THE HIGH COURT
On Circuit
Record No. 2001 304CA
BETWEEN
James Dinnegan and Teresa Dinnegan
Plaintiffs
AND
Eugene Ryan and Mary Ryan
Defendants
Judgment delivered the 13th day of May, 2002 by Murray, J.
1. This is an appeal is an appeal by way of rehearing from the judgment and Order of the Circuit Court in which the Plaintiffs were awarded the sum of IR£20,000 damages for breach of contract and slander. No apportionment of damages was made for the separate causes of action.
2. In these proceedings the Plaintiffs claim that they had an agreement with the Defendant’s whereby the latter would provide light refreshments for a small post-wedding reception at their public house on St. Stephen’s Day, 1998. It is alleged that when the Plaintiffs and their guests arrived at the public house the Defendants refused to serve drinks to the wedding party, in particular the Plaintiffs, or to provide them with any food. On the contrary it is alleged that the First Named Defendant in refusing to serve them asked them to leave in circumstances and in a manner which amounted to defamation of the Plaintiffs characters. Accordingly they claim damages firstly, for breach of contract and secondly, for slander. The Defendants on the other hand deny that there was every any agreement at any time to provide refreshments for the wedding party. It is accepted that the wedding party and in particular the Plaintiffs were asked to leave their premises on St. Stephen’s night when they arrived there. According to the Defendants this was because there being no agreement to provide any kind of wedding reception there was no food available to be served to them. Also, the public house was crowded to capacity and the First Named Defendant did not wish to get involved in any argument with the Plaintiff the premises over the alleged failure to provide the food and beverages for the wedding party.
3. Thus, it is not in issue that the Plaintiffs and their wedding guests arrived at the Defendant’s public house at approximately 6.00pm on the 26th December. The Plaintiffs were informed that neither they nor guests would be served food or drink. They were asked to leave and they left.
4. There are two basic issues. The first is whether there was an agreement between the Plaintiff and the Defendants concerning the provision of food and drink for a post-wedding get together of the Plaintiffs and their guests. The second issue is whether the words alleged to have been spoken by the first named Defendant and his conduct in removing them from the premises in the presence of other customers in the public house at the time, constituted an actionable slander of the Plaintiffs.
5. Turning to the first issue, I do not think it is necessary to recall all of the evidence but to concentrate on the essential aspects of it. The background facts are not in issue. Prior to their marriage the Plaintiffs had been living together for quite a number of years. They had three children, the youngest of which was four and the eldest fourteen. Sometime in 1998 they decided to solemnise their relationship by getting married according to the rites of the Catholic Church and arrange for their wedding to take place on St. Stephens Day, December 26th, 1998. At that time the first named Plaintiff was unemployed. The Defendants are the proprietors of an extensive public house premises known as The Downs Inn a few miles outside Mullingar.
6. In his evidence the first named Plaintiff, Mr James Dinnegan said that he had been in The Downs Inn on a number of occasions prior to the incident in question. His father drank their regularly. He knew the proprietor, Mr Ryan. He went in there on a day around the end of November, early December at about 11.30am to make arrangements for a post-wedding reception. He told Mr Ryan about his forthcoming marriage on St. Stephen’s Day and that he wished to bring his guests to The Downs Inn after the wedding for a small reception consisting of sandwiches and cocktail sausages and drinks. Mr Dinnegan said Mr Ryan at first expressed some concern about a 21st birthday party which he would be having that evening but this he said was resolved when he stated that the wedding party would arrive between 6 and 6.30pm and could leave at approximately 9.00pm before the 21st birthday party got under way. He told Mr Ryan that there would be about twenty persons in the party possibly thirty but not more than that. Mr Dinnegan agreed that no overall price for the provision of food was agreed. He explained this by saying since that it was only going to consist of sandwiches and cocktail sausages he knew it could not amount to too much. The drinks would be bought from the bar. He denied that he and the wedding party turned up at the public house without prior arrangements or that they had chosen the Downs Inn on the day because of an electricity blackout in Mullingar town. His main concern appears to have been to ensure that there would be some food available to his wedding party when they arrived after the wedding. As regards Mr Dinnegan’s visit to the pub to make these arrangement, Mrs Dinnegan gave evidence that they were on their way to visit a brother-in-law in hospital and they took the opportunity to stop at The Downs Inn and her husband went in to make the arrangements while she waited in the car. This took about fifteen or twenty minutes.
