1. In
the late 1990’s a merger took place between Avonmore Foods plc and
Waterford Foods plc. The new company which emerged became known initially as
A.W.G. plc, and subsequently as Glanbia plc, by which name it is now known. As
a result of this merger and the programme of rationalisation which followed
from it, the Milk Processing Plant of Waterford Foods plc at Dungarvan, County
Waterford, was gradually phased out of production resulting in considerable
unemployment in that town and the surrounding area.
2. The
Plaintiff in this action is a company entirely funded by Glanbia plc. It has
three directors all nominees of Glanbia plc. Mr. Joseph Doddy is Secretary and
Manager of the Company. One of the objects of the Plaintiff is to provide
funds in the form of interest free loans or grant assistance to help create new
employment opportunities for persons who became redundant as a result of the
above mentioned merger.
3. As
a result of negotiations between Mr. Matt Walsh and other senior managers of
A.W.G. plc; Mr. Colm Hackett of Forbairt, and Mr. Donal Connelly, County
Manager of the County of Waterford on the one side and Mr. Gerard McCaughey,
Managing Director of Woodroe Limited of Monaghan, trading as Century Homes, his
father, and Mr. Brian Keogh of Irish Productivity Centre who was advising Mr.
McCaughy on the other part, Century Homes was persuaded with very considerable
reluctance because of the very southerly location of Dungarvan to locate its
new factory in that town.
4. Crucial
to the establishment of this factory was the offer of employment grant
assistance contained in a letter dated 2nd October, 1998 from A.W.D.
Development Fund Limited to Woodroe Limited, trading as Century Homes, (the
“Company”), and Woodroe, (Dungarvan) Limited,
(“W.D.L.”), signed by Mr. Joseph Doddy and accepted on behalf of
Woodroe Limited, trading as Century Homes by its duly authorised Director Mr.
Gerard McCaughy, as appears endorsed on that letter.
5. The
issue before the Court in this action relates solely to the Defendant’s
claim to be entitled to draw down a second sum of £200,000 under the terms
of this Agreement. The relevant terms of the Agreement are as follows:-
6. Though
nothing material appears to depend upon it, Mr. Doddy, as indicated by the
penultimate paragraph of his letter dated 13th September, 1999 to Mr. Gerard
McCaughey, appears to have considered that the relevant period for the purpose
of subparagraph 2 (a) of the Agreement expired on the 1st September, 1999.
As
I pointed out during the course of the hearing of this case I do not believe
this to be a correct interpretation of the subparagraph. Though no authorities
in this respect were cited during the course of argument, I believe it to be
well established that in the absence of some very clear indication to the
contrary to be found in the terms of the Agreement read as a whole, - and in
this case I find no such indication, - a requirement that something be achieved
within a particular period after a designated date, as here, “within 8
months after the Commencement Date”, indicates that the Commencement Date
is itself not to be included in calculating the relevant period and that the
Defendant is entitled to the whole of the last day, which in these
circumstances must be the 2nd September, 1999, within which to comply with the
requirements of the subparagraph.
7. In
his letter in reply dated the 21st September, 1999, Mr. McCaughey advised Mr.
Doddy that as of that date Woodroe (Dungarvan) Limited had 36 people in its
employment. It was not suggested at any time during the course of the hearing
before me that this statement was incorrect and in the words of Mr. Doddy,
“the Defendant is well within” the requirements of subparagraph 2
(b) of the Agreement.
8. As
regards the provisions of subparagraph 2 (a), Counsel for the Plaintiff
accepted that no issue was taken by the Plaintiff that on the 2nd September,
1999 the following 8 persons who had been employees on the 31st July, 1998 of
A.W.G. plc were in permanent full time employment with the Defendant, namely:-
17. It
is claimed by the Defendant that in addition to these 8 persons a further 6
persons, who on the 31st of July, 1998 had also been employees of A.W.G., plc,
were employed by them in permanent full time positions within the stipulated
period of 8 months after the 1st January, 1999, namely:-
23. Martin
O’Sullivan from 3rd August, 1999 to 14th August, 1999 and from 18th
October,
1999 to May, 2000.
24. All
these persons were stated to have left the employment of the Defendant of their
own volition and this was not contested by the Plaintiff. Mr. Lynch and Mr.
O’Sullivan gave evidence at the hearing of this action.
