that it is determined that Ms Rippington is liable,
it will then be necessary to consider the defendants’ request that the court should
measure the costs itself, i.e. as opposed to leaving the costs to be taxed (measured) by
the Taxing Master of the High Court in the ordinary way. Thirdly, in the event that it is
determined that the court should measure the costs, it will be necessary to carry out that
exercise.
(1). LIABILITY FOR COSTS
6. The ordinary rule is that costs follow the event, i.e. an order for costs is usually made in
favour of the successful party as against the unsuccessful party. This is expressly
provided for under Order 99, rule 1 of the Rules of the Superior Courts (as amended) as
follows.
“(1) The costs of and incidental to every proceeding in the Superior Courts shall be in
the discretion of those Courts respectively.
[…]
(4) Subject to sub-rule (4A), the costs of every issue of fact or law raised upon a claim
or counterclaim shall, unless otherwise ordered, follow the event.”
*Emphasis (italics) not in the original.
7. As appears, a court retains discretion to make a different order in respect of costs. The
judgment of the Supreme Court in Dunne v. Minister for Environment (No. 2) [2008] 2
I.R. 775, [27] confirms that where a court departs from the normal rule as to costs, it is
not completely at large but must do so on a reasoned basis, indicating the factors which,
in the circumstances of the case, warrant such a departure.
8. The Supreme Court has more recently confirmed in its judgment in Godsil v. Ireland
[2015] IESC 103; [2015] 4 IR 535 that the general rule that costs follow the event
represents the start point for any application.
“[52] The overriding start point on any question of contested costs is that the general
principle applies; namely, that costs follow the event. All of the other rules,
practices and approaches are supplementary to this principle and are designed to
further its application or to meet situations where such application is difficult,
complex or, indeed, even impossible.
[53] For the rule to apply quite evidently there must be an ‘event(s)’, which is capable of
identification. In most cases that will not cause a difficulty, but in some it might.
There may be situations which, it can be said, involve numerous issues, sometimes
discrete and sometimes inter-related. Veolia Water UK plc v. Fingal County Council
(No. 2) [2006] IEHC 240, [2007] 2 IR 81 gives assistance in this regard. When a
multiple issue case requires assessment in light of the decision, the courts in more
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recent times have become more discerning and nuanced in their approach,
sometimes awarding less than full costs and sometimes determining costs relative
to issues which have been won or lost as the case may be. Such an approach, as
well as perhaps being fairer, can also be considered as part of the court's function
to regulate, in an expeditious and cost effective manner, complex litigation which
ever increasingly now appears before it. Care, however, must be taken: not all
cases will be suitable for such analysis and even when applied, the overall picture
must not be lost sight of.”
9. On the facts of the present case, the “event” has been decided unequivocally in favour of
the defendants. The application to strike out the proceedings was successful. Moreover,
the related application, which some of the defendants had brought, for orders restraining
Ms Rippington from instituting further proceedings against them without the leave of the
President of the High Court (or a judge nominated by him) was also successful.
10. Ms Rippington has not sought to suggest that the “event” has been decided in her favour.
Nor does she suggest that this is a case where the opposing side succeeded in only some
of their arguments, with the consequence that an apportionment of costs should be made
Rather, the content of Ms Rippington’s submissions—both written and oral—is
directed to the underlying merits of the application to strike out the proceedings. Ms
Rippington submits that no order for costs should be made pending an inquiry by a jury
into what she perceives as wrongdoing in the administration of the estate of her deceased
sister, Celine Murphy.
11. With respect, Ms Rippington is not entitled to use the occasion of an application for costs
to seek, in effect, to re-agitate the very issues which have been determined by the
principal judgment. The High Court has ruled on the application to strike out the
proceedings, and the only issue which remains outstanding before this court is the issue
of costs. For the reasons set out in detail in the principal judgment, this court has
concluded that the proceedings should be struck out in circumstances where they (i)
disclose no cause of action, (ii) are frivolous and vexatious, and (iii) represent an abuse of
process.
