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D.P.P. v. Cullen [2001] IEHC 21 (7th February, 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/2001/21.html
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[2001] IEHC 21
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D.P.P. v. Cullen [2001] IEHC 21 (7th February, 2001)
THE
HIGH COURT
1999
No.
1938SS
IN
THE MATTER OF
SECTION
2 OF THE SUMMARY JURISDICTION ACT, 1857
AND
IN THE MATTER OF
SECTION
51 OF THE COURTS (SUPPLEMENTAL PROVISIONS) ACT, 1961
BETWEEN
THE
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
APPELLANT
AND
JAMIE
CULLEN
RESPONDENT
Judgment
of Mr Justice Aindrias ÓCaoimh delivered on the 7th day of February
2001
1. Judge
William Harnett, a Judge of the District Court sitting at Kilkenny District
Court, has stated a case for the opinion of this Court pursuant to section 2 of
the Summary Jurisdiction Act, 1857 as extended on the application of the
Director of Public Prosecutions (hereinafter referred to as “the
Director”). It is stated that the prosecution against the Respondent
came before the District Court on the 13th of January 1998 and thereafter on
the 20th of January and the 3rd of February 1998 at Kilkenny District Court on
foot of a Summons served on the Respondent alleging an offence of driving with
an excess of alcohol in his urine contrary to section 49(3) and 6(a) of the
Road Traffic Act, 1961 as amended.
2. The
case stated cites the evidence before the District Court
- Garda
Frances Dunphy, a member of the Garda Síochána stationed at
Kilkenny gave evidence that on the 8th of June 1997 at approximately 4.30 a.m.
she was on duty at Castle Road, Kilkenny with Garda Lennon, Garda Furlong and
student Garda Foley. Whilst talking with two youths they heard a vehicle
coming in their direction from the traffic lights on the Parade up the Castle
Road at what appeared to be high speed. It was a small white car. Garda
Dunphy stated that she stepped out on to the road and waved her flash light
signalling the occupants to stop.
- The
vehicle, a white Peugeot 205 slowed down but failed to stop. It continued on
up the Castle Road. Garda Dunphy observed a male driver and a female
blond-haired passenger.
- Garda
Dunphy and her colleagues immediately got into the patrol car and followed the
vehicle up Castle Road. They put on the blue flashing lamp and followed the
vehicle into Larchfield, a public place. At 4.32 a.m. Garda Dunphy observed
the car pulling into the side of a footpath.
- The
Gardaí pulled in behind the vehicle and Garda Dunphy got out of the car
and proceeded towards the vehicle. As Garda Dunphy walked up to the
driver’s side of the car, the driver had one leg out of the car and was
clearly emerging from the car. Garda Dunphy asked the driver to stand out from
the vehicle. He gave his name as James Cullen, 68 Larchfield, Kilkenny. The
vehicle bore registration numbers and letters 88 KK 2690. Whilst Mr Cullen
was out of the car, he had to lean against the car and the wall. There was a
strong smell of alcohol.
- At
4.35 a.m. and as a result of her observations, Garda Dunphy formed the opinion
that the Respondent was incapable of having proper control of a mechanically
propelled vehicle in a public place due to the consumption of an intoxicant and
at that time Garda Dunphy arrested him for that offence and told him of her
opinion and of the offence under section 49(2) or (3) of the Road Traffic Act,
1961 to 1994. She explained to him that he was being arrested pursuant to
section 49(8) of the said Act. She then explained to him that he was being
arrested for drunk driving as he was unable to have proper control of his
vehicle due to the fact that he had consumed alcohol.
- Garda
Dunphy then gave the Respondent the usual oral warnings and in reply he stated
that he was coming from a wedding and that he had probably too much to drink.
- Garda
Dunphy placed the Respondent in the back of the patrol car. He was taken to
Kilkenny Garda station arriving there at 4.45a.m. Garda Dunphy brought the
Respondent to the public office. The Member in Charge was Garda William
Powell. Garda Dunphy introduced the Respondent to Garda Powell and explained
to Garda Powell the reason for Mr Cullen’s arrest.
- At
4.47 Doctor Miriam Hogan was telephoned. At 5.10 a.m. She arrived at the
station. When she arrived at the station Garda Dunphy introduced her to the
Respondent as a designated medical practitioner called on behalf of the
Gardaí. Garda Dunphy then made a requirement pursuant to section
13(1)(b) of the Road Traffic Act, 1994 and required the Respondent to provide a
sample of his urine or to allow the doctor to take a sample of his blood.
Garda Dunphy advised the Respondent of the consequences of failure to provide a
sample. The Respondent opted to give a sample of urine.