25. I
accept the contention of the Plaintiff that even if the positions taken up by
Messrs. Cullinan, Drummy, Hyslop and Hickey for 5 days or less were permanent
and full time positions created by the Defendant, one could not reasonably
conclude that these persons were, “employed” in such positions for
the purpose of entitling the Defendant to employment grant assistance whatever
about other purposes.
26. I
accept the evidence of Mr. Joseph Doddy that there must be some reasonable
indication of what he described as, “longevity”, in the employment,
some evidence that the individual would probably remain employed in the
position as part of the long term workforce of the Defendant. This was the
obvious purpose of making the employment grant assistance available: to get as
many redundant A.W.G., plc, workers in the Dungarvan Area as possible back into
long term full time employment. Under subparagraph 1(b) of the Agreement
payment of the second sum of IR£200,000 had to be made, if made at all,
within 12 months after the 1st January, 1999. Accordingly, the indications
that the position was likely to be occupied by the individual in the long term
had to be manifest before that date.
27. Mr.
Doddy, whom I accept is a person who has very considerable experience in
dealing with Grant Aid Schemes, says that an important indicator is the length
of time spent by an individual in the position even if on probation. In my
judgment this is sound common sense as the individual is not concerned as to
whether or not the prospective employer does or does not qualify for grant
assistance and is not likely, certainly on that ground, to waste weeks or
months of his or her life in work which has no appeal and in which the
individual can see no future.
28. While
his expression as to, “imprisoning persons in jobs”, might be
somewhat dramatic I accept what is clearly implicit in Mr. McCaughy’s
submission, that it was not the intention of the parties as commercial men to
require the Defendant to somehow ensure that every former A.W.G., plc, employee
employed by the Defendant would remain in that employment for some unspecified
but considerable period of time or until he or she had reached the normal age
of retirement. This was accepted by Mr. Doddy while at the same time insisting
that what the Defendant could do and should reasonably be expected to do was to
make the terms and conditions of the employment offered as attractive as
commercially possible so as to induce such workers to take up positions with
the Defendant and to remain on in those positions. There was no evidence led
nor was it put directly to any of the witnesses for the Defendant on behalf of
the Plaintiff that the Defendant’s terms and conditions of employment
were not such as would induce former employees of A.W.G., plc to join its
workforce.
29. It
was accepted by the Plaintiff that Messrs. Cullinan, Drummy, Hyslop and Hickey
all left the employment of the Defendant of their own volition. I accept the
evidence of Mr. Doddy that in the context of an employment grant assistance
scheme these individuals could be regarded as having in his own words done no
more than, “tried out the employment with Century Homes and found it did
not really suit them and left very very quickly”. This situation is
obviously different to and distinguishable from that of an individual who by
reference to the time spent by him or her in the position, if even on
probation, is as a matter of probability indicating an intention of remaining
on in that position for the foreseeable future.
30. In
these circumstances in my judgment the Defendant is not correct in contending
that Messrs. Cullinan, Drummy, Hyslop and Hickey or any of them were employed
by the Defendant in permanent full time positions for the purpose of due
compliance with the provisions of subparagraph 2(a) of the Agreement. I accept
the submission of the Plaintiff that these four individuals must be regarded as
being in the same category as those who turned down offers of employment with
the Defendant.
31. As
regards satisfying the provisions of subparagraph 2(a) of the Agreement, Mr.
Doddy was prepared to concede that Mr. John Lynch was in what he described as a
“grey area”. In my judgment it is abundantly clear from the
evidence of Mr. Doddy that he would have been prepared to accept Mr. Lynch as
being employed in a permanent full time position with the Defendant,
notwithstanding a 6 month probationary period and so meeting the requirements
of the subparagraph were it not for the fact that he was not still holding this
position on the 2nd September, 1999. He conceded that a person under probation
could be included in the pool of eligible candidates provided he maintained his
job for a reasonable length of time and he further conceded that Mr. Lynch was
in the job for quite a long period.
32. Mr.
Lynch commenced employment with the Defendant on the 8th February, 1999 and
left voluntarily on the 31st July, 1999. The letter offering him employment as
a General Operative at the new factory in Dungarvan is dated the 7th October,
1998. This letter contains
inter alia
the
following paragraph:-
33. Mr.
Doddy told the Court that he was wholly unaware of this requirement by the
Defendant until he examined the documents furnished by the Defendant on
Discovery of Documents. The Agreement itself is silent as to the terms and
conditions of employment which the Defendant might see fit to impose. Mr.