12. Ms Rippington will, if she so chooses, have an opportunity to challenge these findings by
way of an appeal to the Court of Appeal. For the purposes of this costs application,
however, this court proceeds on the basis that these findings are correct. The nature of
these findings gives an added impetus to applying the general rule, i.e. that costs follow
the event, in this case. One of the objectives of costs orders is to regulate litigation by
ensuring that it is carried out fairly, reasonably and in proportion to the matters in issue.
The jurisdiction to make costs orders provides a mechanism to the courts to dissuade
litigation which represents an abuse of process.
13. These principles have been set out with admirable clarity as follows by the Supreme
Court, per McKechnie J., in Godsil v. Ireland (cited above).
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“Costs in our legal system
[19] Inter partes litigation for those unaided is, or can be, costly: certainly it
carries with it that risk. It is therefore essential in furtherance of the high
constitutional right of effective access to the courts on the one hand and the
high constitutional right to defend oneself, having been brought there, on the
other hand, that our legal system makes provision for costs orders. This is
also essential as a safeguarding tool so as to regulate litigation, and the
conduct and process thereof, by ensuring that it is carried on fairly,
reasonably and in proportion to the matters in issue. Whilst the importance
of such orders is therefore clearly self-evident, nevertheless some
observations in that regard, even at a general level, are still worth noting.
[20] A party who institutes proceedings in order to establish rights or assert
entitlements, which are neither conceded nor compromised, is entitled to an
expectation that he will, if successful, not have to suffer costs in so doing. At
first, indeed at every level of principle, it would seem unjust if that were not
so but, it is, with the ‘costs follow the event’ rule, designed for this purpose.
A defendant’s position is in principle no different: if the advanced claim is one
of merit to which he has no answer, then the point should be conceded: thus
in that way he has significant control over the legal process, including over
court participation or attendance. If, however, he should contest an
unmeritorious point, the consequences are his to suffer. On the other hand,
if he successfully defeats a claim and thereby has been justified in the stance
adopted, it would likewise be unjust for him to have to suffer any financial
burden by so doing. So, the rule applies to a defendant as it applies to a
plaintiff.
[…]
[22] There is a second justification, again at the level of principle, for this
is that, in the absence of such a mechanism, both the bringing and defending
of proceedings could be used for abusive purposes. In effect, the financial
weight of a litigant could determine the extent to which, if at all, a particular
claim or defence could be pursued, and, certainly in some circumstances,
could exercise an overly controlling influence on the process. Such of course
would be inimicable to justice and could seriously disable the judicial role, as
ultimately issues which should be determined may never even reach the
point of adjudication. This would be highly undesirable. Accordingly, it is
crucial to have such a means available so that the court, where appropriate,
can dissuade, and if necessary even punish, exploitative conduct and
unprincipled parties.”
14. I turn next to apply these principles to the facts of the present case. This court has found
in the principal judgment that the within proceedings represent an abuse of process. Not
only that, this court has also found that Ms Rippington has been engaged in a relentless
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campaign to set aside a procedural order made by the High Court (O’Neill J.) on 23 July
2012 in earlier proceedings, Rippington & Ors. v. Cox & Anor. (High Court 2011 No. 8319
P). This campaign represents an abuse of process and has put the defendants to the
unnecessary expense of having to respond to multiple sets of proceedings, all of which
are unmeritorious. This court has already found, as part of the principal judgment, that
the abuse of process is sufficiently serious to warrant the making of an order restraining
Ms Rippington from taking any further proceedings against the defendants (without leave
of the court). (Restraining orders of this type are often referred to as an Isaac Wunder
order).
15. In all of the circumstances, the making of a costs order against Ms Rippington is
necessary in order to protect the integrity of the court process and to ensure a just result
for the defendants. No one is entitled to engage in an abuse of process on this scale with
impunity. Having put the defendants to further needless expense by the issuing of the
within proceedings, Ms Rippington must suffer the consequence of a costs order requiring
her to pay their costs.
