1. This
is an application for leave to apply by way of Judicial Review for an Order
quashing the First Named Respondent’s decision to grant the said licences
and for ancillary relief. By virtue of the Fisheries (Amendment) Act 1997
Section 73 an application for leave to question the decision on an application
for a trial licence is to be made by Notice of Motion and leave shall not be
granted unless the High Court is satisfied that there are substantial grounds
for contending that the decision is invalid or ought to be quashed. There is
no similar provision affecting a challenge to a decision to grant a foreshore
licence. However on the application before me the Applicant challenged only
the trial licence and no arguments were adduced to me in relation to the
foreshore licence.
3. As
to the first ground it is clear that the application for the trial licence was
made in the name of the Second Named Respondent. Notice of the application was
duly advertised in accordance with the Aquaculture (Licence Application)
Regulations 1998 Regulation 8(1) again giving the name of the Second Named
Respondent as the applicant. In issuing the licence the name of the Third
Named Respondent was inserted in error and likewise the name of the Third Named
Respondent appeared in the notice published by the First Named Respondent
pursuant to the Aquaculture (Licence Application) Regulations 1998 Regulation
19 thereof. The error was brought to the First Named Respondent’s
attention by means of a letter dated 27th June, 2000 from the Applicant and
consequent upon that the First Named Respondent amended the licence by
substituting the name of the Second Named Respondent and notice of the
amendment was thereafter published. It was accepted before me that the
Applicant was not in anyway mislead or prejudiced by reason of the
administrative error which occurred.
4. The
Act of 1997 provides for the grant of two distinct licences an aquaculture
licence and a trial licence. The Act and the 1998 Regulations regulate the
grant of each in quite different ways. Thus the Act in Section 68 thereof
empowers the First Named Respondent to revoke or amend an aquaculture licence
whereas in relation to a trial licence the First Named Respondent is enpowered
by Section 9(4) of the Act to revoke but not to amend the same.
5. In
relation to this ground the correct approach for the Court to adopt is that
adopted in
Mulhall-v-An
Bord Pleanala
the High Court McCracken J. unreported 21st May, 1996. A mere administrative
error such as occurred here where the Applicant was aware of the application
and the name of the applicant for a trial licence, made submissions in response
to the publication of notice of the application, drew the error to the
attention of the First Named Respondent and was not mislead or prejudiced by
the error is a mere technical error and does not amount to a substantial ground
for the purposes of Section 73 of the Act. Accordingly I refuse leave to apply
for Judicial Review on this ground.
7. The
Aquaculture (Licence Application) Regulations 1998 Regulation 10 requires the
First Named Respondent to notify certain bodies including Duchas of the receipt
of an application for a trial licence. Regulation 10(3) provides that within
six weeks after such notification a body so notified may make written
submissions or observations to the First Named Respondent concerning the
application. The relevant notice to Duchas was issued on the 15th February,
2000 and the response from Duchas was sent to the First Named Respondent on the
13th April, 2000 outside the period of six weeks. In these circumstances the
First Named Respondent considered itself unable to take account of the same. I
am satisfied that this approach adopted by the First Named Respondent was the
correct one for had it done otherwise and considered the response from Duchas
its decision would have been open to challenge by the applicant for the licence
upon the ground that the First Named Respondent had taken into account matters
which ought not to have been taken into account:
O’Keeffe-v-An
Bord
Pleanala
1993 1IR39. Accordingly I refuse the Applicant leave on this ground also.
8. The
other matter particularly relied upon is the Communities (Natural Habitats)
Regulations 1997. Regulation 3 thereof requires the Notice Party to prepare a
list of sites referred to as a candidate list of European sites. Regulation 4
requires the Notice Party to send to
inter
alia
the First Named Respondent copy of the candidate list and to indicate the
operation or activity which the Notice Party considers would be likely to alter
damage destroy or interfere with the integrity of each site. The Applicant
relies upon documents on file with Cork County Council, who must also be sent a
copy of the candidate list pursuant to the 1997 Regulations Regulation 4, which
include a map prepared by Duchas showing the candidate site and which map is
dated 20th April, 2000 as showing that at the date of the grant of the trial
licence the site of the same was part of a candidate site. However I have
before me an Affidavit of Alan Craig a Senior Inspector/Principal Officer in
Duchas in which he avers that the effective date upon which the Notice Party
decided to propose Kenmare river for inclusion in a candidate list was the 16th
May, 2000 and that the documents on Cork County Council’s file were
issued to Cork County Council on the 23rd May, 2000 that is in each case after
the grant of the trial licence. It is clear therefore that the area in respect
of which the First Named Respondent granted a trial licence was not of the date
of the grant of the licence part of a site included in a candidate list. In
these circumstances I refuse leave on this ground also.
9. Insofar
as the Applicant in general terms claims that the decision of the First Named
Respondent is irrational, wholly unreasonable and unsupported by the evidence I
have carefully considered all the documents exhibited on this application and
it is clear that there was ample information before the First Named Respondent
to enable it to make the decision sought to be impugned. The onus on an
Applicant seeking to impugn a decision on this basis carries a very heavy
burden. In the
State (Keegan)-v-Stardust Compensation Tribunal
1986 I.R. 642 Henchy J. quoted with approval a passage from the Judgment of
Lord Green MR in
Associated
Provinical Picturehouses Limited-v-Wednesbury Corporation
1948 1KB 223 where at 230 he stated:-
10. The
Applicant here has not shown substantial grounds in support of the claim that
the First Named Respondent acted irrationally, unreasonably or without evidence
in the sense that those words are used in the context of the
State
(Keegan)-v-Stardust Compensation Tribunal
and
O’Keeffe-v-An Bord Pleanala
. On this ground also I refuse relief.
11. For
the purpose of this application the test which I have applied in determining
whether substantial grounds have been shown or not is that laid down in
MacNamara-v-An
Bord
Pleanala
1995 2 ILRM 125 - the grounds must be reasonable, arguable and weighty and not
trivial or tenuous.