Doddy did however accept in giving evidence that he would have expected any
company to have stipulated for a probationary period of some time. It was his
view that while a person might not legally enjoy the benefit of permanent
employment until such person had successfully completed the probationary
period, nonetheless in the context of an employment grant assistance scheme,
such as in the present case, such a person even while on probation was employed
in a permanent full time position.
34. The
Agreement at sub paragraph 2 (a) required the creation of not less than 10 jobs
in Dungarvan employing staff who on the 31st July, 1998 were staff of (being
employed by) an AWG Company. Earlier in the Agreement, “jobs” are
defined as, “permanent full time positions”. In my judgment,
“permanent” in this context does not imply jobs for life or until
the normal age of retirement but is used to distinguish casual, seasonal and
other forms of discontinuous and periodic employment. In the same phrase,
“full time” is in my judgment used to distinguish part time, relief
work and other forms of short hour working. It was not disputed during the
presentation of the evidence in this case that the positions offered by the
Defendant to Mr. John Lynch and the other former A.W.G., plc, employees were,
“permanent full time positions” .
35. In
my judgment Mr. Doddy is incorrect when he construes the Agreement as requiring
that on the final day of the stipulated period of 8 months after the 1st of
January, 1999 at least 10 persons who on the 31st July, 1998 were employed by
an A.W.G. Company had to be in actual full time permanent employment with the
Defendant. The evidence given to the Court was that this paragraph and indeed
the remainder of the Agreement, apart from paragraph 5 was drafted by Mr. Doddy
on behalf of the Plaintiff with some assistance from a Firm of Solicitors, at
the end of the negotiations.
36. No
authorities were referred to in argument on this issue but in my judgment the
use of the word, “within” in the absence of a clear indication to
the contrary signifies a time frame inside of which the specified jobs were to
be created but without any requirement as to the duration of any particular job
thereafter. I find no indication to the contrary on reading the Agreement as a
whole and the Agreement was accepted by both parties at the hearing as
accurately and completely expressing their intentions. In my judgment had it
been the intention of the Plaintiff that jobs created within the 8 month period
would not be considered for the purpose of this employment grant assistance
scheme unless held by a qualifying person on a particular date or for not less
than a particular continuous period the Agreement could and would have so
provided.
37. This
was an Agreement negotiated between commercial men and designed to solve an
employment crisis in the Dungarvan Area resulting from the downgrading by
A.W.G., plc, of an enterprise providing much needed jobs. The solution was to
encourage the setting up by the Defendant of a factory in the area providing an
alternative source of employment. The evidence offered by the Defendant, that
apart from the attraction of this grant assistance scheme Dungarvan would not
have been considered by them as a location for this factory was not shaken or
seriously challenged during the course of evidence. In the absence of express
and unambiguous provisions in the Agreement it could not, in my judgment, be
reasonably considered to have been the intention of the parties in entering in
to this Agreement which was of advantage to both and of particular advantage to
the economy of the Dungarvan Area that one party should be exposed to a risk of
serious financial disadvantage as a consequence of events over which it had
practically and legally almost no control, - namely the length of time which
persons once genuinely employed in such full time permanent positions would
choose or were able to remain in such positions.
38. Should
I accept Mr. Doddy’s contention that unless at least 10 persons
previously employed by an A.W.G., plc, Company on the 31st July, 1998 were not
only within the period of 8 months prior to, but also on the 2nd September,
1999 in the full time permanent employment of the Defendant the second sum of
IR £200,000 would not become payable, then by way of an example, if one of
those 10 persons so employed should suffer the misfortune of being fatally
injured or dying of some natural cause on the previous day the Defendant
through absolutely no fault of its own would be deprived of the entire benefit
of that sum. Similar circumstances would appertain if any one or more of the
ten persons determined for whatever reason to quit the employment of the
Defendant on or before the 2nd September, 1999 regardless of how long they had
previously been in the employment of the Defendant during the course of the
crucial period of 8 months.
39. In
the absence of an actual express and unambiguous provision in the Agreement I
could not accept that it was the intention of the parties as commercial men in
negotiating and entering into the Agreement, that the Defendant should suffer
the loss of that which it contracted for by so arbitrary and uncontrollable an
event. Instead of this Agreement providing an incentive to the Defendant, as
Mr. Doddy claims, sub paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement would, in my judgment,
if so interpreted, become an actual disincentive because it would be apparent
to the Defendant that no matter how much skill, time and expense was devoted to
making a position in its factory attractive to such employees, its endeavours
could be set at nought by an Act of God, the negligence of others, an ambitious
or disgruntled employee or some other event over which it had minimal or no
control. It would be to turn a commercial arrangement designed to be of
benefit to both parties into something not much better than a mere lottery for
the Defendant. In my judgment, even though he was not employed by the
Defendant on the 2nd September, 1999 the job taken up by Mr. John Lynch on the
8th February, 1999 and held by him until he left on the 31st July, 1999
complied with the provisions of sub paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement and should
have been taken in to account by the Plaintiff.
