High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. This case concerns the future life of a child, whom I shall refer to as R. There are two sets of proceedings before the Court, in which related issues arise. In the first proceedings, which were initiated by Special Summons issued the 30th day of July 1997, JB and DB, a married couple with whom R. has been placed with a view to adoption, seek an Order pursuant to Section 3 of the Adoption Act, 1974, dispensing with the consent of the mother of the child R. to the making of an Adoption Order in respect of the child together with an Order granting them sole custody of the child R. for such period as would enable An Bord Uchtala to make an Adoption Order. As is the practice in these cases the named Respondent is An Bord Uchtala (the Adoption Board) and through the Board the mother of R. is joined in the proceedings. The mother, S.M., opposes the making of the Order sought.

2. The Applicants, who have applied for an Adoption Order in respect of R., and the natural mother, S.M., have met on one occasion at a meeting arranged by Saint Louise's Adoption Society, but are unaware of the full details of each others identities and addresses. In accordance with the practice which was originally set out by Finlay P. (as he then was) in G. v. An Bord Uchtala [1980] IR 32 and which has been followed in all cases under Section 3 of the Adoption Act, 1974, this Court heard the natural mother and the evidence relevant to her situation in the absence of the prospective adopters but in the presence of their legal representatives. Subsequently, the Court heard the prospective adopters and the evidence relevant to their application in the absence of the natural mother but in the presence of her legal representatives. Both sets of proceedings were heard by this Court on 3rd November 1998 and the following days.

3. In the second set of proceedings, which were initiated by Special Summons on the 28th day of January 1998, the natural mother seeks an Order pursuant to Section 11 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, returning the child R. to her custody.

4. Much of the factual background to the issue of the proceedings is not in issue and may be outlined at this point. At a later stage I will deal in further detail with the more contentious aspects of the evidence in the light of the law concerning the placement of a child for adoption by its mother.

5. The child R. was born to S.M. on the 19th of December 1995. S.M. is and has been at all times unmarried. S.M. already had two children, C born 5th May 1990 and J born the 26th February 1994. Since the issue of the proceedings S.M. has given birth to a fourth child who was born on the 4th of February 1998. The father of C was one P.H. with whom S.M. lived for a time in a local authority rented flat in the Dublin area. On the evidence before me there is some controversy as to the paternity of J, to which I will refer later. Apart from a period from December 1990 to February 1992, when C was in the care of the Eastern Health Board pursuant to Orders made by the District Court, both C and J have been in the continuous custody and care of S.M. and it is agreed on the evidence that she cares for them capably and well.

6. The father of R. is one M.B. who is at present serving a lengthy term of imprisonment, having pleaded guilty to the manslaughter of two women. S.M. appears to have had a live-in relationship for a period of some months with M.B. in a premises in the inner city of Dublin. Her evidence is that the relationship was marked with considerable violence, that R. was born as a result of rape by M.B., and that M.B. exercised a very high degree of control over her. M.B. was arrested and charged with murder on the 24th of June 1995. He was remanded in custody and was not granted bail. On the 3rd of May 1996 he pleaded guilty to manslaughter of two women and was sentenced by Carney J. A full sentencing judgment was given by the learned Carney J. setting out the nature and background of the offences. The details of M.B.'s offences, are to say the least, both shocking and gruesome.

7. On 2nd April 1996 M.B. signed a consent to the adoption of his son R. by Mr. and Mrs B, the present Applicants.

8. S.M. has since in or about May 1996 had a relationship with F.O'D., to whom she is now engaged to be married. F.O'D. does not live with S.M., who is now living in a three-bedroom local authority flat. They plan to purchase a house in the countryside relatively near Dublin. For some time S.M. and F.O'D. believed that F.O'D. was unable to father children for medical reasons, but this fear has proved to be unfounded since they now have a child born on 4th February 1998.