7. St. Stephen’s Day turned out to be a very stormy windy day as a result of which electricity wires were blown down and much if not of all Mullingar town was without power. This included the Catholic Church in which the wedding took place that afternoon as a result of which it had to be conducted in candlelight. The power cut gave rise to concern as to whether The Downs Inn was affected by the power cut and Mr Dinnegan’s sister rang the public house to check the position. A female who answered the phone confirmed that they had power.
8. The Plaintiffs had invited a range of friends and relations to the wedding some of which had come from England and other parts of the country.
9. After the wedding ceremony the wedding party left for The Downs Inn. Inevitably some arrived before others although most arrived within a short time of one another. So far as a first named Plaintiff is concerned he came in from the car park with two uncles and a brother. Four drinks were ordered. He said a female behind the bar started to pour the drinks but that the first named Defendant, Mr Ryan came out to the lounge and told him that he did not want Mr Dinnegan there, that he was not being served and he wanted him to leave. According to Mr Dinnegan when he came out from behind the bar Mr Ryan waved his hands repeatedly telling him to “get out, I don’t want you here.” Mr Dinnegan says he was quite shocked, could not believe that this could happen, particularly just at that point on his wedding day without any notice. He felt completely humiliated. His own wedding party had begun to gather at this stage. The lounge was fairly busy and many people who knew him, as he lived in the town itself, could see what was happening. He tried to talk to Mr Ryan but there was no talking to him. After initially taking issue with Mr Ryan he felt so humiliated that he just wanted to get out. People were looking at them and he wished to avoid further embarrassment. They went home to his mother’s house. He was very upset but his wife particularly so and they felt too upset to go anywhere else. They had a few drinks in his mother’s house. In the course of his evidence Mr Dinnegan stated that when he walked into the pub he could see sandwiches laid out on trays in a small function room. At this point I would note that no other member of party who gave evidence observed sandwiches laid out on trays and whatever about the rest of the evidence of Mr Dinnegan I am not satisfied, on the balance of probabilities, that he did infact see sandwiches laid out on trays. He may well have been attempting to gild the lily in this aspect of his evidence. According to Mr Dinnegan he then telephoned Mr Ryan twice that evening and twice the next day but Mr Ryan refused to come to the phone. Eventually he went to his solicitor which in due course led to the initiation of these proceedings.
10. Mrs Teresa Dinnegan, the second named Defendant, explained how she was anxious that the wedding day would go well with a small reception for friends and relations after the wedding. “All we wanted was a few friends and a few sandwiches” When she went to The Downs Inn after the wedding, she explained how she waited for her mother-in-law and went in to the public house not long after her husband. Her evidence was that all she could hear was “get out, get out, I don’t want you here.” She felt ashamed and embarrassed. She said that she literally turned around and walked out shocked and humiliated. She felt ashamed in front of her friends. She could have had food for them in their house afterwards but they had decided to entertain them in The Downs Inn. Afterwards she felt too upset to go anywhere else. She was in tears. So upset was she that she subsequently went to her father’s grave for solace. Mr Dinnegan Snr. gave evidence broadly speaking in support of the evidence of his son and also how he had known Mr Ryan, the First Named Defendant for many years. He was a regular customer of the pub particularly on Saturday nights and neither he nor any member of his family had any history of trouble or difficulty with Mr Ryan.