- The
doctor took a sample of urine from the Respondent and having made the
requirements under the Road Traffic Act completed in duplicate the certificate
which she had taken from the box provided to her. She left the station at 5.35
a.m.
- Garda
Dunphy offered the Respondent either one of the samples of his urine which had
been taken and read out to the Applicant a statement of his rights contained
on the yellow slip. This was to the effect that he might retain either of the
two containers. The Respondent took a sample. Garda Dunphy then handed the
slip to him which he took. He chose one of the samples.
- The
Respondent was released from the Garda Station at 5.30 a.m. on the 8th of June
1997 and the sample was sent by registered post by Garda Dunphy on the 9th of
June 1997.
- Garda
Dunphy received a certificate from the Medical Bureau of Road Safety indicating
a concentration of 229 mg. of alcohol per 100 ml. of urine.
- Garda
Dunphy was cross-examined by Mr Eugene O’Sullivan, Solicitor for the
Respondent. Garda Dunphy agreed that at all times the Respondent had been
polite and was not in any way difficult although there had been some difficulty
in relation to the giving of the sample. It was put to her that this was
because the Respondent was not aware of his rights and had not been made aware
of his rights. In reply Garda Dunphy agreed that she herself had not seen and
could not therefore comment as to whether and how the Member in Charge had gone
about his duties as a Member in Charge on that particular night.
- Garda
Dunphy agreed that she was aware of the presence of Sinead Lambert in the Garda
Station and was aware that Ms Lambert had attempted to contact a Solicitor and
had in fact at one stage a phone book in her hand.
- Garda
Dunphy agreed that, when Doctor Hogan arrived and the requirement was made
pursuant to section 13, the Respondent initially declined to give a sample.
Garda Dunphy did not agree that this was because the Respondent was unaware of
his rights. She did, however, recall the Respondent leaving the doctor’s
room on the requirement being made and that there was some discussion outside
with Ms Lambert.
- While
Garda Dunphy took notes at the time she did not have any note of a complaint
having been made by the Respondent that he had not been read out his rights.
She agreed that the Respondent was then required to go back into the
doctor’s room and the requirement was made pursuant to section 13 and it
was pointed out to him how serious a refusal could be. She denied that she did
not hand the Respondent the yellow paper and further denied that she did not
read out the contents of the yellow slip.
- Garda
Dunphy stated that she was unaware that the Respondent had refused to sign the
custody record book. This was a matter for the Member in Charge.
- Garda
William Powell gave evidence that at 10 p.m. on Saturday the 7th of June 1997
he took up duty as Member in Charge of Kilkenny Garda Station under the
Regulations of the Criminal Justice Act, 1984 being the Treatment of Persons in
Custody in Garda Stations Regulations, 1987. He gave evidence by reference to
the custody book in front of him.
- He
stated that at 4.05 a.m. on the 8th of June 1997 Garda Dunphy arrived at the
Garda Station with the Respondent in her custody. Garda Dunphy informed Garda
Powell at 4.35 a.m. of the fact that Mr Cullen had been arrested for drunk
driving. Garda Powell stated that he read over Mr Cullen’s rights and
handed him a copy of form C.72 (Information for Persons in Custody). At 4.47
a.m. Garda Lennon rang Doctor Hogan who agreed to come to the station.
- At
5.05 a.m. Sinead Lambert called to see the Respondent.
- Under
cross-examination by Mr O’Sullivan Garda Powell stated that he was
relying on what was in the custody book in relation to his recollection of what
happened on the morning in question although he had some recollections. He
agreed that he was clearly incorrect when he had stated to the Court in
examination in chief that the parties had arrived at 4.05 a.m.. He should have
said 4.45 a.m.. Garda Powell did not agree that he had failed to read the
Respondent his rights or hand him a copy of his rights. He said that he was an
experienced Member in Charge and performed the duties of a Member in Charge
frequently.
- Garda
Powell was asked whether he did anything else in performance of his obligations
as a Member in Charge on the particular night. In answer he stated that he
could not say anymore. He was asked further whether he was saying to the Court
that the most he had done was to furnish the rights and hand them over to the
Respondent and that this was the totality of his compliance with the
Regulations. Garda Powell said that this was correct.
- It
was put to him that both the Respondent and Ms Lambert would give evidence that
she arrived as a friend of the accused and borrowed a phone book for the
purposes of telephoning a solicitor. Garda Powell agreed that this was his
recollection. He agreed that he handed the phone book to Ms. Lambert. He did
not agree, however, that he snatched the book back from her. Garda Powell
stated that if somebody wanted to ring a solicitor he would make that call. He
did not agree that the purpose of the phone book being handed to Ms Lambert was
for the purpose of contacting a solicitor friend of hers to assist the
Respondent.
