High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. On the 18th September, 1997 the Office of the Sheriff for the County of Dublin received instructions from the Criminal Assets Bureau to seize a Mercedes motor car bearing registered letters and numbers 95 D 42525. These instructions were contained in a certificate issued by the Criminal Assets Bureau to the County Sheriff. That certificate purported to certify that one Peter Bolger of 24 Glendown Lawn, Templeogue in the city of Dublin had made default in paying the sum of £140,247.58 in respect of certain taxation liabilities and the interest accruing thereon. The certificate was executed by the seizure of the Mercedes car at Dublin Airport by agents of the Sheriff on the 18th September, 1997. On the same day, Peter Bolger was arrested at Dublin Airport by three officers of the Criminal Assets Bureau and was brought to Pearse Street Garda Station where he was detained for a period of fourteen hours. Subsequent to the seizure of the Mercedes car, Solicitors for a company called Louisville Limited, Messrs Haughtons, asserted that the Mercedes was owned by the company. The Criminal Assets Bureau, on the other hand, asserted that the Mercedes car was, at the time of its seizure, the property of Peter Bolger. Faced with these competing claims the Sheriff for the County of Dublin, Mr Fitzpatrick, issued a special summons on the 8th October, 1997 in which he sought this Court's determination as to the ownership of the Mercedes car. On the 20th October, 1997 Mr Justice Moriarty on consent of all three Respondents (the Criminal Assets Bureau, Louisville Limited and Peter Bolger) ordered that a preliminary issue be tried as to "who is the owner of the motor vehicle bearing registration letters and numbers 95 D 42525", the order further recited (on consent) that Louisville Limited would be Plaintiff on the issue and that the Criminal Assets Bureau would be the Defendant on the issue. The Plaintiff on the issue delivered points of claim, and the Defendant on the issue delivered points of defence. The history relating to the ownership of the seized Mercedes 250 car begins in 1994 when Peter Bolger purchased a Mercedes 200 saloon car. That car was traded in when a Mercedes 180 car was purchased in August 1996 - and the Mercedes 180, in turn, was traded in in September, 1996, when the Mercedes 250 car at issue in this case was purchased. Three parties were involved in these transactions on any account of the evidence; they are Peter Bolger, Louisville Limited, and Trecom Holdings Limited. Before dealing with the transactions relating to the purchase of each car I believe it is worthwhile to recount some of the evidence as was given in relation to each of these three parties and then to look at the car transactions bearing in mind that evidence.

2. Peter Bolger gave evidence that he was a business consultant; he indicated that he had concerned himself with the idea of selling beef in Africa, Russia and the Ukraine. He gave evidence of having visited Russia, Ghana and the Gambia and that he had done a sample contract in relation to beef for a particular customer in Ghana. He gave evidence of having procured the incorporation of a company called Trecom Holdings Limited with another individual, a Mr Joseph Arngrimsson, in which he said he held one half of the issued shares and Mr Arngrimsson held the other half of the issued shares. That company had entered into an agreement on the 2nd August, 1996 with David and Joseph Long for the purchase of a "private partnership" Value Travel together with the licence attaching thereto. The purchase price was £20,000, £10,000 of which was payable in cash on the 2nd August, 1996 with the balance of the purchase monies of £10,000 to be paid in cash on the 31st August, 1996.

3. Mr Bolger indicated that essential to the completion of the agreement was the licence which was owned by the Longs. He said that it soon became apparent that it would not be possible for the Longs to transfer to Trecom Holdings Limited the relevant licence. The agreement was not completed, according to Mr Bolger, and the £10,000 which had been paid at the time of the signing of the agreement was recovered and eventually "dispersed between the shareholders" of Trecom Holdings Limited. Trecom Holdings Limited was also in a position to pay the balance of the purchase monies of £10,000 on the 31st August, 1996.

4. Mr Bolger says that this latter sum of £10,000 was a sum that was ultimately used, he said, to assist in the purchase of the Mercedes 180 car on the 16th August, 1996.