40. Mr.
Martin O’Sullivan gave evidence that he had been employed by Waterfood
Foods plc and by A.W.G., plc, for a total of 22 years. Initially he was
employed as a plant operator monitoring the control panel of the machinery in
the Skim Milk Plant. This was prior to October, 1998, and after that date he
held a similar position in the Provender Mill, until being made redundant on
the 30th of June, 1999. In March, 1999 he had been contacted by Century Homes
through Ms. Shalloe and having looked at their Dungarvan operation was
interested in taking up a position with the Defendant. He took a holiday abroad
for two weeks starting on the 3rd of July, 1999 and one or two days after his
return he approached Mr. Dominic Bryan and started work with the Defendant more
or less immediately afterwards. He was directed to work as a member of a team
making up parts for the external walls of houses. This was just about two
weeks before the Factory closed down for the customary two week holiday period.
He was paid for this period. Mr. O’Sullivan gave evidence that he was
very unsettled at this time having lost the job which he had been in for 22
years and he decided to leave the employment of the Defendant at the start of
this Factory holiday period. He was promised a job with a building company and
when this did not eventuate he remained unemployed until he resumed employment
with Century Homes. Someone on behalf of Century Homes contacted him and he
spoke to Mr. Bryan and on the 18th October, 1999 resumed work with the
Defendant, this time as part of a two man team making parts for and assembling
internal walls for houses. He had not, he told me, been happy as part of a
large production team and preferred the greater degree of independence afforded
by this new type of work.
41. In
May 2000 he left the employment of the Defendant voluntarily not for any
financial or health reasons and took up employment with a ventilation company
known as Quinn Air Ltd.
42. He
told me that the difference for him was that he was no longer working in an
assembly line situation: that he was working for himself and probably had more
freedom than in a factory situation. He gave evidence that his first job after
leaving school was with Ericsson installing telephone exchanges and he remained
in that job for about seven years. He then had one or two jobs driving and
soforth before joining Waterford Foods plc. He said that he was aged 47 years
and was living in Dungarvan.
43. While
prepared to accept that Mr. O’Sullivan was “employed” by the
Defendant as respects the period 18th October, 1999 to May 2000 Mr. Doddy
stated that because Mr. O’Sullivan had left the employment of the
Defendant initially after such a short period of time it could not be contended
that his was an eligible job for the purpose of sub paragraph 2 (a) of the
Agreement and in addition Mr. O’Sullivan did not still hold that job on
the 2nd September, 1999.
44. It
cannot be denied that the job, “taken up”, to use the terminology
of paragraph 3 of the Agreement, by Mr. O’Sullivan was created within the
stipulated 8 month period. I have already ruled that it was not necessary in
order to comply with the provisions of sub paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement
that Mr. O’Sullivan should have been employed in that job on the 2nd
September, 1999.
45. The
job in question was a permanent full time position as a General Operative. The
evidence to the Court by Mr. McCaughey and Mr. Bryan, and which I accept, was
that all job offers on the Production side as distinct from the Sales and
Administration side of the business were positions as General Operatives.
Within this designation the individual employees had to be prepared to move
between different tasks as required. Though Mr. O’Sullivan was doing a
different type of work after his return to the Defendant on the 18th October,
1999 from that which he had been doing prior to his departure he continued to
be employed as a General Operative.
46. Mr.
Doddy accepted, notoriously in the case of Mr. Pat Scanlon, who had taken up
employment with the Defendant only on the 30 August, 1999, three days before
the end of the stipulated 8 month period, that regard must be had to job
service not alone within but also after the end of that period and prior to the
1st January, 2000, in considering whether or not an otherwise qualifying
person was employed by the Defendant for the purpose of sub paragraph 2 (a) of
the Agreement. However, Mr. Doddy was emphatic that because Mr.
O’Sullivan had left his employment with the Defendant after only 12 days
or 2 weeks his could not be considered an eligible job for the purpose of sub
paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement. He conceded that Mr.