- It
was put to Garda Powell that he had said to Ms Lambert on the night in question
“You have been here before”. Garda Powell denied that he would
have said anything like that. He was asked whether he knew Ms Lambert and he
replied that he knew her vaguely. Garda Powell was asked whether or not he was
personally aware on the night in question that Ms Lambert had been in a garda
station a number of years previously for the purposes of the taking of a
sample. Garda Powell agreed that he had been so aware on that particular
night. It was then put to him that it was incredible that she could state and
would give evidence that he had uttered the words “You have been here
before” and that he denied it, given that he was in possession of the
knowledge of her previous visit at the time of the detention of the Respondent.
Garda Powell made no particular comment in relation to this.
- Garda
Powell was then asked to account for why some of the dates in the custody
record book appeared to have been changed. He was not in a position to account
for this. He was asked whether it was correct that the Respondent had
expressly declined to sign the custody record book. Garda Powell agreed that
this was so. He was then asked to read out what it was that Mr Cullen was
being asked to acknowledge and Garda Powell confirmed that the signature was to
acknowledge the fact that his rights had been read and that he had been handed
a copy of his rights. It was put to Garda Powell that the declining by the
Respondent to sign the custody record was supportive of his allegation that he
had not been informed of his rights nor handed a copy of his rights. Garda
Powell agreed that the Respondent had at all times been polite and not
aggressive. Garda Powell volunteered the view that everything had gone along
perfectly smoothly until the arrival of Ms Lambert at the Garda Station.
- Following
legal argument the Respondent went into evidence. In his evidence he confirmed
that he was 27 years of age, single and that he worked as a tyre fitter and
that he had no previous conviction. He confirmed that he had not been in a
garda station under arrest before. At about 4.20 to 4.25 a.m. he had been
driving his Peugeot car with his girlfriend back from a wedding. He did not
see the Garda at the castle although he did see somebody there and was
satisfied that he should have stopped. He recalled having been arrested at
Larchfield by Garda Dunphy with the other Gardaí there. After being
arrested he asked his girlfriend to attend at the Garda Station and she agreed
to do so. As there was no room in the squad car she had to make her own way
there.
- At
the Garda Station the Respondent was put sitting down in a waiting area. He
stated that he was not handed a copy of his rights nor were his rights
explained to him. The first reference to a solicitor was when his girlfriend,
Sinead Lambert, arrived at the Garda Station having obtained a taxi to get
there. She explained to him that she knew of a solicitor personally who lived
in Enniscorthy and that she would try and telephone him. Ms Lambert got a
phone book and was looking up the number when the doctor arrived. At this
stage the Respondent was brought into a different room which he presumed to be
the doctor’s room and Garda Dunphy made a requirement of him to give
blood or urine. The Respondent declined initially on the basis that he was not
aware of his rights and wanted to know more about the process and what his
choices were. He then left the doctor’s room and went out again to talk
to Ms Lambert. She was trying to get the number.
- Garda
Dunphy had explained in the doctor’s room that if he did not give a
sample he could be prosecuted for failing to give a sample and disqualified for
two years anyway and also liable to be sent to prison for a period of time.
Whilst the Respondent was with Ms Lambert the Member in Charge, whom the
Respondent had not previously met before, came over and asked Garda Dunphy what
the problem was. Garda Dunphy replied that the witness was not prepared to
give a sample. At this, the Member in Charge immediately took the book from Ms
Lambert’s hand and asked her to get out of the station and mentioned that
she had been there before. Ms Lambert obeyed the order of the Member in
Charge. The Respondent was amazed at these developments.
- The
Respondent was then brought back into the doctor’s room and a requirement
was again made for him to give a sample and he agreed to give a sample opting
for urine. He then provided a sample which was divided in two, placed in two
boxes and Garda Dunphy offered one of the samples to him which he took. The
Respondent was adamant that he did not receive any yellow piece of paper. He
stated that he kept everything that he obtained in the Garda Station that night
carefully and that that amounted to the sample and nothing else.
- The
Respondent stated that Doctor Hogan then left and as the Respondent was leaving
Garda Dunphy asked him to sign the custody record book. The Respondent
declined to sign, explaining that he had not been made aware of his rights.
Garda Dunphy stated that it was not necessary for him to sign it anyway. The
Respondent was then given a lift home. He stated that he did want to contact a
solicitor that night as he felt there might have been some point to be raised
in the fact that he had not been in the car when the Gardaí arrived to
him at Larchfield.
