British
and Irish Legal Information Institute
Freely Available British and Irish Public Legal Information
[
Home]
[
Databases]
[
World Law]
[
Multidatabase Search]
[
Help]
[
Feedback]
High Court of Ireland Decisions
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
High Court of Ireland Decisions >>
Garden Village Construction Company Ltd. v. Wicklow County Council [1998] IEHC 192 (16th February, 1998)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IEHC/1998/192.html
Cite as:
[1998] IEHC 192
[
New search]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
Garden Village Construction Company Ltd. v. Wicklow County Council [1998] IEHC 192 (16th February, 1998)
High
Court
Garden
Village Construction Company Limited v Wicklow County Council and Another
1997/267
JR
16
February 1998
MORRIS
J:
This
matter comes before the court as an application by Garden Village Construction
Company Limited seeking leave to apply by way of Judicial Review for 18
relief's as set out in the Notice of Motion.
The
proceedings relate to an application for planning permission being made by the
second-named respondents, Gannon Homes Limited, to the Wicklow County Council
(the County Council) for permission for a housing development consisting of 240
dwellings and the construction of a new sewage disposal plant to replace the
existing one at Monneycarrol and Newtownmountkennedy, Co Wicklow. Garden
Village Construction Company Limited is a construction company which is
developing certain lands close to the lands in respect of which Gannon Homes
Limited have made this planning application. It now seeks to challenge the
manner in which the County Council has dealt with the application and responded
to it.
I
believe that the relevant facts can be summarised as follows.
On
the 12 June, 1997 Gannon Homes Limited made the application to which these
proceedings relate to the County Council by lodging papers seeking permission
to carry out the works described at paragraph 8 of its planning application.
This application is date stamped the 19 June, 1997. Upon receipt of the
application the County Council in compliance with Article 29 of the Local
Government (Planning and Development) Regulations 1994 date stamped the
Regulations. On the 4 July, 1997 they wrote to Gannon Homes Limited in the
following terms.
"With
reference to your application for permission for 240 dwellings and replacement
of existing sewage disposal works with the construction of a new diffused air
packaged plant at Monalin, Newtownmountkennedy and Kilmacullagh received on the
19/6/1997 I am to inform you that the Planning Authority considers that the
application does not comply with the requirements of the planning regulations.
Accordingly in pursuance of Article 29 of the Local Government (Planning and
Development) Regulations 1994 notice is hereby given requiring you to furnish
the particulars requested on the following page, in order to complete the
application".
Attached
to this letter the County Council set out a list of six matters upon which the
applicant was required to furnish particulars.
The
applicants have not replied to this letter.
Mr
McSweeney, BL counsel for the applicant has, during the course of his case,
summarised his submissions and the basis upon which he claims his clients are
entitled to seek Judicial Review may I believe be stated as follows:-
He
identifies the "decision" which he seeks to judicially review as that arrived
at by the County Council to
(a)
date stamp the application and/or
(b)
to embark upon a consideration of whether the application complies with the
requirements of Articles 18 and 23, and, as may be appropriate, Articles 19, 20
and 22 of the Regulations.
(c)
adopt the procedure provided for at Article 28(2)(b)(II) of the Regulations
(this is the procedure requiring the applicant to furnish additional
particulars).
It
is Mr McSweeney's submission that the planning application lodged by Gannon
Homes Limited is so fundamentally flawed and unsatisfactory that the only
reasonable course for the County Council to adopt would have been to decline to
date stamp it, which act he submits confers upon it a certain status, or, given
that the County Council had no option but to date stamp it, having date stamped
it, to adopt the procedure provided for at Article 29(2)(b)(I) which is the
procedure whereby the applicant is informed that his application is invalid and
cannot be considered by the Planning Authority.
In
support of this submission he points to a number of matters which he says
affect the planning application so fundamentally as to render this the only
proper course for the County Council to adopt. These include the following
matters.
(a)
It is submitted that in paragraph 5 of the application Gannon Homes Limited
claim to be the owner of the sewage disposal plant to which the application
relates. Counsel submits that works of this nature vest in the Local Authority
under the provisions of a Public Health (Ireland) Act of 1878, and this is a
fact of which the County Council would at all stages have had full knowledge.
Accordingly counsel submits that in no circumstances could the situation be
clarified by any additional particulars which could be given by the applicant.