5. As to his liability to the Revenue Commissioners, Mr Bolger acknowledged that some monies might be owing by him to the Revenue Commissioners but he did not accept that what was owing amounted to the sum set out in the certificate of £140,247.58. He indicated that he had sought to avail of the Tax Amnesty Scheme announced by the Minister for Finance in May, 1993. He said that he had instructed his English Solicitors to send to the Revenue Commissioners whatever sums were due by him in respect of arrears of tax for the purposes of availing of the amnesty scheme. There was evidence that two cheques had been sent to the Revenue Commissioners by Mr Bolger's English Solicitors, Messrs Bruce Metcalfe and Company, on the 13th January, 1994 in the sums of £10,691.67 and £3,673.23 respectively. There was also evidence that each of these cheques had been dishonoured by an order not to pay the cheques and that they were returned to Mr Bolger by the Revenue Commissioners by 2 letters dated the 16th May, 1994. Mr Bolger says that whilst he obtained files containing these letters in 1994 he did not in fact see the letters until 1997 and was not aware until that time (August 1997) that the particular cheques had been dishonoured. The cheques to which I have referred were cheques which were drawn on the office account of Messrs Bruce Metcalfe and Company, they were not cheques which were drawn on any account operated by Mr Bolger himself. Mr Bolger indicated to this Court that he was not aware of the reasons why the cheques had in fact been stopped, but he believed that the firm of Solicitors, Messrs Bruce Metcalfe and Company, were having difficulties with the English Law Society. Two other matters are relevant to Mr Bolger's liability to the Revenue Commissioners. Firstly, Mr Bolger indicated that he was in possession of receipts in relation to Value Added Tax which had not been taken into account by the Revenue Commissioners in the preparation of the figures which lead to the issue of the certificate in respect of the sum of £140,247.58. An analysis of the four receipts produced by Mr Bolger disclosed that three of the receipts related to cheque payments by Mr Bolger to the Revenue Commissioners where the particular cheques had been dishonoured and the fourth payment in respect of which a receipt had issued in the sum of £1,081.50 was shown to have been brought into account in the calculation of the sum of £140,247.58. The second matter to which Mr Bolger drew attention in relation to his tax liability and the issue of the certificate was the fact that judgment had been obtained against him by the Revenue Commissioners on the 10th September, 1993 in the amount of £67,524.74 together with £286.00 for costs and that that judgment covered the same period as was covered by the certificate already referred to and covered some if not all of the same liabilities to which the certificate related.

6. Mr Bolger was a Defendant at Southwark Crown Court in England on charges of fraudulent trading, theft and forgery. The trial against Mr Bolger commenced on the

7. Mr Bolger indicated that during the course of the trial he was suffering pain which ultimately he said was diagnosed as a strangulated hernia. He requested leave of the Judge, through his Counsel, to put his foot up on the desk of the dock as the trial proceeded for the purposes of relieving the pain he was suffering from and this he was permitted to do. On the

8. Mr Bolger was convicted in his absence of one count of fraudulent trading and three counts of forgery. On the 7th June, 1995 he was sentenced, in his absence, to three years imprisonment and he was disqualified from acting as a director of any company in that jurisdiction for a period of five years. Mr Bolger did not return to England for the purposes of serving his sentence of imprisonment and ultimately extradition proceedings were instituted against Mr Bolger. These proceedings failed in September, 1996. Detective Constable Jennings of the Metropolitan Police, London, England gave evidence of the failure of the extradition proceedings and that he was "on stand-by" for further warrants seeking the extradition of Mr Bolger to the United Kingdom which he indicated he was due to obtain (but had not done so) in December, 1997. Mr Bolger indicated that he had instructed his lawyers in England to appeal against his conviction for fraudulent trading and forgery. Whilst Mr Bolger indicated that those had been his instructions to his lawyers, there was no evidence before me as to whether in fact an appeal had been taken against the conviction at Southwark Crown Court and if it had what was the status of that appeal or indeed the grounds for such an appeal. As to the medical condition which prevented Mr Bolger from remaining in the United Kingdom for the duration of his trial, there was no evidence from either Dr O'Sullivan or Dr Tanner as to why they had advised that he ought not to return to England for the resumption of his trial on the