- The
Respondent was then cross-examined by Inspector Roche on behalf of the
Appellant. It was put to him that the request to sign the custody book would
have been done by Garda Powell as part of his duties. The Respondent said that
it was his recollection that Garda Dunphy had asked him to sign it. He stated
that it was his first time in a Garda Station and that it was between 4.30 and
5 o’clock in the morning and that he did not know of any solicitor
locally not being from the area himself. He never had a need for a solicitor
before. When the suggestion was made by his girlfriend that she could contact
a solicitor whom she knew, he was very happy that this be done by her on his
behalf and he did wish to avail of a solicitor’s advice at that stage.
- When
asked by Inspector Roche why he did not stop for Garda Dunphy at 4.30 a.m. on
the morning of his arrest, given that it was daylight, he replied that he did
not see her. It was then put to him that he had already pleaded guilty to a
charge of failure to stop contrary to section 109 of the Road Traffic Act,
1961/1968. It was further put to him that his memory was selective and
defective and that he had already admitted after caution to Garda Dunphy that
he had been coming from a wedding where he had probably had too much to drink.
- Sinead
Lambert then gave evidence. She stated that she was 24 years of age, single
and a hairdresser. She had consumed some alcohol that night but her last drink
had been at 1 a.m.. She stated that she had a clear recollection of the
incident. They had been at a wedding.
- She
remembered the Respondent being arrested and brought to Kilkenny Garda Station.
She made it clear to the Gardaí that she would like to accompany her
boyfriend but there was no room in the car, a fact which she fully understood.
She was able to hail a taxi and arrived at the Garda Station a little after 5
a.m.. She announced her presence and introduced herself and explained why she
was there and the Garda on duty let her in to see the Respondent who was
sitting in the corridor just inside the day room. She asked the Respondent
what was going on and the Respondent told her that he had been told to sit
there until the doctor arrived and the doctor had not as yet arrived. She
stated that she suggested to the Respondent that she give a friend of hers,
Rory Deane, a Solicitor in Enniscorthy, a telephone call. There was some
discussion between them about the fact that he had been out of the car when the
Gardaí came along and that there might be some legal advice to be taken
on the matter. The Respondent agreed to the suggestion.
- Ms
Lambert then went over to the Garda in charge and asked him could she borrow a
phone book. She told the Garda that it was to look up a telephone number of a
solicitor friend of hers whom she wanted to ring on behalf of her boyfriend.
He agreed that that was all right and handed Ms Lambert the phone book. At the
same time the Garda mentioned to Ms Lambert that he did not think it really
mattered as the Respondent had to give a sample anyway. Ms Lambert then looked
up the phone book and as she was looking for the telephone number the doctor
arrived. Garda Dunphy brought the Respondent into the doctor’s room. Ms
Lambert was still looking up the number when the Respondent came out and asked
her if she had obtained the number yet. She heard the Respondent tell the
Garda that he wanted to wait before giving a sample, to speak with the
solicitor, that his girlfriend was trying to contact. She said that it was
clear at this stage that Garda Powell was getting fed up and he came over and
grabbed the phone book out of the witness’s hand and said “Get out
of here, you’ve been here before”. She stated that she took this
to be a reference to the fact that some three years previously she had been
arrested and had to give a sample in the Garda Station and had subsequently
been disqualified. She stated that she was shocked at the response of the
officer and that she left the day room and sat out in the waiting area until
the Respondent came out.
- In
cross-examination Ms Lambert stated that she was perfectly clear in her
recollection and that she was not drunk. She had consumed alcohol up until
about 1 a.m. only. She had the phone book in her hand not more than three to
four minutes. Given the time of day, she was looking up Mr Deane’s
private number rather than the office number. It was taking a length of time
which she felt was reasonable in the circumstances and she was very upset by
the remarks of Garda Powell.
- The
case stated then recites that Judge Harnett then recalled Garda Dunphy. She
told him that she would not have asked the Respondent to sign the custody
record book as this would have been the job of Garda Powell. Garda Dunphy was
then cross-examined by Mr O’Sullivan on this point and was asked whether
or not there was any great significance as to whether she or Garda Powell had
asked witnesses to sign the custody record book. She stated that it was
significant only in so far as it would not normally be her who would do it. It
was put to her by Mr O’Sullivan that if Garda Powell had failed to have
this done and that she had noticed it that she would try to correct it. Garda
Dunphy made no particular response to this remark but did confirm that in any
event it was clear from the custody record book that Mr Cullen had expressly
declined or refused to sign it and that what he was refusing to sign was an
acknowledgement that he had been given and read and explained his rights.
