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Sliabh Luachra Against Ballydesmond Windfarm Committee v An Bord Pleanala [2019] IEHC 888 (20 December 2019)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2019/2019IEHC888.html
Cite as:
[2019] 12 JIC 2017,
[2019] IEHC 888
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Page 1 ⇓
THE HIGH COURT
COMMERCIAL
[2019] IEHC 888
[ 2019 No. 63 J.R.]
BETWEEN
SLIABH LUACHRA AGAINST BALLYDESMOND WINDFARM COMMITTEE
APPLICANT
AND
AN BORD PLEANÁLA
RESPONDENT
AND
SILVERBIRCH RENEWABLES LIMITED AND KERRY COUNTY COUNCIL
NOTICE PARTIES
JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Denis McDonald delivered on 20th December, 2019
Table of Contents
Introduction……………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………1
The grounds of challenge………………………………..……………………………………………………………………5
Material contravention of the development plan………………..………………………………………………7
The legal requirements for appropriate assessment…………………………………………………………16
The statement of ground……………………………………………………………………………………………………20
The challenge to the late delivery of expert evidence by the applicant……………………………21
Some subsidiary issues raised by the applicant in relation to the assessment carried out
by the respondent…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………37
The assessment carried out by the inspector and the respondent…………………………………44
Did the assessment identify, in the light of the best scientific knowledge, all aspects of the
development which could adversely affect the hen harrier or the freshwater pearl
mussel?…………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………45
Potential impacts on the hen harrier………….………………………………………………………………………46
The potential impacts on the freshwater pearl mussel…..…………………………………………………54
Have the necessary complete precise and definitive findings and conclusions been
made?……………………………………………………………………..……………………………………………………………62
The hen harrier…………………………….………………………………………………………………………………………63
The freshwater pearl mussel
………………………………………………………………………………………77
Peat slippage …………………………………………………………………………………………………………………96
Post consent conditions……………………………………………………………………………………………………101
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Conclusions in relation to appropriate assessment……………………………………………………………108
EIA………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………………109
Overall Conclusion……………………………………………………………………………………………………………118
Introduction
27th November, 2018 granting planning permission for the construction of a windfarm
and associated works on elevated ground between the villages of Gneeveguilla, County
Kerry and Ballydesmond, County Cork. The application for permission for the proposed
windfarm development envisaged the erection of fourteen turbines with a rotor diameter
up to 120m and a blade tip height of up to 150m above ground level, two permanent
meteorological masts, two medium voltage substations, one high voltage substation,
thirteen site entrances comprising seven new site entrances and six upgraded site
entrances, three barrow pits and adjacent repositories, the provision of new and upgraded
internal site service roads and surface water management measures, temporary site
compounds, underground cabling and associated infrastructure necessary to construct the
development. The respondent, in its decision to grant permission, reduced the number of
turbines from fourteen to twelve. As described in more detail below, the exclusion of two
of the turbines from the development was largely prompted by concerns about the impact
of those particular turbines on the hen harrier.
hectares and will extend across 15 individual land holdings. The site is located to the
west of and sloping towards the upper reaches of the Blackwater river valley. The
southwestern extent of the proposed site is located close to the watershed between the
Blackwater river and Laune river catchments. The site is drained by a number of
tributaries of the river Blackwater including the Tooreengarriv/Carhoonoe, Mountinfant
and Reansup streams. Although the site is located close to the watershed between the
Blackwater and Laune catchments, all drainage serving the proposed infrastructure will be
designed to discharge via the Blackwater catchment with one minor exception which is
not relevant for present purposes.
(“Silverbirch”). Its application for planning permission for the proposed development was
rejected by the County Council (the second named notice party) (“the County Council”)
on 30 May, 2017 for the following reasons:-
(a) In the first place, having regard to the extent, size and scale of the turbines the
County Council considered that the development would create a significant visual
intrusion in the landscape by reason of the height and spatial extent of the
proposed turbines which would be excessively dominant and visually intrusive. The
County Council took the view that the development would therefore seriously injure
the residential amenity and visual amenities of the area and would, inter alia,
contravene Objective ZL-1 of the Kerry County Development Plan, 2015-2021:
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(b) Secondly, noting that the site is located within the catchment of the Blackwater
river which provides a home to the endangered freshwater pearl mussel, the
County Council was not satisfied that the construction would not cause pollution of
local water courses;
(c) Thirdly, the County Council took the view that two of the turbines (namely T8 and
T9) are located within an area known as Barna Bog used by hunting hen harriers
which may breed in the nearby Stacks Mullaghareirk Mountains, West Limerick hills
and Mount Eagle Special Protection Area (“The Stacks SPA”). In particular, the
County Council considered that the proposed development would cause the loss of
hen harrier hunting habitat which would have a significant adverse effect on the
Stacks SPA.
respondent appointed an inspector to review the matter and prepare a report with
recommendations. The inspector conducted an analysis of the proposed development and
reported with a recommendation that planning permission might be granted by the
respondent for a development comprising twelve of the proposed turbines but excluding
turbines T8 and T9. Thereafter on 23rd November, 2018 the respondent, by direction of
that date, decided to grant permission. The relevant decision to grant subsequently
issued on 27th November, 2018.
The grounds of challenge
the development on the following grounds:-
(a) The principal ground on which the applicant seeks to challenge the decision of the
respondent is that there was a failure to carry out and record any Appropriate
Assessment in accordance with national and European law. In making this case,
the applicant has raised concerns in relation to both the hen harrier and the
freshwater pearl mussel;
(b) Next, the applicant makes the case that there is nothing to suggest that the
respondent carried out an Environmental Impact Assessment (“EIA”). In this
context, although the issue is addressed in the report of the inspector appointed by
the respondent, neither the direction nor the decision of the respondent record that
the respondent carried out an EIA;
(c) Thirdly, the applicant contends that, in granting permission for the proposed
development, the respondent has contravened s. 37 (2) of the Planning and
Development Act, 2000 (“the 2000 Act”) in circumstances where (so the applicant
contends) the proposed development materially contravenes the Kerry County
Development Plan (“the development plan”).
Page 4 ⇓
briefly, I propose to deal with that issue first. Thereafter, I will address the first and
second issues listed in para. 5 above.
Material contravention of the development plan
for the proposed development was that it would contravene Objective ZL-1 of the
development plan. According to that plan, the purpose of Objective ZL-1 is to protect the
landscape of County Kerry as a major economic asset and an invaluable amenity which
contributes to the quality of peoples’ lives. The applicant contends that the decision of
the respondent to grant permission contravenes s. 37 (2) of the 2000 Act. Under s. 37,
the respondent may only grant permission for a development which materially
contravenes a development plan where certain conditions (described in para. 9 below) are
met.
development materially contravened the development plan. That is the language which is
used in the 2000 Act. Section 37 (2) (a) of the 2000 Act provides as follows:-
“(2) (a) Subject to paragraph (b), the Board may in determining an appeal under this
section decide to grant a permission even if the proposed development contravenes
materially the development plan relating to the area of the planning authority to
whose decision the appeal relates.”
provisions of s. 37 (2) (b) which are in the following terms:-
“(b) Where a planning authority has decided to refuse permission on the grounds that a
proposed development materially contravenes the development plan, the Board
may only grant permission in accordance with paragraph (a) where it considers
that—
(i) the proposed development is of strategic or national importance,
(ii) there are conflicting objectives in the development plan or the objectives are not
clearly stated, insofar as the proposed development is concerned, or
(iii) permission for the proposed development should be granted having regard to
regional spatial and economic strategy for the area, guidelines section 28, policy
directives under section 29, the statutory obligations of any local authority in the
area, and any relevant policy of the Government, the Minister or any Minister of the
Government, or
(iv) permission for the proposed development should be granted having regard to the
pattern of development, and permissions granted, in the area since the making of
the development plan.”
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concerned with material contravention of a development plan. As noted in para. 8 above,
that is not the language which the County Council used in its decision of 30th May, 2017
to refuse permission. The relevant reference to the County Development Plan is in fact
rolled up with a number of other considerations. The relevant reason is in the following
terms:-
“Having regard to the spatial extent, size and scale of the proposed turbines
relative to the nature of the receiving environment of hilly and flat farmlands and
transitional marginal landscapes, it is considered that a windfarm development of
the scale proposed would create a significant visual intrusion in this landscape by
reason of the height and spatial extent of the proposed turbines which would be
excessively dominant and visually obtrusive when viewed from the surrounding
countryside and villages. The proposed wind farm would have a significant impact
on the value and character of the landscapes in the area and would seriously injure
the amenity and quality of life of communities and individuals who dwell in the
area. The proposed development would, therefore, seriously injure the residential
amenities and visual amenities of the area, would be contrary to the provisions of
the Wind Energy Guidelines… and Section 7.4.5.15 of the Renewable Energy
Strategy 2012, would contravene Objective ZL-1 of the Kerry County Development
Plan… and would be contrary to the proper planning and sustainable development
of the area”.
that, as the text of the reason relied on by the County Council makes very clear, the
decision to refuse permission was not stated to be on the basis that the development
would materially contravene the development plan. I can therefore see no basis to
distinguish the present case from the circumstances addressed by Haughton J. in People
Over Wind v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 271. In that case, Haughton J. dealt with the
issue as follows at para. 270:-
“270. In refusing to grant permission, the planning authority did not use the phrase
‘materially contravene’ when outlining that the development would breach objective
NH13/001 of the Laois County Development Plan … - it merely refers to
‘contravene’. This important distinction was recognised by O'Malley J in Nee v. An
Bord Pleanála [2012] IEHC 532 - a case in which the Court came to the conclusion
that the omission of the word ‘material’ must have been a deliberate choice on the
part of the Council. No evidence has been put before this Court to suggest that, by
the wording it adopted, Laois County Council intended to refer to a material
contravention.”
O’Malley J. in Nee v. An Bord Pleanála [2012] IEHC 532 (to which Haughton J. referred in
the course of his judgment in People Over Wind v. An Bord Pleanála). In Nee, at para. 40
of her judgment, O’Malley J. stated:-
Page 6 ⇓
“…The section relied on specifically provides that the Board may grant permission
‘even if’ the refusal is for a material contravention. That would make little sense if
every refusal by a Planning Authority for contravention of a Plan was to be deemed
to be for a material contravention. It would also have the effect of very significantly
reducing, if not abolishing, the jurisdiction of the board in cases not coming within
the excepted categories. I do not believe that to be the intent of the section”.
considered by Haughton J. in People Over Wind. In the present case, there is nothing in
the materials before the court to support the suggestion that it had been the intention of
the County Council to conclude that the development constituted a material contravention
of the Development Plan.
in material contravention of the Development Plan. The impact of the proposed
development on the landscape is addressed extensively in paras. 8.12.1 to 8.12.8 of the
inspector’s report. Having carefully considered the issue, the inspector came to the
conclusion that he was satisfied that the overall visual impact of the development on the
area would be “within acceptable limits”. In turn, the respondent, in its direction of 23rd
November, 2018 expressly decided to grant permission in accordance with the inspector’s
recommendation. In doing so, the respondent stated that it had taken into account the
policies of the County Council as set out in the Development Plan. Having considered,
inter alia, the Development Plan, the character of the landscape and the topography
surrounding the site, the characteristics of the site and of the general vicinity, the pattern
of existing and permitted development in the area, the distances from the proposed
development to dwellings or other sensitive receptors, and the report of the inspector, the
respondent considered that the development would not have a significant adverse effect
on the landscape or the visual or residential amenities of the area. Thus, in deciding to
grant permission, there is nothing to suggest that the respondent (who, in accordance
with the provisions of the 2000 Act conducts a de novo assessment of the application)
was exercising any jurisdiction under s. 37 (2) (a). It only exercises such a jurisdiction
where there is a material contravention. Based on the extensive analysis carried out by
the inspector in relation to this issue, and based on the reasons set out in the Board
direction (summarised above) it is clear that the respondent took the view that the
proposed development was acceptable in terms of landscape and visual amenity.
refused permission on the grounds that the development would materially contravene the
Development Plan and in circumstances where the decision of the respondent was not
taken in exercise of its jurisdiction under s. 37 (2) (a), it follows that this ground of
challenge to the decision of the respondent fails.
The legal requirements for appropriate assessment
be set out here. No issue arises in relation to the language used in Article 6. Nor does
Page 7 ⇓
any issue arise in relation to the provisions of the 2000 Act implementing Article 6. It is
not, therefore necessary, to set out the relevant statutory provisions which apply.
development site is not located within any Natura 2000 designation, there are a number
of protected sites in the wider area including the Stacks SPA and the Blackwater River
Special Area of Conservation (“the Blackwater SAC”). In light of the potential for the
development to have adverse impacts on the integrity of those Natura 2000 sites, the
inspector stated as follows at p. 112 of his report:-
“… any development likely to have a serious adverse effect on a Natura 2000 site
would not normally be permitted and… any development proposal in the vicinity of,
or affecting in any way, a designated site should be accompanied by such sufficient
information as to show how the proposal will impact on the designated site.
