Judgment Title: Missford Ltd trading as Residence Members Club -v- Companies Acts Composition of Court: Judgment by: Kelly J. Status of Judgment: Approved |
Neutral Citation Number: [2010] IEHC 240 THE HIGH COURT 2010 2 COS IN THE MATTER OF MISSFORD LIMITED T/A RESIDENCE MEMBERS CLUB AND IN THE MATTER OF THE COMPANIES (AMENDMENT) ACT 1990, AS AMENDED JUDGMENT of Mr. Justice Kelly delivered on the 17th day of June, 2010 Introduction Mr. Stafford also seeks an order measuring the legal costs which he incurred for the same period in the sum of €50,600.65 inclusive of VAT. Background I heard the Company’s petition on 13th January, 2010. At that hearing, Mr. Stafford presented a report setting out a summary of the work carried out by him from the time of his appointment. I reserved my judgment on the application for a week. I delivered it on 20th January, 2010. ([2010] IEHC 11). For the reasons set out in that judgment, I dismissed the petition and withdrew the protection of the court from the Company. Subsequently, Mr. Stafford brought this application. I was not satisfied to make the orders sought on the basis of the information then put before me. I afforded him a further opportunity to put additional material of his choosing before the court and this he did. The Company The decision of the Company to petition the court for the appointment of an examiner was precipitated by the Revenue Commissioners attaching the Company’s bank account. Edwards J. did not confer any powers on Mr. Stafford over and above those that are given by statute. As the petition was dismissed, Mr. Stafford never acted as examiner of the Company. The Legal Position
Subsection 4 provides:-
Section 29 makes it clear that the court should only make such orders as it thinks proper for payment of remuneration, costs and expenses of an examiner. The court is not a cipher to rubber stamp claims made by an examiner. That is clear from the observations of Hamilton C.J. in Re Coombe Importers Limited (22nd June, 1995) where he said:-
In carrying out its vigilant scrutiny, the court must always be mindful of the limited functions of an examiner and a fortiori an interim examiner. As was pointed out by Murphy J. in Re Eden Park Construction Limited [1994] I.R. 126:-
The powers of an examiner are circumscribed by the provisions of the legislation. These powers include (a) the same powers as inspectors appointed by the court to require the production of documents; (b) the same power as auditors enjoy relating to the supplying of information and cooperation by the officers of the company; (c) the power to convene, set the agenda for and preside at board meetings of the directors and general meetings of the company; (d) the power to propose resolutions and present reports at such meetings; (e) the right to attend board meetings and general meetings and to be given reasonable notice of them being held; and (f) the power to apply to the court for the determination of any question arising in the course of his office. The powers of the directors of the company are kept intact during the examination unless a special order of the court is made divesting them of some or all of those powers in favour of the examiner. Such orders can be made under s. 9 of the Act. In the absence of such an order, the powers of an examiner are those which are set out in s. 7 of the Act. One of those powers is particularly relied upon in the present case. It is that which is provided for under Section 7(5). It states:-
Nowadays many examiners compute the fees which they wish to charge by reference to an hourly rate of charge. That is so in the present case. Although s. 29 does not prescribe any criteria to assist the court in determining what is reasonable remuneration, it clearly imposes an obligation upon the court which precludes it from simply approving an hourly charge-out rate without further ado. I agree with the views expressed by Finlay Geoghegan J. in In Re Sharmane Limited [2009] IEHC 377 where she said:-
Mr. Stafford has charged an hourly rate of €425. He was assisted by a supervisor, senior, semi-senior and junior. Their respective hourly rates were €210, €185, €150 and €100. Mr. Stafford’s rate of €425 has obtained since 1st January, 2007. It was increased on that date from a previous rate of €400. He says that he is aware of accountants in other firms charging a higher charge out rate. He says that the charge out rates are calculated to ensure recovery of salary costs, overheads and a return to the equity partners of the firm. Mr. Stafford has twenty five years of insolvency experience. In that time, he has worked on over a thousand corporate insolvency assignments. He pointed out that whilst his firm tries to maximise its fee income, it is involved in two areas of non-chargeable work. First, the firm prepares and provides a number of training courses on corporate recovery and insolvency for which it only obtains “modest payment”. No details of this modest payment were provided. It also presents a number of training courses for the Association of Chartered Certified Accountants and for the Institute of Certified Public Accountants for which it receives no fees. He also pointed out that his firm carries out what he described as “a significant amount of pro bono work in respect of individuals facing personal bankruptcy and the loss of their family homes”. His estimate was that he spends approximately 200 hours per annum on such work. His partner spends approximately 140 hours per annum on that work and the staff of the firm, a further 200 hours per annum. Whilst the carrying out of “pro bono” work is to be admired the loss of the fee income incurred by it cannot be sought to be recovered with the approval of this Court by the charging of a greater fee than justified on fee paying work. The same applies in respect of voluntary work done for the Association or Institute of Accountants. Neither can work which attracts the “modest payment” referred to earlier be subsidised by a greater fee than appropriate being charged for more remunerative work. When the firm accepts assignments on behalf of the Revenue Commissioners, an hourly rate of €390 is charged. This amounts to a discount of approximately 8%. That discount is granted because the recovery of fees is guaranteed when the work is carried out for the State. At the conclusion of this examinership, Zurich Bank indicated that they were going to appoint Mr. Stafford as receiver over the Company and this has occurred. Payment of his fees in the instant case are therefore guaranteed. No party has sought to oppose the claim made in respect of remuneration or legal costs. The question arises as to whether the court ought to sanction a charge out rate of €425 which has remained unchanged since it was first introduced in January 2007. There is no doubt but that the economic climate which obtains in 2010 bears little resemblance to that of early 2007. With one or two notable exceptions, it is common knowledge that professional fees have been substantially reduced across the board. Anecdotally and from personal experience one can discern that professional fees have been reduced in the order of one third from what they were in 2007. That such a reduction was necessary is borne out by the August 2009 Competitiveness Report produced by Forfás (the National Competitiveness Council). It stated:-
