High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This is an appeal brought by the Registrar of Friendly Societies from a decision of the Circuit Court reversing an earlier decision of the Registrar of Friendly Societies refusing the Applicant the benefit of a certificate under Section 1 of the Scientific Societies Act, 1843. That Section reads as follows:-

2. As a consequence of statutory adaptations, the Registrar of Friendly Societies is now the equivalent of "the Barrister at Law or Lord Advocate" and there is an appeal from the decision of the Registrar to the Circuit Court. The decision of the Circuit Court can be appealed in the ordinary way to the High Court and it is such an appeal which is now before this Court.

3. The Appellant is a company limited by guarantee. The Memorandum of Association, as amended by a Special Resolution, dated 29th April, 1995 provides that the principal object for which the Company was established is "to establish and maintain a Working Transport Museum for scientific and literary purposes and to provide related education for the public benefit". The Society as I will hereafter call the Appellant is effectively in existence for the purposes of restoring and maintaining obsolete transport vehicles such as buses, trams, vans, etc. and as far as possible displaying them in a museum. The Society has two premises, one in Castleruddery and the other in Howth. This appeal relates to the premises in Howth which is situated in the Howth demesne and leased from a Mr. Gaisford St. Laurence. The evidence established that the Transport Museum in Howth contains a number of vehicle types all carefully restored at great expense and with great art and skill. The Society maintains that having regard to Section 1 of the 1843 Act, as cited above, it should not have to pay rates in respect of the Howth premises. The Registrar of Friendly Societies, however, refused to issue the certificate under the Section because he took the view that the Society was not a Society "instituted for purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively". He did agree that the other requirements of the Section were complied with. The Society appealed that decision to the Circuit Court and in a careful and reasoned judgment, Judge Groarke overruled the decision of the Registrar and held that a certificate should issue. The Registrar, in turn, has appealed that decision. Judge Groarke in his judgment placed heavy reliance on the English case of British Launderers Research Association -v- Borough of Hendon Rating Authority (1949) 1 K.B. 462. He cites the following passage in the judgment of Denning L.J. (as he then was). At p.467:-

4. Quite apart from the reasons given by Denning L.J. I think it reasonable to assume that the word "science" in the 1843 Act would have been intended to be given a broad interpretation. While English decisions have tended to treat the three words, "science", "literature", and "the fine arts" disjunctively, that was for the purposes of dealing with the facts of any given case. I think it both helpful and correct not to lose sight of the total expression, "science, literature or the fine arts", because it would seem to me that the real purpose of the Section was to exempt in certain circumstances societies instituted for the purposes of higher knowledge. It may be of some interest that the Act, either originally or possibly later, by virtue of some Short Titles Act, became known as "the Scientific Societies Act, 1843" even though Section 1 refers to literature and fine arts as well as science. I am firmly of the view that it was never intended that science be interpreted in some narrow academic sense as covering mathematics, chemistry, physics and biology. I would fully adopt the broader interpretation placed on the word by Denning L.J. I would also adopt his view that the mere fact that there may be an educational aspect does not necessarily mean that the purposes are not exclusively scientific.

5. While, of course, a judgment of the English Court of Appeal must be persuasive, I feel that the Battersea case goes much further than many of the earlier English cases. It can also be distinguished from the instant case, in that it dealt with a company limited by guarantee and Jenkins J. himself pointed out (at page 16), 'I think this applies with particular force where, as here, the society concerned is a company incorporated under the Companies Act, with the Memorandum of Association formally stating, as required by that Act, the objects for which it is established'.

6. Looking at the authorities as a whole and given that I am not bound by the Battersea case , I prefer to approach the matter by looking at the factual evidence of the present purposes and activities of the college, and I would agree here with the opinion of the learned Circuit Court Judge that any form of religious involvement which takes place is purely ancillary to the other activities of the college."

7. While this case does involve a company limited by guarantee, the framework of the Memorandum of Association does not, in my view, merely by reference to the educational aspect move the society from the ambit of Section 1 of the 1843 Act. I interpret McGuinness J. as effectively holding that the Court must stand back and decide what were the real purposes of the society and, while documents may provide evidence of those real purposes, they may not be conclusive.

8. I am absolutely satisfied that the Society is entitled to a certificate under Section 1. A great deal of the evidence, which has been adduced before Judge Groarke and before this Court, was not before the Registrar. The Transport Museum is not a workshop for repairing vehicles nor is its purpose to provide either education or entertainment to the public. Its purpose is to engage in what can only correctly be called the difficult science and indeed art of restoration of vehicles which, in many instances, are mere shells or in very bad condition when first dealt with by the Society. It is only by very slow degrees and over years that vehicles can be restored as the Society is entirely dependent on voluntary contributions. Any educational aspect is purely incidental. In a sense, the vehicles could not be restored in the first instance without some public interest because without public interest there cannot be funding. The reasons why members of the public may go to the museum would be many, in my view. Some would go out a genuine interest in engineering. Others would go out of nostalgia. Others for aesthetic reasons. But the Society was not instituted to confer these pleasures on the public. It was instituted by persons genuinely interested in restoring vehicles. Some of the vehicles contain most unusual technical aspects. These had to be restored with great care. Arriving at the correct livery, the correct crest, etc. are all part of the science and/or art of restoration.

9. McGuinness J. in the Gurteen Agricultural College case was apparently informed by Counsel on both sides that there was no Irish decision on the interpretation of Section 1 of the 1843 Act. That is not perhaps entirely correct because in Cleeve & Others -v- Limerick City Manager and Commissioner of Valuation (1942) I.R. 77, Maguire P. in delivering the unanimous judgment of a Divisional Court containing Maguire P., Gavan Duffy J. and Martin Maguire J. did make an oblique reference to the question of exclusivity. The society seeking exemption in that case was the Limerick Protestant Young Mens Association. The following passage from the judgment of Maguire P. is of some interest:-

10. These are very laudable objects and among them are the objects of scientific study and the cultivation of artistic taste. In my view, the references in the first part of the rule to other objects do not necessarily preclude us from holding that the Association was founded for 'the purposes of science, literature or the fine arts exclusively'. Rule 3 of these rules, however, provides that 'the means employed shall be the establishment of a library reading room, classrooms, laboratory, museum and gymnasium, together with sermons (anniversary or occasional), Bible, literary, science and art classes, lectures and other means which may be thought advisable'."

11. The Judge then goes on to deal with Rule 5 which contains still other purposes. There was clearly no exclusivity in that case but what is of interest is that the former President did not consider that references to other objects as such in the first part of that second rule necessarily precluded the Court from holding that the Association could invoke Section 1 of the 1843 Act. That seems to be in line with the views expressed by Denning L.J. in relation to educational aspects of a scientific or artistic endeavour. In other words, 'exclusively' must be given its ordinary meaning but it should not be given an artificially literal meaning that would have been almost certainly contrary to the intentions of Parliament. I am of the view that the necessary exclusivity has been established in this case and that a certificate under Section 1 should issue. The appeal must therefore be dismissed.