Therefore, a proposed development may only be authorised after it has been
established that the development will not have a negative impact on the fauna,
flora or habitat being protected through an Appropriate Assessment pursuant to
Article 6 of the Habitats Directive. Accordingly, it is necessary to screen the subject
proposal for the purposes of ‘appropriate assessment’”
had the potential to have an adverse impact upon, inter alia, the Stacks SPA and the
Blackwater SAC. Insofar as those two sites are concerned, the inspector recognised, in
particular, that the development could have a potential impact on the roosting, breeding,
and foraging habits of the hen harrier but it also had potential implications for
downstream protected habitats and species within the Blackwater SAC. These include the
freshwater pearl mussel.
well established that there are quite stringent requirements that must be complied with
where a stage 2 appropriate assessment is carried out. Those requirements have been
the subject of a number of decisions of the CJEU which, in turn, have been applied in
Ireland in Kelly v. An Bord Pleanála [2014] IEHC 400 and in Connelly v. An Bord Pleanála
[2018] IESC 31. It is clear from the judgment of Finlay Geoghegan J. in Kelly and from
the judgment of Clarke C.J. in Connelly that there are four requirements which must be
satisfied namely:-
(a) In the first place, the appropriate assessment must identify, in the light of the best
scientific knowledge in the field, all aspects of the development project which have
the potential, either as a consequence of the development itself or in combination
with other plans or projects to affect the European site in the light of its
conservation objectives;
(b) Secondly, there must be complete, precise and definitive findings and conclusions
regarding the previously identified potential effects on any European site. This
requires findings to be made following appropriate analysis and evaluation each in
Page 8 ⇓
the light of the best scientific knowledge in the field. The findings and conclusions
cannot have any lacunae or gaps;
(c) Thirdly, on the basis of those findings and conclusions, the planning authority, if it
is to grant permission for the development, must be able to determine that no
reasonable scientific doubt remains as to the absence of the identified potential
effects. It is clear from the decision of Finlay Geoghegan J. in Kelly (in para. 48 of
her judgment) that these findings must be appropriately recorded. In particular,
Finlay Geoghegan J. said:-
“In accordance with the CJEU decision in Sweetman, it is for the national
court to determine whether the appropriate assessment (including the
determination) was lawfully carried out or reached, and to do so, it appears
to me that the reasons given for the Board’s determination in an appropriate
assessment must include the complete, precise and definitive findings and
conclusions relied upon by the Board as the basis for its determination. They
must also include the main rationale or reason for which the Board
considered those findings and conclusions capable of removing all scientific
doubt as the effects of the proposed development on the European site
concerned in the light of … its conservation objectives. In the absence of
such reasons, it would not be possible for a court to decide whether the
appropriate assessment was lawfully concluded or whether the determination
meets the legal test required by the judgments of the CJEU”; and
(d) Fourthly, where these requirements are satisfied, the planning authority may
determine that the proposed development will not adversely affect the integrity of
any relevant European site and will not be prevented from granting permission on
Article 6 grounds.
The statement of grounds
out an appropriate assessment. The case made overlaps with the applicant’s complaints in
relation to EIA and, for that reason, it may be convenient, at this point, to summarise
both elements of the applicant’s case. In making that case, the applicant has made the
following points:-
(a) In para. 4 of the statement of grounds it is alleged (in quite general terms) that
there was a failure to carry out and record any or any adequate EIA in respect of
the proposed development.
(b) In para. 9 of the statement of grounds, it is alleged that the respondent has failed
to engage with its obligation to maintain and restore the habitat of the freshwater
pearl mussel. It is alleged that the respondent has taken an entirely different
approach in this case to the mitigation measures (necessary to ensure that there
are no adverse effects on the mussel) to the approach taken in other cases where it
is alleged more extensive measures were required to be put in place. In this
Page 9 ⇓
context, the applicant contends that the mitigation measures which the respondent
has found to be satisfactory in this case are “different and significantly less
advanced than those considered (and indeed considered insufficient) in other cases.
Reference is made to the refusal by the respondent in respect of an appeal in
respect of a wind farm in Doonbeg and to the decision of the Board the subject of
the proceedings in People Over Wind v. An Bord Pleanála [2014] IEHC 487”. In
particular, the applicant points to the conditions imposed in the People Over Wind
case that the mitigation measures should ensure that there would be zero silt
emissions from the development. It should be noted that silt emissions are
particularly deleterious to the freshwater pearl mussel and to the salmonids which
are so essential for the successful reproduction of the mussel;
(c) It is also alleged that the assessment was conducted on the basis of inadequate
information and inadequate surveys of the receiving environment. Having regard
to the deficiencies and uncertainties identified in the objections to the application
for planning permission made to the County Council, and the further deficiencies
identified by the observers to the appeal, it is alleged that it was not possible for
the respondent to conduct any proper or lawful appropriate assessment. In support
of this contention in the Statement of Grounds, Mr. Fred O’Sullivan (who swore the
verifying affidavit on behalf of the applicant) explained in para. 9 of that affidavit
that a large number of observations were made to the respondent. These included
observations from local individuals, An Taisce, Birdwatch Ireland, Raptor LIFE
Project, Towercorn Ltd, Duhallow Environment Working Group and the Irish Raptor
Study Group. For example, in the submission made by the Irish Raptor Study
Group (authored by Dr. Allan Mee together with two others) reference was made to
the fact that in 2017 a second breeding pair of hen harriers was identified within
the proposed windfarm area on Barna Bog (which had not been identified in the
material submitted by Silverbirch). Furthermore, in the submission made by the
Duhallow Environment Working Group, attention was drawn to the proximity of the
proposed development to the Blackwater SAC. The submission referred to silt
entering the river from another windfarm then under construction and it highlighted
the danger to the freshwater pearl mussel which, the submission explained are
“highly endangered and require clean water [to] survive”.
(d) It is also alleged that the respondent, in adopting the report of its inspector, did not
carry out any adequate appropriate assessment. It is alleged that the report is
“wholly deficient” and that it fails to provide any complete, precise and definitive
findings in the context of appropriate assessment. Complaint is made, in particular,
that the inspector, in purporting to carry out an appropriate assessment, appears to
have relied significantly (if not entirely) on the EIA carried out (which is recorded in
the same report). The applicant makes the point that an EIA and an appropriate
assessment are conducted to a different standard and necessarily have a different
focus. It was accordingly submitted in the course of the hearing that the inspector
(and therefore the respondent itself) had applied the wrong standard in purporting
to carry out the appropriate assessment.
Page 10 ⇓
(e) As pleaded in paras. 13 and 15 of the Statement of Grounds, the applicant makes
the case that the conclusion of the inspector (and thus of the respondent itself) in
respect of the hen harrier focussed entirely on the omission of turbines T8 and T9.
This point is made both in respect of the appropriate assessment issue and in
relation to the EIA issue. In particular, it is alleged that the inspector offered no
assessment at all of the effects of the remaining twelve turbines on the hen harrier.
The case made by the applicant is that no assessment whatever was made of the
development of twelve turbines and related infrastructure for which permission was
granted by the respondent.
(f) Again, with respect to the hen harrier, it is contended that the language used by
the inspector (and thus by the respondent itself) is vague and uncertain and that
this is not appropriate in the context of appropriate assessment. It is alleged that
there are no actual findings, let alone complete findings. In this context, the
applicant draws attention, for example, to the observation made by the inspector,
in the course of his report, that he was “inclined to conclude that the Barna area is
of local importance to the hen harrier”.
(g) With regard to the hydrological and hydrogeological impacts of the development, it
is alleged that the assessment of the inspector at p. 122 of his report is utterly
inadequate. It is alleged that the report does not deal at all with any of the species
for which the Blackwater SAC was designated. In particular, it is alleged that,
notwithstanding the view of the County Council that the mitigation measures
proposed were unsatisfactory, the inspector (and thus the respondent) did not even
set out what the mitigation measures are. It is also alleged, accordingly, that it is
not clear on what basis the inspector could be said to be satisfied beyond a
reasonable scientific doubt that the mitigation measures will be effective.
(h) It is also alleged that the mitigation measures themselves are unclear and
uncertain and that most of them have been left over to be agreed post consent. In
the particular context of the freshwater pearl mussel it is alleged that it is entirely
unclear how the mitigation measures will operate to protect the species (which, as
noted above, is highly sensitive to waterborne sediment and siltation). The case is
made that condition 17 in particular imposes no more than a requirement to follow
generic construction techniques and that the condition is contrary to law having
regard to the provisions of the Habitats Directives and the decision of the CJEU in
Case C-416/17 Holohan. It is alleged that the condition does not prescribe any
specific level of sediment; nor does it prescribe any actual mitigation.
The challenge to the late delivery of expert evidence by the applicant
an affidavit sworn by Fred O’Sullivan on behalf of the applicant on 30th January, 2019.
Thereafter, Silverbirch made an application to admit the proceedings into the Commercial
List. An order to that effect was made by Haughton J. on 11th March, 2019. In that
order, the court, in accordance with an agreed directions timetable, directed that
opposition papers should be filed by 15th April, 2019, a replying affidavit on behalf of the
Page 11 ⇓
applicant (if required) should be filed by 27th May, 2019 and thereafter any replying
affidavits by the respondent or the notice parties should be delivered by 17th June, 2019.
There was some slippage in that timetable in that the opposition papers on behalf of the
respondent were not filed until 29th April, 2019. As a consequence, the timetable was
adjusted. The last adjustment made to the timetable is recorded in an order made by me
on 31st July, 2019 which extended the time for filing of the replying affidavit on behalf of
the applicant to 7th August, 2019 following which the submissions of the parties were to
be exchanged.
was sworn by Dr. Allan Mee (who had been one of the authors of the submission made to
the respondent by the Irish Raptor Study Group). Dr. Mee is a zoologist and a
professional ornithologist and his affidavit, consisting of 69 paragraphs, deals extensively
with the hen harrier and with the impacts of the proposed development on that bird. The
affidavit also raised issues in relation to merlins, bats, woodcock, red grouse and the
short-eared owl. He also raised issues in relation to cumulative impacts of the
development along with other windfarm developments in the vicinity. The affidavit also
contains a number of criticisms of the approach taken by the inspector and the
respondent.
interest in wetland and aquatic habitats. As his affidavit makes clear, Mr. Reidy is
associated with the Duhallow Environment Working Group (which also made submissions
to the respondent in the course of the appeal). His affidavit, comprising 59 paragraphs,
deals extensively with the freshwater pearl mussel, the proximity of the known
populations of the mussel to the proposed windfarm, and the threats facing the long-term
survival of the mussel. He highlights that the national population of the mussel is in
decline as a result of eutrophication and sedimentation of habitat. As I understand it,
eutrophication arises as a consequence of algal growth which uses up oxygen in the
water. The affidavit also contains a critique of the approach taken by the respondent and
Mr. Reidy also addresses and takes issue with the extent of the mitigation measures
proposed. In common with Dr. Mee, Mr. Reidy also raises issues in relation to cumulative
impacts. He also raises questions in relation to impacts on salmon, lamprey, plant
surveys and flora assessment (specifically Japanese knotweed and giant rhubarb).
reply to the affidavits sworn on behalf of the respondent and Silverbirch. In substance
and in form, they do not even purport to respond to the averments made by Mr. Pierce
Dillon in his affidavit sworn on behalf of the respondent or to the averments made by Mr.
Damien Courtney in his affidavit sworn on behalf of Silverbirch. They also canvass a
number of issues which are not raised in the Statement of Grounds at all. In this context,
in the course of the hearing before me, counsel for the applicant very properly
acknowledged that the applicant is not entitled to advance a case which is not pleaded in
the Statement of Grounds. In their written submissions delivered in advance of the
hearing and in the course of oral argument at the hearing, both the respondent and
Page 12 ⇓
Silverbirch have strongly objected to the admission of the affidavits sworn by Dr. Mee and
Mr. Reidy.
applicant’s position to file all of the evidence to support the case made within the relevant
eight-week period allowed for the bringing of judicial review proceedings. Counsel argued
that an applicant cannot be expected to source and engage experts in that timeframe. He
also suggested (although there was no affidavit evidence on behalf of the applicant in
these proceedings to this effect) that an applicant seeking judicial review can have great
difficulty in sourcing an appropriate expert and persuading that expert to provide expert
opinion evidence. Some latitude should be allowed for that purpose. Counsel also
suggested that there was no prejudice to the respondent or to Silverbirch.
evidence from an appropriate expert within the relatively short period of time allowed for
a challenge to a decision of the respondent. Where that occurs and where such expert
evidence is necessary, one would expect that an applicant would, at the very least, make
clear in the Statement of Grounds and verifying affidavit that it is intended to support the
case by reference to expert evidence. In such circumstances, both the court and the
relevant respondent and notice party would be put on notice of the applicant’s intention
and would have an opportunity to address, by means of appropriate directions, a timeline
for the delivery of such evidence and any necessary response from the respondent and
notice party. However, that is not what occurred here. There was no suggestion made at
any point prior to August 2019 that stand-alone expert evidence would be adduced on
behalf of the applicant. The directions given by the court (on the basis of an agreement
between the parties) merely envisaged the delivery of a replying affidavit. As noted
above, the affidavits of Dr. Mee and Mr. Reidy are not by way of reply to the opposition
papers and verifying affidavits filed on behalf of the respondent and Silverbirch. In truth,
both affidavits are stand-alone affidavits which make no attempt to address what was
said in the opposition papers.
associated with groups who participated in the appeal process before the respondent and
made submissions to the respondent. In circumstances where both the Irish Raptor
Study Group and the Duhallow Environment Working Group had participated in the
appeal, they were already fully familiar with the documents filed in the course of the
appeal and in particular were familiar with the nature of the proposed development and
the Natura 2000 interests which they believed could be adversely affected by the
proposed development. No explanation has been furnished as to why, in those
circumstances, it was not possible to obtain affidavits from Dr. Mee and Mr. Reidy at the
outset or, at the very least, at an early stage in these proceedings.
been suffered by the respondent and Silverbirch, it is important to bear in mind that, as
counsel for the respondent highlighted, in the course of her submissions, the affidavits
Page 13 ⇓
(comprising 128 paragraphs in total) were delivered in the middle of the long vacation in
relation to a Commercial Court case which was due to commence on the second day of
term. The arguments made in both affidavits are extensive. As counsel said they are
“roving”. I believe counsel was correct to suggest that they bear all the hallmarks of
authorship by someone who has taken a microscope to try and find any point that could
possibly be made and then to cover those points in extenso in the affidavits.