Whilst I accept that current economic circumstances have given rise to an increase in the amount of insolvency work available, that, of itself, would be no justification for maintaining a January 2007 hourly charge out rate. Anecdote or personal experience cannot be used as a benchmark to set an appropriate level of hourly rate charge. A comparator must be sought. It is difficult to obtain a direct comparator particularly since there was no legitimus contradictor to this application. What has to be sought is a comparable professional doing work of similar importance and complexity operating in the current economic climate and in respect of whom there is no reduction in workload. A part of the legal profession provides a guide in this regard. There is no point in looking, for example, to that part of the profession that deals with conveyancing transactions. That area of practice is in acute distress because of lack of work. But another area of legal work is much more akin to the case in suit. Just as there is no shortage of insolvency work, neither is there any shortage of criminal work available to members of the legal profession. Much of this is provided for by way of State payment. Since 2007, fees paid by the State in respect of both prosecution and defence work have been reduced by at least 16%. (Two reductions of 8% each.) There is an argument that in fact the reductions amounted to more than 16% but there is no dispute of this being the minimum. That is reflective of a general trend in professional fees with few exceptions. I believe it appropriate that the court ought to recognise this and apply a similar reduction in the hourly charge out rate in this case. I, therefore, propose to reduce the charge out rate in respect of all of the personnel involved in the examination by 16%. That equates much more to the realities of life in 2010 than fees struck three years ago. Assignment of Staff In my view, no criticism can be made of Mr. Stafford in relation to this exercise. Work Undertaken The Company’s operations were relatively small and it operated from one location. There were, of course, different operations going on there. They included the operation of a public bar, a restaurant, a nightclub and membership subscriptions also had to be serviced. I have already commented in my judgment of 20th January, 2010 upon the way in which the Company and its directors conducted their business. Mr. Stafford has told me that he suspected that the directors of the Company had little understanding of financial control, tax legislation or company law. Upon appointment as interim examiner, his suspicions in that regard were confirmed. He found that there was inadequate financial control, no regular stock takes being performed and no independent reconciliation of cash sales to till readings. Because of these difficulties, he decided that his staff would carry out a monitoring operation of the Company’s day to day operations. His staff were also required to review all purchasing decisions. That was maintained until his staff had “built up clear lines of communication with the key managers of the business”. Mr. Stafford considered making an application to the court under s. 9 of the Act but made what he calls a “judgment call” that his daily monitoring of the Company’s activities provided sufficient safeguard to the creditors of the Company. Whilst the creditors’ interests may well have been protected by this decision, I do not think it was the correct one concerning his own powers. I am not convinced that a part of the work that was carried out was justified by reference to the limited functions of an interim examiner. If management powers were sought to be exercised, directly or indirectly, then the appropriate thing to do was to apply to the court for an order under s. 9 of the Act. Either an examiner or interim examiner is just that with limited statutory powers or else he must seek leave from the court to take over executive control of the Company. He cannot be a hybrid. Nor can he seek to exercise executive powers, directly or indirectly, without leave of the court and then seek to be remunerated for carrying out work in excess of his actual powers. In the present case, not merely did the examiner involve himself in the monitoring exercise to which I have referred but he also became involved in negotiations concerning a variety of issues which are identified in his second affidavit. Even allowing for the entitlements given to an examiner by reference to s. 7(5) of the Act, I am of opinion that more work was undertaken in the present case than was justified by reference to the limited role of an interim examiner. I do not suggest any impropriety on the part of Mr. Stafford in so doing. He simply did more, with the best of motives, than his warrant permitted. It is impossible to assess the quantum of that work with mathematical accuracy. I have been furnished with a large number of documents demonstrative of the work done. Without itemising them on an individual basis, which would lengthen this judgment by scores of pages, I have been able to form an overall view. I do not think I am being unfair to Mr. Stafford by concluding that at least 15% of the time was spent on fulfilling a role which was in excess of that conferred by the court order. The result is therefore that the charge out rate is reduced by 16% and the overall sum to be allowed is reduced by 15%. Result Mr. Stafford told me that he spent 60 hours working on the examinership but was conscious that that seemed to be a large amount of time and he therefore reduced it to 56 hours by way of a discount. I propose to allow him the 60 hours which he said he actually worked rather than the lesser amount. Applying the 15% reduction, Mr. Stafford will be remunerated for 51 hours at the new hourly rate. Mr. Foley, the supervisor has claimed for 47.75 hours. That will be reduced by 7.1 hours giving a total of 40.6 hours at the new rate. Mr. Hendrick, the senior, claimed for 91.25 hours. That will be reduced by 13.6 hours to 77.6 hours at the new hourly rate. Ms. McDonagh claimed for 1.25 hours. That will be reduced to 1.1 hours at the new rate. Ms. McCarrick, the junior claimed for 2.25 hours. That will be reduced by 0.33 of an hour giving 1.9 hours at the new rate. The effect of these adjustments means that Mr. Stafford will be allowed a sum of €18,207. Mr. Foley, the supervisor will be allowed €7,161.84. Mr. Hendrick, the senior will be allowed €12,059.04. Ms. McDonagh will be allowed €138.60 and the junior, Ms. McCarrick, will be allowed €159.60. That gives a total of €37,726.08. To that must be added €741.15 in respect of expenses giving a grand total of €38,467.23. Legal Costs
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