9. In the months leading to the birth of R., S.M. consistently expressed to Social Workers in the Rotunda Hospital and in her local community care area of the Eastern Health Board her wish that the child be placed for adoption. She expressed no interest in advice regarding any alternative plan for the child's care, stating that the child was the child of rape and that she could not accept or care for the child of M.B. given all the circumstances of its paternity and conception. When R. was born he was not placed in the hospital ward with her but retained in a separate paediatric ward. She appears to have visited him in the hospital on one occasion, bringing him some clothes. In view of her stated wish that the child be placed for adoption it was explained to her that R. would be placed in temporary foster care prior to any placement with prospective adopters. This is the normal procedure carried out by adoption societies with regard to placing any child for adoption. It has the advantage both of permitting the natural mother to recover from the birth and to decide whether, once the child is born, she still wishes for adoption, and also of allowing time to select prospective adopters who are best suited to that particular child and who meet any express wishes of the natural mother. The Adoption Society in this case was the Saint Louise Adoption Society which is a society under the aegis of the Eastern Health Board.

10. On 3rd January 1996 S.M. signed an Admission to Care Form permitting R. to be placed in short-term foster care. Under the heading "Circumstances leading to Admission" the Form states "Pre-Adoptive placement needed" . R. was placed in the short-term foster care of Mrs G.S. and it was stated on the form that the probable duration of the stay would be eight weeks. In fact R. stayed with his foster mother for some six months until 15th June 1996, when he was placed with Mr. and Mrs B. with a view to adoption. Since that date he has been continuously in the custody and care of Mr. and Mrs B. He is now three years of age.

11. During the foster placement S.M. was brought on two occasions by her Social Worker Keith O'Reilly to visit R., on 21st March 1996 and on 12th June 1996. Mr. O'Reilly's evidence is that the second visit was for the purpose of saying good-bye to R. before he was placed for adoption; S.M. disagrees with this interpretation.

12. Following the placement of R. in foster care S.M. returned to reside with her two older children. She was seen from time to time by her Social Worker, Keith O'Reilly. On 9th April 1996 she signed the Statutory Form prescribed under the Adoption Acts (Form 10) agreeing to the placement of R. for adoption. The events surrounding her signing of this form are hotly disputed and I shall refer to them at a later stage when considering in more detail the evidence of the relevant witnesses.

13. On the 5th June 1996 a pre-arranged meeting was held at which S.M. met the prospective adopters Mr. and Mrs B. in the company of S.M.'s Social Worker and Ms Anne Valentine, the Social Worker for Mr. and Mrs B. Only Christian names were used and no details of identification were given. Such a meeting is in full accordance with present day adoption practice; it enables the natural mother to meet and approve the couple with whom her child is to be placed for adoption and also enables the prospective adopters to have some knowledge of the natural mother which may, at a later stage, be passed on to the child. The meeting appears to have gone well. Again its details are to some extent in issue.

14. Subsequent to the meeting, as I have said, R. was placed with Mr. and Mrs B. on 15th June 1996. All the evidence before me establishes that the placement has gone extremely well. Mr. and Mrs B. have given excellent care to R. (whom they call C.) and he has formed a strong and loving bond with them and the members of their extended family. Mr. B. is by profession a Analytical Chemist. Mrs B. is a Primary Teacher who has taken a career break to enable her to care full-time for R. at home.

15. On the 9th of July 1996 Mr. and Mrs B. applied to An Bord Uchtala for an Adoption Order in respect of R.. (Form 1 under the Adoption Acts). They have been visited by the Board's Social Worker for the purposes of assessing the placement.

16. On the 24th of October 1996 S.M. informed her Social Worker, Keith O'Reilly that she was intending to marry F.O'D. and that she wished R. to be returned to her. She was informed by Mr. O'Reilly that she should write to Saint Louise Adoption Society to inform the Society of her change of mind. She did this by letter dated the 13th November 1996. The prospective adopters were informed; they were unwilling to return R. as they felt it was in his best interest to remain in their care. S.M. was informed that she should consult a Solicitor with a view to taking proceedings for the return of her child and it appears that she was given information in regard to the availability of Civil Legal Aid, in particular the address of her nearest Law Centre. However, she did not seek legal advice until some time had elapsed.

