High Court of Ireland Decisions

Judgment Title: Doherty -v- MJELR & Ors

Neutral Citation: [2009] IEHC 246


High Court Record Number: 2007 9400 P

Date of Delivery: 15 May 2009

Court: High Court

1. The plaintiff has sued the numerous defendants in this action and sets out his claims in a statement of claim running to some thirty pages. I have been informed that his action against the following defendants has been struck out or discontinued: The Ombudsman for Northern Ireland, Hugh Orde, The Rev. Ian Paisley and Martin McGuinness. The remaining defendants have brought motions to strike out the plaintiff’s statement of claim. The applications are grounded upon O. 19, r. 27 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court on the grounds that the statement of claim is prolix and/or contains pleadings which are unnecessary or scandalous but which may tend to prejudice, embarrass or delay the fair trial of this action; an order pursuant to O. 19, r. 28 of the Rules of the Superior Courts and/or the inherent jurisdiction of the court striking out the plaintiff’s statement of claim and/or these proceedings on the grounds that they are vexatious and/or that the statement of claim discloses no reasonable cause of action; an order striking out those parts of the plaintiff’s claim against the first to the fifteenth named defendants as relate to their actions as judges on the ground that same disclose no reasonable cause of action as the said claims are made in respect of acts of the said defendants in the exercise of their jurisdiction.

2. The plaintiff, for his part, has brought motions for judgment in default of defence against the defendants. When the motions came on for hearing before me, I adjourned the motions for judgment in default of defence pending the outcome of the defendants’ application to strike out the statement of claim and/or the proceedings.

3. The statement of claim in this case is extraordinary in a number of respects. In the first place, it names an exceptionally large number of defendants. Secondly, the claims made by the plaintiff in the document are wide-ranging and disconnected.

4. A clue as to the purpose of the proceedings can be found in the affidavit sworn by the plaintiff on 21st April, 2009, for the purpose of opposing the application to strike out the statement of claim and/or dismiss his action. Paragraph 2 of that affidavit reads as follows:

“This affidavit is sworn for the purpose of confirming further corruption within the legal, justice and political system . . .”

“2. This affidavit is sworn for the purpose of clarifying the history of this case and the serious abuse of process in my attempt to expose serious wrongdoing in this country, and I say that:

3. this High Court Action is a bona fide action by me to expose serious wrongdoing and is in no way vexatious and frivolous.”

7. I have already referred to the fact that the statement of claim is long and wide-ranging and I do not propose to quote from it in this judgment. A reading of the document shows that it contains a diatribe against various judges and the justice system in general, together with other complaints against various officials and bodies for not doing their duty, for not acceding to requests of the plaintiff, for ignoring complaints of the plaintiff and for acting corruptly or facilitating corruption. Many of the complaints made by the plaintiff concern events in which he was not even involved. Others involve outrageous and wild accusations about judges and other officials in the manner in which they carried out their duties.

8. All of the defendants have made submissions, and a substantial number of the defendants have put in written submissions referring to the case law applicable to the issues which arise in this case. The plaintiff has not put in any written submissions and has not relied on any legal authority in resisting the application of the defendants. I accept the legal submissions made on behalf of the defendants. Insofar as the plaintiff makes accusations and claims against members of the judiciary and other statutory bodies acting bona fide within their jurisdiction, as they enjoy an immunity from action in negligence, they are immune from suit. See Beatty J. in Rent Tribunal [2006] 2 IR 191. The plaintiff conceded that he never brought judicial review applications in respect of any of the defendants. Insofar as he criticises members of the judiciary and other public officials for corrupt or dishonest actions or practices or collusion in such practices, his claims are bound to fail unless he can show that they were not acting bona fide within their jurisdiction as they enjoy an immunity from action in negligence. While I appreciate the plaintiff, in this case ,suggests that in certain instances the judges or other officials may not have been acting bona fide in the exercise of their duties, many of the complaints are anecdotal in nature and are, in my view, an abuse of process because they are brought for an improper or ulterior purpose, which is to cause embarrassment and vexation to the defendants and they do not fit within the rubric of inter partes disputes which are justiciable. In many cases, the plaintiff was not personally affected by the actions of which he complains. The remedy of judicial review is there for persons who have genuine complaints about the manner in which public officials exercise their powers. For example, if they act ultra vires or in breach of natural or constitutional justice or fail to carry out their duties towards the plaintiff, such actions are amenable to judicial review and the reliefs of certiorari, mandamus and prohibition are available. But the courts do not exist for the purpose of facilitating individuals to vent their displeasure, and even their anger, at the manner in which public officials carry out their duties.