Notwithstanding the very proper confirmation by counsel for the applicant that the
applicant cannot go beyond the case made in the Statement of Grounds, no attempt is
made in the affidavits by either deponent to confine themselves to the matters
complained of in the Statement of Grounds.
about the timing of the delivery of the affidavits. They were delivered at a time which
made it virtually impossible to respond to them while, at the same time being in a
position to maintain the hearing date of 8th October, 2019 (namely the second day of
Michaelmas term). In this context, it seems to me that, contrary to the submissions
made by counsel for the applicant, there is a real prejudice to the respondent and the
notice party by reason of the late delivery of affidavits of this kind. The nature of this
prejudice was described by Clarke J. (as he then was) in Woori Bank v. KDB (Ireland) Ltd
[2006] IEHC 156 as “logistical prejudice”. That observation was made in the context of
an application to amend a pleading. It is generally accepted that a relatively liberal
approach should be taken to such applications (as the judgment of the Supreme Court in
Croke v. Waterford Crystal [2005] 2 I.R. 283 makes clear). However, notwithstanding
this liberal approach, Clarke J. identified that such an application could be refused in
circumstances where prejudice (including “logistical prejudice” as explained by him in his
judgment) would be caused to the opposing party. At para. 4.2 of his judgment in that
case, Clarke J. explained the position as follows:-
“4.2 a party may be able to persuade the court that what I might call logistical prejudice
would occur if the amendment is allowed. This will particularly be the case where
the amendment is sought at a very late stage and could have the effect of
significantly disrupting the intended proceedings. In such cases it may be that an
amendment which could properly have been made at an earlier stage might be
refused because to permit the amendment would have the effect of so altering an
imminent trial as to require a significant adjournment to the prejudice of the party
against whom the amendment is sought. It may well be that in the context of
modern case management and the undoubted intention of the rules applicable to
the Commercial Court (which rules are obviously predicated on an efficient and
managed pre-trial process coupled with an early trial of the issues) that such
logistical prejudice may loom larger in the considerations of the court.
The effectiveness of case management can be significantly reduced if parties who
do not comply with the directions of the court can escape the consequences of such
failure without significant adverse results. Similarly belated applications to amend
(after, for example, the parties have filed witness statements and the like) can
Page 14 ⇓
have a significant effect on the ability to conduct a trial in a timely and orderly
fashion. In that context it should also be noted that the nature of the relief sought
can be a material factor in assessing the adverse consequences of a delay in trial.
For example, claims for a specific performance or other similar proceedings (whose
existence can have an effect on the ability of parties to deal in a commercial fashion
with their assets) should be disposed of as quickly as possible and amendments
which could have the effect of significantly delaying such proceedings can, in an
appropriate case, give rise to a significant degree of what I have described as
logistical prejudice”.
seems to me that very similar considerations arise here where, without any prior warning,
expert evidence (particularly extensive expert evidence of the kind set out in the
affidavits of Dr. Mee and Mr. Reidy) is delivered at a very late stage in the proceedings
when a trial is imminent and when the opposing parties would have no ability to respond
to those affidavits without putting the trial date in jeopardy. As noted previously, there is
no basis on which it could plausibly be suggested (and counsel for the applicant very
wisely did not make the suggestion) that the affidavits are in the nature of a reply to the
case made by the respondent and Silverbirch in their respective opposition papers.
kind. Trial dates are allocated well in advance of a trial. If a trial cannot proceed on the
date allocated to it, it may take many months before the court is in a position to allocate
a new trial date. In this case, the trial date was fixed in March 2019 on the basis of the
directions (agreed between the parties at that time) recorded in the order of Haughton J.
I have no doubt that, in March 2019, there were ample trial dates available in Michaelmas
term 2019. However, by the time these affidavits were delivered in August 2019, the trial
dates for Michaelmas term were already fully allocated. It would not have been possible
to secure a new trial date for a four day hearing before Hilary term 2020 at the very
earliest. This would be a particular prejudice in a case of this kind in circumstances
where, as the relatively short timeframe for challenge provided by the 2000 Act
demonstrates, the underlying legislative intention is that challenges of this kind should be
dealt with promptly.
which are brought pursuant to such statutory provisions and against a backdrop where
the Commercial Court has already been persuaded that the proceedings are of sufficient
urgency to merit entry into the Commercial List and case management by the judge in
charge of that list. In para. 13 of the affidavit of Damien Courtney grounding the
application for admission of the proceedings into the Commercial List, Mr. Courtney
stated:-
“13. Given the importance of the Silverbirch Windfarm to meeting the State’s targets for
greenhouse gas emission reduction and renewable energy sources, the capital
expenditure incurred to date, the further expenditure to complete the project, the
Page 15 ⇓
long delay in the planning process already in the proposed new [Renewable
Electricity Support Scheme], the awaited decision on connections after ECP-1 and
the deadlines for lease options, Silverbirch is very anxious to have the within
challenge to the permission granted dealt with as expeditiously as possible. Having
the within proceedings case managed within the Commercial List … is, I say and
believe, the most effective way in which to achieve this outcome”.
delivered nine months after the decision of the respondent which is now the subject of the
challenge in these proceedings. In my view, the delay in this case is such and the timing
of delivery of the affidavits is such that it was incumbent on the applicant, if it wished to
be in a position to rely on such affidavits, to fully explain and justify their delivery at such
a late (and crucial) stage of the proceedings. No satisfactory explanation or reason has
been put forward to justify the late delivery of these affidavits. The timing of the delivery
of the affidavits is not addressed anywhere on oath by the applicant. In light of the failure
to properly explain and justify the delivery of these affidavits, I am left with no alternative
but to exclude them from consideration. In the absence of an objectively justifiable
explanation for their late delivery, the logistical prejudice to the respondent and
Silverbirch is such that the affidavits must be excluded.
to have been an apprehension that, without expert evidence, the applicant could find
itself without any evidence to support the case made in the Statement of Grounds. This
concern appears to have arisen as a consequence of the approach taken by White J. in An
Taisce v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 633 and by O’Neill J. in Harrington v. An Bord
Pleanála [2014] IEHC 232. In both of those judgments, judicial review proceedings were
dismissed on the grounds that the relevant applicant had failed to prove the case made
by it in its Statement of Grounds. In Harrington, the applicant failed to provide any
evidence to support her contention that the site in question was a priority habitat. In An
Taisce, the relevant applicant (Friends of the Irish Environment) had failed to provide any
evidence to substantiate a bald assertion on affidavit that the extraction of peat on bogs
supplying the Edenderry Power Plant is likely to have significant effects on the River
Barrow and River Nore SAC. However, if there was such a concern in this case, it existed
at the outset of these proceedings. On the facts, there is no reason to suppose that such
a concern could not have been addressed by filing affidavits from Dr. Mee and Mr. Reidy
in early course. Moreover, it is difficult to see that such a concern could be said to arise
in this case. It is clear from the entire process that took place in the course of the appeal
before the respondent and from the approach taken both by the respondent and
Silverbirch in these proceedings that it was acknowledged that the position of the hen
harrier and the freshwater pearl mussel would have to be considered and that a Stage 2
appropriate assessment would have to be carried out which involved the requirement that
the respondent be satisfied beyond any reasonable scientific doubt that the development
will not adversely affect either of these endangered species. The concerns in relation to
both species were specifically raised by a number of participants in the process. There
was no dispute between the parties that the hen harrier is a special conservation interest
Page 16 ⇓
for the purposes of Stacks SPA or that the development site lies adjacent to part of the
boundary of the SPA. Likewise, there was no dispute between the parties in this case
about the fact that the proposed site is hydrologically connected to the Blackwater River
and that the potential exists for indirect impacts on the Blackwater SAC and on the
freshwater pearl mussel in particular. Accordingly, I can see no basis for the
apprehension voiced by counsel for the applicant that, without expert evidence, the
applicant could find itself unable to advance the case made in its statement of grounds.
the respondent and Silverbirch in relation to the admissibility of the affidavits of Dr. Mee
and Mr. Reidy. For completeness, it should be noted that it was strongly urged by the
respondent, as an additional basis for contesting the admissibility of the late affidavits,
that the affidavits contained material which had never been placed before the respondent
in the course of the appeal. Reliance was placed on the decision of Murphy J. in Hennessy
v. An Bord Pleanála [2018] IEHC 678 and the decision of Haughton J. in People Over Wind
v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 271. In both of those cases the court took the view that
any affidavit evidence containing new material which was not before the respondent could
not be considered by the court in a judicial review challenge to a decision of the
respondent. It is true that in the latter case, the court granted the applicant leave to
appeal to the Court of Appeal on a number of questions pursuant to s. 50A (7) of the
2000 Act including a question as to whether, in reviewing the decision of the respondent,
in respect of appropriate assessment, the court was confined to a consideration of
matters that were before the respondent. In People Over Wind v. An Bord Pleanála
[2015] IECA 272 the Court of Appeal did not consider it necessary to determine that
question. In those circumstances, counsel for the applicant contended that the question
remained open. However, as matters currently stand and, in the absence of any decision
of the Court of Appeal or the Supreme Court to the contrary, the legal position is as set
out in the judgments of Murphy J. and Haughton J. and, accordingly, if it were necessary
to decide this issue, I would be compelled, in accordance with the principles set out in Re
Worldport Ireland Ltd (in liquidation) [2015] IEHC 189 to take the same approach here.
In light, however, of my view that the affidavits are not admissible in any event, it does
not seem to me to be necessary to make any formal determination in relation to this
aspect of the objection raised by the respondent and Silverbirch to the admission of the
late affidavit. I merely observe that, as a High Court judge, I am obliged to follow
decisions of my colleagues in the High Court, in particular, decisions of such recent
vintage which were arrived at following a careful consideration of the issues. For
completeness, I should also make clear that I entirely agree with the views expressed by
Murphy J. and Haughton J. in those cases. For the court to entertain material that was
not placed before the respondent runs the risk of subverting the role of the court in
proceedings of this kind. The court is not engaged in a de novo hearing. The court does
not itself carry out an appropriate assessment. That is a matter entirely for the
respondent. It is not for the court to conduct an appropriate assessment on different
material to what was before the respondent in order to reach a different conclusion. The
task of the court is to assess whether the respondent, in purporting to carry out an
Page 17 ⇓
appropriate assessment, has complied with the requirements summarised in para. 19
above.
the case on the basis of the Statement of Grounds and the affidavit of Mr. O’Sullivan
together with the affidavits and materials placed before the court by the respondent and
Silverbirch. I do not propose to consider the affidavits of Dr. Mee or Mr. Reidy save to
observe that, while the affidavits go beyond the Statement of Grounds in a number of
respects, there are significant parts of the affidavits which are consistent with the
Statement of Grounds. In circumstances where, it will be necessary, in any event, to
address the Statement of Grounds, the applicant can therefore be assured that the case
which it makes will still be determined notwithstanding the exclusion of these two
affidavits. Given that counsel for the applicant has, as previously noted, very properly
conceded that the applicant is confined to the case made in the Statement of Grounds, I
do not believe that the applicant is, in truth, disadvantaged by the exclusion of these
affidavits.
Some subsidiary issues raised by the applicant in relation to the assessment carried
out by the respondent
Grounds, whether the assessment carried out by the respondent complies with the
requirements summarised in para. 19 above. Before doing so, it may be helpful, at this
point, to dispose of one aspect of the case made by the applicant. This relates to an
aspect of the case summarised in para. 20 (c) above. During the course of the hearing, it
was suggested by counsel for the applicant that the respondent had failed to take into
account the submissions made by some of the observers who participated in the course of
the appeal including the Irish Raptor Study Group and Duhallow Environment Working
Group. In this context, I note the submission made by counsel for the respondent that
the task facing the respondent carrying out an appropriate assessment in an appeal of
this kind is not to address submissions as such but the specific issues that arise in the
context of the Habitats Directive. Counsel for the respondent referred to the decision of
Costello J. in O’Brien v. An Bord Pleanála [2017] IEHC 773. In that case, the issue arose
in the context of an EIA rather than in the context of appropriate assessment. However,
it was submitted by counsel for the respondent that similar considerations apply in the
context of appropriate assessment where the focus of the planning authority will be on
the qualifying interests in the protected site and the potential impacts of the development
on those interests. In O’Brien, Costello J. said at paras. 44-45:-
“44. The implications of the submissions of the applicants in this case are that the
Inspector and the Board must examine, analyse and evaluate each of the
submissions or observations validly made to the Board. This is not what is required
by either the EIA Directive or the Act of 2000, which simply requires that the direct
and indirect effects of a proposed development be so assessed, not the submissions
or observations. The arguments advanced by the applicants leads to a result which
would render the provision of s. 172(1J) (c) effectively otiose. Why would the
Oireachtas stipulate that the planning authority or the Board had an obligation to
Page 18 ⇓
consider the submissions and observations submitted by third parties before the
planning authority or the Board informed the public of the main reasons and
considerations for their decision, if they were already obliged to examine, analyse
and evaluate the individual submissions and observations and make that
assessment available to the public under the provisions of s. 172(1J) (b)?
