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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Sandys & anor -v- Law Society of Ireland [2015] IEHC 363 (12 June 2015)
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Cite as: [2015] IEHC 363
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Neutral Citation [2015] IEHC 363 THE HIGH COURT JUDICIAL REVIEW [2013 No.745JR] BETWEEN GERARD WILLIAMS SANDYS AND BRYAN C. BROPHY APPLICANTS AND LAW SOCIETY OF IRELAND RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Kearns P. delivered on the 12th day of June, 2015 The applicants seek an order of certiorari quashing the determination of the Complaints and Client Relations Committee (‘the Committee’) of the respondent of the 3rd July, 2013 whereby the issue of the applicant’s failure to send an estimate of costs in accordance with section 68(1) if the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994 to the residuary beneficiary of the estate of Ms. Maureen O’Connell, deceased, was referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. Orders are also sought to quash the determination of the Committee that there was evidence of excessive charging by the applicants in respect of three bills submitted to the residuary beneficiary of the estate of the late Ms. O’Connell and directing that the applicants repay the sum of €340,070 to the residuary beneficiary. A further order is sought preventing the referral of the alleged overcharging to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal. BACKGROUND The applicants were retained by Ms. Maureen O’Connell to act as her solicitor during her lifetime and were appointed as executors of her last will and testament. Ms O’Connell passed away on the 5th May, 1998 and a Grant of Probate in respect of her will was extracted on the 7th October, 2004. Her estate was valued at approximately €14,000,000 at that time and the Society of St. Vincent de Paul is the sole residuary beneficiary named in the deceased’s last will and testament. Following the death of Ms. O’Connell, the applicant set about the task of administering her estate. The applicants were required to institute High Court proceedings in 1998 seeking to prove the last will and testament of the deceased and to condemn a subsequent will. These proceedings were eventually settled in March 2013. Circuit Court proceedings were also commenced in December 2005 seeking possession of a premises known as O’Connell’s Bar at 8, Eyre Square, Galway. This valuable licensed premises constituted the principal asset in the deceased’s estate. The defendant in those proceedings issued a counterclaim and those proceedings were ultimately compromised in June 2006 subject to the consent of the Attorney General and the Commissioner for Charitable Bequests and Donations. Once approved, the licensed premises was sold for €14,000,000. Further professional services were provided by the applicants in connection with the extraction of a Grant of Probate and the conveyance of two separate properties owned by the estate, namely the premises at Eyre Square and a site at Castlegar, Tuam Road, Galway. Five separate bills of costs were raised by the applicants in relation to the professional services provided and their fees were discharged out of the deceased’s estate. On the 23rd February, 2011 Mr. Cormac Brennan, solicitor for the Society of St. Vincent de Paul, made a complaint to the respondent Society alleging that the applicants had charged excessive fees for the provision of professional services and had failed to furnish the deceased’s estate with an estimate of the legal fees as required by section 68 of the Solicitors (Amendment) Act 1994. The complaint was referred to the Committee on the 5th September, 2011. Correspondence ensued and the applicant was requested by the Committee to provide detailed schedules to their bills of costs, setting out the nature of the work undertaken and the basis upon which the fees were calculated. Throughout the subsequent months there was a considerable amount of correspondence between the Committee, the applicants and the complainants. Various proposals were put forward as to how to proceed with the matter and how it might be resolved. In January 2012 the Committee suggested that the parties might seek to resolve their differences by agreeing to be bound by the decision of an independent legal costs accountant. However, the parties could not agree as to how the costs for this proposal would be discharged. In July 2012 the Committee engaged the services of Mr. Noel Guiden of Behan & Associates, Legal costs Accountants, to examine the substance of the complaint. By letter of the 12th September, 2012 the Committee advised the parties that the Society would bear the costs associated with procuring a report from Mr. Guiden and the applicant’s solicitors subsequently furnished Mr. Guiden with the applicant’s files for the purpose of examining the complaint and preparing his report. Mr. Guiden delivered his report to the Committee on the 9th November, 2012. Mr. Guiden’s report sets out the five bills of costs which were examined. In relation to the Circuit Court proceedings, for which the applicants had charged €165,000.00 for solicitor’s fees, the report states that “I cannot see any circumstances whereby a fee in the magnitude of the fee charged is justifiable…I am of the opinion that the Solicitor’s