9. Apart from being the owner of one half of the issued shares in Trecom Holdings Limited, Mr Bolger indicated that he was also involved in a company called Louisville Limited. Mr Bolger also gave evidence that he was also a director of a company called Blue World Holdings Limited: he said that this company in fact traded as "Eringold" and that it was used by him for the purposes of entering into certain transactions in Gambia. He said that he had, after extensive negotiations, entered into arrangements whereby Blue World Holdings Limited, trading as Eringold, would open a factory of 30,000 sq ft for the purposes of processing beef and would also sell beef into Gambia. He produced lease agreements relating to such a venture which had been entered into with the Gambian Ports Authority. One of the agreements was dated the 9th December, 1997 and the other of the lease agreements was dated the 1st March, 1998 (sic). Mr Bolger indicated that Blue World Holdings Limited had been used for the Gambian transaction instead of using Louisville but that he intended that Louisville would be a major shareholder in Blue World Holdings Limited. He stated that he had given instructions to his accountants, Messrs Fergus and Fergus, Accountants, to make Louisville Limited the major shareholder in Blue World Holdings Limited. Having thus stated his instructions to his accountants, Mr Bolger then went on in evidence to say the opposite; namely, that his intended purpose was in fact that Blue World Holdings itself would acquire shares in Louisville Limited. According to

10. Mr Bolger, the beef processing activity to be carried on by Blue World Holdings Limited trading as Eringold in the Gambia is due to commence on the 1st March, 1998 and from the outset there will be some 150 employees involved in the project. While Mr Bolger ultimately ended up establishing his proposed business activity in the Gambia, he had earlier considered whether or not he would engage in business in Ghana. He told the Court that, through Louisville Limited, he had agreed to fulfil a sample contract for 150,000 cans of tinned beef for a Ghanaian customer. The consideration for the contract was some US$150,000. He said that this contract had been performed and that all payments to be made thereunder had been made in pounds sterling. He had given most of the monies received to Michael O'Leary who, he believed, had lodged them in an account of Mr. O'Leary's in National Irish Bank and he, Peter Bolger, retained a balance of some Stg £24,000. The name of the Ghanaian company with whom he had entered into the sample contract was Intertrade Limited.

11. Louisville Limited was incorporated on the 9th August, 1996. As I have already indicated the name "Eringold" was registered as a business name of Louisville Limited on the 16th August, 1996. Peter Bolger was the sales and marketing director of Louisville Limited and he completed a B10 form in respect of the directorships in the company, but that form, although passed to Mr Michael O'Leary, has not been filed in the Companies' Office. The managing director of Louisville, according to Mr Bolger, was Michael O'Leary, a former partner in Simpson Xavier and Company, Accountants. Louisville Limited currently has a business address in Inchicore. While Mr Bolger initially intended that Louisville would be the party to enter into the agreements in Gambia for the processing of beef and the sale of beef in Gambia, in fact it was, as I have indicated, a company called Blue World Holdings Limited which entered into the relevant lease agreements in respect of the operation of a 30,000 sq ft factory in the Gambia. Mr Bolger described that prior to the completion of the agreements in relation to Gambia both he, Mr Michael O'Leary and Mr Michael Keating had travelled to Gambia. He was of the view that Louisville had a current value of £5m having regard to the proposed venture in Gambia. As already noted the sample contract for the supply of 150,000 cans of beef was a contract which was entered into by Louisville Limited with a Ghanaian company called Intertrade and which apparently generated revenue for Louisville of some US$150,000. Mr Bolger acknowledged that there was no invoices relating to the agreement to supply the cans of beef to Intertrade. He also agreed that Louisville had no books or records. In July, 1997 Michael O'Leary (who Mr Bolger had described as the managing director of Louisville Limited) when interviewed by Detective Sergeant William O'Brien of the Criminal Assets Bureau indicated that there were no books and records or any financial details available in relation to Louisville Limited.

12. Mr O'Leary told Detective Sergeant O'Brien that the company Louisville Limited was "in embryo" and had not progressed to a stage where financial details were available. While no financial records are available in relation to Louisville there is evidence from Mr Michael O'Leary that prior to the agreement to supply cans of tinned beef to the Ghanaian company, Mr Peter Bolger gave to him, Michael O'Leary, some £21,000 in Dutch Guilders with a view to funding the purchase of the canned beef. Mr O'Leary changed the money into Irish Pounds and lodged those monies to a dormant account of his own as opposed to an account in the name of Louisville Limited. At that time (namely the 9th August, 1996) no account had yet been opened in the name of Louisville Limited according to Mr O'Leary. Apart from the absence of any account in 1996 (or at any time thereafter) in the name of Louisville Limited there was also evidence from Mr O'Leary that no shares in Louisville had issued to Mr Bolger or to Mr O'Leary or to anyone else since the date of the incorporation of the company.