11. Mr McGregor was the photographer engaged by the Plaintiffs to take photographs of their wedding and he was also a friend. When he arrived at the Downs Inn he could see members of the wedding party coming out. He stated that he could not believe what was happening. He had been told two or three weeks before the wedding that the party would be going to the Downs Inn afterwards and that he would be required to take photographs there as well as at the church. He had been told by the Plaintiffs that some food would be available in the pub. He gave evidence that everybody was deeply upset by what had happened and nobody had the heart to go anywhere else. Mr Gerard Dolan, a brother-in-law of the Second Named Plaintiff, was one of the first to arrive with his wife and Mr Martin McDonald. They had never been to the Downs Inn before. They had no difficulty in ordering and being served a drink. He said there was “a nice crowd” but not a large crowd in the pub. They ordered and were served a second drink. He heard shouting and saw a man telling members of the party including the First Named Plaintiff to “get out - get out.” He was not known to
12. Mr Ryan or Mr Ryan did not know him. However, when the rest of the party were not allowed stay, they left. Mr Martin McDonald also gave evidence of being with the last mentioned witness and being served two rounds of drink. At one point he saw a female behind the bar saying something to Mr Dinnegan, the First Named Plaintiff which he thought was to the effect that she could not serve him. There seemed to be a bit of confusion. Then he saw the First Named Defendant, Mr Ryan, in an archway who told Mr Dinnegan and party that they were not being served. Mr Ryan said “I don’t want you here, I want you to leave.” Mr Ryan was taking control, he said. He also stated that when he ordered the first round, he did so from a barman who appeared to look to Mr Ryan, as if he was checking whether he should serve the drink or not. In any event he was served. In cross-examination it was put to Mr McDonald that in fact the barman at that time had gone off duty and that Mr Ryan was upstairs having dinner. Mr Patrick Dinnegan, a brother of the First Named Plaintiff and Mr William McDonald, a brother of the Second Named Plaintiff also gave evidence, broadly speaking consistent with the case being made by the Plaintiffs.
13. Ms Rachel Greville was the first witness called on behalf of the Defendants. On the date in question she was a barmaid working in the Downs Inn. She had been working there for six years. She has since left the employment of the Defendants. On the occasion in question, she had just relieved one of the barmen and had no one behind the counter to assist her. There were sixty to eighty people in the bar, which was essentially a family run pub. When she saw the group arriving, maybe sixteen people, she spoke to the Plaintiff. She asked him to come down to a particular part of the counter as she wished to speak him for a second. She explained to him that she was working on her own and was too busy and would not be able to serve him. She called him down the counter as she did not wish to embarrass him in front of other people. She stated in evidence that St. Stephens Day was one of the busiest days in the year and she was on her own in the bar. Normally there would a lull between 6 and 9pm but this day it was different. The Plaintiff asked her was she refusing to serve them because of who they were. They wanted to know why. They seemed shocked and wondered why they were being refused. This conversation lasted six or seven minutes. There were people waiting to be served. Mr Ryan was upstairs having his dinner. She took the decision not to serve because there were too many people in the pub. She did not consult Mr. Ryan. It was Mr Ryan’s son who called Mr Ryan down to the bar. She saw Mr Ryan talking to the Plaintiff Mr Dinnegan and other men that were with them. She did not hear anything. She heard no shouting, no raised voices. She had come in and told the barman to go on his break and took over from him. There was never any sign of an argument taking place. She did not hear anything of significance.
14. Mr Eugene Ryan, the First Named Defendant, said that Mr and Mrs Dinnegan were completely wrong in claiming that there was an agreement to providing food for their wedding party on the evening in question. He had only one wedding in seven years in the public house. He had the odd 21st Birthday party, anniversary parties and the like.
15. St. Stephens Day, March 17th and 31st December are traditionally very busy and they take no booking for those occasions. He has a diary of bookings. It is a diary for noting in particular band bookings. According to Mr Ryan it became something of a shock to him to see the members of the wedding party arriving to his premises on the evening in question. The public house had a capacity for 100 people. He thought it was acceptable for his barmaid to decide that there was so many there that she would not serve any other arrivals. He did however agree that he had never known a pub to put up a “full-up” sign.
16. He had told Mr Dinnegan that he had no wedding booked; that there was nothing in the book for December 26th. There was no “hassle”. The conversation went on for 24-25 minutes. Mr Dinnegan was getting a bit annoyed. He said to Mr Dinnegan would you ever leave please. Mr Dinnegan and his party left the premises. He received no phone calls that night. Mr Ryan in evidence acknowledged that a couple of weeks prior to December 26th there had been an incident in the pub involving a relation of the first named Plaintiff, who had got sick on the premises. He said this had nothing to do with the events in the pub on December, 26th.