45. In my judgment it was not necessary for the Board (or the Inspector) to examine,
analyse or evaluate the Bowdler Report or the points made in the report or the
experience of the applicants (or their neighbours) in relation to noise in order to
carry out a lawful EIA. It is sufficient that there is an examination, analysis and
evaluation of the direct and indirect effects (including the noise implications) of the
proposed development on the environment as set out in … the Inspector's report.”
light of the very recent decision of the Supreme Court in Balz v. An Bord Pleanála
[2019] IESC 90 where O’Donnell J. (albeit not specifically in the context of either EIA or
appropriate assessment) observed at para. 57:-
“57. the submission was rejected in limine on the basis of a determination that the
matters contained therein were irrelevant. It is a basic element of any decision-
making affecting the public that relevant submissions should be addressed and an
explanation given why they are not accepted, if indeed that is the case. This is
fundamental not just to the law, but also to the trust which members of the public
are required to have in decision making institutions if the individuals concerned,
and the public more generally, are to be expected to accept decisions with which, in
cases, they may profoundly disagree, and with whose consequences they may have
to live. …” (emphasis added).
I do not, however, believe that this always requires that every submission made to the
respondent should be individually addressed in a decision of the respondent or in a report
of an inspector which precedes such a decision. What seems to me to be crucial is that
the points made in submissions should be addressed. In circumstances where there will
frequently be an overlap between submissions made by one observer and another, it
seems to me that it would not be necessary to address every submission by name so long
as the substantive points made in the submissions are each appropriately addressed. As
noted in para. 19 above, it is a crucial part of the exercise which the respondent is obliged
to carry out, in the context of appropriate assessment, that there should be complete,
precise and definitive findings and conclusions regarding any identified potential effects
on the qualifying interests of any European site.
the 28 observations that had been received from interested parties during the course of
the appeal and summarised the principal points made. Among the points highlighted by
the inspector in this section of the report included concerns in relation to the hen harrier,
the potential loss of breeding and foraging habitat for hen harriers, displacement and
disturbance during both construction and operational phases and collision risk; the
Page 19 ⇓
inspector also highlighted concerns with regard to the potential for landslides and peat
slippage and the associated ecological pollution; and the inspector also drew attention to
the concerns that had been expressed that construction of the development would likely
have a detrimental effect on water quality and the hydrological regime of the area with
adverse downstream impacts on aquatic habitats including the Blackwater SAC which
supports a population of freshwater pearl mussel.
in particular, during the course of the submissions made by counsel for the applicant.
This relates to the case made by the applicant that none of the concerns of the County
Council in relation to appropriate assessment are addressed in the inspector’s report.
This submission needs to be put in context. It is clear from a consideration of the report
that the inspector carefully summarised the planning history and the particular history of
the unsuccessful application to the County Council for permission which led to the appeal.
Section 4 of the inspector’s report addresses the process before the County Council in
some detail summarising, inter alia, the decision of the County Council and the reasons
for it and also summarising the reports of the County Council planning department
(including the report relating to the environment which considers the freshwater pearl
mussel) and the report of the biodiversity officer of the County Council that addresses
both the impact on the Blackwater SAC and the impact on the Stacks SPA. However,
counsel for the applicant submitted that, thereafter, when the inspector came to carry out
the assessment for the purposes of Article 6 of the Habitats Directive, there was no
reference back to the concerns of the County Council in relation to the impact of the
development on the freshwater pearl mussel and the loss of hen harrier hunting habitat.
consideration of s. 37 (1) (b) of the 2000 Act that an appeal to the respondent requires
the respondent to treat the appeal as though it were an application that had been made
to it in the first instance. Insofar as relevant, s. 37 (1) (b) provides as follows:-
“…where an appeal is brought against a decision of a planning authority…, the
Board shall determine the application as if it had been made to the Board in the
first instance and the decision of the Board shall operate to annul the decision of
the planning authority as from the time when it was given …”.
planning authority is not unlike the position of the High Court on an appeal from the
Circuit Court under s. 38 (2) of the Courts of Justice Act, 1936 (save to the extent that
the High Court, on such an appeal, is confined to hearing from the same witnesses in
relation to the same subject matter as gave evidence in the Circuit Court). The High
Court hears such appeals without any reference to the decision actually made by the
Circuit Court and reaches its own decision on the evidence heard afresh by it. If
anything, the position of the respondent on an appeal from a planning authority is even
broader than the position of the High Court on an appeal from the Circuit Court. In the
Page 20 ⇓
case of the respondent, it can entertain observations from persons and bodies who did
not participate in the original application before the planning authority.
assessment, would not refer back to the decision of the County Council or the approach
taken by the County Council. It is, in any event, clear from a consideration of the report
of the inspector that he did, as part of his assessment, have regard to the concerns that
were voiced in relation to the freshwater pearl mussel and the hen harrier. The question
is whether the assessment carried out by the inspector (and by extension the respondent)
complied with the requirements summarised in para. 19 above. It is to that issue to
which I now turn.
The assessment carried out by the inspector and the respondent
purposes of carrying out a valid appropriate assessment. As highlighted by Clarke C.J. in
Connelly at para. 8.16, a valid appropriate assessment decision is a necessary pre-
condition to a planning consent in cases where appropriate assessment is required. It is
therefore necessary, in the present case, to consider each of the requirements
summarised in para. 19 above. I deal below with each of those requirements in turn.
Did the assessment identify, in the light of the best scientific knowledge, all aspects of
the development which could adversely affect the hen harrier or the freshwater pearl
mussel?
arises solely in relation to the hen harrier and freshwater pearl mussel since they are the
relevant interests, the subject of the Stacks SPA and the Blackwater SAC respectively,
which are in issue in these proceedings. It is clear from the report of the inspector in this
case that these interests were at the forefront of his consideration of the application.
Potential impacts on the hen harrier
species under the Birds Directive, the likely potential impacts on bird populations within
the development site area would typically include:-
(a) The disturbance of bird communities within the site and the surrounding area which
may lead to the desertion of nest sites during the breeding season or avoidance of
the site by new and returning birds for breeding purposes;
(b) The direct loss of habitat from the construction of the turbine bases and hard
standing area;
(c) The indirect habitat loss through site development works near the turbine locations
and on access tracks to the site which may reduce the extent of suitable habitat
locations;
(d) The risk of collisions with turbine blades.
Page 21 ⇓
site area as a whole. The observations are not confined to the area in the immediate
vicinity of turbines T8 and T9 located on or near Barna Bog. Thereafter, at p.p. 81-85 of
the report, the inspector addresses the potential impacts on the hen harrier in more
detail. He deals, first, with direct disturbance of nesting birds. The inspector notes that it
is acknowledged in the EIS that breeding hen harriers could be disturbed if turbines were
to be constructed in close proximity to nesting territories. The inspector records that
surveys carried out in 2016 and 2017 identified the presence of one territorial pair of hen
harriers within the Barna Bog area approximately 700 metres northwest of the nearest
proposed turbine which successfully raised two juveniles. While the applicant draws
attention to the fact that the observations made by the Irish Raptor Study Group
identified one additional breeding pair in this area, I do not believe that this is material in
the context of the identification of the impacts of the development. The key point is that
the inspector identified the potential impact of the development on breeding pairs.
Whether that is one pair or two pairs is not material. The potential for adverse impacts is
the same whether one is dealing with one or more pairs of hen harrier. The inspector
noted that it was in this context that the Department of Arts, Heritage, Regional, Rural
and Gaeltacht Affairs (“the department”) submitted that, in light of this information,
turbines T8 and T9 should be omitted. The inspector recorded that the department had
made this submission in circumstances where those turbines were located within 1km of
the SPA in an area used regularly by hunting hen harriers and that the loss of hunting
habitat due to disturbance/displacement and mortality attributable to collision are
significant risks which cannot be ruled out.
could be reduced as a result of habitat loss following construction or through disturbance
during the construction phase. The inspector noted in particular that three bird species
(which make up a substantial proportion of the hen harriers’ diet) have been recorded
breeding within the proposed development site. This observation was made by the
inspector in respect of the entire site and is not confined to the immediate area around
turbines T8 and T9. In this context, the inspector, at p. 83, said that he would “reiterate
the concerns raised by the Department…that hen harriers will be displaced from hunting
habitat within 250m of operational wind turbines”.
that a submission had been made that the hen harriers are well known to fly at lower
elevations (below ten metres in height) when hunting and flights at higher elevations will
usually only occur when the birds are returning to the nest, performing display flights, or
simply when flying from one location to another. However, the inspector noted in
particular that juvenile hen harriers are initially quite clumsy and unskilled in the air and
thus would be at a greater risk of collision. The inspector also noted that the majority of
hen harrier flying activity recorded within both the development site itself and the 2016
study area was below 30 metres in height. The inspector explained that this had led to a
submission being made that the risk of collision with the proposed turbines is considered
to be low. However, the inspector added the observation that the collision risk for
Page 22 ⇓
juvenile birds from a nest within 500 metres of a turbine “could be much higher”. The
inspector also noted the submission made by the department that there was evidence in
the previous two-year period of hen harrier mortality within the Stacks SPA due to
collisions with turbine blades and that, as a consequence, the risk of collision may have
been underestimated in previous studies.
to habitat loss. He referred to a number of studies which gave rise to mixed results which
suggested that in some cases there was avoidance of an area of least 250m from a
turbine while in other instances birds had been noted hunting within 50-100 metres of
turbines. The inspector noted that the department had rejected the suggestion made by
the applicant that hen harriers would continue to hunt and had advised that hen harriers
“will be displaced from using hunting habitat within 250m of operational wind turbines
(which would seem to correspond with the UK study referenced in the EIS)”. These
observations by the inspector must be read in conjunction with his observations in
relation to the availability of prey for hunting (summarised in para. 48 above). As noted
in para. 48, three bird species (which are an important source of prey for the hen harrier)
have been recorded breeding on the development site.
development on the hen harrier albeit that the applicant contends that this assessment is
manifestly insufficient and, in particular, does not address anything other than the
immediate area of Barna Bog and turbines T8 and T9. That is an issue that I will address
when I come to consider the next element of the Article 6 (3) requirements. At this point,
I will confine my consideration to the first element of those requirements.
context of the EIA carried by the inspector. However, on p. 118 of his report, the
inspector expressly refers back to this section of the report for the purposes of
identifying, in the context of appropriate assessment, the potential impacts of the
development on the hen harrier. I do not believe that the inspector can be faulted for
taking that course. It is an entirely logical and sensible course to adopt once all relevant
potential impacts for the purposes of appropriate assessment have been identified.
impacts that arise for the hen harrier and, in the course of the hearing before me, no one
has identified a potential impact which has been omitted or overlooked.
The potential impacts on the freshwater pearl mussel
addressed at p.p. 87-90 of the inspector’s report. The inspector considers a number of
surveys of the River Blackwater dealing with the presence of the pearl mussel. The
inspector highlights, in particular, the additional impact assessment appended to the
grounds of appeal which had clarified that, while previously, the nearest recorded
freshwater pearl mussel in the River Blackwater were at or near Lisheen Bridge, a
population of 21 mussels had been observed close to Scrahan approximately 2.6km
Page 23 ⇓
hydrologically downstream of the site boundary (and closer than those previously
recorded at Lisheen Bridge). The inspector then draws attention to the susceptibility of
the freshwater pearl mussel to changes in water quality, the requirement for very high-
quality rivers with clean river beds and waters with very low levels of nutrients. The
inspector also noted the fact that the population of the freshwater pearl mussel in the
Blackwater is currently at an unfavourable conservation status. The inspector then
highlighted that, in these circumstances, it is clear that any further deterioration in
surface water quality within the tributaries and watercourses draining to the River
Blackwater consequent on the development could potentially have a significant indirect
impact on the freshwater pearl mussel.
91-92 and also at p.p. 97-98. The potential negative impacts are not confined to the
construction phase but the inspector also said that potential negative impacts might arise
at the operational stage. The potential impacts comprise:-
(a) The pollution of watercourses with suspended solids due to run off of soil from
construction and clear-felled areas due to disturbance of fine subsurface substrates
in the course of construction and excavations at and adjacent to watercourse
crossings. At p. 98, the inspector specifically refers to the potential for sediment
release during clear-felling and construction phase earthworks and the danger of
the discharge of water with high concentrations of sediment to water courses due
to the dewatering of the excavations required for the turbine and meteorological
mast foundations;
(b) At p.p. 91-92 of his report, the inspector identifies that one of the most significant
potential impacts arising as a direct result of the construction of the proposed
development is the possibility of bog failure/slippage given the peaty subsoil
conditions on site. While this section of his report is not concerned directly with the
issue of the freshwater pearl mussel, peat slippage would have obvious
consequences for the freshwater pearl mussel if peat fragments were to enter the
watercourses leading to the River Blackwater thereby increasing the level of
sediment. In the course of his oral argument, counsel for the applicant placed
some emphasis on the possibility of peat slippage. While I do not believe that this
forms part of the applicant’s pleaded case (and therefore is not an issue that the
applicant is entitled to pursue) I will, nonetheless, for completeness and without
prejudice to any pleading point that may arise, briefly consider the arguments that
were made during the course of the hearing in relation to peat slippage;
(c) The contamination of surface waters during construction (and operational works)
through the accidental release or discharge of hydrocarbons or other contaminated
site run-off. At p. 98, the inspector notes that this could include the risk of sewage
pollution from temporary toilet facilities on site;
(d) Changes to the hydrological regime of the area through the alteration of the flow
rates of streams and rivers; and
Page 24 ⇓
(e) The creation of preferential flow paths for surface water resulting in a significant
increase in the volume of water entering local watercourses which could interfere
with the sustained flow of water particularly during dry weather.
with regard to previous experience of construction projects in the vicinity of the
Blackwater SAC impacting on downstream water quality. While the inspector does not
regard an anecdotal report of serious siltation (raised by the department) as sufficiently
robust evidence, it is clear from p. 90 of the report that the inspector identified that
siltation or pollution of a watercourse is a potential impact of a development of this kind.