13. Trecom Holdings Limited was incorporated on the 26th June, 1996. The shares in the company were held equally by Mr Bolger and a Mr Joseph Arngrimsson. A B10 form (containing notice of change of directors or secretaries or in their particulars) relating to the company was signed by Mr Arngrimsson on the 31st July, 1996. In the B10 form the appointment of Mr Bolger and Mr Arngrimsson as directors of the company are noted. At note 6 of the B10 form Mr Bolger indicates that he is not a director of any other company and gives a business address. As I have already indicated, Trecom Holdings had entered into an agreement of the 2nd August, 1996 with David and Joseph Long whereby Trecom agreed to purchase "Value Travel" described in the agreement as a "private partnership" duly licensed. As I indicated the sale was never completed because the Longs could not transfer a licence to Trecom Holdings Limited and the £10,000 which had been paid by Trecom on the signing of the agreement was recovered by Trecom and "dispersed between its shareholders". The monies which Trecom Holdings Limited envisaged it would expend in the completion of the agreement with the Longs i.e. £20,000 was introduced equally by Mr Bolger and Mr Arngrimsson. Mr Bolger says that management accounts for Trecom were produced for a number of months from June 1996 onwards. He said that the £10,000 which he introduced to Trecom Holdings Limited had been obtained by him for consultancy work which he had done in Moscow which work was paid for in Dublin in cash but which was never lodged to any particular bank account. As I have already indicated one half of the consideration to be paid under the agreement with the Longs (namely £10,000) was used to purchase the Mercedes 180 car; this car was in turn traded in for the Mercedes 250 car. Mr Bolger said in evidence that he spoke to Mr Arngrimsson about using the money derived from a trade in of the Trecom car as "an investment" by Trecom Holdings Limited in Louisville.

14. This car was purchased in September 1995 by Peter Bolger from George Mitchell trading as GM Motors. It was purchased by Mr. Bolger for his own personal use. The circumstances which gave rise to the purchase are somewhat uncertain, and the elements which comprise the contract for sale are changeable depending on which portion of Mr. Bolger's evidence one is hearing: without wishing to be unfair to Mr. Bolger, he firstly describes purchasing the car for £10,400: £400 being a deposit and the balance being wired to Mr. Mitchell by his solicitors on the 18th July, 1996; secondly,

15. Mr. Bolger describes a transaction whereby, on the one hand, he paid Mitchell £1,500, traded in another car, agreed to arrange a £1 million loan for

16. Mr. Mitchell, and in return, received a Nissan Micra car for his wife and a Mercedes car for himself. The third explanation is even more complex: He purchased the Nissan Micra and the Mercedes cars; he traded in a Ford Scorpio, he paid Mitchell £1,500 and, later, a further £2,300; if in fact he procured a £1 million loan for Mitchell he would have no further liability than the sums already paid. If he did not arrange the loan, he would have to pay a further £10,000. These three accounts see Peter Bolger paying George Mitchell different sums of cash of £10,400, £3,800 and £1,500. As to the circumstances under which he came to deal with George Mitchell, the position as I said is somewhat uncertain but not critical to what I have to decide in this case; Mr. Bolger meeting George Mitchell and negotiating with him is recalled by another witness Peter Le Breton: he recalls talk of a price of £7,500, or £8,000, for the Mercedes car; he heard reference to a deposit of £1,500 and the payment of a balance of £6,000 (this is similar to figures given by Mr. Bolger to a Detective Garda Hughes as detailed in a statement of Mr. Bolger made to the Detective Garda on the 2nd October, 1995). Mr. Le Breton describes going with Mr. Bolger to premises on Sundrive Road and hearing Mr. Mitchell say that he wanted a £1 million loan and that if he got the loan £10,000 would be allowed against the car; if not that sum of £10,000 would be due to be paid by Mr. Bolger to Mr. Mitchell. He recalls reference to the trading in of a Ford Scorpio as part of the overall deal for the purchase of the Mercedes saloon car. Mr. Bolger, on acquiring the car, filled out a proposal form to Hibernian Insurance for the private use of the car. In addition, he obtained a vehicle registration certificate in relation to the car which had registered numbers

17. The contract for the purchase of this car was made between Evolution Limited and Peter Bolger. Peter Bolger says he was acting for Trecom Holdings Limited and that he had asked Jason Duffy of Evolution to put Trecom Holdings name on the invoice. The cash used for the purchase of the car was money he had obtained from Russian consultancy work, which represented moneys he himself had invested in Trecom Holdings Limited. The monies had never been put into a bank account by Peter Bolger. The result of this transaction was that Trecom Holdings Limited now owned a car and owed Peter Bolger £9,000. The £10,000 was in fact paid in cash: the first £1,000 being taken from the boot of Mr. Bolger's car in £20 notes, and the £9,000 being paid in £20 notes afterwards.