3. This
completed the evidence in the case.
4. Submissions
were then made to the presiding Judge. On behalf of the Respondent it was
submitted that he had not been informed of his rights either orally or by
documentation having regard to the evidence. It was submitted by Mr
O’Sullivan that it was clear that the first time the Respondent knew of
anything concerning his rights was when his girlfriend arrived at the station
and informed him of his rights. Having regard to the clear breach of the
custody regulations by the Member in Charge the Respondent had been denied his
legal and constitutional rights of access to a solicitor and of advice
generally and that accordingly any evidence gathered thereafter should, in the
discretion of the Trial Judge, be ruled inadmissible.
- On
behalf of the Director it was submitted that the Respondent had pleaded guilty
to failing to stop for Garda Dunphy on the night in question. He had admitted
that they were coming from a wedding and probably had too much to drink. He
did give a sample of urine. The presence of a solicitor could not prevent the
Respondent from providing a sample of either blood or urine as he was required
by law to do so. The Member in Charge was deployed as a permanent Member in
Charge at Kilkenny Garda Station and deals with many prisoners. The Respondent
was a prisoner and a person entitled to his rights and Ms Lambert was allowed
a visit which is all she is entitled to under the regulations. It was to be
noted that it was Garda Powell himself who provided Ms Lambert with the phone
book and by her evidence she had the phone book for up to four minutes to phone
the solicitor, whom she knew.
5. It
was further submitted that the Court has a discretion in relation to the
failure to comply with the said regulations.
6. Having
regard to the evidence which the learned Judge of the District Court heard in
this case and to the demeanour of the various witnesses he made the following
findings of fact:
- The
Respondent had not been handed a notice of his custody rights;
- The
Respondent had not had his rights read out to him;
- The
Respondent had not had his rights explained to him;
- The
Respondent declined to sign the custody record book as his rights had not been
given to him;
- Garda
Powell’s evidence was faulty and unreliable. In this regard the District
Court Judge accepted the Respondent’s evidence that Garda Powell had
snatched the phone book back from Ms Lambert thus preventing her contacting a
solicitor and asked her to leave and said words to the effect that she had been
there before;
- Garda
Powell had not performed the duties incumbent upon him as a Member in Charge
pursuant to the requirements of the Treatment of Persons in Custody in Garda
Stations Regulations 1987;
- The
times on the custody record had clearly been changed;
- No
explanation whatsoever had been offered for the change in the custody book by
the Member in Charge;
- Having
regard to the above findings of fact the learned Judge of the District Court
dismissed the charge on his being satisfied that the legal and constitutional
rights of the Respondent had not been accorded to him on the night in question
and in the exercise of his Judicial discretion.
7. The
opinion of this Court is sought as to whether
- He
was correct in law in dismissing the said charge brought against the Respondent
- In
light of the facts as settled in this case, which facts have been agreed, and
in full consultation with both the Appellant and Respondent’s legal
representatives for this case stated, the Judge asks whether hi is entitled to
take the view that the stating of this case amounts to an unwarranted attempt
to oust the inherent jurisdiction of the District Court to hear this matter to
a reasonable conclusion.
The
Law
8. Regulation
8 of the Custody Regulations provides as follows:-
“(1) The
Member in Charge shall without delay inform an arrested person
or
cause him to be informed :-
- In
ordinary language of the offence or other matter in respect of which he has
been arrested.
- That
he is entitled to consult a Solicitor and
- (i)
in the case of a person not below the age of seventeen years of age that he is
entitled to have notification of his being in custody in
the
station concerned sent to another person reasonably named by him....
The
information shall be given orally. The Member in Charge shall also explain or
cause to be explained to the arrested person that, if he does not wish to
exercise a right specified in subparagraph (b) or (c)(i) immediately he will
not be precluded thereby from doing so later.
(1) The
Member in Charge shall without delay give the arrested person or cause him to
be given a notice containing the information specified in subparagraphs (b) and
(c) of paragraph (1) and such other information as the Commissioner of An Garda
Síochána with the approval of the Minister for Justice, may from
time to time.
(2) Paragraphs
(1) and (2) apply only in relation to the Member in Charge of the station to
which the arrested person is taken on arrest or in which he is arrested.
(3) The
time of the giving of the information specified in paragraph (1) and the notice
specified in paragraph (2) shall be recorded. The Member in Charge shall ask
the arrested person or cause him to be asked to sign the custody record in
acknowledgement of receipt of the notice. If he refuses to sign, the refusal
shall be recorded.
”
“
A failure on the part of any member of the Garda Síochána to
observe any provision of the Regulations shall not of itself ... affect the
lawfulness of the custody of the detained person or the admissibility in
evidence of any statement made by him.”