This is reinforced by what is said by the inspector at p.p. 118-119 of his report where he
draws attention to the potential for the pollution of watercourses through the release of
suspended solids.
with EIA issues, the inspector, when he came to address the appropriate assessment
issues, specifically referred back (at p.p. 118-119 of his report) to the section dealing
with EIA. With regard to the Blackwater SAC, he also stated at p.p. 119-120:-
“Potential pathways for impact have been identified in the form of a hydrological
connection from the proposed windfarm development site to the SAC, in particular
during the groundworks phase of the construction of the turbines and associated
roadways etc. (such as by way of sedimentation, the accidental release of
pollutants and the risk of landslide). In the absence of more detailed consideration
of mitigation measures (e.g. site management and drainage design measures),
there is the potential for adverse effects on the European Site which will require
further assessment by way of Natura Impact Statement”.
arising from the operational stage of the proposed development, this is something which,
as noted above, he expressly identified at p. 88 of his report. It seems to me that the
passage quoted above which highlights the construction phase does not exclude what had
previously been said by the inspector at p.p. 88-89. It should be noted that the reference
to “the groundworks phase of the construction…” is prefaced by the words “in particular”.
which have the potential to affect the freshwater pearl mussel. In this context, it is clear
from the material available to the respondent during the course of the appeal and in
particular from the expert report of Dr. William O’Connor submitted with the appeal that
the principal aspects of the development which have the potential to have an impact on
the freshwater pearl mussel will arise during the construction phase. At s. 2.1 of Mr.
O’Connor’s report, he identifies that, during the construction phase, the most likely
potential impact of the proposed development is the release of silt laden runoff into
watercourses and subsequent transport of that material to downstream locations with
negative impacts on the freshwater pearl mussel. The potential impacts on water quality
identified by Mr. O’Connor are consistent with the impacts identified by the inspector at
Page 25 ⇓
p.p. 88-89 of his report. It should be noted that, at one point in the hearing, it was
suggested by counsel for the applicant that Dr. O’Connor’s report predated the appeal and
provided no new information that was not already available to the County Council.
However, in the course of the hearing, it was confirmed that Dr. O’Connor’s report was
prepared for the purposes of the appeal. It is dated June 2017 and therefore post-dates
the decision of the County Council in May 2017.
operational phase of the development. He explains that the main risk would arise from
maintenance of the facility when oils and lubricants may be used on site. Again, this is
consistent with what is said by the inspector at p.p. 88-89 of his report.
aspects of the development which have the potential to adversely affect the freshwater
pearl mussel in the Blackwater SAC. As the respondent has adopted the inspector’s
report, I can find no fault with the manner in which the respondent has conducted the
first element of the Article 6 (3) appropriate assessment exercise. The stage 1 screening
exercise carried out by the respondent appears to me to have been conducted wholly
lawfully.
Have the necessary complete precise and definitive findings and conclusions been
made?
findings were made to the requisite standard regarding the identified potential effects on
the hen harrier and the freshwater pearl mussel. As noted in para. 19 above, if planning
consent is to be given for the proposed development, the findings must have no lacunae
or gaps and the respondent must have been able to determine that no reasonable
scientific doubt remains that the development will not have an adverse impact upon the
hen harrier and the freshwater pearl mussel. I deal below, in turn, with the hen harrier
and the mussel.
The hen harrier
of his report and at p.p. 121-122. As noted previously, there is a crossover between what
is said in the report about the hen harrier in the context of EIA and in the context of
appropriate assessment. At p. 122 (in the section dealing with appropriate assessment)
the inspector expressly refers the respondent to his earlier comments in the context of
EIA. It is therefore necessary to consider what is said by the inspector in both sections of
his report.
“On balance, given the inclusion of the hen harrier within Annex I of the E.U. Birds
Directive and the protection afforded to same, the overall suitability of the
Barna/Barna Bog area for hen harrier breeding and foraging activities as
established by historical records and more recent survey work, the proximity of the
Barna lands to the … [Stacks SPA] …, and the availability/potential usage of the
Page 26 ⇓
said lands by hen harrier from within the SPA, I am inclined to conclude that the
Barna area is of local importance to hen harrier and that the proposed development
of turbine Nos. T8 & T9 within same would be likely to have an unacceptable
environmental impact on the hen harrier in the locality given the consequential
loss/disturbance of suitable habitat and the potential risk of collision. Moreover, for
the purposes of appropriate assessment, and having regard to the precautionary
principle, it is my opinion that it cannot be definitively established that the
development of turbines (Nos. T8 & T9) within the Barna area would not have an
adverse impact on hen harrier. Accordingly, in the event of a grant of permission, I
would recommend the emission of Turbine Nos. T8 & T9.
(N.B. in support of the omission of Turbine No. 9, I would refer the Board to the
‘High’ risk weighting applied to the construction of that turbine in the ‘Peat stability
Hazard Ranking Assessment.’ Furthermore, the associated omission of the
road/service infrastructure serving Turbine No. T9 would negate any requirement
for a new crossing of the Carhoonoe Stream thereby addressing the concerns of the
Department…as regards same)”.
equivocal language used in the passage quoted above. In particular, the use of the
words: “on balance” and “I am inclined to conclude…”. Some criticism is also made of the
formula of words used later in the same extract where the inspector said that: “it is my
opinion that it cannot be definitively established that the development of turbines…T8 &
T9 …would not have an adverse impact on hen harrier”. I do not believe, however, that
the language used by the inspector warrants criticism. As counsel for the respondent
made clear, in the course of her submissions, this finding by the inspector in this section
of his report is a finding that the development of the windfarm (by the construction of
turbines T8 and T9) in the Barna Bog area would give rise to an unacceptable impact on
the hen harrier given “the consequential loss/disturbance of suitable habitat and the
potential risk of collision”. As counsel for the respondent noted, there is no requirement
that the inspector has to be satisfied that this risk exists beyond a reasonable scientific
doubt. On the contrary, a precautionary approach must be taken in the context of the
Habitats Directive. Thus, the inspector (and, in turn, the respondent) only has to be
satisfied that the risk cannot be excluded. In my view, this submission of counsel for the
respondent is entirely correct.
of the inspector’s report, the inspector concentrates on the Barna Bog area and does not
address the remainder of the development (i.e. other than turbines T8 and T9). Counsel
stressed that this was particularly important given the recognition in the report that the
development had the potential for adverse effects on hen harriers within the Stacks SPA.
It should be recalled that, as noted in paras. 46 to 50 above, the inspector had previously
identified a number of potential impacts on the hen harrier:-
(a) Mortality due to collision with turbines;
Page 27 ⇓
(b) Site avoidance by foraging birds. As noted in para. 48 above, the inspector had
noted in particular that three bird species (which make up a proportion of the hen
harriers’ diet) have been recorded breeding within the proposed development site.
The inspector did not suggest that this was solely within the area of Barna Bog.
(c) Habitat loss and displacement. In this context, it should be noted that, at p. 79 of
his report, the inspector identified that there were “notable levels of activity within
Reaboy in the vicinity of Turbine Nos. T5, T6 & T7”. This is also potentially relevant
to the issue of mortality risk;
(d) Disturbance of nesting birds. However, the only evidence of nesting birds was in
the vicinity of Barna Bog.
p.p. 121-122 where, referring back to the potential impacts of the hen harrier which he
had identified in the course of his Stage 1 appropriate assessment, the inspector
continued as follows:-
“The NIS has subsequently concluded that, subject to adherence of a series of
specified mitigation measures, there would be [no] adverse effects on the integrity
of the identified Natura 2000 sites as a result of the proposed development.
In order to avoid unnecessary repetition, I would refer the Board to my earlier
comments with regard to the implications of the proposed development for the hen
harrier as set out in my environment impact assessment ….I would reiterate my
opinion that given the inclusion of the hen harrier within Annex 1 of the E.U. Birds
Directive…, the overall suitability of the Barna/Barna Bog area for hen harrier
breeding and foraging activities as established by historical records and more
recent survey work, and the proximity of the Barna lands to the [Stacks SPA] and
the availability/potential usage of the said lands by hen harrier from within the SPA,
I am inclined to include that the Barna area is of local importance to hen harrier
and that the proposed development of Turbine Nos. T8 & T9 within same would be
likely to have an unacceptable environmental impact on hen harrier in the locality
given the consequential loss/disturbance of suitable habitat and the potential risk of
collision. Therefore, for the purposes of appropriate assessment, and having regard
to the precautionary principle, it is my opinion that it cannot be definitively
established that the development of Turbines Nos. T8 & T9 within the Barna area
would not have an adverse impact on hen harriers. Accordingly, in order to ensure
that the proposed development will not adversely affect the integrity of the SPA or
undermine/conflict with the Conservation objectives applicable to same, I would
recommend the omission of Turbine Nos. T8 & T9 by way of mitigation”.
86 (quoted in para. 64 above). The only other relevant observation of the inspector in
this section of his report is at p. 123 where he says (having previously dealt with
cumulative impacts):-
Page 28 ⇓
“Therefore, I consider it reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the information
available, that the proposed development, when taken individually and in
combination with other plans or projects, will not adversely affect the integrity of
the [Stacks SPA] …”.
contained complete precise and definitive findings and conclusions in relation to the entire
development and that the inspector was, in substance, confirming that there were no
issues with the balance of the development over and above turbines T8 and T9. She also
carried out a careful analysis of the submission made to the respondent by the Irish
Raptor Study Group and suggested that the points made by the study group in respect of
adverse impacts for the hen harrier did not withstand scrutiny. Counsel accepted that the
points raised by the study group in relation to the alleged inadequacy of the surveys
conducted was not specifically addressed by the inspector but she submitted that the
criticisms of the surveys were so “manifestly wrong that it’s not something that needs to
be addressed…”.
Raptor Study Group do not withstand scrutiny. She may also be correct in her submission
that there was sufficient material available to allow him to be satisfied that the
development (other than turbines T8 and T9) would not have an adverse impact on the
hen harrier. Given the role of the court in proceedings of this kind, it would not be
appropriate for me to express any view on that issue. However, I cannot accept that the
conclusion articulated by the inspector and adopted by the respondent satisfies the
requirements summarised in para. 19 (b) above namely the obligation to make complete,
precise and definitive findings and conclusions regarding the identified potential effects on
the hen harrier, following appropriate analysis and evaluation in light of the best scientific
knowledge. In my view, there is nothing in the report of the inspector to explain how the
development other than turbines T8 and T9 will not have an adverse impact on the hen
harrier. The material just quoted focusses solely on the Barna Bog and turbines T8 and
T9. It is clear from the earlier sections of the inspector’s report that, as noted in paras.
46-47 above, the potential impacts listed in para. 46 arose in relation to the site area as a
whole. They were not confined to the area in the immediate vicinity of turbines T8 and
T9 located on or near Barna Bog. Accordingly, if the proposed development other than
turbines T8 and T9 was to pass an appropriate assessment (insofar as potential impacts
on the hen harrier is concerned) there would have to be a conclusion reached as to how it
was that the potential impacts previously identified would not, in fact, arise if the
remaining turbines (and associated infrastructure) were to be constructed and operated.
appropriate analysis and evaluation. While there is, very clearly, analysis and evaluation
in the inspector’s report of turbines T8 and T9, there is no equivalent evaluation and
analysis of the remainder of the site. In reaching a conclusion in relation to the balance
of the development, the inspector may have had regard to the material contained in the
Natura Impact Study (“NIS”). In this context, it appears to follow from the decision in
Page 29 ⇓
Connelly that a person in the position of the inspector is entitled to rely on other materials
for the purposes of providing reasons for findings. This appears to be so even where no
express reference is made by the decision maker to those materials so long as it is
sufficiently clear to a reasonable observer carrying out a reasonable enquiry that the
matters contained in the materials in question formed part of the reasoning for the
relevant decision. At para. 9.2 of his judgment in that case, Clarke C.J. said:-
“The test is, in my view, that identified in Christian. Any materials can be relied on
as being a source for relevant reasons subject to the important caveat that it must
be reasonably clear to any interested party that the materials sought to be relied on
actually provide the reasons which led to the decision concerned. In that regard, it
seems to me that the trial judge has, put the matter much too far. The trial judge
was clearly correct to state that a party cannot be expected to trawl through a vast
amount of documentation to attempt to discern the reasons for a decision.
However, it is not necessary that all of the reasons must be found in the decision
itself or in other documents expressly referred to in the decision. The reasons may
be found anywhere, provided that it is sufficiently clear to a reasonable observer
carrying out a reasonable enquiry that the matters contended actually formed part
of the reasoning. If the search required were to be excessive then the reasons
could not be said to be reasonably clear.”
made by the Irish Raptor Study Group in the course of the appeal and it seems to me to
have been incumbent on the inspector in those circumstances to address the substantive
points raised by the Irish Raptor Study Group so as to explain how he came to the
conclusion that the points raised by them did not alter the conclusions reached in the NIS.
In my view, that required the inspector, at minimum, to identify where in the NIS the
relevant analysis is contained which satisfied him that the development (other than
turbines T8 and T9) would not have an adverse impact on the hen harrier. It also seems
to me to have been incumbent on the inspector to explain why he was not persuaded by
the substantive points made by the Irish Raptor Study Group. As noted in paras. 37-38
above, I do not believe that it was necessary for the inspector to address every individual
submission that was made to the respondent so long as the substantive points relevant to
the hen harrier were addressed. There will often be an overlap between the submissions
of one observer and another. The crucial requirement is that the points should be
addressed. If the points are without merit, then that should be stated and the basis for
that view should be explained.
the NIS where, in his view, it provides an appropriate level of assurance that the potential
effects previously described by the inspector at an earlier point in his report will not give
rise to the adverse effects which were identified as potential impacts at the stage 1
screening stage. In particular, there would need to be an answer to the concerns
expressed about the loss of foraging for the hen harrier given the fact recorded in the
inspector’s report that the entire site was frequented by three important species of bird
Page 30 ⇓
favoured by the hen harrier as prey. It also seems to me that the inspector should have
explained how he came to the conclusion that, notwithstanding what he had said (as
noted in para. 66(c) above) about the level of hen harrier activity in Reaboy in the vicinity
of turbines T5, T6 and T7, the development of those turbines and related infrastructure
could safely proceed.
report itself or by reference to specific sections of the NIS, why he was satisfied that the
concerns outlined by him at p. 83 of his report about collision risk (in particular for
juvenile hen harriers, as summarised in para. 49 above) have been satisfactorily resolved.