18. The invoice relating to the purchase of this car is dated erroneously the

19. Mr. Arngrimsson had agreed to the investment of the Trecom Holdings Limited car in Louisville Limited and had been assured that the £19,000 value of the car would increase fivefold if Louisville Limited took off. There was no formal or written agreement between Trecom Holdings Limited and Louisville Limited as to the allotment of any shares to Trecom Holdings Limited in Louisville Limited although, according to Mr. Bolger, it had been agreed between himself and Mr. Arngrimsson that there would indeed be shares allotted to Trecom Holdings Limited; despite that fact, there had been no determination as to the number of shares to be so allotted. The car, once purchased, was driven by Peter Bolger and by Michael O'Leary. It was driven by Mr. O'Leary on one occasion only. Mr. O'Leary was, nonetheless, a passenger in the car, according to Mr. Bolger, on about thirty or so occasions. Certain documents existed relating to the purchase of the car and its insurance: there was an insurance proposal form, an insurance certificate, a document issued pursuant to Section 140 subsection 2 of the Finance Act, 1992, an assignment by Peter Bolger of a no claims bonus to Louisville Limited, a declaration for registration of a used certificate, and a licensing authority certificate recording Louisville Limited as the owner of the car. The common denominator of all these documents is that they do show Louisville Limited as the owner or the insurer of the car.

20. Michael O'Leary said in an affidavit dated the 24th September, 1997 that his then understanding of the position was that Louisville Limited did not purchase the car and was not the beneficial owner of the car and that he always understood the car was in fact owned personally by Peter Bolger. In evidence he stood over this averment. He did, however, allow that on the 18th September, 1997 he had said to Peter Bolger and Gerard Haughton that the car was "the only real asset of the company": he said that he said this by way of indicating the view that a liquidator might adopt were a liquidator appointed to Louisville Limited at that time. Between September 1996 and September 1997 there was no evidence of any express ratification by Louisville Limited of the agreement to purchase the car which had been made in September 1996.

21. Mr. Arngrimsson and that he, Mr. Bolger, was authorised by Louisville Limited to enter the agreement. He was the person, according to Counsel, who "called the shots" in relation to Louisville Limited, and if he decided to purchase the car, he had the authority of the company to do so. In any event, he had indicated to Michael O'Leary prior to purchase that he was purchasing the car for Louisville Limited and, according to Mr Bolger, Mr. O'Leary agreed to the purchase. It was submitted, even if the contract was concluded without express or ostensible authority, such defect was cured by Louisville Limited ratifying the contract. Such ratification, it was submitted, was to be gleaned from, firstly, the use of the car for the business of Louisville, secondly, the use of the car by the de facto directors of Louisville, thirdly by the payment by Louisville of the insurance premiums and fourthly by Michael O'Leary's alleged acknowledgement that the car was "the only real asset of the company" which was made according to Mr. bolger at a meeting on the 18th September, 1997. It was finally submitted that whether or not ratification took place the effect of the contract for sale was that the property in the car passed to Louisville Limited and that the company was the owner of the car when it was seized by the Sheriff.

22. In assessing whether or not the Court should attach any weight to the evidence given by Mr Bolger, it was submitted by Counsel on behalf of the Criminal Assets Bureau, that there were a number of factors the Court should take into account.

23. Mr O'Donnell, on behalf of the Criminal Assets Bureau, submits that

24. Mr Bolger has given in evidence three different accounts of how the purchase of this car was funded by him. Mr O'Donnell submits that so different are the accounts as to the funding of the car that no reliance whatsoever can be placed on Mr Bolger's account of the funding of this first car, the Mercedes 180 or the Mercedes 250.