(2). SHOULD THE HIGH COURT MEASURE COSTS IN GROSS
16. The general approach which the High Court takes to costs orders is to confine itself to
determining which party should bear the costs, and to leave over the measurement of the
quantum of those costs to the Taxing Master of the High Court. In some instances, the
High Court will provide instructions as to the extent to which costs are to be recovered,
e.g. the court might direct that certain costs are to be disallowed, or might direct that a
party only recover a specified percentage of its costs. The detailed quantification of those
costs is then left to the Taxing Master.
17. The High Court does, however, retain jurisdiction to measure costs itself. More
specifically, Order 99, rule 5 provides that in awarding costs the court may direct that a
sum in gross be paid in lieu of taxed costs. The language used under the rule suggests
that there is a distinction between the exercise to be carried out by the High Court in
measuring costs itself, and that which would be carried out by the Taxing Master of the
High Court. The fact that a “sum in gross” is to be paid “in lieu of” taxed costs suggests
that the former is to be calculated on a different basis. Had it been intended that the
High Court would merely exercise the same jurisdiction as the Taxing Master, then the
rule would simply have stated that the High Court may tax the costs itself.
18. The interpretation of Order 99, rule 5 has been considered in detail by the High Court
simple and straightforward cases, most judges are well capable of making an appropriate
assessment of costs. In measuring costs, the High Court should have regard to the
matters set out at Order 99, rule 37 (22) (ii). The judgment does not expressly address
the significance, if any, of the distinction between a “sum in gross” and taxed costs.
19. The nature of the function to be exercised by the High Court in measuring costs has been
[2015] 1 I.R. 707. The Court of Appeal endorsed the approach in Taafe.
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“[20] I quite agree with the sentiments contained in that passage [in Taaffe v. McMahon
[2011] IEHC 408]. It is, of course, implicit in this approach that the judge must
have some evidential or other objectively defensible basis for the manner in which
costs are measured. The power to measure costs must, of course, be exercised
judicially. It would, after all, be unjudicial for a judge to clutch ‘a figure out of the
air without having any indication as to the estimated costs’ (Leary v. Leary
[1987] 1 W.L.R. 72 at p. 76, per Purchas L.J.) This is not to suggest that the judge must
hear evidence regarding costs or even invite detailed submissions on this issue
before electing to measure costs in any given case. It may be that a judge will
have personal knowledge of the sums likely to be allowed in straightforward cases
of the type presently before him or her. This would certainly have been the case in
Taaffe v. McMahon [2011] IEHC 408, (Unreported, High Court, Kearns P., 28th
October, 2011) where Kearns P. – with his vast knowledge and experience of
judicial review practice and procedure – could readily have made an ‘educated
estimate’ of the level of costs in a straightforward uncontested judicial review case
of that kind.”
20. The Court of Appeal emphasised at a later point that a court has an express power to
direct the parties to produce to the court estimates of the costs incurred by them.
21. The judgment of the Court of Appeal suggests that the exercise to be carried out by the
High Court in fixing a gross sum need not be as extensive as that which would be carried
out by the Taxing Master. Nevertheless, the exercise must be carried out judicially, and
the trial judge must have material available which would enable them to make an
appropriate assessment of the gross sum.
22. The import of this case law appears to be as follows. First, the power of the High Court to
assess costs should be confined to straightforward cases. Secondly, the parties must be
given an opportunity to address the court as to the appropriate sum to be awarded.
Thirdly, whereas the exercise of assessing costs need not be as elaborate as that which
would be performed by the Taxing Master, there must nevertheless be material before the
High Court which allows it to make an informed decision. This material might include, for
example, estimates of costs submitted by the parties.
23. Applying these principles to the facts of the present proceedings, I am satisfied that this
is an appropriate case in which the High Court should direct the payment of a sum in
gross in lieu of taxed costs, for the following reasons. First, the proceedings meet the
criteria of being straightforward. The course of the proceedings involved a number of
short procedural applications before the President of the High Court for the purposes of
case management, and the only substantive hearing was completed within a single day
on 15 May 2019. The proceedings were disposed of on the basis of an application to
strike out which was heard on affidavit evidence only. The legal principles governing an
application to strike out proceedings are well established, and none of the defendants
considered it necessary to file written legal submissions on the application. (Ms
Rippington did file written legal submissions herself).