17. Ms Ryan, the First Named Defendant’s daughter gave evidence consistent with that of her father. If there was a function, either she or one of the family would make the sandwiches. There was no function booked for that night. They never have a function on
18. St. Stephens Night. There was no contract with the Plaintiffs to provide food. When requested to leave the Plaintiffs and their party left calmly and quietly.
Conclusions
19. First of all I would like to dispose of some subsidiary matters. There was a certain amount of controversy, raised mainly with the Plaintiffs in cross-examination, as to whether the Plaintiffs and their wedding party could have come in and out one of the doors of the pub used by them on the grounds that the door was supposed to have been bolted or locked due to the stormy conditions outside. I do not consider that anything turns on this particular issue although if I had to decide it I would accept the account of the Plaintiffs on the balance of probabilities. The second named Plaintiff, Mrs Dinnegan, was also cross-examined on the basis that if contractual arrangements were being made for the wedding reception, she would have gone into the pub with her husband when they were being made and/or would have at least enquired about the cost and also that she would have made arrangements for flowers to be placed in the area where they would get their refreshments. Again I do not think a great deal turns on these matters but it does seem to me entirely logical that she would choose to remain in the car while her husband went into the public house to make what were essentially very simple arrangements for a small get together of the wedding party. It struck me that Mrs Dinnegan had been anxious that the appropriate arrangements would be made for the post-wedding get together with their guests and if she was anxious that her husband would in fact make the necessary arrangements she could only have been reassured by the fact that she was with him in the car when he called into the public house to make them. As regards the flowers her answer was that it never had struck her to have flowers for the occasion. That strikes me as entirely logical and reasonable given the very informal nature of the post-wedding get together.
20. I now turn to the more substantive questions which arise in relation to the first issue concerning the contractual arrangements for the post-wedding reception. Although Mr and Mrs Dinnegan had been living together as man and wife with a young family for quite a number of years it was quite clear from their evidence that the day on which they choose to solemnise their relationship and make their wedding vows was to be for them no less a momentous and important occasion in their personal lives as it would be for many other couples getting married. They carefully made the church arrangements for the wedding, engaged a photographer, invited relations and friends not only from Mullingar but from elsewhere in the country and from England. Mr Dinnegan was unemployed at the time and the celebrations which were going to take place after the wedding ceremony were to be of a relatively modest nature. This did not mean that it was in any way less important for them to have a place to bring their relations and friends where they could provide them with some food and drinks to celebrate the happy occasion in relaxed and friendly surroundings. I am quite satisfied that they were telling the truth when they said they decided upon the Defendants public house as the venue for that event and that Mr Dinnegan went there and entered into the specific arrangement, outlined in his evidence, with the first named Defendant, Mr Ryan. I accept fully the evidence of Mrs Dinnegan when she described how they stopped at the public house one morning at 11.30am for the specific purpose of
21. Mr Dinnegan going into make the arrangements with Mr Ryan. I do not accept at all the suggestion, which was made at one point, that the Plaintiffs only chose to go to the Downs Inn after the wedding when they found that all or most of Mullingar was affected by the blackout but that the Defendants premises were not. If corroboration were required that their plans were made in advance, it is to be found in the evidence of the photographer,
22. Mr McGregor whom I found to be an impressive and truthful witness. A few weeks before the wedding he stated that he had been informed of the arrangements for the wedding party to go to the Downs Inn for food and drink after the wedding ceremony.
