High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This case raises a net question of statutory interpretation. A dispute had arisen between the Applicants and their employer, the Notice Party, concerning a claim for the payment of a marriage gratuity on the Applicants' resignation from the Notice Party's employment. The Applicants claimed that marriage gratuities were payable to women who resign in similar circumstances to them and that they are entitled to the payment of a marriage gratuity as they performed "like work" with named female fellow workers in terms of Section 3 of the Anti-Discrimination (Pay) Act, 1974 The First named Applicant referred his claim under the 1974 Act to an Equality Officer on 13 July, 1996 The Second named Applicant referred his claim in 1989 A particular Equality Officer was allocated the claims and in each case she made a recommendation dated 13 January, 1998 A letter of that date was sent to the Applicants' Solicitors enclosing the respective recommendations and making it clear that any appeal must be lodged in the Labour Court within 42 days from the date of the recommendation.

: Both Applicants want to appeal their respective recommendations but the Respondent has refused to accept the appeals as being out of time.

: Section 8(1) provides that a party to a dispute in relation to which an Equality Officer has made a recommendation may appeal to the Labour Court against the recommendation and under the section the Labour Court must hear and decide the appeal and must convey its determination to the parties. Paragraph (e) of the sub-section however provides as follows:-

: "An appeal under this section shall be lodged in the Court not later than 42 days after the date of the Equality Officer's recommendation and the notice shall specify the grounds of the appeal."

: There is no provision in the Act or in any amending Act for the Labour Court or any other body or Court to extend the 42 day period. It is common case therefore that the Applicants, if they are out of time, cannot apply for an extension. The question is when does the 42 day period commence?

: It is not in dispute that the appeals were received by the Respondent on 25 February, 1998 being 43 days after the date of the Equality Officer's recommendations. For some extraordinary reason the Respondent only received the Notices of Appeal nine days after they were posted but it is not in dispute between the parties that the Respondent did not in fact receive the Notices until 25 February, 1998 While the Respondent argues that the Applicants are one day late with the lodgement of the appeal, the Applicants claim that they are in time in that they argue that "the date of the Equality Officer's recommendation" in paragraph (e) of Section 8(1) of the 1974 Act should be interpreted as meaning the date of receipt of the Equality Officer's recommendations.

: The latest authoritative statement of principle on the interpretation of statutes is contained in the judgment of Blayney J in Howard v Commissioners for Public Works 1993 ILRM 665 at 690 Blayney J, delivering one of the majority judgments in the Supreme Court, approved the traditional statements of principle contained in Craies on Statute Law, (7th Edition, 1971) at p. 65 and Maxwell on the Interpretation of Statutes. (12th Edition, 1976) at p. 28 The quotation from Craies reads as follows:-

: "The cardinal rule for the construction of Acts of Parliament is that they should be construed according to the intention expressed in the Acts themselves. If the words of the statute are themselves precise and unambiguous, then no more can be necessary then to expound those words in their ordinary and natural sense. The words themselves alone do in such a case best declare the intention of the law giver. 'The Tribunal that has to construe an Act of a legislature, or indeed any other document, has to determine the intention as expressed by the words used. And in order to understand those words it is natural to enquire what is the subject matter with respect of which they are used and the objective in view. The equivalent passage in Maxwell followed by Blayney J reads as follows:-

: "The rule of construction is 'to intend the legislature to have meant what they have actually expressed' (per Parke J in R v Banbury (Inhabitants) (1834) 1 A&E 136 at 142). The object of all interpretation is to discover the intention of Parliament, 'but the intention of Parliament must be deduced from the language used' (per Lord Parker CJ in Capper v Baldwin 1965 2 QB 53 at 61). For 'it is well accepted that the beliefs and assumptions of those who frame Acts of Parliament cannot make the law' (per Lord Morris in Davies Jenkins & Co Limited v Davies 1967 2 WLR 1139 at 1156)."

: Applying these principles I must hold that the Respondent is correct in its interpretation of the relevant statutory provision.

: In plain English the expression "the date of the (Equality) Officer's recommendation" can only mean the date appearing on it. If the Oireachtas intended the 42 day period to commence on the date a party received the recommendation then that would have been stated. Time limits are framed and worded differently in different statutory codes and indeed in different statutory provisions within the same code. The Planning Acts, the Landlord and Tenant Acts and the Rules of the Superior Courts are all examples of codes or regulatory regimes where time limits feature prominently. But in each case the Oireachtas or the Rules Making Committee may devise different ways of fixing the commencement date and different ways of fixing the termination dates. In this case each of the recommendations were dated and clearly the 42 day period commenced from that date. By the same token the expression "shall be lodged in the Court" can only have one meaning. It can only mean that the document actually reached the Labour Court in the ordinary course of its everyday business. If therefore the Notice was posted to the Labour Court there is no basis on which the expression "lodged in the Court" could be interpreted as meaning the date of posting.

: In the course of argument Counsel for the Applicants, Mr Richard Kean, SC, argued quite rightly that in theory you could have a situation where there was long delay in transmitting the recommendation to the parties. He points out that in such a situation the 42 day period could in practice be arbitrarily and very considerably reduced. But I do not think that this argument can be availed of to enable a Court to depart from the normal canons of construction and from interpreting clear unambiguous words in their plain and ordinary meaning.

: I am quite satisfied that it is intended by the Oireachtas that a recommendation of an Equality Officer should be as soon as is practicable sent out to the parties. If there was gross delay in transmission it may well be that that part of the procedure could be quashed by Certiorari. But none of that arises in this case and I am certainly making no decision on it. In this case each of the recommendations was transmitted to the parties immediately after it was signed and dated. 42 days is quite a long period and I suspect that the Oireachtas has deliberately selected it to cover problems arising out of possible postal delays.

: Of course in this case there is an unexplained postal delay in the delivery of the Notices of Appeal to the Labour Court. The delay was of such a magnitude that a Court in the ordinary way might have been sceptical as to whether the Labour Court was mistaken as to the date of receipt of the Notices. But it is conceded that there was no mistake and that the Notices were received by the Labour Court on the 43rd day. Mr Kerr, Counsel for the Respondent, both in oral submission and in written submissions has referred to other authorities. But I think that they are of limited assistance only. In my view this case can and should be decided on the plain meaning to be given to the words in the sub-section.

: I must therefore refuse the Judicial Review sought.