1. The
proceedings herein which have a lengthy and complicated history were commenced
by the Applicant in October of 1993 and comprised an application for relief by
way of an Order of Mandamus requiring the Defendant to provide secure
residential placement for the psychological assessment, diagnosis and treatment
of her son, Niall Herron, who was then an infant aged 12 years.
2. By
Order of the High Court Barron J. dated the 3rd day of November, 1993 it was
ordered that the relief sought by the Applicant should stand refused.
3. The
proceedings came before the Supreme Court on the 6th day of December, 1993 on
foot of a notice of appeal dated the 8th day of November, 1993 whereupon after
delivery of an ex-tempore judgment (Finlay C.J.) an Order was made dated the
6th day of December, 1993 directing, inter alia, that:-
4. In
delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court which gave rise to the foregoing
order Finlay C.J. was at pains to explain that:-
5. That
explanation was necessary because on the date of the making by the Supreme
Court of the Order of the 6th day of December, 1993 Niall Herron was the
subject of an application by the Applicant to the Court of Appeal in England
for his return to this jurisdiction pursuant to the provisions of the Hague
Convention (having allegedly been abducted to England by or on behalf of his
father who is the estranged husband of the Applicant). In the event, the
English Courts refused to return Niall Herron to this jurisdiction and this
Court is not concerned with the reason for that refusal.
6. Niall
Herron (also known as Niall Matthews) was born on 31st October, 1980 and
accordingly he is now more than 18 years old and the Applicant has adduced
evidence on affidavit indicating:-
7. The
Applicant claims that the proceedings herein are still extant and that the
Order of the Supreme Court dated the 6th day of December, 1993 remains in force
and requires, inter alia, that Niall Herron, having returned to the State must
be ".....brought by the Garda Siochana before the High Court ....sitting at
Dublin as soon as practicable ....and that....pending his being brought before
the High Court as aforesaid.....(he)....may be lodged at St. Michael's House..."
8. The
Respondents argue that since Niall Herron has now attained his majority the
Order of the Supreme Court dated the 6th day of December, 1993 is spent since
it can only be construed as having an application to Niall Herron during his
minority and that any other construction of the Order (particularly when read
together with the judgment of Finlay C.J.) would have the effect of interfering
with certain constitutional and other rights enjoyed by Niall Herron and
depriving him of some of those rights.
9. There
is a constitutional obligation on the State pursuant to the provisions of
Article 42.5 of the Constitution to cater for the requirements of children who
have "... very special needs" where those needs cannot be provided by the
parents or guardians of such children - see
F.N.
-v- Minister for Education
,
[1995] 2 I.L.R.M. 297 (and see also
G.
-v- An Bord Uchtála
,
[1980] I.R. 32 and (more recently)
D.B.
-v- Minister for Justice
,
[1999] 1 ILRM 93).
10. The
constitutional obligation arises in relation to (a) children (b) with very
special needs (c) which cannot be provided by their parents or guardians.
11. It
is contended on behalf of the Respondents that the obligation does not arise in
respect of Niall Herron because (a) he is not a child (b) he does not have
".... very special needs..." (c) which cannot be provided by his parents or
guardians.
12. The
Applicant contends that the proceedings herein must be deemed to be an
application made pursuant to the provisions of Section 11 of the Guardianship
of Infants Act, 1964 (No. 7 of 1964) (hereafter referred to as "the 1964 Act").
13. The
relief sought herein (which was refused by Order of the High Court (Barron J.)
dated the 3rd day of November, 1993) was relief by way of Judicial Review in
the form of an Order of Mandamus requiring the Respondents to provide
residential placement for psychological assessment, diagnosis and treatment of
Niall Herron who was then aged 12 years. In the Statement of Grounds delivered
on behalf of the Applicant dated the 5th day of October, 1993, the Applicant
inter alia relied upon the following ground in support of her application:-
14. The
Applicant comes within the definition of a "guardian of an infant" pursuant to
the provisions of the 1964 Act and it cannot reasonably be suggested that the
relief which she has sought herein does not comprise an application to this
Court "... for its direction on any question affecting the welfare of the
infant "...since it comprises an application to require the Respondents to
provide residential placement and psychological assessment of Niall Herron".
15. Although
Section 11 of the 1964 Act was intended primarily to deal with questions
relating to custody, access and maintenance of children (this is clear from the
provisions of Sub-section (2) thereof) I do not believe that the jurisdiction
of this Court has been confined to such matters having regard to the provision
in Sub-section (1) thereof to the intent that the Court may ".... make such
Order as it thinks proper...." in respect of ".... any question affecting the
welfare of the infant....".
16. Accordingly,
since an application was made by the Applicant who was then a guardian of an
infant on a question affecting the welfare of that infant, it follows that the
"... reference to an infant..." shall include a reference to a child who
"....has attained the age of 18 years and is suffering from mental or physical
disability to such extent that it is not reasonably possible for him to
maintain himself fully".
17. Since
Sub-section (2)(b) of Section 11 of the 1964 Act empowers the Court to "order
the father or mother to pay towards the maintenance of the infant such weekly
or other periodical sum as, having regard to the means of the father or mother,
the Court considers reasonable" and since an "infant" is defined within the
1964 Act as a "person under twenty-one years of age" it follows that Section 11
is a ".... provision of the.... Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964.... that
provides for payments to be made for maintenance or support of children up to
the age of 21 years".
18. In
consequence, Section 2 of the Age of Majority Act, 1985 does not affect the
construction of the word "infant" including the reference to the age of
twenty-one years which is contained in the definition of the word "infant" in
Section 2 of the 1964 Act.
19. It
follows from the foregoing that this Court has jurisdiction to deal with the
matters which are in issue in the proceedings herein notwithstanding the fact
that Niall Herron is now more than 18 years old.
20. In
the light of the Order of the Supreme Court herein dated the 6th day of
December, 1993 I consider that it is appropriate that the proceedings herein be
re-entered and I so order.
21. I
note that the Order of the Supreme Court dated the 6th day of December, 1993
expressly recommended that legal representation for Niall Herron in the High
Court be provided in accordance with the Attorney General's Scheme and that a
Solicitor for that purpose be nominated by the President of the Incorporated
Law Society and that such Solicitor should have authority to engage the
services of one Senior and one Junior Counsel. I believe that it is
appropriate that such legal representation be provided for Niall Herron
forthwith and I require that steps be taken in that regard with immediate effect.
22. Thereafter
the Court will hear such applications as may be made by and on behalf of the
parties and of Niall Herron based upon such evidence as may be adduced and the
parties will be facilitated in order to enable them to make such applications
and adduce such evidence as they deem desirable.
23. I
would stress however that I have pointed out to the parties that these
proceedings must presently be viewed in the context that the relief sought by
the Applicant has been refused by Order of the High Court (Barron J.) dated the
3rd day of November, 1993 and that the Order of the Supreme Court dated the 6th
day of December, 1993 was made in the context described by Finlay C.J. as
outlined earlier herein.
24. Insofar
as the Applicant has herein sought the attachment and committal to prison of
certain named persons for Contempt of Court, I regard her application as
scandalous, vexatious and possibly mischievous. Not one shred of evidence has
been adduced on behalf of the Applicant which would suggest that the named
persons concerned acted in anything other than an exemplary manner in discharge
of their various duties.
25. Accordingly,
I have no hesitation in dismissing the application which has been made for the
attachment and committal to prison of the persons concerned and will hear such
submissions as to the costs of and incidental to that application as may be
necessary.