23. There was a certain amount of controversy during the course of the evidence as to whether the Defendant Mr Ryan was present in the pub lounge when the wedding party arrived. There was also a conflict in the evidence as to whether the barman was present when the first of Mr Dinnegan’s guests arrived or whether he had departed for a break just before they arrived. Whatever about those issues the defence of the Defendants is clear, namely, no booking was made and that was the reason that no food was available. They were refused drink because, according to Ms Greville, she had decided that there were enough customers in the pub already, and/or according to Mr Ryan he did not wish to entertain or have any argument on his premises about the assertion that he had agreed to provide food for the wedding party. Apart from anything else I find the Defendants’ defence quite inconsistent with some pre-trial correspondence that took place between the parties. As appears from a letter dated 10th July, 2001 and sent by the Plaintiff’s solicitors to the Defendant’s solicitors, Counsel for the Ryans’ had indicated during legal argument on a motion for discovery in the Circuit Court that the Plaintiffs had been refused service on the premises “on the basis that there had been trouble involving another member of their group a number of weeks earlier.” In that letter the Plaintiffs solicitors sought particulars of that particular allegation which they stated was the first time that it had been made. By letter dated the 12th July, 2001, the Solicitors for the Defendants wrote to the Plaintiffs solicitors in answer to the particulars concerning the allegation stated as follows: -
“(a) The person in question is a brother of the first named Plaintiff but the Defendants do not know his name.
(b) The incident in question happened in the evening time and as best the Defendants can recollect sometime between 10 and 11pm. The incident happened to the best of the Defendants recollection approximately 2 to 3 weeks prior to the 26th December, 1998 and accordingly would have happened sometime during the first two weeks of December, 1998.”
24. In a response to a query to give details of the alleged incident the Solicitors for the Defendant said that this was a matter of evidence and within the knowledge of the Plaintiff.
25. One matter which this letter from the Defendant’s solicitor did not contain was any denial or contest of the statement that the reason for refusing the Plaintiffs service in the premises on the occasion in question had been alleged trouble involving another member “of their group a number of weeks earlier.” In fact the whole tenor of the letter, in giving details of the allegations, was to confirm that this was the purported motivation for refusing service to the Plaintiffs. This is wholly inconsistent with the story advanced by Mr Ryan in his evidence in Court. I am not at all satisfied with the evidence of Mr Ryan. I did not find him to be a credible witness. It is quite clear that when he came on the scene, irrespective of the point in time at which this occurred, he had one thing in mind only and that was to clear Mr and Mrs Dinnegan and their friends out of his public house. Indeed this emerges from his own evidence, he did not wish Mr and Mrs Dinnegan to remain on the premises one moment longer than was necessary. He knew it was their wedding day, whatever the merits of the situation, he was going to give them no quarter, not even allow them one drink, or allow them to buy one round of drinks. I do not consider this the normal kind of behaviour that one would expect from the owner of a public house who is dealing with customers coming to his public house on their wedding day even under the apparent misapprehension that they had arranged for some food to be served. Having considered all the evidence and in particular that of Mr Ryan himself, I am satisfied that there was a premeditated and conscious decision on his part to refuse service to Mr and Mrs Dinnegan even though they had made the booking with him. I decline to speculate on what the motivation for his attitude might be. It may or may not have something to do with the alleged earlier incident, although Mr Ryan denied this. I am satisfied that I have not been told the full story behind this matter. The absence of evidence from the barman who was on the premises may be significant. I do not attach any decisive importance to the fact that Mr Dinnegan’s booking was not recorded in Mr Ryan’s book. I am satisfied that not every event or booking was recorded in that book which is primarily, although not exclusively, to record the bookings of the bands which have to be reserved one year in advance. Similarly I do not attach any importance to his statement that he really did not do wedding receptions and only had a wedding reception on one previous occasion. This particular wedding reception was of a very informal and relatively modest scale. The provision of sandwiches and cocktail sausages for twenty or at most thirty people who would buy drinks from the bar from 6.00pm to the latest 9.00pm was very much in line or indeed on a relatively reduced scale to other kinds of functions for which he took bookings such as club events, 21st birthday parties or anniversaries. In any event I accept the Plaintiffs’ evidence that they made the booking with Mr Ryan as truthful and reject his evidence to the contrary.