professional fee should have been more in the order of €30,000.00/€35,000.00”. In relation to the extraction of the Grant of probate and administration of the estate, Mr. Guiden recommended a fee in the order of €55,000.00/€65,000.00 rather than the €175,000.00 which had been charged. The professional fee in respect of the conveyance of the property at Eyre Square was €140,070.00. Mr Guiden’s report states that if an hourly rate of €300 was applied in respect of the work undertaken, in excess of 460 hours would have to be spent on the conveyance to arrive at the fee charged. Mr. Guiden described this as “highly improbable” and suggested a fee of €35,000.00/€40,000.00 in circumstances where the conveyance was “fairly straightforward”. Mr Guiden did not recommend altering the bills of costs in relation to the High Court proceedings on the basis that the bill had already been compromised and settled. The bill in relation to the conveyance of the Tuam property, for which a professional fee of €1,500.00 was charged, is described as “clearly reasonable”. Mr. Guiden’s report was sent to the parties in November 2012. A meeting of the Committee was scheduled to take place on the 6th February, 2013. However, on the 5th February, the applicants’ solicitors wrote to the Society stating that they were not in a position to have the matter determined at the meeting of the 6th February. This letter further stated that, after considering Mr. Guiden’s report, the applicants wanted an opportunity to submit a report prepared by their own legal costs accountant and former Taxing Master. A number of issues with Mr. Guiden’s report were highlighted, including that it did not consider the level of fees charged before the recession in 2008 and that the report failed to consider the importance of the Circuit Court proceedings to the eventual sale of the property at Eyre Square for a favourable price. An issue was also raised in relation to the requirement to send a s.68 letter to beneficiaries of an estate. At the meeting of 6th February, 2013 the Committee indicated that no additional report of a legal cost accountant of the applicants’ choosing could be submitted but that their submissions to the Committee could be informed by such a report. On the 8th April, 2013, after receiving the draft minutes of the meeting of the 6th February and taking instructions from the applicants, the applicant’s solicitors wrote to the Society objecting to the continuing chairmanship of Mr. Richard Hammond on the basis of a perception that he had pre-judged the complaint and the Committee would not consider a report of a legal cost accountant in response to Mr. Guiden’s report. Mr. O’Dwyer, solicitor for the applicants, states in this letter “It has always been my understanding over many years of practice that the primary purposes of the Complaints and Client Relations Committee was to resolve complaints between the Complainant and the Respondent. I am not aware that any such effort by the Society to resolve the issues between the complainant Mr Cormac Brennan and my client had taken place. Our clients would be amenable to such a proposition…”. By letter dated the 19th April, 2013 the Committee pointed out that Mr. Guiden’s report had been sent to the applicants in November 2012 yet submissions in relation to it were received only on the 5th February, 2013, on the eve of a meeting of the Committee. The Committee states that the applicants had ample opportunity to consult their own legal cost accountant at any stage over the previous two years and that at no time during that period did they put forward any proposal to reduce the fees, which is the usual method by which matters of this nature are resolved. It is reiterated in this letter that at such a late stage in the process the Committee was not willing to consider a separate report of a legal cost accountant and would proceed to determine the matter based on Mr. Guiden’s report. It is denied that the chairman pre-judged the matter and a final meeting was scheduled for 30th April, 2013. Following further correspondence on the issue of the chairman recusing himself, which he refused to do, submissions were filed by the applicants on 29th April, 2013 and the matter was subsequently adjourned to 3rd July, 2013. In the intervening period the submissions of the applicants were forwarded to Mr. Guiden for review. Mr. Guiden submitted his observations to the Committee by letter dated 7th June, 2013. After taking objection to certain matters raised in the applicant’s submissions, he states that “I do not propose commenting individually on any of the items raised in Crean O’Cleirigh & O’Dwyer’s letter of 29th April as there is nothing contained therein which in any way alters my opinion”. The Committee convened on the 3rd July, 2013 in order to adjudicate on the complaints and the decision arrived at was communicated to the applicants’ solicitor by letter dated 8th July, 2013. The decision letter states that the Committee found there to have been a total overcharge of €340,070 and that this sum, plus VAT, should be reimbursed to the complainant no later than 31st January, 2014. The overcharging was also referred to the Solicitors Disciplinary Tribunal along with the failure to send letters in accordance with section 68 of the 1994 Act. No findings were made in respect of inadequate professional services under section 8 of the Act.