It seems to me that the inspector should, at minimum, have identified where in the NIS
there is material which explains to the requisite standard (i.e. to the extent that there be
no reasonable scientific doubt) that the development other than T8 and T9 will not give
rise to a material risk of collision.
inspector’s report will be left at a loss to understand how the potential impacts identified
in the report can be said to have been addressed to the extent necessary to enable a
conclusion to be reached, following appropriate analysis and evaluation, that the adverse
impacts previously identified at the screening stage will not arise.
comply with the requirements summarised in para. 19 (b) above. As a consequence, it
seems to me to follow that the third requirement (summarised in para. 19 (c) above) is
also incapable of being satisfied on the basis of the material currently contained in the
inspector’s report. It follows that the decision of the respondent must be quashed on this
ground. As the decision in Connelly makes clear, a failure to comply with the Article 6 (3)
requirements goes to jurisdiction and invalidates a decision taken by the respondent in
breach of those requirements. The only order that can be made in the circumstances is
an order quashing the decision. I am, however, conscious that there may well be
sufficient materials before the respondent which would enable the respondent to make
complete precise and definitive findings and conclusions regarding the previously
identified potential effects on the hen harrier as outlined in the inspector’s report. There
may well therefore be a basis to remit the matter to the respondent for a further
determination. I will, however, postpone making any order to that effect pending further
submissions from the parties.
The freshwater pearl mussel
summarised at para. 55 – 58. It is now necessary to consider whether the Inspector
(and, in turn, the respondent) have made complete, precise and definitive findings and
conclusions regarding the previously identified potential effects on the freshwater pearl
mussel. This is addressed, in the first instance, at pp. 89-90 of the inspector’s report
where he says:-
Page 31 ⇓
“In order to minimise the potential constructional and operational impacts on the
aquatic environment attributable to the proposed development, it is intended to
implement a series of mitigation measures as set out in Section 5.8 of the EIS,
although regard should also be had to the measures contained in Chapter 6: ‘Soil
and Geology’ and Chapter 7: ‘Hydrology’ of the EIS (as supplemented by the
associated appendices and the additional information provided with the grounds of
appeal). Of particular relevance of the context of preserving downstream water
quality during the construction stage is the proposal to implement a spoil
management strategy in conjunction with a surface water management plan in
order to prevent sediment-laden surface water runoff from the earth works entering
water courses. It is also proposed to prepare a detailed Construction and
Environmental Management Plan for the project which will include Construction
Method Statements and a Construction Stage Surface Water Management Plan that
will incorporate various erosion and sediment control measures including the
installation of drainage of runoff controls prior to the commencement of site
development and clearance works; the minimisation of the area of exposed ground;
the prevention of runoff entering the site from adjacent grounds; the provision of
appropriate control and containment measures on site; the monitoring and
maintenance of erosion and sediment controls throughout the project; and
establishing vegetation as soon as practical on all areas where soil has been
exposed. These measures are to be further supplemented by a Habitat
Management Plan, the inclusion of an emergency erosion and soil control response
plan as a contingency measure in the Surface Water Management Plan, the
implementation of a water sampling programme both before and during
construction, and the adoption of best practice techniques including the installation
of interceptor drains, silt fences, check dams, silt traps and settlement/siltation
ponds etc.
It is also proposed to implement an Operational Phase Environmental Management
Plan for the monitoring of wildlife for the efficacy of the mitigation measures to be
undertaken both during and post construction.
Whilst I would acknowledge that concerns have been raised by the Department …
as regards previous experience of construction projects impacting on downstream
water quality … and that reference has been made to an anecdotal report of serious
siltation of an upper Blackwater Watercourse being attributable to the construction
of a windfarm with general mitigation measures similar to those cited in the
submitted EIS, in my opinion, this does not form a sufficiently robust basis on
which to refuse permission for the subject proposal. In the event that any siltation
or pollution of a watercourse could be attributed to a particular development
project, I would suggest that it would be necessary in the first instance to
definitively ascertain the actual cause of the pollution event. For example, it is
unclear whether or not the occurrence of any such situation would be attributable
to a deficiency in the overall design of the project or the mitigation measures
Page 32 ⇓
proposed or whether it arose from a failure by the developer/contractor to
adequately adhere to the prescribed programme of mitigation.
Accordingly, having reviewed the submitted information, including the measures to
be implemented with respect to drainage design and site management during the
construction and operational phases of the proposed development, in addition to
the proposal to conduct water quality monitoring during all phases of the project
which would allow for the opportunity to review and revise measures as
appropriate, it is my opinion that the risk of a detrimental impact on downstream
water quality and the consequence of same on aquatic ecological considerations can
be satisfactorily mitigated both through the nature/design of the works proposed
and the implementation of an appropriate programme of pollution control measures
which are linked to good construction and site management best practice.”
issues. However, in common with the hen harrier, the inspector effectively adopts this
section of his report when he comes to address the appropriate assessment issues. A
number of criticisms were made by counsel for the applicant of this passage. In support
of the case made in the statement of grounds (summarised in para. 20(g) above),
counsel emphasised that the Construction and Environmental Management Plan (“CEMP”)
is not yet in existence and therefore could not be assessed by the inspector. He also
drew attention to what he described as the “vague” and “aspirational” nature of the
Surface Water Management Plan (“SWMP”).
counsel criticised the approach taken by the inspector on the basis that the inspector did
not satisfy himself as to what happened in relation to the unnamed development
mentioned in the anecdotal report. However, that is not part of the case made in the
statement of grounds and I therefore do not believe that it is something that I should
address in this judgment. Moreover, the failure of another developer to take appropriate
steps to prevent ecological damage would not, in any event, have entitled the inspector to
take an adverse view in respect of the development proposed by Silverbirch.
specifically address the concerns expressed by the Duhallow Environment Working Group.
I cannot accept that this criticism is valid. The submissions made by that group do not
appear to me to raise any issue which is not addressed by the inspector. I therefore do
not propose to consider this criticism further in this judgment. As noted in para. 38
above, I do not believe that it is necessary that every individual submission should be
identified by name so long as the relevant substantive points made in the submission are
appropriately addressed.
in para. 77 above suggests that the assessment carried out by the inspector was done to
an EIA standard even though the stage 2 appropriate assessment requires a much higher
standard. Counsel also argued that this section of the inspector’s report does not engage
Page 33 ⇓
with the essential elements of the Article 6(3) test and he highlighted in particular that
there is no finding in this section of the inspector’s report that the development will not
adversely affect the integrity of the Blackwater SAC and the freshwater pearl mussel in
particular.
a later stage in his report, to carry out a stage 2 appropriate assessment. As noted above
in the context of the hen harrier, the inspector, at p. 121 of his report, draws attention to
the NIS which he suggests has concluded that “subject to adherence to a series of
specified mitigation measures, there would be [no] adverse effects on the integrity of the
identified Natura 2000 sites as a result of the proposed development”.
the Blackwater SAC, at p. 122 as follows: -
“Similarly, I would refer the Board to my earlier comments with regard to the
hydrological implications of the proposed development as set out in my
environmental impact assessment of the subject application. In my opinion, this
outlines how the design of the proposed development, when taken in combination
with specified mitigation measures, will not adversely impact on the integrity of the
Blackwater … [SAC] and thus will not compromise its qualifying interests …
Therefore, I consider it reasonable to conclude, on the basis of the information
available, that the proposed development, when taken individually and in
combination with other plans or projects, will not adversely affect the integrity of …
the Blackwater … SAC in view of the sites conservation objectives”.
it contains no analysis or evaluation of the mitigation measures and that it does not
explain how the inspector came to the conclusion that the mitigation measures were
sufficient to allow a conclusion to be reached, capable of removing any scientific doubt,
that the freshwater pearl mussel would not be adversely affected by the proposed
development. In addition, counsel emphasised the points made in the statement of
grounds summarised in para. 20(a), (f) and (g) above. Counsel also criticised the report
because it does not set out what the mitigation measures are. While I agree that it would
be preferable that the mitigation measures should have been set out, it is nonetheless
clear from the decision of the Supreme Court in Connelly that a party in the position of
the respondent (and this applies equally to an inspector of the respondent) is entitled to
rely on other documents submitted in the course of the appeal if it is sufficiently clear to a
reasonable observer carrying out a reasonable enquiry that the material contained in
those documents actually formed part of the reasoning relied on for the purposes of
making the relevant decision. Thus, it will be necessary to consider the relevant material
before the board to ascertain whether it would be sufficiently clear to a reasonable
observer carrying out a reasonable enquiry that the inspector had a proper basis to form
the view that the proposed development would not have an adverse impact on the
Page 34 ⇓
freshwater pearl mussel. The material available to the respondent is considered in paras.
86 to 93 below.
completeness, address the inspector’s assessment of the issue relating to peat stability.
As noted in para. 55 above, the inspector identified that the most significant potential
impact arising as a direct result of the construction of the proposed development is the
possibility of bog failure/slippage given the peaty subsoil conditions on site. While issues
relating to peat stability do not appear to me to form part of the applicant’s pleaded case,
it should be noted that at p.p. 93-97 of his report, the inspector carries out a careful
review of the information in relation to peat slippage. The inspector identified a number
of discrepancies in the peat stability assessment submitted on behalf of Silverbirch. In
particular, he recalculated the relevant factors of safety in respect of the turbines and also
in respect of the proposed Ballynahulla substation. At p. 96 the inspector identified that
the approach taken in the EIS in relation to historical peat failures in the area was to
apply the precautionary principle. Having regard to that principle, Silverbirch, in the EIS
utilised a conservative risk allocation for historical failure. While a peat slide had occurred
in the Sliabh Luachra area in 1896, there were a number of factors which justified a risk
ranking for the affected areas of the site as “very low” or “low”. In this context, a
number of factors were considered including the fact that significant peat extraction had
taken place in the intervening 121 years. There was also now the presence of extensive
man-made and natural drainage channels which serve to limit the presence of water on
the affected slopes. At p. 97, the inspector came to the conclusion that the peat stability
analysis, notwithstanding certain discrepancies in the material submitted by Silverbirch
(which he effectively corrected himself through the analysis undertaken by him)
established that the proposed development can safely proceed without giving rise to peat
slippage. This is subject to the implementation of a series of mitigation measures. It
seems to me, on the basis of the extensive analysis undertaken by the inspector in
relation to the peat slippage issue, the inspector has arrived at a decision (following
evaluation and analysis) which meets the requirements of the case law, in particular the
decision of the High Court in Kelly and of the Supreme Court in Connelly.
Connelly, to consider the material available to the respondent in relation to the freshwater
pearl mussel. In this regard, very extensive material was placed before the respondent by
Silverbirch to address the concerns in relation to the Blackwater SAC and the freshwater
pearl mussel in particular. At s. 5.1.1 of the EIS, it was acknowledged that particular care
is required with regard to the Blackwater and its feeder streams that drain the proposed
development. The EIS stated that protection of these water courses “will be imperative in
preventing water quality deterioration downstream”. The EIS also stated that best
practice pollution control measures (which are described in detail elsewhere) will be
employed during the construction phase to prevent the transport of deleterious
substances to the Blackwater SAC. In this context, it was specifically stated:
Page 35 ⇓
“release of suspended solids to all surface waters will be controlled by interception
(E.G. Silt Traps) and management of site runoff. Any surface water run-off must
be treated to ensure that it is free from suspended solids, oil or any other polluting
materials”.
caught by condition 2 of the conditions imposed by the respondent in its decision to grant
permission. Condition 2 requires that all of the environmental, construction and
ecological mitigation measures set out in the EIS, the NIS and the other particulars
submitted with the application (expressly including the report of Dr. William O’Connor
discussed further below) should be implemented by Silverbirch. Counsel for Silverbirch
submitted (correctly in my view) that the passage quoted above, although it does not say
so in terms, amounts to a “zero silt requirement” equivalent in its effect to the express
condition contained in the decision of the respondent in the People Over Wind Case. I
should also make clear that, in my view, condition 2 goes significantly further than what
was described by counsel for the applicant, during the course of the hearing, as the
standard or “generic” condition requiring that all environmental and ecological mitigation
measures should be implemented. Condition 2 specifically addresses the mitigation
measures in respect of the freshwater pearl mussel since it refers, in terms, to the pearl
mussel impact assessment (i.e. the report of Dr. O’Connor).
the mitigation measures which are proposed to be used in this case. He explained that
the drainage from the windfarm development will be kept separate from the natural
drainage on the site and that the drainage from the development site will not discharge
directly to water courses but instead will be discharged over land through the use of level
spreaders after any siltation has settled out in settlement ponds. He drew attention to
the objective of the SWMP which is to ensure that the drainage network for the
development does not impact on the existing natural drainage network on the subject
site. Thus, at s. 3.1 of the SWMP it is specifically stated that it is a fundamental principle
of the drainage design that: -
“… clean water flowing in the upstream catchment, including overland flow and flow
in existing drains, is allowed to bypass the works areas without being contaminated
by silt from the works. This will be achieved by intercepting the clean water and
conveying it to the downstream side of the works areas either by piping it or
diverting it by means of new drains or earth mounds. In the same section of the
SWMP, it is explained that the mitigation measures proposed are designed to the
standard recommended in a 2006 study of freshwater pearl mussel populations in
the Lutter River in Germany by Altmuller & Dettmer. The significance of this is that
the measures described in Altmuller & Dettmer are specifically referred to in the
sub Basin Management Plan for the Blackwater as the appropriate standard of
sediment control for construction projects within the sub basin. The Altmuller &
Dettmer study describes a two phase treatment system comprising a sediment trap
and plant filtration bed. Water from construction works first enters the sediment
Page 36 ⇓
traps and then flows through the plant filtration bed. There is a secondary
vegetative system which attenuates and absorbs the residual particles which do not
settle in the sediment trap. According to the SWMP this two phase system has
proven to be successful in the protection and influential in the restoration of the
resident freshwater pearl mussel pollution in the Lutter river in Germany. However,
as the SWMP makes clear, the system which is to be put in place here adds a
further phase to the Altmuller & Dettmer system. This will involve a secondary
treatment system in the form of a graded gravel filter bed through which water
from the ponds will pass before being dispersed across a wide area of vegetation”.
and for every 1.2 km area of internal access road ensuring that each item of windfarm
infrastructure will have its own individual three tier treatment system including settlement
pond and vegetative filter. In addition to this system, the SWMP describes additional
measures to minimise sediment and erosion at source by minimising exposed areas,
establishing vegetation, road cleaning, silt fences, check dams, wheel washes, and the
avoidance of works in or near water courses.
