1. By
Order of Barron J. dated Tuesday the 21st February, 1995 the Applicant was
given leave to apply by way of Judicial Review for an Order of Certiorari
quashing the Conviction Orders made against the Applicant by the first named
Respondent at Cork District Court on the 15th day of February 1995 on the
grounds that the Applicant was not permitted to call evidence to the effect
that the list of previous convictions had not been given fully and that the
failure to give a full list of such previous convictions deprived the Applicant
of the defence she was making to the proceedings.
3. No.
65 J.R. 1996 which are the subject matter of separate proceedings. In these
proceedings the Applicant sought leave to argue additional grounds but I
refused such application and confined the Applicant to arguing the grounds
allowed by Mr. Justice Barron.
4. Notwithstanding
that ruling, the Plaintiff continued to argue a number of other points
concerning the conduct of the proceedings in the District Court - the Court
having given very wide latitude to a lay litigant. Those points concerned:
5. She
was not allowed, however, to argue the allegation of a long-standing conspiracy
against her, or allegations of perjury against Mr. Galvin, who did not give
evidence in the District Court in the case under review.
6.
The
convictions sought to be impugned were in relation to the 19th August, 1994 in
respect of which date the Applicant was convicted of an offence of no tax
displayed and fined £100 and also of an offence of failing to wear a
safety belt in respect of which she was fined £25. A transcript of the
proceedings was produced in Court and Mr. Galvin was cross-examined as was Mr.
Joe Dutton of Doyle Stenographers.
9. The
Applicant contends that the transcript should read
"This
is not a road traffic offence"
.
It is also alleged that Mr. Dutton spoke to Garda Harte after the proceedings
and took a list of convictions which he then copied down to supplement his
transcript.
10. In
relation to these matters I find the following:- First of all Mr. Dutton is
an expert and an extremely experienced stenographer with over twenty-five years
experience in the Department of Justice before working with Doyle Court
Reporters. He is also in my assessment an extremely truthful witness. It has
to be borne in mind that the transcript was not in existence at the District
Court proceedings and was not relied on by anybody in those proceedings.
Furthermore, I accept unreservedly the evidence of Mr. Dutton that he did not
compile his list of convictions for a transcript from talking to Garda Harte as
alleged. The alleged inaccuracies in the transcript, even if they were proved,
do not appear to me to have any bearing on any issue that I have to decide.
11. That
the first named Respondent was erroneous in relation to his knowledge of
fundamental constitutional law, resulting in prejudice towards the Applicant's
witness and the Applicant.
12. It
is the law that applications for an inquiry under Section 40 challenging the
illegal detention of persons held in custody may be properly and legally made
by a stranger acting on behalf of the person alleged to be so detained. A
witness for the Applicant gave evidence that he made such inquiries. The judge
erroneously was of the view that it would be an offence for a non-lawyer to
make such an application. That error by the learned Judge does not appear to
me to be any way germane, to the decision he finally made, and there is no
evidence before this Court to show that it in any way prejudiced the Judge
against the Applicant in determining the criminal case before him.
13. After
conviction the Guard gave evidence that the Applicant was convicted on the 4th
April, 1993 at Cork District Court, no tax displayed, two counts and on each
count fined £20. The Judge said
14. In
fact, as per the Guard's evidence, the learned District Judge was incorrect in
so stating. The Applicant criticises Mr. Galvin for not pointing out that
error to the Judge. Mr. Galvin said in evidence in this Court that he did not
avert to the matter. I accept his evidence. In any event, the date that the
District Judge thought correct, being a year earlier than the evidence given by
the Guard, could not have worked to the prejudice of the Applicant in relation
to penalty - on the contrary it would have operated in ease of penalty if it
mattered at all. The allegation that in some way it would help to prove her
conspiracy theory is, in my view, quite unsustained.
15. The
Applicant complains that Mr. Galvin did not give a full list of the previous
convictions of the Applicant at Question 131 at page 37 in the transcript:
16. The
Applicant now complains that it was wrong and in some way prejudicial to her
that Mr. Galvin did stop the Guard from giving the full list of convictions. I
cannot accept that contention. It is frequent practice for State Solicitors as
prosecutors in such matters as this to not ask for an exhaustive list of
previous convictions. Furthermore it is a frequent practice of Judges to adopt
the same approach. The Applicant suggests that by not giving the full list of
convictions, Mr. Galvin was acting from some sinister motive. I do not accept
this contention. I accept that the decision was in ease of the Applicant and
not adverse to her interests. Furthermore, she was asked
"Now
do you want to ask the Guard any question Mrs Herron?"