O’Sullivan’s employment with the Defendant from the 16th October,
1999 to May, 2000 was a reasonable period of employment sufficient to satisfy
the requirements of sub paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement. However, he stated
that one could not consider Mr. O’Sullivan’s two periods of
employment together for the purpose of determining whether there was a
compliance with sub paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement.
47. Apart
from what Mr. Doddy saw as the crucial importance of Mr. O’Sullivan not
holding on the 2nd September, 1999 the job which he had taken up with the
Defendant within the stipulated 8 period, it was his opinion that the period of
12 days or 2 weeks served by Mr. O’Sullivan during the currency of the 8
month period had to be regarded in isolation and accordingly did not amount to
eligible employment for the purpose of sub paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement.
48. In
considering this Agreement in my judgment it is essential that one remains at
all times conscious of the origin and purpose of the Agreement. The purpose
was to get employees being made redundant by A.W.G., plc, back into permanent
full-time employment by encouraging the Defendant to provide substitute jobs
for those persons. A large number of these persons, including Mr.
O’Sullivan himself, had been in the same type of job for more than two
decades. After so long a period in one type of employment the transition to
another type of employment with different methods of working was bound to
present serious problems for some people, including, on his own evidence, Mr.
O’Sullivan. Matters of temperament and deep rooted habit were involved
and these were something which terms and conditions of employment alone could
not overcome. This was clearly understood by the Defendant as appears from the
evidence of Mr. Dominic Bryan. I am satisfied from the evidence that the
Defendant was prepared to exercise very considerable perseverance and
flexibility in endeavouring to procure and retain the services of former
A.W.G., plc, employees such as Mr. O’Sullivan.
49. Mr.
Doddy might well be correct in his belief that a target of ten jobs within 8
months employing qualifying former A.W.G., plc, employees was an eminently
achievable objective and that there could be no relaxation of our departure
from this requirement in any circumstances. However, it appears to me that Mr.
O’Sullivan was so employed unless there was evidence which established or
from which the Court could draw a clear inference that the job taken up by him
on 18th October, 1999 was an altogether new and different job from that which
he took up in July of that year as considered in the context of an employment
grant assistance scheme. In my judgment there is no such evidence to be found
in this case. Undoubtedly Mr. O’Sullivan left the employment of the
Defendant just before the commencement of the summer holiday in 1999 with the
intention of starting work in the building industry. However, within 8 weeks
approximately after that vacation he was back at work with the Defendant
without having obtained other employment and as on the first occasion having
been contacted by the Defendant. Mr. Bryan, Operations Director of the
Dungarvan Company, Woodroe (Dungarvan) Limited, (W.D.L.), gave evidence that
the Defendant was very anxious to procure and retain the services of persons
such as Mr. O’Sullivan and Mr. Lynch who had a long proven record of time
keeping and commitment to work and that consequently his job with the Defendant
remained open for Mr. O’Sullivan if things did not work out for him,
which turned out in fact to be the case.
50. In
my judgment, mindful of the purpose of the Agreement, once one disregards the
purported necessity of Mr. O’Sullivan being employed by the Defendant in
a permanent full-time position on 2nd September, 1999, in the absence of some
express provision in the Agreement there is no rational or logical reason why
the break in Mr. O’Sullivan’s service should not be disregarded for
the purpose of determining whether there could be found in his service with the
Defendant prior to the date on which the second sum of IR£200,000 would
become payable, an indication of a likely intention on his part of becoming a
long term employee of the Defendant. In my judgment this is particularly so
having regard to the background to and the duration of the break in his
employment with the Defendant. In my judgment one cannot loose sight of the
fact that Mr. O’Sullivan was employed by the Defendant for an overall
period of 3 months and after the 18th October, 1999 was employed by the
Defendant for almost 2½ months before the Plaintiff could be required
under the terms of the Agreement to pay the second sum of £200,000. In my
judgment the position held by Mr. O’Sullivan was a qualifying job within
the provisions of sub paragraph 2 (a) of the Agreement.
51. In
the circumstances the Defendant had, as required by sub paragraph 2 (a) of the
Agreement, within 8 months after the Commencement Date created not less than 10
jobs in Dungarvan employing staff who on the 31st July, 1998 were staff of
(being employed by) an A.W.G. Company. This being so the Defendant was
entitled to be paid by the Plaintiff the second sum of IR£200,000 on or
before the 2nd January, 2000.