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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Coyle -v- Finnegan & anor [2013] IEHC 463 (25 October 2013)
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Cite as: [2013] IEHC 463
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Judgment Title: Coyle -v- Finnegan & anor Neutral Citation: [2013] IEHC 463 High Court Record Number: 2008 7678 P Date of Delivery: 25/10/2013 Court: High Court Composition of Court: Judgment by: Laffoy J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation: [2013] IEHC 463 THE HIGH COURT [2008 No. 7678P] BETWEEN MICHAEL COYLE PLAINTIFF AND
MATTHEW FINNEGAN JUNIOR AND FRANCIS FINNEGAN DEFENDANTS Judgment of Ms. Justice Laffoy delivered on 25th day of October, 2013. The proceedings and the plaintiff’s claim as pleaded 2. The core factual basis of the plaintiff’s claim as pleaded is that from 1990, at the request of the Deceased, he provided services to the Deceased at his farm in County Cavan on the basis of an express or an implied promise by the Deceased that, in recompense for carrying out such work and providing services, the Deceased, rather than making payments to the plaintiff in respect thereof during his lifetime, would devise and bequeath the farm to the plaintiff by his will together with all livestock and machinery thereon at the date of his death. The statement of claim discloses that the Deceased’s farm is registered on Folio 173F of the Register of Freeholders, County Cavan. It was pleaded that the plaintiff worked for and provided services to the Deceased from 1990 until about 2003. However, by the terms and provisions of his last will and testament the Deceased failed to honour his promise to the plaintiff. The following reliefs were sought by the plaintiff against the defendants in the prayer in the statement of claim:
(b) ancillary orders the objective of which is to procure the registration of the plaintiff as the owner of the lands registered on Folio 173F; (c) a declaration that the defendants hold the lands registered on Folio 173F upon a constructive trust or, alternatively, an implied, or resulting trust in favour of the plaintiff; (d) a declaration that the defendants are estopped from denying the plaintiff’s entitlement to be registered as beneficial owner of the lands registered on Folio 173F by reason of the conduct of the Deceased; (e) ancillary orders the objective of which is to make the defendants account for the rents and profits of the lands from the date of the death of the Deceased; and (f) as an alternative remedy, the payment of the sum of €825,000 by the defendants to the plaintiff “in quantum meruit and/or quantum valebat”. The circumstances of the Deceased and the wills he made 5. The Deceased did in fact make a will on 12th August, 1991 at the offices of George V. Maloney & Co., Solicitors, in Cavan. The will was witnessed by a legal assistant in that office, Mary Davis and by George Maloney. Mary Davis, who drafted the will, did a detailed attendance of what transpired on the day and she testified at the hearing. In that will, the Deceased appointed Mr. Maloney and Ms. Davis as executors. He made a specific devise of “my dwelling house, contents therein together with my farm of land and all cattle, stock and farm machinery” to the plaintiff, whom he described as his first cousin. He devised the residue of his estate to his two sisters, one of whom lived in England and one of whom lived in Wales, in equal shares. 6. The attendance prepared by Ms. Davis is very informative. She ascertained that the assets of the Deceased included the farm but he was not very forthcoming about whether he had bank accounts and all she ascertained was that the Arva branch of Ulster Bank was his bank. Ms. Davis recorded what the Deceased informed her about the devise to the plaintiff as follows:
7. Despite the fact that it is pleaded that the plaintiff helped the Deceased on the farm until about 2003, his evidence was that he did nothing for the Deceased after 2000. In circumstances which I will outline later, the Deceased got help from the defendants’ family members from around December 2002. The Deceased made a new will on 8th August, 2003, which again was made in the office of George V. Maloney & Co., and was drafted by Ms. Davis, who recorded in an attendance note what transpired on that day. The Deceased revoked the August 1991 Will. He appointed Mr. Maloney and Ms. Davis as executors. He made two relatively small charitable bequests which aggregated €1,100. He gave a legacy of €5,000 to the plaintiff “for assistance rendered to me some years ago”. In this will he specifically devised his “dwelling house, contents therein together with my farm of land and all cattle, stock and farm machinery” to the second defendant absolutely. He also appointed the second defendant his residuary legatee. The will was duly executed and witnessed by Ms. Davis and another member of the staff of the firm of George V. Maloney & Co. 8. Once again, the attendance note prepared by Ms. Davis is both informative and instructive. The Deceased had made an appointment to attend the solicitors’ office the previous week. He told Ms. Davis he was sixty eight years of age at the time. She noted that he “talks constantly and talks very fast”. Ms. Davis got the August 1991 Will, which had been retained in the office of George V. Maloney & Co., and told him that she would read it over to him. His response was that there was no need to read it over, that he knew what was in it and that he had made it in 1991. She then recorded that he told her that the plaintiff had not been helping him since 2000. She recorded that he said that he found going up to him was only imposing himself on the plaintiff. The plaintiff knew about the August 1991 Will. She then recorded that the Deceased said the following:
