1. This
matter arises out of an application made on behalf of the applicant pursuant to
the order of Smyth J. made on 12th May, 1997 in which he gave the applicant
leave to apply by way of judicial review for, inter alia, the following relief:-
3. The
applicant (the Society) was created by Royal Charter in 1750 and since then has
developed and maintained a uniquely distinguished place in the cultural,
scientific, industrial and agricultural life of Ireland. It carries on its
activities in extensive premises at Ballsbridge in the city of Dublin which
includes a vast indoor arena known as the Simmonscourt Pavilion. The latter
became operational in or about 1975 and in its early years was used primarily
for exhibitions, stabling, blood stock sales and indoor show-jumping.
Subsequently, from 1983 activities were extended to include major conferences,
international pop and classical concerts; boxing matches, indoor tennis events,
ballet and opera. In 1992, a rival venue, The Point, appeared on the Dublin
scene which offers promoters a broadly similar premises and range of facilities
as at the Simmonscourt Pavilion. In 1993 The Point Exhibition Co. Limited,
having been successful before Geoghegan J. in judicial review proceedings
against the Revenue Commissioners reported at [1993] 2 I.R. 551, obtained an
excise licence pursuant to the provisions of the Act, Section 7 on the ground
that The Point constituted an "other place of entertainment" within the meaning
of the section. This facility gave the owners of The Point a substantial
advantage over the Society which had no such seven day licence. Since then the
latter has lost a substantial volume of business to The Point - notably major
concerts and other musical events as well as some exhibitions intended to be
held on Sundays when no liquor licence is available to the Society.
4. In
1993/4 the Society carried out a major upgrading development at the
Simmonscourt Pavilion with a view to making it more suitable for concerts, ice
shows, operas and other events of a public entertainment nature for which the
applicant believed there was an increasing demand. The Society applied for and
obtained from the District Court a public music and singing licence for the
Pavilion pursuant to Section 51 of the Public Health Acts (Amendment) Act,
1890. A sum of £691,000 was expended on the premises to comply with the
requirements of the Fire Services Act, 1981. Following the grant of the music
and singing licence, negotiations commenced between representatives of the
Society and the respondents in or about July, 1994 with a view to obtaining a
theatre licence for the Pavilion under Section 7 of the Act. Ultimately, by
letter dated 27th April, 1995 the respondents indicated that having examined
the Society's application and having regard to the nature of events held in the
premises, they refused the licence on the basis that the Pavilion was not a
theatre or place of public entertainment within the meaning of the Act.
Further correspondence then ensued in which, inter alia, the case was made that
the unavailability of a seven day intoxicating liquor licence severely
restricted the Society in its marketing of the Simmonscourt Pavilion as a place
of public entertainment and as an exhibition centre, particularly as its main
competitor "The Point" holds a theatre licence granted under Section 7 of the
Act. The respondents by letter dated 8th July, 1996 retained their opinion
that the vast majority of the activities taking place at the Simmonscourt
Pavilion could not be regarded as public entertainment and, therefore, the
premises did not qualify as a "place of public entertainment" within the
meaning of Section 7 aforesaid.
5. The
net issue for determination by the court is whether, having regard to the range
of public activities carried on at the Simmonscourt Pavilion, it is within the
concept "or other place of public entertainment" envisaged by Section 7 of the
Act.
7. In
Section 1(1) it is enacted that the word "theatre" means "a theatre or place of
public entertainment licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquor under Section
7 of the Excise Act, 1835";
8. Two
conclusions emerge from the foregoing statutory provisions. First, the
Society, having obtained a music and singing licence from the District Court
for the Simmonscourt Pavilion, has established the condition precedent for an
application to the respondents for a liquor licence in respect of the premises
under section 7 of the Act.
9. Secondly,
the phrase in Section 7 ".... in any theatre or other place of public
entertainment....." is clearly within the ejusdem generis rule of statutory
interpretation. The following explanation of the rule is given in Maxwell on
Interpretation
of Statutes
,
12th Edition, at p. 297.
10. There
is nothing to show that a wider sense than that applicable to "theatre" was
intended by the reference to "or other place of public entertainment" in
Section 7 of the Act. That proposition is underscored by the relevant
provisions in the Intoxicating Liquor Act, 1927 to which I have referred. It
is enacted therein that "theatre" includes a place of public entertainment
licensed for the sale of intoxicating liquor under section 7 of the Act of
1833. The requirements of sections 20 and 21 of the 1927 Act apply not only to
a theatre but also to a place of public entertainment within the meaning of
Section 7 of the Act of 1833. These requirements imply that the public
entertainment envisaged is a performance for the benefit of the public with a
defined time frame and where seating is provided for patrons.
11. The
range of events at the Simmonscourt Pavilion differs substantially from that at
The Point. A substantial majority of them are trade or other exhibitions most
of which usually continue all day for a period of days. They are open to
interested members of the public who normally pay a fee to attend. Such
exhibitions usually contain a wide range of goods and/or services which are put
on show by commercial exhibitors for the purpose of demonstration and sale.
The public perambulates from exhibitor to exhibitor. In order to attract a
large attendance at a particular exhibition, an element of entertainment may be
provided as, for example, film shows relating to the subject-matter of the
exhibition (e.g. tourism) or occasional entertainment or instruction by well
known theatrical or sporting personalities.
12. I
have no difficulty in accepting that events such as indoor horse-shows, boxing
and tennis tournaments qualify under the ejusdem generis rule for inclusion as
"public entertainment" within the meaning of section 7 of the Act and they are
also within the ambit of sections 20 and 21 of the Intoxicating Liquor Act,
1927 in the same way as pop or classical concerts; operas; ice and fashion
shows. They all share in common the concept that they are public
entertainments for the benefit of a, by and large, static audience that is
usually seated for the performance which has a defined time span limited to a
period of a few hours. Trade and other exhibitions in general terms do not
have these characteristics. In my view the inclusion of film shows or casual
theatrical type entertainments which are subsidiary to the primary objective of
the exhibition is irrelevant. It is necessary to look at the event as a whole
and decide whether or not it is within the ejusdem generis rule. If the answer
to the question whether the user of the Simmonscourt Pavilion as envisaged by
the Society comprises a preponderance of events which are properly within the
concept of an "other place of public entertainment" in section 7 of the Act is
in the negative then the respondents were correct in law in refusing to grant a
liquor licence for the Pavilion. I have no doubt that the preponderance of
events there as envisaged by the Society are outside the parameters of section
7 of the Act and, therefore, the respondents were obliged to refuse to grant
the requested liquor licence for the premises which was an annual seven day
licence. The scope of statutory interpretation by the courts was extensively
reviewed by the Supreme Court in
Howard
-v- The Commissioners of Public Works in Ireland
and
Byrne
& Others -v- Same
[1994] 1 I.R. 101 - see the judgments of Finlay C.J.; Blayney J. and Denham J.
In essence it was decided therein that a court has no power to manipulate a
statutory provision by extending or ignoring the plain meaning of the words
used in the interest of avoiding a perceived injustice. Where such a situation
exists the remedy lies exclusively with the legislature.