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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Minister for Justice and Equality -v- Matysik [2015] IEHC 456 (17 June 2015)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2015/H456.html
Cite as: [2015] IEHC 456
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Judgment
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Neutral Citation [2015] IEHC 456 THE HIGH COURT [2011 No. 36 EXT] IN THE MATTER OF THE EUROPEAN ARREST WARRANT ACT 2003 AS AMENDED BETWEEN THE MINISTER FOR JUSTICE AND EQUALITY APPLICANT AND
PATRYK MATYSIK RESPONDENT JUDGMENT of Ms. Justice Donnelly delivered the 17th day of June, 2015 1. The surrender of the respondent is sought by Poland pursuant to a European Arrest Warrant (“EAW”) dated the 9th June, 2010. There are two points at issue in this case. There is a claim that the respondent should not be surrendered because to do so would breach Section 45 of the European Arrest Warrant Act, 2003 as amended (“the Act of 2003”). There is a separate claim that to return him to Poland would breach his fundamental rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) by reason of the delay in the execution of the EAW. The background to the EAW 3. The original EAW had issued in accordance with the form in the annex set out in the 2002 Framework Decision (2002/584/JHA) on the EAW. In light of the amendments made to the form of the EAW under the European Arrest Warrant (Application to Third Countries and Amendment) and Extradition (Amendment) Act, 2012 which implemented the 2009 Framework Decision (2009/299/JHA) on mutual recognition of trial in absentia, a request was made to the Polish judicial authority for a completed new section (d) of the warrant. In the new section (d), the Polish judicial authority indicated that the respondent appeared in person at the trial. 4. The EAW was endorsed for execution in this jurisdiction on the 26th January, 2011. He was arrested on that warrant at an earlier stage, was released on bail and failed to turn up at the hearing of his s. 16 surrender application. The subsequent arrest took place on the 3rd October, 2014 and he was remanded in custody until the date of the hearing of this s. 16 surrender application on the 8th May, 2015. A Member State that has given effect to the 2002 Framework Decision Section 16(1) of the Act of 2003
b) the EAW, or a true copy thereof, has been endorsed in accordance with s. 13 for execution, c) the EAW states, where appropriate, the matters required by section 45, d) The High Court is not required, under sections 21A, 22, 23 or 24 of the Act of 2003 to refuse surrender, e) The surrender of the person is not prohibited by Part 3 of the Act of 2003 as amended. 7. I am quite satisfied on the basis of the affidavit of Sean Fallon, a member of An Garda Síochána, the affidavit of the respondent, and the details set out in the EAW that Patryk Matysik, who appears before me, is the person in respect of whom the EAW has issued. Endorsement Sections 21A, 22, 23 and 24 Part 3 of the Act of 2003 as amended The Provision of Section 38 12. In accordance with the provisions of Section 38 (1)(b), his surrender is not prohibited. Section 37 - Delay and Fundamental Rights 14. Apart from a complaint about the delay, nothing has been put before the Court in relation to any personal circumstances or family circumstances of the respondent that might mean that it is a disproportionate interference with his Article 8 rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”) to surrender him for the purpose of serving this sentence. It was submitted that there was a delay on the part of the Polish judicial authority in seeking his surrender and certain time limits were pointed to. The case of Minister for Justice and Equality v. Ciecko (unreported, 18th December, 2013, High Court, Edwards J.) was relied upon to establish that delay was a matter that had to be put in the balance when considering whether there was a pressing public interest in the surrender of a person to another jurisdiction. 15. The only personal right that was referred to on behalf of the respondent was his right to liberty. Without having to decide definitively whether a liberty right comes within the meaning of right to respect for private life within the meaning of Article 8 of the ECHR, I have treated it as such for the purposes of this case. It is accepted that deprivation of liberty is a usual consequence of surrender. The issue in this case is whether the deprivation of liberty would be disproportionate to the necessity for the interference with the right to respect for the right to liberty. 16. The matter of delay (and there has been some delay in this case) is a matter that I have to consider in the context of the pressing social need for his surrender. The Polish authorities searched for him in Poland and could not find him. They received information that he was staying in Ireland. An application was made in Poland for the issue of an EAW in June of 2010. The warrant was received in this jurisdiction in January 2011 and endorsed later that month. He was arrested in October 2014. It is clear that Poland were seeking him during the intervening time. He is wanted for 2 separate offences of swindling for which he received a total sentence of 1 year. The two offences and the combined sentence are not insignificant. In all these circumstances, the pressing social need for the surrender of this respondent has been established. There is nothing on the facts to suggest that there is any disproportionate interference with his private life (including his right to liberty) in this case. 17. I have also considered whether the circumstances in which his sentence was reactivated as set out above, raise a fair trial right in respect of his proposed surrender. It is an egregious breach in the system of justice as applicable to the respondent that is required for surrender to be refused on Article 6 grounds. It was for him to establish by cogent evidence that there are substantial grounds for believing that there is a real risk of an egregious breach of his fair trial rights on his surrender. In the circumstances as set out above, I am satisfied that the respondent has not established that there are substantial grounds for believing that he is at real risk of being subjected to an egregious breach of his fair trial rights were he to be surrendered. 18. I therefore reject his objection to surrender under s. 37 of the Act of 2003. Section 45 Conclusion |