SWMP. A detailed description of the settlement pond design is contained in s. 4.5.
Detailed descriptions of the attenuation design are contained in s. 4.6. In s. 4.3.11, a
commitment is given that the drainage and treatment system will be managed and
monitored at all times particularly after heavy rainfall events during the construction
phase. The drainage and treatment system will be regularly inspected and maintained to
ensure that any failures are quickly identified and repaired so as to prevent water
pollution. Similarly, s. 4.3.1.3.1 requires that continuous turbidity monitors will be
installed upstream and downstream of the site in the river Blackwater which will relay
real-time information and can trigger an alarm if limit values are being approached. This
will give advance warning of a potential difficulty. The relevant limits in this regard are
set out in Dr. O’Connor’s report at p. 7. These limits are in accordance with the
recommendations in the Freshwater Pearl Mussel Conservation Status Assessment Report
published by the National Parks & Wildlife Service (“NPWS”) in 2015. It is confirmed on
p. 20 of Dr. O’Connor’s report that, prior to construction, the aquatic monitoring
programme will be agreed in consultation with NPWS and Inland Fisheries Ireland (“IFI”).
In addition, a weekly monitoring report will be forwarded to (among others) NPWS and
IFI. Crucially, all of these commitments are caught by condition 2 attached to the
respondent’s decision and will therefore be fully enforceable.
s. 4.4, it provides that, following construction, runoff on the roads, hardstands and other
work areas will continue to be directed to the outfall weirs. The check dams within the
drainage channels will remain in place to ensure that runoff continues to be attenuated
and dispersed across existing vegetation. Water monitoring will continue during years
one and two of the operational phase, commencing after the complement of construction.
The sediment ponds will be kept in situ once construction has been completed.
Page 37 ⇓
earlier version of the SWMP, that its terms were vague and uncertain; that the mitigation
measures were generic and were not specifically designed with the Freshwater Pearl
Mussel in mind. It is unnecessary to form any view as to whether those criticisms were
well founded with regard to the first version of the SWMP. However, in light of the very
considerable detail that is contained in the SWMP which was before the respondent and in
light of the standard by which the mitigation measures were to be applied (namely the
Altmuller & Dettmer report), I do not believe that these criticisms are justified in the case
of the SWMP which was considered by the inspector and the respondent. Moreover, the
SWMP must also be read in conjunction with the report of Dr. O’Connor. In that report,
Dr. O’Connor reviews the SWMP and he expresses the view that the highest standards of
surface water quality management and pollution control will be employed during the
construction of the development. Among the features which he highlighted was the use
of sedimats which will be used in water courses draining the site. Dr. O’Connor explained
that these sedimats have been successfully used downstream of drainage maintenance
works on the River Nore in Co. Laois upstream of the location of a population of Nore
pearl mussels (which are a particularly rare species of freshwater pearl mussel). Dr.
O’Connor also draws attention to the use of continuous turbidity monitors which will
provide real-time information and can trigger an alarm if limit values are being
approached. Dr. O’Connor expresses the view that, because the development has taken
on board key elements and the recommendations of the Blackwater sub-basin
management plan, it will be part of the solution rather than the problem for the
Blackwater catchment. Crucially, having reviewed the mitigation measures and the
proposed monitoring Dr. O’Connor expresses the following view in relation to predicted
impacts: -
“the developers demonstrated via a detailed surface water management plan
(including erosion and sediment control details) the intention and ability to protect
water quality. With agreement of method statements and a monitoring programme
with IFI and NPWS, implementation of mitigation measures proposed and due to
the considerable distance upstream of the nearest FPM population, no impacts on
FPM are predicted to occur as a result of the proposed development. The mitigation
measures are also considered to be sufficient to protect aquatic species such as
salmon and trout which are present in the streams on and near sites. The
measures will be more than sufficient to protect the nearest FPM population which
occurs c.2.6 downstream of the boundary of the site and both distance and water
dilution will provide further significant protection to this mussel population”.
impressive. Given the approach taken by the Supreme Court in Connelly, it seems to me
that the SWMP and the report of Dr. O’Connor in this case provide extensive analysis and
evaluation which assist in understanding the conclusion reached by the inspector and
subsequently, by the respondent that the proposed development will not have an adverse
impact on the freshwater pearl mussel in the Blackwater SAC.
Page 38 ⇓
the case made by the applicant at the hearing before me:-
(a) In the course of opening the report of Dr. O’Connor to the court, counsel for the
applicant drew attention to the manner in which Dr. O’Connor dealt with the
potential for a landslide or a peat slide. In this context, it should be noted that
Sliabh Luachra was the scene of a natural disaster in 1896 when a moving bog
caused a number of fatalities in the area. As noted above, a concern in relation to
peat slippage does not appear to me to be part of the case made in the statement
of grounds and to the extent that I address it below, I do so for completeness and
without prejudice to the fact that this case has not been pleaded.
(b) Secondly, as summarised in para. 20 above, the applicant contends that the
conditions attached to the decision of the respondent impermissibly leave over for
consideration to a later stage, the construction-stage details of proposals for the
management of surface water through a Construction Stage SWMP. It might also
appear from the passage of the inspector’s report quoted in para. 77 above that a
CEMP of any kind has yet to be prepared.
Peat slippage
in the report of Dr. O’Connor notes as follows:-
“The risk of a potential bogburst or landslide occurring on the site as a consequence
of the works required to facilitate construction of the windfarm is negligible.
Therefore, the risk of serious pollution or siltation of the watercourses occurring as
a consequence of such an incident is negligible subject to the appropriate mitigation
measures outlined… in the EIS”. (emphasis added).
entirely the wrong standard. He argued that it was clear that this fell far short of the
“reasonable scientific doubt” standard. However, in response, counsel for the respondent
strongly urged that a negligible risk of an adverse impact was not sufficient to warrant
refusal of a planning consent. She argued that Article 6(3) does not require that the risk
of adverse effects should be ruled out to the standard of absolute certainty. She relied, in
this context, on the judgment of the CJEU in Case C-236/01 Monsanto [2003] ECR I-
8166. That case was concerned with novel food ingredients which are regulated by
Regulation (EC) No. 258/97 (“The Novel Foods Regulation”). Under the Novel Foods
Regulation, novel foods cannot be placed on the market for human use without first giving
notice to the EU Commission. However, there is an accelerated and simplified procedure
for the authorised use of such foods where, on the basis of scientific evidence, the novel
foods are substantially equivalent to existing foods or food ingredients as regards their
composition, nutritional value, metabolism, intended use and the level of undesirable
ingredients. In that case, the simplified procedure was used by Monsanto in order to
place on the market novel foods derived from maize. The Italian Health Ministry alleged
that the use of the simplified procedure was improper. The Ministry was concerned that
Page 39 ⇓
the proposed product contained a number of transgenic ingredients. The Italian Ministry
expressed concern that the product would be a danger to human health. However, the
Commission consulted the EU Scientific Committee for Food which expressed the view
that the information presented by the Italian Ministry did not provide specific scientific
grounds for considering that the use of the novel foods at issue endangered human
health. Nonetheless, the Italian authorities issued a decree prohibiting the sale of the
product. This was challenged by Monsanto. While the facts of this case are very different
from the present case, counsel for the respondent argued that the approach taken by the
CJEU is instructive given that, in common with Article 6(3) of the Habitats Directive, the
Novel Foods Regulation proceeds on the basis of the precautionary principle. Counsel also
highlighted the fact that the decision of the CJEU in Monsanto was subsequently cited by
the CJEU in its seminal decision in the context of Article 6(3) in Case C-127/02
Waddenzee [2004] ECR I-7448 at para. 59. Crucially, Monsanto was cited in the context
of reasonable scientific doubt (as para. 59 of the judgment in Waddenzee makes clear).
“If the twofold objective of [the Novel Foods Regulation], namely ensuring the
functioning of the internal market in novel foods and protecting public health
against the risks to which those foods may give rise, is not to be adversely affected,
protective measures adopted under the safeguard clause may not properly be
based on a purely hypothetical approach to risk, founded on mere suppositions
which are not yet scientifically verified”. (emphasis added).
case, Advocate General Kokott expressed the view that absolute certainty is not required
under Article 6(3). At paras. 107-108 of her opinion, she said:-
“107. However, the necessary certainty cannot be construed as meaning absolute
certainty since that is almost impossible to attain. Instead, it is clear from the
second sentence of Article 6(3)… that the competent authorities must take a
decision having assessed all the relevant information which is set out in particular
in the appropriate assessment. The conclusion of this assessment is, of necessity,
subjective in nature. Therefore, the competent authorities can, from their point of
view, be certain that there will be no adverse effects even though, from an
objective point of view, there is no absolute certainty.
108. Such a conclusion of the assessment is tenable only where the deciding authorities
at least are satisfied that there is no reasonable doubt as to the absence of adverse
effects on the integrity of the site concerned. As in the case of a preliminary
assessment – provided for in the first sentence of Article 6(3)… – to establish
whether a significant adverse effect on the site concerned is possible, account must
also be taken here of the likelihood of harm occurring on the extent and nature of
the anticipated harm. Measures to minimise and avoid harm can also be of
relevance. Precisely where scientific uncertainty exists, it is possible to gain further
Page 40 ⇓
knowledge of the adverse effects by means of associated scientific observation and
to manage implementation of the plan or project accordingly”.
the same case that the Article 6(3) standard is a stringent one. As all of the case law
makes clear, planning consent can only be granted where the deciding authority is
satisfied that there is no reasonable doubt as to the absence of adverse effects on the
relevant protected interest. However, it is striking that in para. 59 of its judgment, the
CJEU expressly cited the Monsanto decision in the context of reasonable scientific doubt.
At para. 59, the CJEU said:-
“59. Therefore, pursuant to Article 6(3)…, the competent national authorities, taking
account of the conclusions of the appropriate assessment of the implications of [the
relevant development] for the site concerned, in the light of the site’s conservation
objectives, are to authorise such activity only if they have made certain that it will
not adversely affect the integrity of that site. That is the case where no reasonable
scientific doubt remains as to the absence of such effects (see, by analogy, Case C-
236/01 Monsanto…, para. 106 and 113)”.
para. 97 above) is the paragraph which expressly says that decisions should not be made
on a purely hypothetical approach to risk founded on mere suppositions which are not
scientifically verified. Thus, although the CJEU, in para. 59 of its judgment in Waddenzee
refers to the planning authority having “made certain that [the development] will not
adversely affect the integrity of that site”, the CJEU was clearly not intending to override
or reverse the approach taken previously in Monsanto. On the contrary, the CJEU was
reiterating the approach taken in para. 106 of Monsanto. In the circumstances, it seems
to me that the submission of counsel for the respondent is correct. As an expert body,
the respondent is in a much better position than the court to form a view as to whether a
risk which was described by an expert as no more than “negligible”, is sufficiently remote
to be discounted in the context of an Article 6 (3) appropriate assessment of risk. In my
view, having regard to the approach taken in Monsanto, the respondent was not required
to be absolutely certain that a bog movement or landslide would never occur in the
future. The relevant standard is reasonable doubt.
Post consent conditions
conditions imposed by the respondent and contends in particular that the conditions leave
over a number of matters for consideration at a later stage, post consent. The applicant
submits that this is contrary to the approach taken by the CJEU in Holohan. The applicant
also contends that condition 17 imposes no more than generic construction techniques
and does not include a zero silt requirement such as the condition imposed in the People
Over Wind case.