This, he submits, renders the application fundamentally flawed and bad.
(b)
Counsel submits that paragraph 8 is basically wrong in that no mention is made
of Gannon Homes Limited intention to demolish the existing structure which now
serves as the sewage treatment plant. Moreover he says that the town land in
which the plant is situate is not mentioned.
(c)
Counsel submits that paragraph 14 of the planning application is fundamentally
flawed in that while it identifies the use of the land or structure as
"derelict/grazing land" it makes no mention of the fact that the existing
sewage treatment plant is in fact used for that purpose.
Counsel
makes a number of other criticisms however the foregoing are in my view
sufficient to identify the type of points which he makes.
Counsel
submits that significant consequences flow from the decision of the County
Council to adopt or to receive this defective planning application instead of
returning it to the applicant as provided for in Regulation 29(3). These
consequences would include, for instance, the right of the applicant to have a
decision made on his application, the possibility of a permission by default,
the possibility of a claim for compensation and the possibility of a right to
appeal to An Bord Pleanala.
Therefore,
it is submitted on behalf of the applicant, that this is a decision from which
material consequences flow and it is one which is capable of being reviewed by
way of Judicial Review and that leave to apply for Judicial Review in these
circumstances should be granted.
On
the receipt of a planning permission in my view the Planning Authority is left
with no discretion but to date stamp the documents with the date of their
receipt. This act does not alter the status of the documents which have been
received, as was submitted by counsel, so as to bestow on them an additional
status or, as counsel put it, bestows on it a "spurious validity".
In
my view no additional status is bestowed on the document by having a date stamp
affixed to it as the document may still be rejected and, in the circumstances
outlined in Article 29(2)(b)(I) and Article 29(3) be returned to the applicant.
The necessity to date stamp the documents with the date of their receipt by the
County Council arises only by reason of the fact that planning consequences
flow from various time scales commencing on the date of the receipt of the
documents by the Planning Authority.
Having
received the application for planning permission the Planning Authority is
required to consider whether it complies with the various Articles of the 1994
Regulations. If they determine that it complies with the Articles they are
required to send the applicant an acknowledgement stating the date of receipt
of the application (see Article 29(2)(a)).
In
the event that the Planning Authority considers that the planning application
does not comply with the requirements of Articles 18 and 23 and, as may be
appropriate, Articles 19, 20 and 22, they are empowered to require the
applicant to furnish such particulars as may be necessary to comply with these
requirements.
This
is the determination or decision to require the applicant to furnish
particulars, instead of rejecting the application, which the applicant
challenges.
It
is well settled that for a court to intervene or interfere with such a
determination or decision the circumstances referred to in O'Keeffe v An Bord
Pleanala [1993] 1 IR 39 must exist.
Chief
Justice Finlay at page 70 of this decision expressly approves the decision of
Henchy, J in State (Keegan) v Stardust Compensation Tribunal [1986] IR 642. I
quote Chief Justice Finlay as follows;
"In
dealing with the circumstances under which the court could intervene to quash
the decision of an Administrative Officer or Tribunal on the grounds of
unreasonableness or irrationality Henchy in that judgment set out a number of
such circumstances in different terms.
they
are;
(1)
It is fundamentally at variance with reason and common sense
(2)
It is indefensible for being in the teeth of plain reason and common sense
(3)
Because the court is satisfied that the decision maker has breached his
obligation whereby he must not flagrantly reject or disregard fundamental
reason or common-sense in reaching his decision".
At
page 71 of that judgment Finlay CJ says;
"The
court cannot interfere with the decision of an administrative decision making
authority merely on the grounds that (a) it is satisfied that on the facts as
found it would have reached different inferences and conclusions or (b) it is
satisfied that the case against the decision made by the authority was much
stronger than the case for it".
Having
considered the contents of the planning application and the decision made by
the County Council in this case I am satisfied that the applicant has not made
out any case to establish the existence of any of the circumstances in which
the court should intervene. The decision to seek further particulars was not at
variance with reason or common-sense. It was not indefensible for being in the
teeth of plain reason or common-sense and I am satisfied that the decision
maker had not breached his obligation not to flagrantly reject or disregard
fundamental reason or common-sense in reaching his decision.
Accordingly
I see no grounds for granting the relief claimed and I refuse the applicant's
application.
© 1998 Irish High Court