Judgment Title: K. -v- Refugee Appeals Tribunal & Anor Composition of Court: Judgment by: Hogan J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation Number: [2011] IEHC 301 THE HIGH COURT 2009 811 JR BETWEEN S. K. APPLICANT AND
REFUGEE APPEALS TRIBUNAL AND MINISTER FOR JUSTICE, EQUALITY AND LAW REFORM RESPONDENTS JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Hogan delivered on 7th July, 2011 1. In these judicial review proceedings the applicant, Ms. K., seeks to quash a decision of the Refugee Appeal Tribunal of 30th May, 2009, whereby the applicant’s application for asylum status was rejected on credibility grounds. I myself granted the applicant leave pursuant to s, 5(2) of the Illegal Immigrants (Trafficking) Act 2000, on 1st December, 2010. 2. The applicant is Ethiopian who is now aged in her early twenties. She contended that her father was a member of a political organisation called CUD and that he was abducted by police forces following protests against the outcome of disputed elections in 2005. Ms. K. says that her father was never seen again. 3. Ms. K. maintains that the schools were then in forment and that she organized protests against the regime. She says that she was one of about 20 students who was then arrested and brought to a police station. It is alleged that the students were detained for about 7 weeks. During this time, she was beaten with plastic sticks, given little food and questioned regularly. 4. She contends that while in detention she was beaten one day and that she bled through her nose and was rendered unconscious. She says that she was brought to the Raz Desta Hospital under armed guard. When the police authorities indicated that she would shortly have to return to jail, the applicant claims that she escaped from the hospital through a toilet window. She ran out of the hospital wearing hospital clothes, reached a public road and hailed a taxi to her godmother’s house which was about twenty minutes away 5. She further contends that her godparents looked after her for a week at the request of her mother. Her godparents planned the journey together with an agent, Ato Nassar. The agent and her godfather brought her by car to Kenya where she stayed for one week. I pause here to observe that the Tribunal member stated that she had stayed for two days, but it is acknowledged that there was a translating error and that Ms. K. had always said one week. She then says that travelled with Mr. Nasser to Ireland via an unknown country and she arrived here on 20th September, 2006. Ms. K. said that she could not apply for asylum in any third country because she was under the control of Mr. Nasser. As she was under 18 at the time, she had no passport or identity card. The Tribunal’s analysis 7. I have already dealt with the jurisdiction of this Court to review errors of fact in judicial review proceedings in a recent judgment which, coincidentally, happens to be another Ethiopian case with a very similar name, SGK (Ethiopia) v. Minister for Justice, Equality and Law Reform, High Court, 5th July, 2011. As is plain from that case (and many similar recent decisions), this Court can quash an administrative decision on this ground only where there have been serious errors of fact such that, taken cumulatively, they amount to a error of law or where the administrative body thereby effectively assumes a jurisdiction which it does not otherwise have. 8. Against this background, we may now consider the Tribunal’s analysis so far it contained negative credibility assessments of the applicant’s case. If these assessments were substantially accurate in substance, then providing that the reasoning is rational and cogent - in the sense that the inferences flow from the premises - then the Tribunal’s decision is unimpeachable in law. In the present case, however, I have found that in at least two material respects, the inferences cannot fairly be drawn from the factual premises, so that this decision cannot be allowed to stand. The applicant’s medical condition
13. Next, so far as the questionnaire is concerned, there are two answers which are relevant. Question 20 asked the applicant to identify any documentation she intended to submit in support of her application. Ms. K. replied:-
A. Not applicable to me.” 16. First, there was no inconsistency in the manner suggested, even if no allowance is made for the possible ambiguity in Q. 30. Ms. K. had clearly indicated in the very same questionnaire - admittedly in answer to Q. 20, rather than Q. 30 – that the medical problems which she contended were induced by beatings and hard labour while in prison. 17. Second, the Tribunal member overlooked the fact that the first interview had been conducted without the benefit of an interpreter. While the reference to a heart condition may seem over dramatic, it is perfectly possible that Ms. K. was intending to refer to heart palpitations and anxiety attacks and, in the absence of an interpreter, this was the best that she could convey. The key point, however, is that the HSE officials could only record the bare gist of the applicant’s case in the absence of an interpreter and no fair inference can be drawn about a subsequent alleged inconsistency in such circumstances. 18. Third, there is no possible basis for invoking the Istanbul Protocol in these circumstances. That Protocol is intended to assist medical practitioners preparing medico-legal reports in respect of the alleged victims of torture to assess the patient’s medical conditions and, specifically, to give guidance on whether the conditions are consistent with the applicant’s narrative. It has absolutely no relevance whatever to interviews conducted by social workers or questionnaires completed by the applicant herself. 19. Given that these premises are simply not factually sustainable, it follows that the negative credibility inference drawn by the Tribunal member cannot be regarded as a reasonable one: cf. the comments of Henchy J. in The State (Keegan) v. Stardust Victims Compensation Tribunal [1986] I.R. 642. School activities and detention of students
(9) Where an adverse finding involves discounting or rejecting documentary evidence or information relied upon in support of a claim and which is prima facie relevant to a fact or event pertinent to a material aspect of the credibility issue, the reasons for that rejection must be stated.” 25. Given the centrality of this particular negative credibility assessment to the Tribunal’s overall conclusions, these breaches of the IR principles are such that the decision cannot therefore be allowed to stand. Conclusions
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