McG. (P.) v. F. (A.) [2003] IEHC 19 (7 May 2003)
[1996 No. 54 M]
BETWEEN
PETITIONER
RESPONDENT
JUDGMENT of Quirke J. delivered the 7th day of May 2003.
This is an application by the petitioner for a declaration that the marriage entered into between the parties on the 25th September, 1993, was null and void.
It is claimed that the purported marriage between the parties was of no legal effect by reason of the fact that the petitioner and the respondent lacked the capacity to enter into or to sustain a normal lifelong marital relationship with one another as a result of their respective states of mind, mental conditions and emotional and psychological development at the date of the purported marriage.
At the commencement of the proceedings the respondent's legal advisors announced that she was no longer contesting the claim advanced on behalf of the petitioner, that no evidence would be adduced on her behalf and that her legal advisors had been instructed to withdraw from the proceedings. I directed that the respondent should nonetheless be represented in court throughout the entire of the proceedings and she was so represented.
FACTS
The uncontested evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner has established the following facts.
The petitioner is a business man who completed his training in 1978 and who established a property investment and development company with his brother and sister in 1982.
The respondent has worked in a secretarial capacity in England for some five and a half years before returning to Ireland in July, 1991, where she worked in similar capacities in different companies.
The petitioner met the respondent in October, 1991, when he was 36 years old and she was 27 and a serious courtship between the two commenced in December, 1991, culminating in the parties announcing their engagement to be married in December, 1992.
During the weeks and months immediately following the engagement the business affairs of the petitioner were particularly tense and volatile and they occupied a substantial amount of his time.
In evidence he indicated that he was dismayed when the respondent advised him that she had booked a hotel for a wedding, on a date which she had chosen in September, 1993, when he felt he would be particularly busy.
During the summer of 1993, serious tensions developed between the parties relative to the petitioner's lengthy working hours and his request for a postponement of the honeymoon.
Constant disputes arose between the petitioner and the respondent during the period up to and including the day immediately prior to the wedding and their relationship was strained and tense.
A disagreement between the parties on the day immediately prior to the wedding was of such severity that the petitioner believed that the respondent no
longer wished to proceed with the wedding and this affected his confidence and caused him to consider postponing the wedding.
The events which occurred before, during and after the wedding ceremony were unfortunate and must have been deeply distressing for all of those who witnessed them.
The respondent was very late arriving at the church and was visibly intoxicated, having consumed a substantial amount of alcohol while preparing for the wedding and during a visit to a licensed premises on her way to the church.
It is unnecessary to recite the details of the respondent's extraordinary and embarrassing behaviour during the course of the wedding ceremony and right throughout the remainder of the wedding day and evening.
It caused great distress and unhappiness and resulted in a serious of disputes which involved family members of both of the parties, including the respondent's mother and the petitioner's sister.
For the petitioner, the entire of the day and the evening which followed was so distressing that it resembled a nightmare and the position cannot have been much better for the respondent.
The wedding night passed in dispute and the following day the parties went on honeymoon, still in dispute with one another and with various relatives.
Although there had been a comparatively satisfactory sexual relationship between the parties prior to the marriage there were significant sexual difficulties between them on honeymoon, which was acrimonious, with constant disputes referable to the wedding ceremony and to the events which preceded it.
Upon return from the honeymoon further disputes arose in relation to the accommodation which the parties were to share, the petitioner's pre-occupation with his business and the continuing tension between the two families.
By autumn of 1995 the petitioner was constantly absent from the home and the respondent was refusing to conclude an agreement between them relative to their business affairs and inheritance.
No useful purpose will be served by a recitation herein of the considerable unhappiness and disagreement which the parties endured throughout 1996.
The petitioner issued the petition herein on the 31st January, 1997 and an answer was filed on behalf of the respondent on the 30th May, 1997. On the 14th May, 1997, the Master of the High Court, by order, appointed Dr. Gerard Byrne, Psychiatrist, as Medical Inspector to carry out a psychiatric examination of the petitioner and of the respondent and to report in writing to the court.
In June, 1997 the respondent sought and obtained an order restraining the petitioner from entering their home in Leinster.
Dr. Byrne interviewed both parties on several occasions, furnished a report in writing to the Court dated the 30th August, 2001, and testified during the trial of these proceedings.
He took the view that neither the petitioner nor the respondent showed any evidence of psychiatric illness or personality disorder. He believed that the actual circumstances of the wedding, together with the rows which preceded it, caused the petitioner to lose commitment to the marriage and to repudiate it almost immediately after the ceremony as a result of sexual and other difficulties which made him unable to sustain the relationship.
Dr. Byrne said that the petitioner suffered from a ,condition which did not have a clinical description but had been caused by circumstances before, during and after the wedding which were superimposed the petitioner's state of mind. The condition was characterised by anger, disappointment, distress and frustration.