26. I am not convinced by the evidence by Ms Greville. She described herself as the barmaid, although quite an experienced one, who took it upon herself on the spur of the moment to refuse service to Mr and Mrs Dinnegan and their party. I find it difficult to accept that she would turn away customers, without consulting her employer whom she said was upstairs at the time. This was a family run pub and there was no evidence that she considered consulting with her employer, if she felt under pressure, as to whether he or some other member of the family would be available to help her out behind the bar counter or whether in the circumstances the barman should come back on duty. I am not convinced by her evidence on this matter. Moreover, if this was a straightforward case of refusing service because she was too busy with other customers, she could have done so openly instead of bringing, at least on her evidence, Mr Dinnegan down to a quite part of the counter in order to inform him that she would not serve him. She did say in evidence that she had on one other occasion refused a rugby team whose coach had stopped at the pub when they were busy dealing with a post-GAA match crowd. Whatever happened on that other occasion, I am satisfied that on this particular occasion the Plaintiffs were refused service by reason of a decision of Mr Ryan notwithstanding the agreement which he had with them.
27. Having regard to all the evidence and for the reasons set out above I conclude that the Defendants wrongfully, and in breach of their contract with the Plaintiffs refused to provide the Plaintiffs with any service for them and their wedding group when they arrived at the Defendants premises for their post wedding get together. I will deal with the question of damages after I have addressed the other cause of action, namely slander, relied upon by the Plaintiffs.
Slander
28. As regards the Plaintiffs action for slander, it was accepted by Counsel for the Plaintiffs and properly so, that while at common law libel is always actionable per se, slander generally speaking, is not so actionable and therefore the general rule is that a person defamed by a slander can only succeed on proof of “special damage” arising as the direct, natural and reasonable result of the publication of the words complained of. (see M’Mullan O’ Mulhall and Farrell [1929] 1I.R. 470) There are exceptions to this general rule where slander is actionable per se. However, there is no element in this case which would bring the slander within any of those particular exceptions and obviously this is why Counsel for the Plaintiffs (notwithstanding the pleadings) accepted that it was in incumbent upon the Plaintiffs to prove special damage as well as the slander in order to succeed against the Defendants.
29. While there is an arguable case that the words spoken by the Defendant to and concerning the Plaintiffs, in particular the first named Plaintiff, may have been slanderous given the circumstances and context in which they were spoken, the position in this case is that even if there was a slander it is not actionable in law unless there is proof of special damage. At this point the question to be considered is whether there is proof of any special damage. Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that one background factor to take into account is the publicity given to the wedding in the local newspapers. This arose from the fact that some special publicity was given to the wedding in a local newspaper due to the fact that it had to take place in the dark by candlelight only on account of the blackout. This meant the wedding was fairly widely known to have taken place. The ejection of Mr Dinnegan from the pub meant that people could well ask themselves is this the sort of fellow they would wish to do business with. Therefore, he might have difficulty cashing a cheque, looking for a job or seeking work as a PVC fitter which was work which he had subsequently undertaken. The special damage did not have to be for a specific amount.
30. Apart from the fact that Mr Dinnegan was unemployed at the time of the alleged slander it was not contended, and could not have been contended, that it was spoken of him concerning his trade or profession. Furthermore, there was no evidence that he had on any occasion been adversely affected in a particular way by the conduct of third parties arising from what was said and took place in the pub.
31. Gatley on Libel and Slander (9th edition, 1998, pg. 119) sums up what constitutes special damage by reference to a range of authorities and states “special damage for this purpose is some “actual, temporal loss” - the loss of some “material” or “temporal advantage” which is “pecuniary” or “capable of being estimated in money”. So, for example, the requirement is satisfied where there is the loss or refusal of an office or employment, or the dismissal from a situation, or the loss of a client, or of a dealing.” Gatley goes on to point out that mere social ostracism or disgrace is not enough even though it’s effect on the Plaintiff may be very painful. The special damage must have accrued before action is brought. Mere apprehension or possibility of temporal loss in the future is not sufficient. (Onslow -v- Horne (3 Wils.177 at 188) cited with approval in M’Mullan -v- Mulhall and Farrell (cited above). In Michael -v- Spiers and Pond Ltd (1909 101 L.T. 352), cited by Gatley, the Plaintiff was ejected from the Defendants licensed premises by their servant who said that he was drunk. In that case it was held that a threat by the Plaintiff’s father to remove him from the Directorate of a company which he, the father, had control, unless the Plaintiff could clear his character, did not constitute special damage on the ground that a threat of temporal damage in the future was not sufficient to constitute such damage.