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24. Secondly, as discussed in more detail under the next heading below, the court has
sufficient material before it to allow it to make an informed assessment of costs. In
particular, the court has the benefit of two reports from legal costs accountants as to the
level at which the costs of such an application would tax. The court also has the benefit
of detailed bills of costs from some of the defendants.
25. Thirdly, the history of these proceedings is such that it is desirable in the interests of
justice that the issue of costs be resolved expeditiously. These proceedings are merely
the latest manifestation of a relentless campaign of litigation by Ms Rippington arising out
of an order of the High Court made as long ago as 23 July 2012. The proceedings
represent an abuse of process, and all aspects of same should accordingly be brought to a
conclusion without any unnecessary further delay or expense. An order directing that the
costs be taxed by the Taxing Master in default of agreement would result in further delay
without any obvious benefit in circumstances where this court is, given the
straightforward nature of the case, in a position to measure costs.
(3). MEASURING THE APPROPRIATE SUM IN GROSS
26. Each of the four defendants has submitted an estimate of their costs. Two of the
defendants have also submitted a letter from a legal costs accountant setting out their
respective views as to the level at which the legal costs would be measured by the Taxing
Master.
27. Mr Noel Guiden of Behan & Associates, by letter dated 18 June 2019, has provided a costs
estimate on behalf of the seventh named defendant, Anne Stephenson. Mr Guiden
estimates that the solicitors’ general instructions fee would be taxed at €15,000, and the
brief fee for counsel would be taxed at €2,500. The court also has the benefit of a
detailed bill of costs on behalf of the seventh named defendant. This sets out the nature
of the work represented by the solicitors’ general instructions fee.
28. Mr Rob McCann of McCann Sadlier has, by letter dated 20 June 2019, provided a costs
estimate on behalf of Murray Flynn Maguire solicitors and Sighle Duffy, the fifth and sixth
named defendants. Mr McCann has estimated that the solicitors’ general instructions fee
would be taxed at €15,000. Mr McCann has suggested that the brief fee for counsel
would be taxed at €5,000. This is a higher sum than that estimated by Mr Guiden. This
difference may be explicable, in part, by the fact that the brief fee suggested by Mr
McCann is referable to senior counsel and not junior counsel.
29. The court also has the benefit of detailed fee notes from each of the counsel involved in
the case. These set out, inter alia, the dates of the various procedural hearings before
the President of the High Court. They also set out the details of the drafting work
undertaken by counsel.
30. Ms Rippington has not engaged with these matters at all, other than to observe that all of
the defendants are themselves lawyers, and to suggest that they could have chosen to
represent themselves in the proceedings rather than to engage legal representation and
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thereby adding what she characterises as “another layer of costs”. I will return to
consider this point at paragraph 41 below.
31. As discussed under the previous heading, it appears from the case law that the exercise
of measuring a sum in gross differs from the exercise of taxing costs. The precise
demarcation between the two exercises has not yet been fully delineated. It seems that
the exercise of measuring a sum in gross is less elaborate, and does not necessarily
require the level of detail which would, for example, be set out in a bill of costs in the
form prescribed under Order 99.
32. The judgment in Taaffe v. Mahon indicates that regard should be had to the factors which
would inform the taxation of costs under Order 99, rule 37(22). Insofar as relevant, this
rule provides as follows.
“(i) Where in Appendix W there is entered either a minimum and a maximum sum, or
the word ‘discretionary’, the amount of costs to be allowed in respect of that item
shall, subject to any order of the Court, be in the discretion of the Taxing Master,
within the limits of the sums so entered (if any).
(ii) In exercising his discretion in relation to any item, the Taxing Master shall have
regard to all relevant circumstances, and in particular to–
(a) the complexity of the item or of the cause or matter in which it arises and the
difficulty or novelty of the questions involved;
(b) the skill, specialised knowledge and responsibility required of, and the time
and labour expended by, the solicitor;
(c) the number and importance of the documents (however brief) prepared or
perused;
(d) the place and circumstances in which the business involved is transacted;
(e) the importance of the cause or matter to the client;
(f) where money or property is involved, its amount or value;
(g) any other fees and allowances payable to the solicitor in respect of other
items in the same cause or matter but only where work done in relation to
those items has reduced the work which would otherwise have been
necessary in relation to the item in question.”