He is satisfied that at the time of the marriage the petitioner lacked the capacity to enter into and in particular to sustain a relationship of marriage with the respondent.
There are no children of the marriage.
THE LAW
At the commencement of this case the respondent, who had formerly delivered an answer in which she affirmed the marriage and sought to have the petition rejected, indicated, through her legal advisors, that she no longer wished to contest the proceedings, would offer no evidence and was instructing her advisors to withdraw from the case.
Ms. Clissman, counsel for the petitioner properly advised the court that the petitioner had agreed to pay to the respondent a very substantial sum of money in order to make adequate provision for her in the future.
She stated that notwithstanding this payment there had been no collusion between the parties in relation to these proceedings but that in the event that this court saw fit not to grant the relief which has been sought herein, then the parties, who had not lived together since late 1996 or early 1997 had agreed that they would jointly seek a decree of divorce. She also stated that the respondent has agreed with the petitioner that the sum paid to her is sufficient to satisfy all or any claims which she has, or may in the future have, against the petitioner for maintenance or otherwise arising out of the marriage.
Having considered the evidence in this case including in particular the evidence of Dr. Gerard Byrne, I am satisfied that there has been no collusion between the parties which would have the effect of concealing from this Court any evidence of whatsoever nature or kind which would be material to the determination which this Court is required to make.
It is now well settled that proof that a person at the date of marriage lacked the capacity to enter into and sustain a proper or normal marital relationship constitutes a valid ground for nullity (see U.F. (orse. U. C) v. J. C. [1991] 2 I.R. 330).
In P. C. v. V. C. [1990] 2 I.R. 91 it was decided that where two parties entered into a marriage contract innocently, being unaware that by reason of factors connected with the personality and psychology of each partner going beyond mere temperamental incompatibility, it would be impossible for them to sustain a normal marriage relationship, the petitioner should not be denied a decree of nullity because the respondent wished to hold him to the marriage bond.
O'Hanlon J. adopted with approval the following passage from the judgment of Barrington J. in B.D. v. M.C. (orse MD.) (Unreported, High Court, 27th March 1987)
"This being so, I am satisfied that this marriage could not have succeeded. This was because M. (the respondent) at the time of the marriage and at all times material to this case, was suffering from such a degree of emotional immaturity as to preclude the formation of a normal marriage relationship. I do not know if M.'s condition can be described as an illness. It is apparently a "disorder" which requires and may be susceptible to psychotherapy. But whether it is an illness or a disorder, it is equally incapacitating so far as the formation of a marital relationship is concerned."
He continued:
"His ultimate finding in that case was that "the petitioner and the respondent were unable to enter into and sustain a normal marital relationship because of the incapacity of the respondent resulting from emotional immaturity and because of the respective states of mind and mental conditions of the petitioner and the respondent." Accordingly, he took into consideration, not only what was alleged against the respondent but also the contributing factor of the petitioner's psychological make up ...
The distinguishing feature between the present case and B.D. v. M.C. ... lies in the fact that in the present case while I have come to the conclusion that there were elements of emotional immaturity and psychological disorder on both sides which prevented the formulation of a normal, viable relationship with each other, I would consider that these features and traits of character were much more marked in the case of the husband than in the case of the wife. As there has been no repudiation of the marriage contract on her part at any stage, but rather the strongest possible affirmation of it, can the husband rely on what is in a large measure his own want of capacity?
In my opinion, he can, primarily because of the fact that the want of capacity existed to some extent on both sides, as it did in B.D. v. M.C. ... If necessary, however, I would also incline to the view that as both parties entered into the marriage contract innocently, in the sense that they were unaware that by reason of factors connected with the personality and psychology of each partner, it would be impossible for them to sustain a
normal marriage relationship for any length of time, the petitioner should not be denied a decree of nullity because the respondent wishes to hold him to the marriage bond."
In the instant case Dr. Byrne has testified unequivocally that it is his professional view that, at the time of the marriage, the petitioner lacked the capacity to enter into or to sustain a relationship of marriage with the respondent. His opinion is based upon lengthy interviews with the parties and was apparently fortified by the evidence adduced by other witnesses whose testimony he heard during the course of these proceedings.
He raised some doubts relative to the capacity of the respondent to sustain a relationship of marriage with the petitioner but his final opinion on that issue was inconclusive.
The respondent no longer seeks to affirm the marriage and does not contest the evidence adduced on behalf of the petitioner as to the incapacity of the petitioner.
I am satisfied on the evidence that, as in P. C. v. V. C. (supra), both parties in this case entered into the marriage contract innocently, in the sense that, by reason of factors connected with the personality and psychology of each partner, it was impossible for them to sustain a normal marriage relationship for any length of time. I have already indicated I am satisfied that there has been no collusion between the parties.
It follows that the petitioner is entitled to the relief which he seeks. Accordingly the marriage between the petitioner and the respondent is hereby declared null and void.