H292
Judgment Title: Doyle -v- Buckley (Practising under the Style and Title of J Buckley & Co Solicitors) Neutral Citation: [2013] IEHC 292 High Court Record Number: 2011 6056 P Date of Delivery: 25/03/2013 Court: High Court Composition of Court: Judgment by: Charleton J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation Number: [2013] IEHC 292 The High Court Record No 2011/6056P Between Denis Doyle Plaintiff And
Joe Buckley (Practicing under the Style and Title of J Buckley and Company Solicitors) Defendant Judgment of Mr. Justice Charleton delivered on the 25th of March, 2013. For over ten years the defendant was the plaintiff’s solicitor. They have now fallen out in a bitter dispute about fees. As to what may be due, very little is agreed between them. The plaintiff points to payments he made to the defendant between 1998 and 2011 amounting to €900,000 and claims that this is obvious overcharging. Further, he says that he did not really pay these fees but, rather, that they were deducted without his consent. The defendant replies that all fees were agreed and that whereas some fees for conveyancing transactions may have exceeded the professionally recommended level of percentage charge, these were specifically sanctioned by the plaintiff as client. At this stage, I have no view on any of this. The plaintiff seeks an order for taxation pursuant to s.2 of the Attorneys and Solicitors (Ireland) Act 1849, as amended by the Legal Practitioners (Ireland) Act 1876, or alternatively an order under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court referring the defendant's bills of costs to the Taxing Master. Background The immediate background to these proceedings is that in November 2010 the plaintiff appointed a firm of cost accountants to investigate the bills he had paid to the defendant as his solicitor. Whatever dialogue followed was unsatisfactory to the plaintiff. The plenary summons which initiated this action was issued on the 5th July, 2011 and was followed by a statement of claim that was delivered on the 19th August, 2011. That statement of claim describes the alleged problem that led to this litigation. One of the many transactions on which the defendant acted as solicitor for the plaintiff related to the sale of land to a company called Sandystream Developments Ltd. A deposit was needed for this sale and so in May 2006 the plaintiff paid over to the defendant a sum of €600,000 on the basis, it is claimed, that this would be held in the defendant's client account to the credit of the plaintiff. Proceedings were then issued against that company as purchaser. The deposit was forfeited by the purchaser and released to the credit of the defendant on behalf of the plaintiff. Because the purchaser company had been liquidated, agreed fees of €35,000 had then to be paid. The plaintiff claims that from January 2010, the defendant held the sum of €565,000 as monies on behalf of the plaintiff. In March 2010, the plaintiff claims that he asked for the release of these funds but was told by the defendant that the vast bulk of same had been used up in fees. Correspondence was exchanged. In the course of this, the plaintiff sought assurances that the money was still being held. According to the defendant, it was being held, but "against fees and expenses and interest properly due to this firm from Mr Doyle and his siblings." The defendant further claims to have been advised professionally that costs due to him amounted to €604,700. The matter came to court on interlocutory applications. Pursuant to an order of the High Court on the 18th July, 2011, the defendant was required to make certain disclosure as to what had happened to the money. This resulted in an affidavit from the defendant which indicated that of the deposit figure of €600,000, and such interest as it earned in the bank, a sum of €45,146.99 remained. Consequently, the plaintiff claims damages for breach of contract, fiduciary relationship, trust, misrepresentation and also seeks accounts and enquiries. Taxation
(2) The client has a period of twelve months within which to demand and obtain taxation; (3) After the expiry of twelve months or after payment of the amount of the bill, then the court may, if the special circumstances of the case appear to require the same, refer the bill to taxation, provided the application to the court is made within twelve calendar months after payment; (4) After the expiry of the latter period, there is no statutory power to refer for taxation.
(b) the second for the numbers of the items; (c) the third for the particulars of the services charged for; (d) the fourth for disbursements; (e) the fifth for the Taxing Masters’ deductions from disbursements; (f) the sixth for the professional charges; (g) the seventh for the Taxing Masters’ deductions from professional charges.
Application For the Sandystream matter, three bills were apparently furnished by the defendant solicitor to the plaintiff as his client. Of these, one was settled. All of them are germane to the within proceedings. It is utterly pointless to have a plenary hearing on issues of breach of contract, and in what ever other legal dressing the cause is pleaded, when central to the issue as to whether money was wrongly taken by the defendant is how much he was entitled to charge. Even if it is proven that the defendant was entitled to charge the full sum or more than the sum of the deposit retained by him on behalf of the plaintiff together with interest earned thereon in the bank over that period, or, was not so entitled, a decision by the appropriate public official on what the proper fee was will remove at least one of the central uncertainties in this case. It is to be appreciated that on the statement of claim another issue might arise even if the defendant is vindicated in this respect and that is the manner in which the money was paid over or charged or taken, again depending upon the viewpoints of the parties. Given that the jurisdiction clearly exists, I am entitled to refer the Sandystream matter to taxation. There are two extra bills which have been given the administrative numbers D215 and D226. These bills are hereby referred to taxation. Other charges going back to 1998 are also heavily contested. I could not propose to go that far back. Some of these may have been paid in error by the plaintiff but, on the other hand, they may also have been paid after a proper bill of costs, as described above, was furnished by the defendant solicitor to him as his client. Where a proper bill of costs has been furnished and where this has been paid by the plaintiff in a regular way, there is no warrant for exercising the inherent jurisdiction of the court to order taxation of costs at this stage. No official will know better than the Taxing Master as to whether a proper bill of costs supports any charge dating back to the year 2000. By payments in a regular way, I mean that on receiving the bill of costs, the plaintiff himself disbursed the sum due by either paying over a cheque or through some form of bank transfer or by signing a letter or other document indicating that a particular sum of money for particular work referable in a reasonable way to such bill of costs should be paid or taken from monies to his credit in the solicitor’s accounts. In the affidavit evidence exchanged between the parties, at increasing length and with the growing number of exhibits, a contest is entered as to what was or was not a proper bill of costs, and whether any bill apparently so furnished was one which complied with the statutory requirements. On one side, the plaintiff’s, it is said that none of these are proper bills of costs and on the other it is said that they all are. The Taxing Master must adjudicate on the issues as to costs from the year 2000 onwards and may have to decide:
(2) whether evidence of voluntary payment by the plaintiff to the defendant as described above exists. Result |