33. These criteria have to be read in conjunction with section 27 of the Courts and Court
Officers Act 1995. This section provides that the taxation of costs entails a power to
examine the “nature and extent of” any work done, or services rendered or provided by
counsel or by a solicitor. It also entails consideration of whether any costs, charges, fees
or expenses included in a bill of costs in respect of counsel or a solicitor are “fair and
reasonable” in the circumstances of the case.
case should not be elevated above the relevant criteria mandated by Order 99, rule
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37(22) for fixing costs. The amount of time actually spent on a case is only one element
of the relevant circumstances by reference to which the nature and extent of the work
done is assessed.
35. I turn next to apply these principles to the circumstances of the present case. The nature
of the application before the court, i.e. an application to strike out proceedings, and the
fact that same was heard on affidavit evidence only, has the consequence that the court
has a much fuller appreciation of the nature and extent of the work required by solicitor
and counsel than would be the position, for example, in the instance of a full plenary
hearing. This is not a case where there would have been a requirement on the part of the
solicitors to seek out and interview expert witnesses for example. Nor is it a case which
involved the discovery and production of documents. To put the matter colloquially, the
extent of the work which would have taken place “behind-the-scenes” would have been
less than in the instance of a full plenary hearing.
36. In reaching its determination on the application to strike out the proceedings, the court
had to carefully consider the content of each of the affidavits filed on behalf of the various
parties. The court has some sense from this exercise of the extent of the work which
would have been required to prepare those affidavits, i.e. in terms of taking instructions
and drafting. Again, the work involved would be less than that required in other types of
proceedings heard on affidavit such as, for example, judicial review proceedings. The
nature of the application in this case dictated that much of the content of the affidavits
are directed towards setting out the procedural history, including the earlier proceedings
which had been taken by Ms Rippington. Whereas this exercise had, of course, to be
carried out with care in order to ensure that a fair and balanced narrative was presented
to the court, the task would not have been especially difficult or time-consuming. It
would have been a largely mechanical exercise, involving the preparation of a chronology
of events by reference to the pleadings, affidavits, judgments and correspondence in the
various proceedings. Moreover, the deponents of the affidavits are all lawyers
themselves, and as a consequence their involvement would be more hands-on than in the
case of a lay client. This would have lessened the burden on the “external” lawyers. For
example, a draft affidavit produced by a witness who is a solicitor is likely to require less
input than one prepared by a lay witness.
37. The legal issues in the case were also straightforward. The principles governing an
application to strike out proceedings as an abuse of process and/or as frivolous and
vexatious are well-established. Indeed, the principles are so well-established that none of
the defendants considered it necessary to file written legal submissions on the application.
The hearing of the application took place over the course of a single day on 15 May 2019.
38. Having regard to all of these factors, I measure the costs in gross in the sum of €6,750
for each of the relevant defendants. This sum has been calculated on the basis of:–
(i). A solicitors’ general instruction fee of €3,000;
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This fee is also intended to include the solicitors’ court attendances and their input
into the finalisation of affidavits.
(ii). A brief fee for counsel in respect of the hearing on 15 May 2019 of €2,500;
(iii). A fee of €500 for counsel in respect of their drafting work;
(iv). A fee of €750 for counsel in respect of their attendance at the various procedural
hearings before the President of the High Court.
Although the work required of solicitor and counsel in respect of these procedural
applications would, obviously, be much less than that involved in the hearing on 15
May 2019, there were a significant number of applications.
39. I also allow an additional sum of €500 (exclusive of VAT) in respect of outlay by each of
the firms of solicitors, e.g. costs incurred in respect of post, photocopying, swearing
affidavits, court fees etc. This is the figure recommended by Mr McCann, and appears to
be broadly within the range of figures put forward in the individual bills of costs submitted
by some of the defendants.