STATUTORY PROVISIONS
‘Client’ is defined in section 2 of the Act as follows - ‘“client’” includes the personal representative of a client and any person on whose behalf the person who gave instructions was acting in relation to any matter in which a solicitor or his firm had been instructed; and includes a beneficiary to an estate under a will, intestacy or trust;”
(a) a requirement to refund without delay, whether wholly or to any specified extent, any amount already paid by or on behalf of the client in respect of the solicitor's costs in connection with the said legal services; (b) a requirement to waive, whether wholly or to any specified extent, the right to recover those costs.”
(a) the actual charges, or (b) where the provision of particulars of the actual charges is not in the circumstances possible or practicable, an estimate (as near as may be) of the charges, or (c) where the provision of particulars of the actual charges or an estimate of such charges is not in the circumstances possible or practicable, the basis on which the charges are to be made, by that solicitor or his firm for the provision of such legal services and, where those legal services involve contentious business, with particulars in writing of the circumstances in which the client may be required to pay costs to any other party or parties and the circumstances, if any, in which the client's liability to meet the charges which will be made by the solicitor of that client for those services will not be fully discharged by the amount, if any, of the costs recovered in the contentious business from any other party or parties (or any insurers of such party or parties).” SUBMISSIONS OF THE APPLICANTS
Failure to Afford Fair Procedures It is submitted that basic principles of fair procedures and natural justice require that any person who stands accused of the conduct alleged is entitled to be heard in his defence and to be afforded the opportunity to make the best possible case in reply to the allegations. Counsel refers the Court to the decision in Re Haughey [1971] I.R. 217 where a senior Garda had made a number of allegations about the respondent to the Dáil Public Accounts Committee. After refusing to answer questions before the Committee the respondent was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of six months. On appeal to the Supreme Court the respondent contended inter alia that the Committee’s procedures failed to vindicate his right to natural and constitutional justice. In finding for the respondent, Ó Dálaigh C.J. stated that a person whose conduct is impugned in the course of proceedings before a quasi-judicial body is entitled to the following rights:-
It is submitted that the respondent’s Committee fell into error by refusing to allow the applicants to adduce evidence to rebut the expert opinion of Mr. Guiden. In this regard, counsel relies upon the following statement of Henchy J. in Kiely v. Minister for Social Welfare [1977] IR 267:-
Unlawful delegation of decision making function In Flanagan v. UCD [1988] 1 I.R. 724 the respondent’s disciplinary committee decided that the applicant had been guilty of plagiarism on the basis of a report the disciplinary committee had procured with the applicant’s consent from an independent expert, Professor Hannan. Barron J. held that:-
It is further submitted that any suggestion that the Committee would have been placed in an “unworkable” position were it required to consider a further expert report is an entirely unsustainable proposition. The Committee has a statutory function to adjudicate between competing contentions of fact or legal submissions advanced by all interested parties, and is not entitled to restrict the focus of the inquiry merely to avoid having to prefer one expert opinion over another. It is submitted that by following so closely the report of Mr. Guiden the Committee unlawfully delegated its decision making role.
Failure to give reasons
(1) give to an applicant such information as may be necessary and appropriate for him to consider whether he has a reasonable chance of succeeding in appealing or judicially reviewing the decision; (2) arm himself for such hearing or review; (3) know if the decision maker has directed its mind adequately to the issues which it has considered or is obliged to consider; and In Mallak v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform [2012] 3 IR 297 the Supreme Court identified the obligation to give reasons as a requirement of natural and constitutional justice. Fennelly J. stated as follows:-
Counsel for the applicants submits that the statement of opposition filed by the respondent tacitly accepts that the Committee did not give any or adequate reasons for its decision but now seeks to justify this failure by reference to “the context of the longstanding investigation of the complaint, the express delineation of the issues being considered, the exchange of documentation and the manner in which submissions were received and addressed in oral discussion before the Committee.” It is submitted on behalf of the applicants that the reasons for the determination can not be inferred from the history of the proceedings before the Committee and that, in any event, the applicants were entitled to an explanation as to why their submissions in relation to the fees charged were rejected and why the Committee confined its deliberations solely to the range of figures put forward by its appointed legal costs accountant. It is further submitted that the respondent is now belatedly attempting to offer an explanation for the Committee’s failure to state any reasons for its decision and that the Court should be slow to allow material gaps in the decision making process to be retrospectively filled in by evidence adduced and/or submissions made in the context of these proceedings.