Submissions
of Counsel
10. Counsel
on behalf of the Director refers this Court to the decision of O’Hanlon
J. in the case of the
Director
of Public Prosecutions -v- Eric Spratt
[1995] 2 ILRM 117. This case concerned a charge of refusing to comply with the
requirement of the Garda doctor in relation to a provision of a sample
following upon an arrest under section 49 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as
amended. In contrast to the present case it is submitted that there was no
evidence whatsoever in relation to the compliance or otherwise with the Custody
Regulations.
11. O’Hanlon
J. having considered the content of the relevant Regulations and the provisions
of section 7(3) aforesaid stated,
inter
alia
,
as follows at page 122 of the Report:-
“The
phrase ‘of itself’ is obviously an important one in the
construction of the statutory provisions, and I interpret the subsection as
meaning that non-observance of the Regulations is not to bring about
automatically the exclusion of evidence of all that was done and said while the
accused person was in custody. It appears to be left to the court of trial to
adjudicate in every case as to the impact of the non-compliance which the
regulations should have on the case for the prosecution.”
12. In
the course of his judgment O’Hanlon J. also considered the previous
Judgment of Blayney J. in the case of
Walsh-v-O’Buachalla
[1991]1I.R. 56. The facts of this case were that the Applicant was denied
access to a solicitor in circumstances where the arresting Garda believed that
the request was not genuine and was made merely for the purpose of delay. The
Applicant was informed that he could contact a solicitor as soon as the
specimen had been taken. After the specimen was taken the Applicant did not
seek to contact a Solicitor. The Applicant sought to quash his conviction on
the foregoing grounds. Blayney J. held, assuming the refusal of the
Applicant’s request for access to a solicitor was in breach of his
constitutional rights, that the certificate of the doctor was nonetheless
admissible in evidence since the specimen had been obtained after but not as a
result of that breach.
13. O’Hanlon
J. approved this decision in the
Spratt
case stating
inter
alia,
at
page 123
:-
“I
think that the correct approach in the present case is to pose the same
question which Blayney J. asked of himself in
Walsh’s
case. If a breach of a constitutional right of the accused person took place,
as alleged, in what manner was he prejudiced thereby? Was any information
obtained which might not have been otherwise obtained?
It
is easy to conceive a situation where an accused person in custody is not
informed of his right of access to a solicitor, and does not seek legal advice
in consequence, and proceeds to make an incriminating statement when a legal
adviser might have counselled silence. In this set of circumstances it can be
envisaged that the decision of the trial Judge might be to exclude the evidence
so obtained.
In
the present case, however, as in
Walsh’s
case, an accused person was in the garda station awaiting the arrival of the
registered medical practitioner who was to take a sample of blood or urine,
which the accused person was obliged by law to provide for him in accordance
with the relevant statutory provisions. Access to a solicitor or advice from a
solicitor could not avert this fate, and no further evidence was then required
for the purpose of the prosecution save evidence of the circumstances of the
arrest, the obtaining of the sample and the formal, technical evidence of what
was disclosed by the sample taken.”
In the words of Blayney J.
“It was submitted on behalf of the Applicant that if he had had access to
a solicitor he could have been advised by him. But what advice could a
solicitor have given him? He would certainly not have advised him to commit an
offence by refusing to give one or other of the specimens. All he could have
done was to confirm that the Applicant was required by law to provide a
specimen of blood or urine. No advice could have prevented the specimen being
obtained, and, accordingly, the applicant’s not having had access to a
solicitor in no way affected its being obtained. (p.60)”
14. Further
reliances is placed by Counsel on behalf of the Director upon the decision of
this Court delivered by Budd J. in the case of the
Director
of Public Prosecutions (at the suit of Garda Patrick Dillon) -v- Patrick Devlin
(Unreported High Court 2nd September 1998). This case also concerned the
charge of drink driving contrary to section 49 of the Road Traffic Act, 1961 as
amended and the evidence given disclosed that the Member in Charge was in
breach of Regulation 8(1) in that he failed to inform the Respondent orally of
his right to consult a solicitor and to have notification of his being in
custody sent to another person reasonably named by him. The Member in Charge
did hand over a notice to the Respondent which contained information as to his
rights. The charge was dismissed by the District Judge on grounds including
this ground. On an Appeal by way of case stated, having considered the
Custody Regulations, statutory provisions and case law Budd J. upheld the
appeal. In the course of his Judgment he considered all of the submissions
made on behalf of the Respondent including submission that the trial Judge must
be entitled to consider the particular nature of the breach of the Custody
Regulations and the explanation offered for this by the Member in Charge. In
the course of his Judgment he stated,
inter
alia
,
as follows:-
“
All
this is correct but, on the basis of the impression made on him by the
evidence, the District Judge must go on to apply the law as set out in section
7 and the cases cited by adjudicating as to what impact the non-compliance with
the regulations has had on the case for the prosecution. I should add that
there is no suggestion in the case stated that the District Judge formed the
view that he was dealing with a conscious and deliberate violation of the
Respondent’s right or of the Custody Regulations or that reprehensible or
oppressive behaviour on the part of the Garda tainted the entire prosecution
case. Accordingly, on this issue, in view of the words of the statute and the
statements of O’Hanlon J. and Blayney J. in respect of the case law it
seems to me that there was no actual adjudication on the impact of the breach
of the Regulations on the admissibility of the evidence subsequently obtained
against the accused and that, accordingly, the learned District Judge was wrong
in dismissing the charge on this basis. I should add that it would be for the
District Judge to make such findings as are appropriate in light of the
guidelines and quoted statements as to the law and then come to his conclusion
in the light of his findings made in accordance with the law.”