25. Mr Bolger says that he told Mr Duffy of Evolution Limited to put the car in the name of Trecom Holdings Limited. Mr Duffy recalls the fact that the £10,000 was paid entirely in cash in notes of £20 denomination, £1,000 of which was taken from the boot of a car by Mr Bolger to make the original down-payment. Counsel on behalf of the Criminal Assets Bureau submit that Mr Bolger's explanation of how this transaction was funded is as unreliable as his description of how the first transaction was funded. Although Mr Bolger contends that the monies belonged to Trecom Holdings Limited, he also allows that the monies represented funds that he earned as a result of certain consultancy work he did in Russia. Counsel on behalf of the Criminal Assets Bureau reminded the Court that Mr Bolger first explained the origin of these monies as having been paid to him in Moscow but later changed his account to the monies having been paid to him in Dublin.

26. The power of use embraces the right of exclusive enjoyment and the right of maintaining and recovering possession from all other persons. The power of disposal includes the right of destruction of the goods, the right to alter the goods and the right to alienate or transfer ownership in the goods: all these rights are regarded as comprising the "bundle of rights" which together merge into one general right of ownership in goods. The idea that such rights (as I have enumerated above) are not to be viewed as 'free standing' or separately existing but as merged in one general right of ownership is central to the analysis of ownership by both Austin ( Jurisprudence, 5th Edition, at page 789 ) and Markby ( Elements of Law, 6th Edition, Ss 309, 314, 321, 323 )

27. The learned authors of Chalmers Sale of Goods 13th Edition, observed at page 184 that:-

28. The authors go on to observe that, in English law, a distinction has been made between the general property in goods and a special property and in same goods; they note that this distinction has often been expressed by distinguishing between "the" property in goods and "a" property in the same goods. While his judgment in the Court of Appeal was a dissenting one, Lord Justice Bowen in Bardick -v- Sewell 1884 13 CHD 159 at page 175 made this distinction saying in relation to a pledgee of goods:-

29. Section 18 of the 1893 Act sets out the rules of the ascertainment of the intention of the parties as to when the property in the goods is to pass. Rule 1 provides that unless a different intention appears:-

30. As I have already noted, it is argued that the name of the owner of the Mercedes 250 is one of the particulars appearing on a document purporting to be signed by an officer of the Revenue Commissioners and that such particular was extracted from "other records relating to vehicles" and therefore, is evidence of such ownership until the contrary is shown. Three issues arise in relation to this submission. Firstly, does the presumption in subsection 2 relate only to proceedings such as are referred to in subsection 1 or is it of general application?; secondly, does the presumption only relate to such ownership as is disclosed on a document as at the date (if any) appearing on the document?; and thirdly, is the presumption of ownership merely a presumption that the Mercedes in question was 'kept' by the person whose name appears as owner in the particulars?

31. Where an individual enters into an agreement on behalf of a disclosed principal, but does not do so with actual or ostensible authority, such an agreement is voidable at the instance of the principal who can elect, within a reasonable period of time, to ratify the contract on the one hand or, on the other hand avoid the contract by repudiating it. Ratification can of course take many forms; it can be done expressly, or it can be implied from conduct (such as silence, acquiescence or user of the subject matter of the agreement). The effect of ratification is to place the contracting parties in the position they would have been had the agent been authorised at the outset to enter into the particular agreement in question.

32. Certain trusts arise by operation of law; one such trust is the resulting trust which arises in circumstances where the law presumes that it was the intention of the original donor of the property that it should be held in trust. One such circumstance is where the purchase money or property has been provided in whole or in part by a third party and where as a result the property is purchased in the name of another. In such a case the law presumes that the person in whose name the property stands holds that property on a resulting trust for the person who provided the purchase monies. That presumption can of course be upset or rebutted by what is known as the presumption of advancement. This is a presumption which arises by reason of the relationship existing between the parties to the transaction being a relationship such that the law presumes a gift was intended. The Courts have allowed that relationships such as that of a father and his child or that of anyone who stands in loco parentis to another is a sufficient relationship to sustain the presumption of advancement. I know of no decided case, and none was opened to me, which suggests that the relationships to which the presumption of advancement extend include those of a shareholder and the company in which he owns shares or the relationship between an individual and the company which he manages, controls and operates.