Availability of an alternative remedy It is further submitted that just because the applicants were entitled to appeal the impugned decision does not automatically bar them from seeking the relief within. In this regard, counsel refers the Court to the decision in Doherty v. South Dublin County Council [2007] IEHC 4 wherein Charleton J. stated:-
The applicants submit that the logical conclusion of the respondent's contention is that the applicants should be satisfied with an unfair hearing before the Committee and a fair appeal to this Court. It is submitted that this contention is without merit and that the applicants were entitled to a fair hearing at first instance and also on appeal. In any event, it is further submitted that the respondent's failure to state the reasons for its decision meant that the applicants were unable to discern the basis for the determination impugned or to engage with it in any meaningful way by way of an appeal. In Leary v. National Union of Builders [1970] 2 ALL ER 713, Megarry J. considered the circumstances in which an appeal would not constitute an adequate remedy for a party to whom a decision is addressed. It was held that a failure to afford fair procedures at first instance cannot be cured by an appeal conducted in accordance with the principles of natural justice. Megarry J. stated as follows:-
(b) The court will look at all of the circumstances to ascertain whether the relief sought is one which is more properly characterised for an application for judicial rather than appeal. (c) The court has a discretion to consider an application for judicial review notwithstanding the existence of alternative remedies, and notwithstanding the fact that these alternative remedies were not pursued by an applicant. (d) The essential question for the court is whether the application brought is for the type more properly dealt with by judicial review.”
The Section 68 Letter In Condon v. Law Society of Ireland [2010] IEHC 52 this Court held that the definition of a client for the purposes of the 1994 Act was broadly framed to ensure that beneficiaries could have recourse to the Respondent where solicitors had provided inadequate services. It was held that:-
Counsel refers the Court to the decision of Denham J. (as she then was) in Board of Management of St. Mologa’s N.S. v. Department of Education [2011] 1 IR 362 as authority for the proposition that where words in a statute have a clear, plain meaning they should be so construed. It is further submitted that any other interpretation of section 68 would give rise to an absurd situation where solicitors were compelled to furnish an estimate of costs to a person from whom he has not taken instructions and does not have the capacity to give instructions in respect of the administration of the estate. Moreover, such a beneficiary is not entitled, if dissatisfied with an estimate, to decide not to retain the solicitor concerned. Therefore, counsel contends, furnishing an estimate of costs to such a person would be entirely otiose.
SUBMISSIONS OF THE RESPONDENT
Breach of natural justice
It seems to this Court that the answer to this question depends upon the nature of the investigation being conducted by the Law Society. In very broad terms it can stated that if an investigative process, or investigative processes (if two or more investigations are being run in parallel), has the potential to result directly in the making of an adverse finding or findings against, and/or the imposition of sanctions upon, the person under investigation that person must be afforded the level of fair procedures and respect for his/her natural justice rights appropriate to a formal disciplinary inquiry. If, however, an investigative process is in the nature of a preliminary step, in which the investigator does not have the power to make adverse findings against, or impose sanctions upon, the subject under investigation, and which involves merely the gathering and sifting of information which requires to be assessed in order to determine if there is a basis for the initiation of some further process in the course of which the subject will have a full opportunity to deal with relevant complaints or concerns, eg. a formal disciplinary inquiry, then less formal procedures may be quite adequate and appropriate.”