9. The Deceased made his last will and testament on 14th September, 2004. Once again, the will was drafted in the offices of George V. Maloney & Co. On this occasion, Ms. Davis had no involvement and there is no attendance note of what transpired. The only variations from the August 2003 Will were that the Deceased omitted the legacy of €5,000 to the plaintiff and made no provision at all for the plaintiff. He divided the land comprised in Folio 173F between the second defendant and his brother, the first defendant. The second defendant was devised the land on the northern side of the public road, which was identified by reference to the Land Registry map. The first defendant was devised the land on the south of the public road, which again was identified by reference to the Land Registry map. That devise to the first defendant was with the benefit of the herd number attaching to the lands registered on Folio 173F. It was provided that, if there were insufficient funds to discharge the pecuniary legacies, they would be charged on the lands registered on Folio 173F until paid. The two defendants were named as residuary beneficiaries. The will, which will be referred to as the September 2004 Will, was duly executed and witnessed by two members of staff of George V. Maloney & Co., one being a solicitor who is no longer with the firm. 10. Subsequently, by a transfer dated 22nd September, 2006, the Deceased transferred a site of Folio 173F to the first defendant. The transfer was expressed to be made in consideration of €2,000. The site comprised 0.72 acres and it had road frontage. It was valued at €60,000 in June 2006. The evidence did not establish a link between that transaction and the Deceased’s reference in August 2003 to having a site for sale or what, if anything, happened in relation to that proposed sale. In my view, neither matter is of particular relevance to the issues before the Court. 11. The Inland Revenue affidavit in connection with the estate of the Deceased, which was sworn by and filed on behalf of the defendants, disclosed that he had assets, the gross value of which at the date of his death was €586,700, which included the land, which was valued at €570,000, and the farming assets, which were valued at €16,500. The debts of the estate amounted to €36,554.42. Accordingly, the net assets were valued at €550,145.58. Of course, the value of the land has diminished since late 2007. It was valued at €475,000 in July 2012 by Cully & Sons on behalf of the plaintiff and the valuation report was put in evidence by agreement. Although there was a slight dispute as to the valuation, no evidence as to the current value of the land was adduced on behalf of the defendants. The plaintiff’s evidence 13. The plaintiff’s evidence was that between 1993 and 1998 he did a lot of extra work on the Deceased’s farm. At that time the “REPS” Scheme was in place. The farm had to be stock proof, it had to be fenced, there had to be adequate buildings for the cattle, the main drains had to be cleared, a lane had to be opened up and so forth. According to the plaintiff it was a “full time job”. He got no pay. He understood he was going to get the place and he was building it up for himself. The Deceased was glad to have his help. The plaintiff identified one event which was of some significance, although he did not identify exactly when it occurred. As I understand it, it was between 1993 and 1998. The Deceased was considering early retirement. He attended a seminar in relation to State early retirement schemes at Ballyhaise Agricultural College and the plaintiff accompanied him. To avail of the early retirement scheme, he would have had to sign over the farm to a suitable candidate. On the way home from the seminar he told the plaintiff that he thought the scheme suited a father and son situation better and he had decided he would leave things as they stood. Not unreasonably, the plaintiff interpreted this statement as confirmation that their relationship would continue as it was and that the plaintiff would become entitled to the farm on the death of the Deceased. 14. Between 1991 and 1997 the plaintiff did his own farm work “in between” working on the Deceased’s farm. In September 1997, Mr. Jim Sheridan asked him to do “a bit of hedge cutting” and he did some of that work when he had time. In 1998 he got a contract with the ESB to clear hedges under electricity lines. While it was not a full-time job, and it depended on the weather, it left him busy. In 1999 he got two boys to help him with the farm work on his own farm and on the Deceased’s farm. In the year 2000 he had a clearance sale of his own cows, because he was finding it hard to do all the work. However, he was at the Deceased’s farm every day, although not all day except occasionally. His work on the Deceased s’ farm slowed down after 2000. He got more work from Mr. Sheridan. The plaintiff’s evidence was that the Deceased did not mind. His evidence was that the Deceased “got a contractor”. Their relationship did not change. He gave as an example the fact that when the Deceased was in hospital following the accident on 17th March, 2003, the plaintiff’s name was given as his next of kin. The Deceased’s mobility got worse between 2003 and his death in 2007. The plaintiff was aware that “the Finnegans” were doing a lot of driving for him, but he was not aware of any other relationship between them. 15. As recorded earlier, the plaintiff’s evidence, which I accept as accurate, was that on the day after he made the August 1991 Will the Deceased told him that he had made the will. However, the Deceased did not tell him that he changed his will in 2003 and that he changed it again