and she declined so to do. If the Applicant felt in any way aggrieved, I have
no doubt that she would have asked the appropriate questions. She is no
stranger to Court, and no stranger to legal proceedings, and there is not any
evidence before me that she was cowed or intimidated. Notwithstanding the
criticism of the State for failing to adduce evidence of more of her
convictions, the Applicant makes the point that those convictions were not
properly proven, as there was non-compliance with the proper procedure for
proving previous convictions. The point was not taken at the time, it was not
one of the grounds on which Mr. Justice Barron permitted the Judicial Review to
take place, did not operate in anyway unfairly on the Applicant as the
convictions were and are unchallenged as to their validity. In those
circumstances it seems to me that I should not quash the Order of the District
Court on that basis.
18. This
statement was made
after
the conviction and therefore could not have influenced the learned Judge in
arriving at his decision. The Applicant makes the case that by undermining her
allegations of harassment it could have influenced the penalty. However it
seems to me that the curtailment of the list of previous convictions is much
more likely to have worked in her favour, besides which the Applicant says
that the imposition of penalty is not the thrust of her proceedings here.
Furthermore it is not covered in the grounds permitted by Mr. Justice Barron
and permitted by this Court to be argued.
19. The
Applicant further complains that her trial was unsatisfactory in so far as the
learned Judge did not allow the Mr. Barry Galvin the Prosecutor to be called in
evidence. The matter is dealt with at page 32 in the transcript and runs as
follows:
21.
Mr. Justice Haughton
-
'If you are calling him as a witness on your behalf and if you are calling him
when he is called to the stand you will be bound by his evidence. Do you want
to call him, first of all.
22.
Mr. Justice Herron
-
'... Now, would you explain to me on what basis you feel you are entitled to
call Mr. Galvin, the Prosecutor to give evidence on your behalf.
23.
Mrs. Herron
-
'...Well, first of all it is usually an Inspector who conducts or prosecutes
cases on behalf of the people. He is a member of the State - he is the State
Solicitor - and usually it is an Inspector who prosecutes. Secondly, I believe
that he is a party in a conspiracy to pervert the course of justice.
24. Mr.
Galvin
-
'..
Judge, I object to this lady now trying to make this Court a forum for
political purposes and she is scandalising the Court and is not bound by it.
The officers of the Court are bound by the Court rules in the evidence they
give and she must be bound by the same rules. All she is doing is abusing the
privilege of the Court.
25. Mrs.
Herron
-
'.. My Lord. I am not attempting to abuse this Court and I am stating what I
believe to be an infringement of my rights.
26. Mr.
Justice Haughton - ' .. All right. In order to establish that do you want to
call Mr. Galvin?
27. Mr.
Justice Haughton - 'I am not permitting you to do so and the allegation is
irrelevant to these particular proceedings. Do you want to call any other
witness?'
28. Mrs.
Herron
-
'...No.
May I say about the tax, which is one of the issues I merely want to question
Mr. Galvin about. In 1990 a car which I was driving was seized by a member of
An Garda Siochana in Cork City. I was told I would be prosecuted and I waited
for the prosecution.'
31. Mr.
Justice Haughton - '.. That may be something that is in mitigation. You have
admitted that the car was not taxed and that summons, if you have no more
evidence to call or no further submissions to make as to the legal position, I
have to determine whether you are guilty or not guilty, first, before I hear
any address you may wish to make with regard to this issue before us, have you
any legal submissions to make.'
32. It
appears to me from the foregoing that the reason that the Judge made an Inquiry
as to the relevance of the evidence and that the Applicant intended to adduce
from Mr. Galvin and that he ruled the matter to be irrelevant. In my view,
having regard to the totality of the proceedings, and the evidence given, the
Judge was within his jurisdiction and entitled to make the ruling he did. It
is very frequently the function of a Judge to adjudicate on the relevance of
evidence called or proposed to be called. The fact that the Judge did not
allow Mr. Galvin to be called by the Applicant does not afford any grounds for
having the conviction quashed.
34. In
relation to these matters a perusal of the transcript shows those complaints to
be unjustified. The mention of committal for contempt arose in relation to an
apparent unwillingness of the Applicant to abide by a ruling of the Judge. In
my view, the Judge was quite entitled to act as he did and acted within
jurisdiction. It is vitally important for the administration of justice that
the High Court should not seek to interfere with the freedom of a trial judge
in the conduct of a trial, unless the requirements of justice so demand.
Likewise the allegations that the Judge was biased in favour of Mr. Galvin or
that the trial was unfair, are manifestly not borne out by the evidence.