32. In any event in this case, there is no evidence of any actual, (or prospective) material or temporal loss on the part of the Plaintiff. In fact apart from the alleged defamatory nature of the words spoken, there was no evidence whatsoever of the effect of the alleged slander on third parties. Assuming, for present purposes, that the words were defamatory with the implication that the Plaintiff’s reputation was damaged by reference to those who became aware of the slander, this would obviously not constitute special damage as defined by the authorities. In short, the Plaintiffs have not established that they suffered any special damage arising from the slander alleged in the Civil Bill. Therefore, even if there was a slander, it is not actionable and the Plaintiffs must fail on this ground alone. It is, therefore, not necessary to enter upon the question whether in fact the words spoken by the first named Defendant were, in the circumstances, slanderous.
Damages for breach of contract
33. As regards damages I think it should first be noted that the contract was broader than the simple provision of sandwiches and cocktail sausages. This was no bread and butter business contract where the purely commercial value of the transaction is the sole or primary subject of the contract. It was a contract not only to provide food and a bar service but also to provide a place which would be an occasion for the enjoyment and celebration of the wedding day of the Plaintiffs to be shared in by their family and friends. It was a contract intended to ensure that the Plaintiffs could mark and bring to a close a momentous day in their lives in the comfort of the Downs Inn.
34. The loss sustained by the Plaintiffs arising from the breach of contract was not just disappointment at losing the advantages which might accrue from a successfully completed commercial transaction. The loss which they sustained, was the denial to the Plaintiffs of the occasion for enjoyment and happiness to be shared with their family and friends. That was the essence of the contract. For that loss they are entitled to compensation. The degree of that loss was undoubtedly exacerbated by the manner in which the contract was breached, namely, without forewarning and at the last minute when they arrived in the public house. This meant that instead of their wedding day ending on a memorable and high note, it was plunged to the depths of humiliation, shock and disappointment, which not only brought it to a distressing end but engraved a permanent blotch on the memory of what should always have been a day of good memories. Given the nature and purpose of the contract, the loss in this regard which the Plaintiff sustained was reasonably foreseeable and, moreover, flows directly from its breach. Damages are intended to be compensatory. In the circumstances of this case I am satisfied that the Plaintiffs are entitled to be compensated for the fact that they were wrongfully and in breach of contract deprived of their happy occasion to celebrate their wedding day and suffered the distress and disappointment which is inevitably a direct consequence of the breach of such a contract. The law and practice of the Courts in awarding damages for breach of this type of contract has evolved in recent decades (see for example Contract Law in Ireland, Robert Clarke, 4th edition. at 479) stimulated to a significant extent by the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Jarvis -v- Swans Tours Ltd [1973] 1 A.E.R. 71. In Johnson -v- Longleat Properties (Dublin) Ltd (unreported, High Court, 19 May, 1976 and noted in 13 Ir.Jur. 186, 1978) McMahon J. stated
“It appears to me that in principle damages may be awarded for inconvenience or loss of enjoyment when these are within the presumed contemplation of the parties as likely to result from the breach of contract. That will usually be the case in contracts to provide entertainment or enjoyment ...”.
35. On the evidence, both Mr Dinnegan and Mrs Dinnegan suffered not only humiliation in front of their friends, but a great deal of personal distress that this particular day should be spoilt in such a shocking, uncaring and arbitrary manner. I accept the evidence that they were emotionally devastated, that Mrs Dinnegan was tearful for many hours afterwards and that although they had the option of seeking out some other hostelry to get together for at least a drink, they were so distressed that they really did not have the heart in them to do so. Mrs Dinnegan was so upset that she visited her father’s grave for solace. In my view they are both entitled to significant damages against the Defendants. I would not differentiate between the Plaintiffs on the question of damages and therefore I aware €6,000 damages to Mr Dinnegan the first named Plaintiff and €6,000 damages to Mrs Dinnegan the second named Plaintiff. Accordingly there will be a decree of €12,000 damages for the Plaintiffs against the Defendants.