in 2004. The plaintiff’s evidence was that, although he was aware that members of the Finnegan family were “on the scene” since 2002, it never crossed his mind that he might be cut out of the will. 16. It was put to the plaintiff in cross-examination that the Deceased was able to drive a tractor and that he was able to do most of the farm work himself and that the plaintiff had exaggerated his role in running the Deceased’s farm. The response of the plaintiff was that the Deceased relied on him a good bit. In my view, what the Deceased told Ms. Davis both in August 1991 and in August 2003 bears that out. The defendants’ evidence 18. Both defendants gave evidence of driving the Deceased from Arva to Ballinamore in 2006 to get the cattle “dosed”. They stopped along the way. The Deceased told them that he had changed his will and he showed them a copy of the will, which I assume was his last will, the September 2004 Will. The issue was never raised by the Deceased again with either of them. The law
(b) that under the doctrine of proprietary estoppel the defendants are estopped from denying the plaintiff’s entitlement to be registered as owner of the lands registered on Folio 173F; and (c) alternatively, that the plaintiff should be compensated on a quantum meruit basis for the services he provided to the Deceased between 1991 and 2000. 21. Another difference was that, at the hearing, counsel for the plaintiff did not, in reality, pursue the constructive trust basis of the claim and the emphasis was on proprietary estoppel. 22. While I have considered the wide range of authorities relied on by counsel for the parties, and, in particular, by counsel for the plaintiff, I do not find it necessary to address all of them in this judgment. Instead, I propose outlining the legal principles discernible in the three authorities which I find of most relevance and then considering what is the proper approach to the application of those principles to the plaintiff’s claims. The three authorities are:
(b) the decision of the Court of Appeal in England and Wales in Gillett v. Holt [2000] 3 WLR 815; and (c) the decision of the High Court (Hogan J.) in Coleman v. Mullen [2011] 4 I.R. 603. McCarron v. McCarron 25. That being the case, the observations made by Murphy J. in relation to proprietary estoppel were clearly obiter. He quoted the circumstances in which proprietary estoppel operates by reference to the following passage from Plimmer v. Mayor of Wellington (1884) 9 App Cas 699, which was an appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council:
26. The decision of the Court of Appeal in Gillett v. Holt, in my view, may be properly characterised as a step in the evolutionary process of the development of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel. The headnote in the Weekly Law Reports summarises the facts succinctly. The plaintiff spent his working life as a farm manager for and as a friend of the first defendant, a landowner of substantial means, who made repeated promises and assurance over many years, usually on special family occasions, that the plaintiff would succeed to his farming business including the farmhouse in which the plaintiff and his family had lived for twenty five years. After 1992 relations between the plaintiff and the first defendant deteriorated rapidly. In 1995 the plaintiff was dismissed and the first defendant made lifetime dispositions to the second defendant, in whose favour he also altered his will, making no provision for the plaintiff. The plaintiff sought equitable relief based on proprietary estoppel. The Court of Appeal held on the facts that the defendants’ conduct had given rise to an estoppel, and the minimum equity to do justice to the plaintiff was for the first defendant to convey to him the freehold of the farmhouse together with a sufficient sum of money to compensate for his exclusion from the rest of the farming business. 27. Delany (at p. 760), having referred to the comment in the speech of Lord Walker in Thorner v. Major [2009] 1 WLR 776 (at para. 29), that most scholars agree that the doctrine of proprietary estoppel is based on three main elements, being a representation or assurance made to the claimant, reliance on it by the claimant, and detriment to the claimant in consequence of his (reasonable) reliance, quotes the following passage from the judgment of Robert Walker L.J. in Gillett v. Holt (at p. 829), which was relied on by counsel for the plaintiff:
Coleman v. Mullen
Application of the law to the facts: the claim in contract 30. Following the decision of the Court (Hogan J.) in Coleman v. Mullen, in determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to be compensated on a quantum meruit basis for the services he provided to the Deceased between 1991 and 2000, the test to be applied is whether there is evidence of intention on the part of both parties to create legal relations as to the entitlement of the plaintiff to reasonable remuneration for services actually rendered to the Deceased, in the event that the Deceased revoked the August 1991 Will. In my view, it is reasonable to conclude that there was such an intention on the totality of the evidence. 