‘It seems to me that the commencement of an investigation by the Society into allegations of misconduct is potentially a most serious matter for the solicitor in question. From carrying on his professional business, in many instances supporting other colleagues and staff, he may find himself being summoned, within an acute timeframe, to appear before the CCR or other Committee, and suddenly in a most concentrated way he may be fighting for his practice and indeed even his career. His very livelihood may be in jeopardy and may be even eliminated in extreme cases. It is because of these potentially devastating consequences that the legislature has laid down firm and definite rules which are designed to protect and safeguard, not only members of the public, but also members of the Law Society itself. It therefore seems to me that, at a minimum, fair procedures must demand that the Law Society informs a solicitor of its intention to conduct a misconduct investigation and of the statutory provision(s) under which it proposes to do so. Otherwise there is a grave risk to justice.’ 93. In marked contrast to the timeline in the instant case, where the relevant periods stretch from May, 2004 to September, 2007, the solicitors in O'Driscoll were notified by the Law Society of the first complaint on the 25th October, 2005, and the second on the 24th November, 2005. Within two weeks the CCR Committee had determined complaint No. 1 and within three weeks had dealt with complaint No. 2. If the referral to the Disciplinary Tribunal had not been set aside by the court, the solicitors therefore, within a period of about six weeks, would have found themselves the subject matter of a formal disciplinary process involving the Tribunal. This would have occurred in circumstances where they were led to believe that the process in question was solely within the provisions of s. 9 of the Act of 1994. 94. It hardly needs stating that for a solicitor to face an allegation of misconduct, with all of what that might entail, as distinct from an overcharging complaint per se, is a critically more important matter for him, involving as it might the consequences above described. Whilst there is no doubt but that fair procedures would apply before the Disciplinary Tribunal, the passage reproduced from O'Driscoll was intended to reflect what I believe the law to be, namely that one must consider the question of fair procedures at all stages of a tiered process (see para. 70 supra). In considering such issue O'Driscoll found unacceptable an submission that the CCR Committee could carry out an investigation into conduct, even when all known indicators were to the contrary. That could not be fair by reference to any standard, notwithstanding what rights might arise at a later stage to prevent that situation from occurring. O'Driscoll held that the Society must inform a solicitor of the existence of a misconduct inquiry if that is what the Law Society intends or is pursuing. This can be done by any means as stated by way of an example that a reference to a particular statutory provision may well be adequate to satisfy such requirement. However, such would not be the only way of conveying the information. Once a solicitor was so informed, the means and method of so doing was entirely secondary. 95. That, in my view, is what O'Driscoll decided. It is an entire misunderstanding of the decision to suggest that it laid down any general rule which would require what has been described as "the full panoply of natural justice rights" to be applied at every phase of an investigative process. It made no such decision and any reading of it in that regard, is incorrect.”
Delegation of decision making function It is submitted that both parties were afforded an opportunity to address Mr. Guiden’s report and make submissions in relation to it. The respondent denies that the Committee in any way curtailed itself or considered itself to be hamstrung by the report of Mr. Guiden. It is submitted that the minutes of the Committee meeting of the 3rd July, 2013 make clear that the report was considered by the members and some members indicated that the level of fees indicated by Mr. Guiden had been overstated. Nevertheless, the Committee came to the view that in respect of the three bills which it directed be reduced, such reduction should be at the higher level of the range of fees adopted by Mr. Guiden. It is submitted that while Mr. Guiden’s report was sought to enable the Committee to discharge its functions under section 9 and impose a just solution in the absence of agreement between the parties, there was no unlawful delegation of this function and the ultimate decision was arrived at only after detailed consideration of all relevant matters, including the submissions of the applicants. Furthermore, the respondent submits that when the proposal of obtaining a report from an independent expert was initially advanced, the applicants did not object and forwarded their files for review. It was only some three months after the report was published that the applicants first suggested commissioning their own report and this was ultimately not available until April 2013. It is submitted that the matter had come before the Committee on numerous occasions and, despite various proposals, no agreement could be arrived at. In those circumstances, counsel for the respondent submits that the Committee was entitled to adopt the course it did in order to impose a just solution.
