1. The
Applicant commenced these proceedings by way originating Notice of Motion
pursuant to Order 84(A) of the Rules of the Superior Courts (S.I. 374/1998)
Rule 2 thereof dated the 8th March, 2001 seeking a review of an award of a
contract on the grounds that the award of the same was in breach of the
provisions of Council Directive 93/36/EC of 14th July, 1993, European
Communities (Award of Public Supply Contracts) Regulations 1992 and European
Communities (Award of Public Supply Contracts) (Amendment) Regulations 1994 and
in breach of the legitimate expectation of the Applicant. In response to the
originating Notice of Motion the Respondent on the 26th March, 2001 issued a
Motion seeking to have the application struck out under the inherent
jurisdiction of the Court on the basis that the Applicant’s claim cannot
succeed. It is not, as I understand it, sought to rely on the Rules of the
Superior Courts Order 27 which applies where no cause of action is shown or the
proceedings constitute an abuse of the process of the Court. It is that motion
which is before me.
2. The
approach which the Court must take on an application such as the present was
considered in
Sun
Fat Chan -v- Osseous Limited
(1992) 1 IR 425. Unlike the situation which appertains in this application the
Court in that case acted on admitted facts. However, I am satisfied that the
jurisdiction to strike out arises not just when facts are admitted but also
where the facts are clear and show that the claim is unsustainable. However,
the Court should be slow to make an Order. McCarthy J. at p. 428 said:-
3. It
has been agreed before me that if I find in favour of the Applicant upon any of
the grounds relied upon by it as the basis of its claim in that I cannot say of
that ground that it is bound to fail then I should allow the proceedings to
continue in total and that the claim should proceed to the next stage envisaged
by Order 84(A) - the Respondent to file a statement of grounds of opposition
and the Applicant’s motion to proceed to hearing.
4. The
circumstances giving rise to the claim are as follows. On the 25th July, 2000
the Respondent caused a notice to be inserted in the Official Journal of the
European Union announcing a tender for hospital beds and accessories including
mattresses. The Applicant is a manufacturer of mattresses and submitted a
tender in response to and in compliance with the advertisement. The Applicants
product was subjected to testing along with the products of other companies
which took part in the tender process. Following on testing the Respondent
issued a Best Buy Guide to Health Boards, hospitals and other similar
institutions. Those institutions in turn placed orders with the successful
tenderers including the Applicant some of the orders being placed before
testing on the Applicant’s product was completed.
5. The
Applicant claims that the Respondent abandoned the tender process in favour of
a procedure whereby it issued a Best Buy Guide and further the Best Buy Guide
as originally issued contained errors in relation to the Applicant’s
product.
6. A
major basis upon which the Applicants claim is attacked by the Respondent is
that it claims not to be a contracting authority within the definition of
Council Directive 93/36. Contracting authority is defined as follows in
Article 1 of the Directive:-
7. The
Respondent is not incorporated. The board consists of representatives of a
number of Health Boards, voluntary hospitals, directly funded homes and a
representative of the Department of Health and Children. It describes its
function as an umbrella to enable Health Boards, voluntary hospitals and
directly funded homes and other bodies to exploit economies of scale in the
procurement of goods and services. It claims that it does not itself contract,
the contract in each case being with the relevant body availing of its
services. Thus in the present case while the tender was sought for mattresses
what was envisaged was that on foot of the tender individual bodies would
approach one or more of the successful tenderers for its requirements but
without any obligation to do so: the tenderer on the other hand would have an
obligation to supply. The advertisement inserted in the official journal makes
this clear, it is claimed. The advertisement describes the awarding authority
as follows:-
8. The
contracting authorities therefore it is claimed, are the bodies on whose behalf
the advertisement was inserted and they in turn are the appropriate Respondents.