31. It is clear that both parties understood that the plaintiff was prepared to provide services to the Deceased because of the promise that he would get the farm on the death of the Deceased. It is also clear that the Deceased recognised that the plaintiff should be informed, if the Deceased varied or revoked the August 1991 Will, so that the plaintiff was not ultimately going to be the beneficiary of the farm. One aspect of that commitment of disclosure on the part of the Deceased obviously was that the Deceased considered that, in that event, the plaintiff would no longer provide services to him without remuneration. As it happened, the plaintiff had ceased to provide services to the Deceased about three years before the August 1991 Will was revoked and, perhaps, that is why the Deceased did not tell him that he had revoked the August 1991 Will in 2003. However, I think it is reasonable to infer that there was another implication of the commitment of the Deceased that, if he was not going to fulfil his end of the bargain, the plaintiff would be told. That implication was that, to the extent that the plaintiff had already fulfilled his end of the bargain, he would be reasonably compensated for the services he had already rendered. It is clear on the evidence that the plaintiff, unlike the plaintiff in Coleman v. Mullen, was not merely motivated by good neighbourliness and charitable instincts. He expected to be remunerated in the fullness of time for his labours and he made that clear in cross-examination when he stated that, if the Deceased had told him that he had changed his mind in 2003, he would have sent him a “bill”. 32. Moreover, the evidence indicates that the Deceased did not consider that he was the recipient of good neighbourliness or charity. When he made the August 2003 Will, he clearly recognised that he had some obligation to compensate the plaintiff for the services he had provided over the years because in making provision for payment of €5,000 to the plaintiff he specifically stated that it was “for assistance rendered” to him some years previously. Notwithstanding that the probability is that it was the fact that the plaintiff ceased to help the Deceased to run the farm from around the year 2000 which precipitated the revocation of the August 1991 Will, I have come to the conclusion that, as a matter of law, the plaintiff is entitled, in accordance with quantum meruit principles to reasonable remuneration for the services he actually provided to the Deceased. 33. Notwithstanding that finding, I propose to consider the application of the doctrine of proprietary estoppel which, in terms of remedies available, is more flexible than assessing and awarding damages on a quantum meruit basis. Proprietary estoppel
(b) Between 1991 and 2000 the plaintiff acted in reliance on the assurances given to him by the Deceased both before and after August 1991, in particular, the assurance he gave him on the day following the making of the August 1991 Will and the confirmation on the way home from the seminar on early retirement schemes. (c) The plaintiff did suffer a detriment in consequence of his reasonable reliance on the Deceased’s assurances and such detriment was of the type envisaged by Murphy J. in McCarron v. McCarron, in that the plaintiff suffered a loss or detriment by providing his own labours and services to assist the Deceased in running the farm without any remuneration for his endeavours. As Murphy J. pointed out, that type of detriment should qualify for recognition in equity and, in my view, in this case it does. 35. Looking at the facts in the round, I am satisfied that it would be unconscionable if the plaintiff was not recompensed for the labours and services he provided to the Deceased over the period from 1991 to 2000. Further, it would be unconscionable if the defendants acquired the Deceased’s farm under the September 2004 Will free from any entitlement of the plaintiff to be recompensed. Therefore, in my view, equity requires that the plaintiff be reasonably remunerated for the labours and services which he gave the Deceased and that he be given some form of security in relation thereto over the lands registered on Folio 173F in order to ensure that the amount which the Court finds due to him is discharged. The suggestion in the judgment of Murphy J. in McCarron v. McCarron that a charge or lien on the lands for a sum equivalent to reasonable remuneration for services rendered might constitute adequate compensation, in my view, is particularly suitable to the situation here and meets the equity of this case. I propose adopting that course here. It remains to determine the measure of reasonable remuneration. Measure of reasonable remuneration 37. At the end of the evidence of Mr. Fitzpatrick, who was the last witness called on behalf of the plaintiff, counsel for the plaintiff informed the Court that they were seeking the sum of €74,000 on a quantum meruit basis together with interest. I assume that that was a reference to interest on the sum awarded from the date of judgment. There was no discussion at the hearing of an entitlement of the plaintiff either to contractual interest or pre-judgment interest pursuant to s. 22 of the Courts Act 1981. Clearly no basis for awarding the plaintiff interest on the basis that the estate of the Deceased is contractually liable for interest has been made out. As regards pre-judgment interest under s. 22 of the Courts Act 1981, I am of the view that this is not a case in which the Court should exercise its discretion to award pre-judgment interest. The defendants did not create the situation which has arisen in this case; literally they inherited it. Nothing emerged at the hearing on the basis of which it would be appropriate for the Court to make an order under s. 22. Order 39. There will also be an order that payment of the said sum of €74,000 together with interest thereon at the statutory rate of 8% to the plaintiff shall be charged on the lands registered on Folio 173F of the Register of Freeholders, County Cavan until satisfaction of the said sum and interest. Finally, there will be an order directing the Property Registration Authority to register the charge in favour of the plaintiff on Folio 173F and to register the plaintiff as the owner of the charge.
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