Alternative remedy available Counsel further refers the Court to the oft cited dicta of O’Higgins J. in State (Abenglen) v. Dublin Corporation [1984] I.R. 381:-
While an appeal under section 11(1) is not a de novo hearing, the Supreme Court noted in Fitzgibbon v. The Law Society [2014] IESC 48 that the High Court has flexibility to allow the matter to proceed by way of oral evidence. Denham C.J. Stated (at para. 21): -
Failure to give reasons It is submitted that the duty to give reasons is not an absolute one, but exists in order to enable a party affected by a decision to determine whether or not a quasi-judicial body has validly exercised a power conferred on it. In Manning v. Shackelton [1994] 1 I.R. 397 the applicant contended tat the failure by the Property Arbitrator to provide reasons for his award and a breakdown of the sums awarded rendered same ultra vires. Barron J. considered a number of previous cases where the Courts had quashed decisions over the failure to give reasons and noted:-
Counsel for the respondent submits that this must be viewed against the backdrop of a process that was ongoing for in excess of two years and where the primary matters of concern to the Committee had been identified well in advance of the Committee’s decision of 3rd July, 2013. It is submitted that the Committee decision indicates that it is taking the higher level of the alternative figures put forward by Mr. Guiden and that the applicants, having had the report of Mr. Guiden for eight months, could have been in no doubt as to the basis upon which the particular figures were arrived at. Counsel contends that there is no question of an injustice to the applicants on the basis of what is set out in Shackleton. It is submitted that no greater explanation was required in relation to the decision of the Committee to refer the failure to send an estimate of costs under section 68 to the Tribunal in circumstances where the applicants’ solicitors had acknowledged in correspondence that no such letter had been sent. The respondent contends that the same can be said in relation to the referral of the overcharging for an inquiry by the Tribunal. In relation to the direction that a sum of €3,000 be paid by the applicants to the Law Society’s compensation fund, the respondent submits that the reason for this is obvious and that the determination letter states that it relates to “the Society’s costs in investigating the matter”, which, of itself, is a reason. Furthermore, the applicants have also received copies of the minutes of the relevant Committee meeting of 3rd July, 2013 and these constitute a statement of the reasons for the various decisions of the Committee.
Lack of a Section 68 Letter It is submitted that St. Vincent de Paul, as a beneficiary under the will of the deceased, was a “client” of the applicants within the meaning of section 2 of the Act 1994 Act and refers to the decision of this Court in Condon v. The Law Society [2010] IEHC 52 where it was stated:-
…I think the wider definition of ‘client’ as contained in s.2 must necessarily be the correct one. The sole purpose of the work which the applicant was doing was to benefit the beneficiaries. In my view the clear and obvious purpose of s.2 - and the fact that a beneficiary is therein defined as a client - is to ensure that a beneficiary obtains all the protections under the Act which any other client of a solicitor would obtain. I am also satisfied that the purpose of the 1994 Act is not to create two classes of clients, namely those who can make a complaint about inadequate services and those who cannot make a complaint about inadequate services.” Counsel for the respondent submits that the suggestion that St. Vincent de Paul was a client but not a client from whom instructions were taken and there was therefore no need to send a section 68 letter is entirely at variance with the decision on Condon (ibid.) where this Court stated:-
DISCUSSION The Court must next consider whether or not the procedure adopted by the Committee was lacking in fair procedures or in breach of natural justice. In this regard, the Court accepts the submission of the respondent that the role of the Committee was two-fold - it was required not only to carry out an investigation under section 9 of the 1994 Act in relation to alleged overcharging, but was also required to consider whether or not the applicants’ conduct should be referred to the Tribunal. In relation to the section 9 aspect and the alleged overcharging, the applicants’ primary challenge is that the Committee imperilled a fair hearing by refusing to allow them to submit its own independent expert report. However, before this request was made by the applicants in February 2013, the matter had come before the Committee on numerous occasions and, despite the Committee’s best efforts, had dragged on for over two years with no realistic prospect of an amicable agreement between the parties. It was in those circumstances that the Committee had decided to seek the view of an independent legal costs accountant and it is noteworthy that the applicants acquiesced to this process and forwarded their files once the burden of the associated costs was borne by the Committee. The applicants received Mr. Guiden’s report in November 2012 and then, on the eve of a Committee meeting in February, sought permission to submit their own expert report to