15. It
is submitted by Counsel on behalf of the Director that in applying the
principles to the facts of the present case, it is clear that when a breach of
the Custody Regulations occurs in any given case there is a duty on the
District Judge to form a view as to what effect, if any, this has had on the
prosecution case. In the present case it is submitted that the failure on the
part of Garda Powell to comply with the Custody Regulations did not, of itself,
result in the specimen being taken. The Respondent was under a duty to provide
the specimen, and the oral notification to him of his right to have a solicitor
or another person notified of his presence in the Garda Station would not have
affected this obligation. It is submitted that it is difficult to envisage how
the Respondent could have been prejudiced by the failure to orally inform him
of his rights in those circumstances.
16. It
is further submitted that the District Judge did not adjudicate on the impact
of the breach of the Custody Regulations on the Respondent, as he is required
to do under the statutory provisions and the case law cited.
17. In
light of these submissions it is submitted that I should answer the first
question posed in the negative and, with regard to the second question, that
this is not a proper question of law for the opinion of the High Court, and
without prejudice to this submission, it should be answered in the negative.
18. Reliance
is placed by Counsel for the Respondent upon the decision of the Supreme Court
in the case of
Keating
-v- The Governor of Mountjoy Prison
[1991] 1I.R.61 where McCarthy J. stated,
inter
alia
,
at page 66 of the report:-
“If
cases arise where the circumstances of arrest are such as to amount to an
affront to the constitutional role of the courts, then the District Justice
will refuse to proceed with the matter and will discharge the person before
him.”
19. In
the course of his judgment McCarthy J. stated, inter alia, at page 65 of the
Report as follows:-
“In
the course of the hearing a Justice of the District Court or a Judge of the
Circuit Court, in an appropriate case, is bound to enquire into the
circumstances under which particular evidence was obtained and may rule against
the admission of such evidence if satisfied that it was obtained in
circumstances involving a breach of constitutional rights such as to taint the
evidence itself.”
20. Counsel
for the Respondent has further made reference to the right of an accused person
not to incriminate himself/herself. He submits that the conduct of the
Gardaí in this case amounts to an outrage.
21. It
was further submitted on behalf of the Respondent that in reaching his decision
in this case, the judge of the District Court did so in exercise of his
constitutional duty as a judge and in so doing must be considered as having
“a
sole and exclusive authority to control and supervise the conduct of
proceedings in his own Court within the limit of the jurisdiction conferred
upon him.”
22. In
this regard Counsel has adopted the language of Gannon J. in the case of case of
Clune
-v- Director of Public Prosecutions
[1991]ILRM 17.
23. In
the course of his Judgment in that case Gannon J. stated,
inter
alia
,
as follows:-
“Many
of the procedures which were appropriate to the circumstances when the inferior
Courts where administered by lay magistrates have been adapted and adopted in
relation to our District Court now administered by fully competent and
qualified lawyers, whose independence as judges, not only from the executive
but even from their judicial colleagues, must be respected. The Justice
sitting in the District Court has the sole and exclusive authority to control
and supervise the conduct of proceedings in his own Court within the limits of
the jurisdiction conferred upon him. His independence and authority are
secured in his freedom not only from pressures of political or executive nature
but also from purported intervention, direction, or control by any Superior
Court. If he should be in error it is the interests of the parties to the
suit, whether the public or private individual, which require the error to be
corrected.”
24. Further
reference was made to the decision of Kinlen J. in the case of
D.P.P.