102. In Holohan, the CJEU made clear that a planning authority may only leave matters over
for future determination where the authority is certain that the planning consent
Page 41 ⇓
establishes sufficiently strict conditions to guarantee that the integrity of the Natura site
will not be adversely affected. At para. 47 of its judgment in Holohan, the CJEU said:-
“ … Article 6(3) … must be interpreted as meaning that the competent authority is
permitted to grant to a plan or project development consent which leaves the
developer free to determine later certain parameters relating to the construction
phase, such as the location of the construction compound and haul routes, only if
that authority is certain that the development consent granted establishes
conditions that are strict enough to guarantee that those parameters will not
adversely affect the integrity of the site.”
respondent had left over for future determination the details of the CEMP relating to the
method statements for construction, the location of the site and material compound and
the other elements of the construction required for the development to be carried. One
might also get a similar impression from what is said by the inspector at p.p. 89-90 of his
report (quoted in para. 77 above) where he speaks of the proposal to prepare a detailed
CEMP and a construction stage SWMP. However, condition 16 and the relevant section of
the inspector’s report must both be read in context. In particular, they must be read in
the context of condition 2 and the detailed mitigation measures which are required to be
put in place as a condition of the grant of permission. Under condition 2, Silverbirch is
required to implement all of the environmental, construction and ecological mitigation
measures set out in the EIS, the NIS and the other particulars furnished in the course of
the planning appeal process including Dr. O’Connor’s report. These include, insofar as
condition 16 is concerned, all of the material set out in Chapter 2 of the EIS dealing with
the construction of turbine foundations, associated crane hardstanding areas, drainage
infrastructure, borrow pits/repositories, windfarm entrances and access roads which are
described at p.p. 657-662 of the EIS. They also include the detail in relation to
construction materials, tree felling, forestry replanting works, site establishment
(including temporary site facilities and access) at p.p. 678-679 of the EIS. In addition,
further details are given in relation to crane hardstanding area construction, turbine
foundation construction and drainage construction and borrow pits at p.p. 680-683 of the
EIS. Thus, it is clear that the matters listed in condition 16 are already addressed in
detail in the material which must be read with condition 16. The CEMP required under
condition 16 is necessary so that the local planning authority will be in a position to
maintain oversight and control during the construction phase. As counsel for the
respondent said, in the course of oral submissions, condition 16 is not, as contended by
the applicant, a licence to agree terms and conditions in the future. It must be seen
against the framework of what has been already been addressed in detail in the EIS. To
paraphrase what has been said by the CJEU in Holohan, the decision of the respondent
contains conditions in condition 1 and condition 2 that are, when read with the underlying
documents, detailed enough and strict enough to ensure that the parameters of condition
16 will not adversely affect the Blackwater SAC or the freshwater pearl mussel in
particular.
Page 42 ⇓
construction, construction-stage details of proposals for the management of surface water
by means of a construction SWMP must be submitted to and agreed with the planning
authority. Again, if one read condition 17 on its own, one might form the impression that,
contrary to Holohan, the decision of the respondent left over important matters to be
agreed in the future. However, as in the case of condition 16, it is clear that the
parameters of the SWMP have already been addressed in detail in the material filed
during the course of the appeal, in particular in the SWMP described in paras. 88 to 90
above. By virtue of conditions 1 and, in particular, condition 2, Silverbirch is obliged to
carry out surface water management measures in accordance with the existing SWMP.
The purpose of condition 17 is to ensure that the local planning authority will be in a
position to oversee and monitor the carrying out of those surface water management
measures in accordance with the criteria set out in the SWMP which has already been
reviewed and accepted by the respondent. In those circumstances, I cannot see how
there is any breach of the principles laid down by the CJEU in Holohan insofar as condition
17 is concerned.
than a requirement to follow generic construction techniques and that the condition fails
to impose a zero silt limit such as that imposed in the People Over Wind case. However,
as discussed in paras. 86-87 above, there is, in substance but not in name, a zero silt
requirement in this case as a consequence of the commitment made by Silverbirch that
any surface water run-off must be treated to ensure that it is free from suspended solids
oils or any other polluting material. Furthermore, there are a suite of very specific
measures which Silverbirch is required to take in this case (as outlined in paras. 88 to 91
above) which are very clearly designed to ensure that sediment is not released into any
watercourse. Very specific measures are to be put in place which are designed to protect
the freshwater pearl mussel. The measures in question are detailed and impressive and I
do not believe that one can dismiss them as being merely “generic”.
water quality and aquatic ecology including the freshwater pearl mussel. Condition 18
requires that the water quality downstream should not materially deteriorate as a result
of felling or construction. It also requires that proposals for a detailed programme of
water quality monitoring throughout the construction period should be submitted to and
agreed with the planning authorities. Finally, it requires that continuous turbidity
monitors should be installed upstream and downstream of the site during any felling
activities and construction. Similar issues arise in relation to condition 18. The applicant
argues that condition 18 is not sufficiently precise. The case is also made that it leaves
over matters for agreement with the planning authority. There is also a contention that
the relevant standard to which monitoring is to take place is not specified anywhere in the
condition.
17. While condition 18, on its face, might appear to be imprecise and contrary to the
Page 43 ⇓
Holohan principle, it must also be read in context. In particular, it must be read with
condition 2 and with all of the material that was placed before the respondent which
Silverbirch is now required to implement in order to protect the freshwater pearl mussel.
This includes all of the measures previously discussed in paras. 88 to 91 above and the
measures in the report of Dr. O’Connor. That report also provides the relevant limits
against which the requirements of condition 18 are to be assessed. Insofar as matters
are left over for agreement with the local planning authority, it is clear that the measures
in question have already been prescribed in the EIS and the SWMP which were before the
respondent and which are now enforceable pursuant to conditions 1 and 2. It is
important that the local planning authority should have oversight and control over the
carrying out of the measures (the parameters of which are already set out in the material
furnished to the respondent) so as to ensure that Silverbirch and any contractor retained
by it should fully implement the measures concerned.
Conclusions in relation to appropriate assessment
by the applicant in relation to conditions 16, 17 and 18 must fail. It also seems to me
that the balance of the applicant’s complaints in relation to appropriate assessment,
insofar as the freshwater pearl mussel is concerned, has not been made out. The only
element of the applicant’s case that succeeds in relation to appropriate assessment is in
relation to the hen harrier to the extent that it is unclear from the inspector’s report how
a conclusion could have been reached that all of the potential impacts on the hen harrier
had been satisfactorily resolved at the stage 2 appropriate assessment.
EIA
discussion at the hearing (or in the written submissions of the parties) of EIA issues. The
principal argument made on behalf of the applicant was that there was no evidence that
any EIA had been carried out by the respondent. This was on the basis that there is an
absence of any reference to the carrying out of an EIA in the board direction issued by the
respondent or in the decision ultimately made by the respondent. Nonetheless, the
applicant also made a case (as recorded in para. 20 above) that there had been no
satisfactory analysis, evaluation or assessment of the direct and indirect effects and
impacts of the proposed development on the receiving environment contrary to ss. 171A
and 172 of the 2000 Act and Article 3 of the EIA Directive (Directive 2014/52/EU). The
case was also made that the only EIA carried out was in respect of turbines 8 and 9 and
that no assessment of the remaining turbines had been carried out. To that extent, there
was an overlap between the case made in relation to appropriate assessment and in
relation to EIA.
to an EIA in the board direction and decision of the respondent, it can be said that an EIA
was carried out by it. In this context it is clear from the board direction dated 23rd
November, 2018 that the decision of the respondent to grant permission for the
development was significantly based on the inspector’s report and recommendations. The
second paragraph of the board direction expressly states that the respondent:
Page 44 ⇓
“…decided to grant permission generally in accordance with the Inspector’s
recommendation …”.
The board direction also refers to the EIS submitted by Silverbirch.
to, inter alia, the EIS the submissions and observations made in connection with the
planning application and appeal (including the observations and submissions made in
relation to the environmental and Natura impacts of the proposed development), and the
inspector’s report. The decision also expressly states that the respondent accepted and
adopted the appropriate assessment carried out in the Inspector’s report in respect of the
potential effects of the proposed development on the conservation objectives of, inter
alia, the Stacks SPA and the Blackwater SAC. It will be recalled that the inspector, in his
report, expressly adopted, as part of his appropriate assessment, the assessment
previously described in the EIA exercise carried out by him. That said, it is striking that
there is no express adoption by the respondent of the EIA carried out by the inspector.
judgment of Cregan J. in Buckley v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 572. In that case,
there was a sentence in the decision of the respondent in relation to EIA in which the
respondent stated that it noted the inspector’s report. The question which arose for
consideration was whether that was sufficient to establish that the board had adopted the
inspector’s report (which contained a very full EIA). The applicant in that case argued
that there had been no adoption of the inspector’s report as required by s. 172 (1H) of
the 2000 Act under which it is provided that, in carrying out an EIA, a planning authority
or the respondent may have regard to and adopt in whole or in part any reports prepared
by officials, consultants, experts or other advisors.
Supreme Court in Ní Eili v. EPA (Supreme Court, unreported, 30th July, 1999, Murphy J.),
the decision of Clarke J. (as he then was) in Maxol v. An Bord Pleanála [2011] IEHC 537,
the decision of Finnegan J. (as he then was) in Fairyhouse Club Ltd v. An Bord Pleanála
(High Court, unreported, 18th July, 2001), the decision of Kelly J. (as he then was) in
Cork City Council v. An Bord Pleanála [2007] 1 IR 761 and the decision of Baker J. in
Ogalas v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 205. Those decisions demonstrate very clearly
that it is not necessary that the respondent should expressly adopt the report of an
inspector where it is reasonable to conclude that the respondent adopted the reasoning of
the inspector in arriving at its decision. Cregan J. also cited, in this context, the
observations of McCarthy J. in the Supreme Court in Re. XJS Investments Ltd [1986] I.R.
750 where McCarthy J., at p. 756, stressed that planning documents are not to be read in
the same way as legislation emanating from skilled draftsmen. They are to be construed
in their ordinary meaning as it would be understood by members of the public without
legal training. Cregan J. also referred to the judgment of Haughton J. in Ratheniska
Timahoe and Spink Substation Action Group v. An Bord Pleanála [2015] IEHC 18. At
para. 117 of his judgment, Cregan J. came to the following conclusion:-
Page 45 ⇓
“117. On the facts of the present case, it is clear that the inspector carried out an [EIA].
Indeed the Applicant accepts that were this ‘adopted’ by the Board then its
argument would fall away. In circumstances however, where the Board in its
decision, at the very outset, stated that it decided to grant permission ‘generally in
accordance with the inspector's recommendations for the following reasons and
considerations and subject to the following conditions’ and that it had regard to ‘the
report of the inspector’ and that it adopted all 25 conditions in the Inspector's
Report, I am of the view that it is clear that the Board did ‘adopt’ the Inspector's
Report and carry out an appropriate EIA in accordance with its statutory
obligations.”
J. in Buckley. Nonetheless, it seems to me that, applying the principles set out in the
judgment of Cregan J. and the further case law analysed by him, the result must be the
same. In this case, the respondent expressly stated in the board direction drawn up on
the date of the meeting at which the respondent considered the appeal that it decided to
grant permission generally in accordance with the recommendations of the inspector. In
addition, as noted in the decision itself, the respondent expressly states, as part of its
reasons and considerations, that it has had regard to the report of the inspector.
Furthermore, in common with the facts considered by Cregan J. in Buckley, the conditions
attached to the respondent’s decision are precisely those which were recommended by
the inspector. In those circumstances, it seems to me to be reasonable to conclude that
the respondent adopted the report of the inspector for the purposes of arriving at its
decision. Thus, if the inspector carried out an EIA which meets the requirements of s.
171A of the 2000 Act and of the EIA Directive, it follows that this has been adopted by
the respondent. In such circumstances, there is no substance to the complaint made by
the applicant that the respondent failed to carry out an EIA.
statement of grounds) whether the EIA carried out by the inspector satisfies the
requirements of s. 171A of the 2000 Act and the EIA Directive. In this context, it is
important to bear in mind that the focus of the applicant’s case has been the hen harrier
and the freshwater pearl mussel. While that case was principally made in the context of
appropriate assessment, this overlapped with the case made in respect of EIA. The
applicant contended that there had been a failure to examine, analyse and evaluate the
direct and indirect effects of the proposed development on the hen harrier and the
freshwater pearl mussel. There was no attack on the EIA in other respects. This is
unsurprising given the very extensive material contained in the report of the inspector in
relation to EIA. The inspector’s report runs to 137 pages in total. 61 of those pages are
taken up with the very detailed EIA carried out by the inspector which, subject to what I
say below in respect of the hen harrier, assesses the direct and indirect effects of the
proposed development on each of the interests identified in s. 171A (1) of the 2000 Act.
explained in paras. 46-61 above that the inspector has identified all of the potential
Page 46 ⇓
effects on both species in his report. Furthermore, having regard to my finding that
precise and definite conclusions have been reached as to the absence of adverse impacts
on the freshwater pearl mussel, it must follow, in my view, that, for the purposes of EIA,
this amounts, in substance, to a finding that there will be no direct or indirect effects on
the mussel.
drawn attention in paras. 72 - 74 above to the fact that the report is silent in relation to
the effects on the hen harrier in respect of those elements of the development other than
turbines T8 and T9. It seems to me to follow that the report is insufficiently complete to
form the view that the inspector has identified all of the actual effects (whether direct or
indirect) of the development on the hen harrier. As noted in para. 76 above, it may well
be the case that the inspector was in a position to form the view that the development
(other than turbines T8 and T9) would not have an effect on the hen harrier. However, as
the report does not, in my view, rule out the possibility that such effects might occur, I
am compelled to conclude that there was no sufficient evidence that an EIA was
completed in respect of the effects of the development (other than turbines T8 and T9) on
the hen harrier. It seems to me to follow that, accordingly, the decision of the
respondent must be quashed on the grounds that there is insufficient evidence to
conclude that an EIA was completed in respect of the effects of the development on the
hen harrier. However, there may well be a basis to remit the matter to the respondent
for further determination. I will, however, postpone making any order to that effect
pending further submissions from the parties.
Overall Conclusion
respondent must be quashed on the grounds set out in paras. 76 and 117 above. I find
against the applicant in relation to the balance of the claim made by it. I will hear the
parties in due course in relation to any consequential orders that should follow. I will also
hear the parties in relation to whether or not the matter should be remitted to the