9. I
am not satisfied that the matter can be so simply disposed of. It is quite
clear from the documents exhibited on the application that the decision as to
whose tender should be accepted rested with the Respondent although those
parties on whose behalf it is claimed the advertisement was placed have no
obligation to purchase supplies from a successful tenderer. This arrangement
could in my view arguably amount to a contract - the benefit obtained by the
Applicant being placed on a list of successful tenderers from whom the bodies
represented by the Respondent might purchase their supplies and the
consideration moving from the Applicant being the expense incurred in
submitting a tender and having its product tested. If some such contract
should be found to exist at the hearing of the Applicant’s motion it
would then be necessary to proceed and determine whether the contract so found
comes within the definition of Public Supply Contract as defined in Council
Directive 93/36/EEC:-
10. The
contract which I have suggested might be found in the relationship between the
Applicant and the Respondent is arguably within the definition of Public Supply
Contracts. The contract is for pecuniary interest: the Respondent tells me
that its function is to achieve economy of scale in purchases by Health Boards,
voluntary hospitals and so forth. The contract involves the purchase of
products: the definition arguably does not require that the purchase should be
between the tenderer and the contracting authority. The expression
“with or without option to buy”
arguably refers to a situation such as that envisaged by the Respondents
advertisement - the bodies which the Respondent represented were to have an
option to buy from the successful tenderer but no obligation to do so.
11. Another
possibility is that a tripartite agreement could be found the parties to the
same being the Applicant, the Respondent and the bodies represented by the
Respondent. In such a contract the Respondent again would arguably come within
the definition of contracting authorities the contract being for pecuniary
interest involving the purchase of products the bodies represented by the
Respondent having an option but no obligation to buy from the Applicant.
12. The
second objection raised by the Respondent is that no contract for the supply of
beds was in fact awarded the procedure having at some point transformed into
one whereby a Best Buy Guide was issued by the Respondent to the bodies which
it represented from which they could select but without any obligation to do
so. This objection presupposes that the only contract that could come into
existence on foot of the advertisement was one between the Applicant and the
bodies represented by the Respondent and not as I have postulated a separate
contract between the Applicant and the Respondent and individual contracts to
purchase between the bodies represented by the Respondent and the Applicant
each time an order for the Applicant’s product should be placed. It is
arguable that placing the Applicant’s list name and product on the Best
Buy List.
13. In
the Affidavit grounding this Motion the Respondents General Manager deposes
that the Respondent has no corporate identity or legal personality and that
accordingly it is not capable of suing or being sued. This proposition is not
axiomatic. (See Superior Court Rules Order 14 Rules 1, 5, 10 and 11.) The
Applicant may well be able to satisfy the Court on the hearing of the
substantive motion that the Respondent is a partnership the partners being
those individuals nominated by the bodies habitually represented by the board,
to constitute the Respondent. Alternatively, the Respondent may be a trade
name under which the various bodies which it represents carry on business so
that those bodies are in fact liable for its defaults. In any event there is
no bar to proceedings being instituted against the Respondent in the
Respondent’s name.
14. I
bear in mind the caveat of McCarthy J. quoted above: the full circumstances
surrounding the Respondents involvement in the events given rise to this claim
may not yet be before the Court. It is possible that discovery might bring
further circumstances to light relevant to the determination of the issues
which arise. Documents disclosed on this application are capable of persuading
the Court that the Respondent acted as something more than a mere agent. The
tender was based on a document - Instructions to Tenderers - which is
informative in this regard. The Respondent is described as the awarding
authority. The Respondent appropriates to itself many functions appropriate to
a contracting party rather than an agent in the following paragraphs thereof:-
15. As
against the foregoing paragraph 3.4 of the document corresponds closely in its
description of the functions and relationships of the party with that deposed
to on behalf of the Respondent. However, it is not inconceivable that on
construing the document a Court might find the Respondent to be something more
than a mere agent with no contractual liability.
16. Having
regard to the agreement between the parties that if any part of the Applicants
case survives examination on this motion the entire of the same should go to
the next stage of the procedure laid down in Article 84(A) the foregoing, it
seems to me, is sufficient to enable me to dispose of this motion. I am not
satisfied that the Applicants case whether on agreed facts or on clear facts as
established on the Affidavits must fail. Accordingly, I refuse to make an Order
striking out the Applicant’s claim that being the relief which the
Respondent seeks on this Notice of Motion.