-v- Dempsey
(Unreported, High Court 2/7/1997).
25. With
regard to the requirement that the Courts uphold their procedures, further
reliance is placed by Counsel for the Respondent on the case of the
Director
of Public Prosecutions -v- Shaw
[1982] I.R.1 where at page 61 of the Report Griffin J. stated,
inter
alia,
as follows:-
“Even
if his statement is held to have been voluntarily obtained in the sense
indicated, it may nevertheless be inadmissible for another reason. Because our
system of law is accusatorial and not inquisitorial, and because (as has been
stated in a number of decisions of this Court) our Constitution postulates the
observance of basic or fundamental fairness of procedures, the Judge presiding
at a Criminal trial should be astute to see that, although a statement may be
technically voluntary, it should nevertheless be excluded if , by reason of the
manner or of the circumstances in which it was obtained, it falls below the
required standards of fairness. The reason for exclusion here is not so much
the risk of an erroneous conviction as a recognition that the minimum of
essential standards must be observed in the administration of justice. Whether
the objection to the statement be on constitutional or other grounds, the
crucial test is whether it was obtained in compliance with basic or fundamental
fairness.”
26. It
is submitted on behalf of the Respondent that in the instant case the minimum
essential standards were not observed by the Gardaí and that this
therefore entitles the Judge of the District Court to dismiss the charge
against the Respondent. It is submitted that the constitutional rights of the
Respondent were affected by the action of the Gardaí in this case in
breach of, firstly, his right to silence and, secondly, his right to a
solicitor.
27. In
reply, counsel for the Director of Public Prosecutions submitted that in the
first place the right to silence is not absolute and that in the instant case
nothing stems from that right. It is further submitted that the right to a
solicitor, if breached, was not such as to give rise to the obtaining of any
evidence in breach of that right.
Conclusions
28. This
Court has been furnished with a copy of the Custody Record in the form of an
Annex to the case stated. While it shows at paragraph (C) under the heading
“Initial Action Taken”, 22. ‘Information given to arrested
person in accordance with Regulation 8(1). Time 4.48 a.m.’, it appears
that the figure 8 may have been changed from an earlier time and in regard to
the contents of paragraph 23, ‘Notice of rights. Time 4.59 a.m.’
the time specified appears to represent a change from an earlier time. It is
to be noted that these changed times have not been initialled, which would be a
preferable practice, if there had been an inaccuracy in regard to the original
time when these matters where noted.
29. Nevertheless
in the instant case the learned Judge of the District Court has concluded on
the facts that the Respondent had not been handed notice of his custody rights
and had not had his rights read out to him or explained to him. In these
circumstances it is not for this Court to pass judgment on this conclusion as
the same was reached on evidence before the District Court Judge. It is to be
noted that the learned Judge of the District Court found the evidence of the
Member in Charge to be faulty and unreliable. This Court must accordingly
treat this case in light of these findings.
30. While
it is clear that the learned Judge of the District Court concluded on the
evidence before him that the legal and constitutional rights of the Respondent
had not been accorded to him on the night in question, he states that he
dismissed the charge in the exercise of his judicial discretion. It is unclear
how, in the exercise of his discretion, he came to the conclusion that the
evidence in relation to the concentration of alcohol in the urine of the
Respondent should be excluded, in circumstances where, under the terms of the
Road Traffic Act, it was a mandatory requirement on the Respondent that he
furnish a specimen of his blood or urine when requested to do so. What is
clear from the case stated in the instant case is that, while O’Hanlon J.
stated in
Spratt’s
case that it is for the court of trial to adjudicate in every case as to the
impact of the non-compliance which the regulations should have on the case for
the prosecution, the case stated to this Court does not make any finding in
relation to the impact of the non-compliance on the case for the prosecution.
Before excluding the evidence I am satisfied that a Judge of the District Court
would have to be satisfied that the impact of the non-compliance with the
regulations was one which had a material effect on the case for the
prosecution. In the context of the taking of a statement from a person in
custody it is clear that such may be very material but, as in the instant case,
where the giving of a sample was a requirement of law, I am not satisfied that
the non-compliance with the regulations was such as to have warranted the
dismissal of the charge against the Respondent in the circumstances outlined in
the case stated. Accordingly I will answer the first question in the negative.
With regard to the second question, insofar as the learned Judge of the
District Court has in fact stated a case for the opinion of this Court, no
circumstance arises for the answering of the question in the manner put
forward. Were the District Court Judge to refuse to state a case upon request
being made of him pursuant to the provisions of the Summary of Jurisdiction
Act, 1857 that decision would itself be reviewable by this Court.
© 2001 Irish High Court