9. Many of the claims made in the statement of claim are vague and imprecise. The complaints are numerous and unconnected with each other, save for general complaints about various defendants failing to carry out their duties properly and acting in a corrupt manner or facilitating corruption.

10. On any reading of the statement of claim, the allegations can only be viewed as scandalous or vexatious. See Riordan v. Hamilton and Ors. [2000] IEHC 189 (Unreported), Riordan v. Ireland (5) [2001] 4 I.R. 463. See also Faye v. Tegral Pipes Ltd. [2005] 2 IR 261, where McCracken J. stated at p. 266:

“While the words ‘frivolous and vexatious’ are frequently used in relation to applications such as this, the real purpose of the jurisdiction is to ensure that there will not be an abuse of the process of the courts. Such abuse cannot be permitted for two reasons. Firstly, the courts are entitled to ensure that the privilege of access to the courts, which is of considerable constitutional importance in relation to genuine disputes between the parties, will only be used for the resolution of genuine disputes and not as a forum for lost causes which, no matter how strongly the party concerned may feel about them, nevertheless, have no basis for a complaint in law. The second, and equally important, purpose of the jurisdiction is to ensure that litigants will not be subjected to the time consuming, expensive and worrying process of being asked to defend a claim which cannot succeed.”

12. To permit the plaintiff’s action to proceed would be to allow a parody of justice to take place. The claims which he makes are so outrageous and so varied, and the number of defendants so large, that it would be quite impossible to conduct an orderly trial of the issues which he raises. In Hanly v. News Group Newspapers Ltd. [2004] 1 I.R. 472, at 475, Smyth J. stated:

“The function of pleadings is to ascertain with precision the matters upon which the parties differ and the points on which they agree and, thus, to arrive at certain clear issues on which both parties require a judicial decision . . . only the material facts and not the evidence on which they are to be proved should be pleaded. Notices for particulars and replies thereto are not pleadings in the strict sense of the word, but merely information exchanged between the parties for their own information.”

“The purpose of pleadings is to convey what the nature of the action is. Pleadings should not be used as an opportunity of placing unnecessary or scandalous matters on the record of the court, or as an opportunity of disseminating such matters when they have nothing to do with any dispute between the parties. Allegations are not scandalous where they would be admissible in evidence to show the truth of any allegation in the pleadings which is material to the relief claimed . . . In the pleadings here, there are allegations which are totally unnecessary to any reasonably balanced or strongly held views of the plaintiff as against the defendant. The imputations of character made here would leave a person open to litigation and defamation, had they not been accorded the protection of the privilege of the court. I need not go through them, but merely highlight further, what I would regard as contemptuous language and scandalous allegations. It is perfectly in order for a litigant to say that a defendant has acted in a particular way. However, what has been imputed here is not only over the top but is being deliberately used for the purpose of trying to advance some view which does not accord with fairness, commonsense, justice, constitutional right or with any modicum of decency.”

“I am further of the view that the purpose for which this proposed action is sought to be brought is an improper purpose, namely, the harassment and oppression of the various parties referred to in the proceedings already determined by the Supreme Court and that the proposed action is other than the assertion of a legitimate right. Accordingly, I consider the bringing of this claim will be vexatious.”

14. Where the extent of the scandalous or vexatious pleading is sufficiently gross and extensive, it seems to me that it is not the function of the court to sift through the material in the statement of claim to see if, perhaps, somewhere within it, a claim can be found in the proper form. The court is entitled to have regard to the document as a whole. There might well be cases where there is an isolated pleading here or there which may be scandalous or vexatious, but the greater part of the document contains pleadings in a proper form. In those cases, the courts can strike out the offending portions of the pleadings. But that is not the case here. This statement of claim is, in fact, a narrative of the plaintiff’s complaints about the judiciary, various public officials and the justice system in general. In the words of Henchy J. in Cahill v. Sutton [1980] I.R. 269 at 286:

“It would be contrary to precedent, constitutional propriety and the common good for the High Court . . . to proclaim itself an open house for reception of such claims.”

15. I am quite satisfied that this statement of claim, considered in its entirety, is a document which discloses no reasonable cause of action and is prolix, scandalous, vexatious and an abuse of process. Accordingly, I will direct that the statement of claim be struck out.