40. In making this measurement, I am conscious that whereas the figures allowed for counsel
come close to the (lower) range of fees actually charged by counsel, the sum to be
allowed in respect of the solicitors falls significantly short of that actually charged. It also
falls short of that suggested by the two legal costs accountants. The principal reason for
this discrepancy is that I consider that the volume and value of the work required by
solicitors in the present case was limited in circumstances where the application was
procedural in nature; there was no complex factual background; the deponents were all
qualified lawyers themselves; and the application was largely “counsel driven”.
DEFENDANTS ENTITLED TO ENGAGE EXTERNAL LEGAL REPRESENTATION
41. As noted earlier, Ms Rippington has suggested that the defendants should not be allowed
to recover any costs in respect of external legal representation in circumstances where
the defendants are all legally qualified lawyers themselves. I do not accept the
submission.
42. For the reasons set out by the Supreme Court in Godsil v. Ireland, there is a public
interest in ensuring that a person who has been brought to court to answer allegations
which are ruled to be unfounded should normally recover costs against the person who
instituted and maintained the proceedings. Of course, a successful party is not entitled to
a full indemnity in respect of the costs nor to recover unnecessary or unreasonable costs.
Costs are instead measured on an objective basis. The Taxing Master or the High Court
will decide, for example, on whether it was necessary to engage counsel, and, if so, how
many. A party may have chosen to brief senior and junior counsel but may nevertheless
only be entitled to recover the cost of one counsel from the losing party.
43. It was not unreasonable—nor “luxurious” to use the phrase employed in the older case
law—for the defendants to engage independent legal representation. In particular, it was
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appropriate to engage counsel to present the case. (The defendants, with one exception,
are not practising barristers and should not therefore be expected to act as advocates).
44. Ms Rippington has chosen to make serious allegations—which are entirely unfounded—
against the defendants in respect of their professional conduct. The defendants are fully
entitled to defend themselves against these serious allegations. It was entirely
reasonable for the defendants to avail of independent legal representation in so doing. It
is often said that a lawyer who acts for his or herself has a fool for a client. It was proper
to engage external lawyers who could present the defence in a calm and objective
manner.
45. As appears, I have already made some deduction for the fact that the deponents of the
affidavits are all lawyers themselves, and that this would have lessened the burden on the
“external” lawyers. Moreover, the solicitors’ general instructions fee allowed is less than
that suggested by the legal costs accountants. These downward adjustments to the level
of costs which might otherwise have been allowed in a case where the clients are not
legally qualified are sufficient to cater for the particular circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION AND FORM OF ORDER
46. There are no special circumstances which would justify departing from the general rule
that “costs follow the event”. The “event” in this case consisted of the making of orders
in favour of the relevant defendants dismissing the proceedings and the making of an
Isaac Wunder order against Ms Rippington. The making of a consequential costs order
against Ms Rippington is necessary in order to protect the integrity of the court process
and to ensure a just result for the defendants. No one is entitled to engage in abuse of
process, on the scale on which Ms Rippington has engaged, with impunity. Having put
the defendants to further needless expense by the issuing of the within proceedings, Ms
Rippington must suffer the consequence of a costs order requiring her to pay their costs.
47. This is an appropriate case in which the court should measure the costs itself, i.e. as
opposed to leaving the costs to be taxed (measured) by the Taxing Master of the High
Court in the ordinary way.
48. For the reasons set out under the previous heading above, this court has measured the
costs in gross in the sum of €6,750 for each of the relevant defendants, and allows a
further sum of €500 (exclusive of VAT) in respect of outlay by each of the firms of
solicitors, e.g. costs incurred in respect of post, photocopying, swearing affidavits, court
fees etc.
49. The order for costs will be subject to the usual stay in the event that an appeal to the
Court of Appeal is made within time.
SCHEDULE OF PARTIES
The relevant defendants for the purpose of the proposed costs orders are as follows.
Murray Flynn Maguire Solicitors and Sighle Duffy
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(One set of costs to cover both these defendants)
Anne Stephenson
Peter Maguire
Rita Considine
Result: Cost awarded for the Defendants