High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. The Applicant faces two murder charges. The first relates to the death of Patrick Murray. The second concerns the death of Darren Carey. They were two young men who went missing at the end of December, 1999. Their bodies were found in the Grand Canal on the 9th and 10th January, 2000 respectively. Both had been shot. Both were in the water for a number of days before being recovered.

2. The Applicant seeks bail on these charges. Bail is strongly opposed by the Director of Public Prosecutions on a number of grounds which I will consider shortly.

3. At the outset it must be borne in mind that the Applicant is presumed to be innocent in respect of these charges. That presumption is a real one and not a mere formula of words. I bear it very much in mind.

4. Secondly, the Applicant has a right to bail. It is not a privilege but a right. Like many rights however, it is not absolute. It must be balanced against the public interest in ensuring that the integrity of the trial process is protected. Where evidence is accepted that as a matter of probability an Applicant, if granted bail, would not stand his trial or would interfere with witnesses or would commit serious offences whilst on bail, the right to liberty may have to yield to the public interest in the administration of justice.

5. All three of these grounds are relied upon by the Director of Public Prosecutions in opposition to this application. I will consider each in turn.

6. The Applicant has in the past failed to honour bail terms resulting in warrants being issued for his arrest. Four such warrants have been issued in the past. Undoubtedly the most serious of these relates to a trial on indictment in the Dublin Circuit Criminal Court. He faced a trial on the 15th May, 1995 on a number of serious offences including robbery, assault and charges under section 112 of the Road Traffic Act. On the occasion that he was arrested for these offences police had to give chase over nine miles in the Dublin area at rush hour on a Monday morning. I am satisfied that furious driving at high speed took place on that occasion. The Applicant in his own evidence effectively admitted that his actions on that occasion were consistent with him seeking to evade arrest. On the trial date he failed to appear. He says that he was shot the night before. The evidence satisfies me that such injury as was sustained was self-inflicted. This is indicative of the measures which the Applicant has been prepared to take to evade justice in the past.

7. There are three other instances of warrants being issued in the District Court in more recent times. None of the purported explanations put forward in respect of these failures to observe bail terms are convincing, nor do they excuse the non-appearance.

8. The Applicant has a considerable history of failure to observe bail terms. The past is in his case, in my view, a good indicator of the future.

9. Over and above this however, there are other aspects of the Applicant's behaviour which satisfy me that there is a reasonable probability that if granted bail he will not appear for trial.

10. Whilst in London he used the false name. He procured a forged driving licence in that false name. He gave the false name to London Metropolitan police officers who arrested him within a few weeks of the murders in suit.

11. Another false name was given to an Essex police officer when he boarded a flight to Belfast. He flew there and then took a train to Dublin. The explanation for this extraordinary way of returning to Dublin and the use of the second false name was that he was in fear of what he described as "spy agents" whom he says were following him. I do not believe that. Nor do I believe his story that English police officers advised or indeed offered to provide protection to him. No such suggestion was ever made to either of the two English police officers who gave evidence before me.

12. He further evinced an intention to evade justice when he fled having been stopped at a checkpoint manned by Officer Whelan in July, 1999.

13. I am therefore, quite satisfied that the evidence shows a reasonable probability that if granted bail he will not honour it.

14. Three instances were relied on. I discount two of them in their entirety. In one case the witness to give evidence on this topic failed to appear. In the other an attempt was made to adduce hearsay evidence in support of the contention. But the witness whom it was said was terrified to appear was never in fact asked to come to court. Furthermore, all of the views expressed concerning her reluctance to attend court were based on information acquired many months ago. I therefore discount in their entirety both of these matters relied upon by the Director of Public Prosecutions.

15. The third incident concerned a direct threat made to Detective Sergeant O'Gara. I accept that the threat was made to him after the arrest of the accused for these murders. I believe it was a serious threat and that the Applicant has the capacity to carry it out. The threat was taken seriously by the Detective Sergeant who knows the accused for years.

16. The evidence satisfies that there is a probability that witnesses will be interfered with if bail is granted.

17. I am not satisfied on the evidence that this objection has been made out by the Director of Public Prosecutions. There was evidence in the past of a road traffic offence being committed whilst on bail. That in my view is not sufficient to discharge the onus of proof in this case on this aspect of the matter.

18. I find therefore, that there is a reasonable probability that the Applicant if granted bail will not turn up for trial and will interfere with witnesses.

19. The offences charged are the most serious in the criminal calendar. They carry a mandatory life sentence on conviction.

20. I will not rehearse the evidence which it is proposed to give at trial. It was outlined in considerable detail in response to a question put in cross-examination. It is sufficient for me to say that on the basis of what I heard I am satisfied that there is a substantial body of evidence against the accused and that the police are justified in believing that a weighty case exists against him. Given the Applicant's propensity to evade justice in the past the incentive to do so here is much greater.

21. There has been a regrettable delay in serving the Book of Evidence. I am told it will be served next week. I hope that that will be so. Whilst I accept that the investigation has been an involved one and the Book of Evidence large, it must now be served in accordance with the evidence which I heard.

22. I am conscious of the delays in the Central Criminal Court. By refusing bail today the Applicant will be in custody for a longer period than I would wish prior to trial. He will however, be given such priority as possible given that he is in custody. Even taking such delay into account however, it would not justify the Applicant being released on bail.

23. Bail is refused. The application is dismissed.