controvert the findings of Mr. Guiden. In my view, having regard to the role of the respondent in disputes of this kind as set out by McKechnie J. in O’Driscoll, the Committee was entitled to refuse this eleventh hour request and to instead adopt the course it did in an effort to arrive at a ‘fair solution’. It is perfectly clear from the correspondence exhibited that the applicants were in no way prohibited from using their own expert to inform their submissions on Mr. Guiden’s report and they did in fact do so in lengthy submissions filed in April 2013. The minutes of the 3rd July meeting also make clear that these lengthy submissions were considered in detail by the Committee and the Court does not accept that the applicants were prevented in any way from submitting their best defence. In those circumstances I am satisfied that the Committee afforded both parties fair procedures by commissioning, at its own expense, a report from a suitably qualified expert and allowing both parties the opportunity to make comprehensive submissions in relation to it. As to whether or not the Committee delegated its decision making function to Mr. Guiden, the Court does not accept this contention. It is clear that the assistance of Mr. Guiden informed the decision of the Committee. This is precisely what it was intended to do once submissions in relation to the report had been advanced by both parties and considered by the Committee. I am satisfied that, as the minutes of the Committee meeting make clear, the various members of the Committee fully engaged with both the report and the submissions of both parties, and ultimately decided to direct repayment in the amounts set out in the determination. It is clear from the minutes that the Chairman indicated that “it was open to the Committee to deviate entirely from the report if it wished, in light of all the submissions”. I am satisfied that the decision arrived at was the Committee’s own decision and it did not unlawfully delegate its decision making function to Mr. Guiden. The Court does not accept that the Committee has failed to provide any or any adequate reasons for its determination. The jurisprudence in relation to the duty of quasi-judicial bodies to give reasons makes clear that it is not necessary to provide an exhaustive analysis of every aspect of a particular case and that the broad basis for a decision is sufficient. It is crucial however that the parties affected by a decision can be satisfied that the relevant body directed its mind to the issues before it. I am satisfied that the Committee in the instant case carefully considered the applicants’ submissions on each aspect of the case and that the applicants can be left in no doubt as to the reasons for the Committee’s decision which was communicated by letter dated 8th July, 2013. While the Court is satisfied that this letter adequately sets out the basis for the decision in its own right, the Court also accepts that having been furnished with the minutes of the relevant Committee meeting the applicants can not claim to be left in any doubt as to the reasons for the Committee’s decision. It is also of relevance that the determination was arrived at after two years of ongoing engagement and correspondence between all sides to this dispute. The Court finds that, in all the circumstances, any suggestion that the applicants are not aware of the reasons for the decision of the Committee is entirely unsustainable. In relation to the referral of the alleged overcharging to the Tribunal, it is my view that fair procedures were adopted by the Committee in arriving at this decision. The applicants were aware at all times of the allegations against them and were put on notice and permitted to attend and participate in every meeting of the Committee. The Court accepts the submissions of the respondent that no adverse findings have been made against the solicitor and they will be entitled to a fully comprehensive and fair hearing before the Tribunal which accords with the principles of natural justice. The Court also accepts the submissions of the respondent in relation to the correct interpretation of “client” under the 1994 Act and the requirements of section 68. As this Court noted in Condon, the definition of client in the1994 Act extends to a beneficiary to an estate under a will, intestacy, or trust. The applicants in the present case contend that while St. Vincent de Paul, as a beneficiary, is a ‘client’, it did not give instructions to the applicants and therefore it was not necessary to issue a section 68 letter. The Court does not accept this proposition. As submitted by counsel for the respondent, if the applicant is correct this would lead to an absurd situation whereby solicitors tasked with administering an estate were not in receipt of instructions from anybody and therefore free to proceed without having provided an estimate of costs to the estate from which fees will be withdrawn. Such a situation is entirely at odds with the intention of the legislature in relation to section 68 of the Act. The Committee were entitled to refer this matter to the Tribunal where the applicants will be protected by the ‘full panoply of natural justice rights’ as referred to by Edwards J. in O’Sullivan. CONCLUSION For the reasons outlined above I would dismiss the applicants’ case and affirm the decision of the Committee of 3rd July, 2013. |