33. Having carefully considered and assessed the evidence which Peter Bolger gave, I am unable to accept that evidence. I should now state why I have formed this view in relation to his evidence. Mr Bolger is a person who stands convicted of fraudulent trading and forgery. The conviction was the verdict of a jury at Southwark Crown Court in England in a trial which commenced on the 13th March, 1995. On the 3rd April, 1995 Mr Bolger failed to turn up for the resumed hearing of that trial. He was subsequently convicted in his absence and then sentenced in his absence to a term of three years imprisonment together with a five year disqualification from acting as a director. Peter Bolger had in fact returned to Ireland; he said that he had been unwell during the course of the trial and upon his return to Ireland was diagnosed (he said) as suffering from a strangulated hernia. He stated that he had consulted two doctors who advised him not to travel back to the United Kingdom for the resumption of his trial (a Dr Tanner and a Dr O'Sullivan). Extradition proceedings were brought against Mr Bolger and were unsuccessful in September 1996. Peter Bolger says he instructed his Solicitors and Barristers to appeal against his conviction and sentence and he swore that he was innocent of the charges upon which he had been convicted. I regarded it as somewhat surprising to say the least that no corroborative evidence was lead to establish the state of Peter Bolger's health as at April, 1995 when he did not return to face the resumed hearing of his trial, or to establish the existence in fact of an appeal against his conviction and sentence. I regarded it as surprising that witnesses who were amenable to be called were not called on matters of importance and I inferred (in the absence of explanation as to why such witnesses were not called) that such witnesses would not or could not corroborate what Peter Bolger had said under oath as to his ability to return to the United Kingdom to stand trial or as to the status of his appeal against conviction and sentence. Equally, I was somewhat concerned that no corroborative evidence had been called to support Mr Bolger's allegation that Trecom Holdings Limited had 'agreed' to invest the proceeds of the Mercedes 180 in Louisville Limited although I noted Mr Bolger's evidence that Mr Arngrimsson was unwell. The failure to adduce corroborative evidence on this aspect was of concern but did not of itself compel me to reject Mr. Bolger's evidence. Another of the reasons why I viewed Mr Bolger's evidence with some degree of suspicion was the fact that in his account of his involvement in the Trecom transaction with the Longs, the canned beef contract, the purchase of each of the cars and his consultancy work, one common denominator was present throughout namely, cash, which never saw the safety or the inside of a bank. I found it somewhat incredible that a bona fide businessman would carry around large quantities of cash for prolonged periods of time as Mr Bolger did, apparently on behalf of his companies Trecom Holdings Limited and Louisville Limited without lodging those monies to the safety of bank accounts in the names of such companies. I could infer that his conduct was an atavistic throwback to those times when it was common for people to distrust banks and to keep their money under the floor boards of their homes. However, such an inference in this case would avoid what I believe to be the correct inference namely that Peter Bolger dealt in cash because to do otherwise would be to expose himself personally to the scrutiny of the Revenue Commissioners. Apart from the foregoing, I find Peter Bolger's differing accounts of the purchase of his first car (the Mercedes 200) impossible to reconcile and the changing stories can only be consistent with an attempt to "reduce" the amount of cash which he, Peter Bolger, provided to purchase that car. As to the other two cars purchased, I did not have (apart from Mr Bolger's evidence which I do not accept) any satisfactory evidence that cash sums involved in these transactions were provided by either of Mr Bolger's companies (Trecom or Louisville). I do not accept Mr Bolger's evidence that Louisville Limited or Trecom provided company monies in the purchase of either the second or third cars; I believe that the monies provided for these purchases were, in substance and in fact, the monies of Peter Bolger. While it is true that his house was in the name of himself and his wife and that he had purchased the Mercedes 200 in his own name, it is also fair to observe that, following his conviction in the United Kingdom and the Judgment of the Revenue Commissioners obtained against him, there was very good reason for him to ensure that as few assets as possible appeared to be owned by him personally. In summary, I reject the evidence of Mr Bolger as to the manner in which the purchase of the three Mercedes cars were financed; I believe that the finance for the purchase of all of these cars was in fact provided for by Mr Bolger out of his own monies and that neither Trecom Holdings Limited or Louisville Limited provided any of the monies to purchase any of the cars. In such circumstances, the Mercedes 250 car, the legal ownership of which had vested in Louisville Limited, was on the 18th September, 1997 held by Louisville Limited on a resulting trust for Peter Bolger. In such circumstances the Criminal Assets Bureau is entitled to a declaration that the third named Respondent was the beneficial owner of the said vehicle bearing registered number 95 D 42525 immediately prior to its seizure on 18th September 1997. As to the claim of Louisville Limited, I will make an order dismissing that claim.