17. During this period S.M. experienced some changes of mind with regard to her wish to reclaim custody of R. On the 10th of December 1996 she informed her Social Worker that after discussions with her family and F.O'D. she had decided that it was in R.'s best interest to be adopted by the prospective adopters. A meeting with the adopters was arranged for 16th December 1996 at which it was planned that S.M. would be reassured that R. was making good progress. However on 13th December 1996 S.M. informed her Social Worker that in fact she did wish R. to be returned to her and she did not attend the planned meeting. Mr. and Mrs B. did attend at the local Health Centre on that day. They gave a photograph of R. and a letter in regard to his progress to Keith O'Reilly, who delivered it to S.M.'s flat. It appears that she greatly resented this, regarding it, as far as I could ascertain from her evidence, as an underhand procedure.

18. During the next few months Keith O'Reilly states that he made various efforts to contact S.M. by delivering notes to her flat but there does not in fact appear to have been much contact with her. On the 21st of March 1997 he met S.M. with her partner F.O'D., who stated that he supported S.M. in whatever plans she had in regard to R. The couple stated that they had now taken legal advice in regard to the recovery of R..

19. Keith O'Reilly saw S.M. again on the 2nd May 1997 when he visited her at her flat. On this occasion, according to Keith O'Reilly's contemporaneous notes, she informed him that "following much thought and discussion on the subject both with F.O'D. and her immediate family she was willing for R. to remain with the B. family". She also told Keith O'Reilly that she had not in fact sought legal advice in regard to R. at any stage. She asked for a further meeting with the Bs to discuss R.'s progress. However she did not attend at a subsequent appointment with Keith O'Reilly and thereafter he was unable to make any contact with her. S M asserts tht Keith O'Reilly at this stage repeatedly tried to make her sign a final consent form. On the evidence before me there is no basis for this assertion. At no stage was a final consent form produced to S M, nor was she ever asked to sign such a form.

20. On 3rd September 1997 S.M. attended the Rotunda Hospital in regard to her new pregnancy. There she informed Sheila McRory, a Social Worker in the Hospital, that she wished to have R. returned to her.

21. On the 22nd of April 1997 the Registrar of An Bord Uchtala wrote to Eugene Davy, the Solicitor acting for Mr. and Mrs B. stating:-

22. Mr. and Mrs B. instructed their Solicitor to issue proceedings, which was done by Special Summons on the 30th of July 1997.

23. The Registrar of an Bord Uchtala also wrote to S.M. on the 22nd of April 1997 advising her of the possibility of instituting legal proceedings to reclaim her child and enclosing a list of Civil Legal Aid Law Centres and their addresses. S.M. did not in fact seek legal advice until after her meeting at the Rotunda Hospital with Social Worker Sheila McRory in or about August or September 1997. She then contacted her local Law Centre who gave her an appointment on 7th October 1997 and issued proceedings on her behalf on 28th January 1998.

24. It is settled law that in deciding whether a mother has validly agreed to place her child for adoption the test is whether she has given a fully informed and free consent to the placement. This test was first established in the various judgment in G. v. An Bord Uchtala and was subsequently set out in summary form by Finlay P. (as he then was) in S. v. Eastern Health Board , an unreported but much quoted judgment delivered on the 28th February, 1979. At page 18 of the judgment the learned Judge, having analysed the judgments of the Supreme Court in G. v. An Bord Uchtala , stated:-

25. There was some controversy between the judgments of the Supreme Court in G. v. An Bord Uchtala as to whether the unmarried mother's right to custody of her child was Constitutional in origin, and as to whether at the point when she agreed to place her child for adoption she waived or abrogated this Constitutional right. In quite a number of the cases on Section 3 of the 1974 Act which followed G. v. An Bord Uchtala it was accepted by the Court that the mother at the agreement to place stage of the adoption procedure waived her Constitutional right to custody - an attitude which gave particular weight and solemnity to that agreement. Any doubts as to the effect of an agreement place for adoption on the rights of the mother has been resolved by the Supreme Court in M.O'C v. Sacred Heart Adoption Society and An Bord Uchtala [1996] ILRM 297. In his judgment in this case O'Flaherty J. with the agreement of the other members of the Court, held that a consent to placement for adoption can never amount, in itself, to an extinguishment of the mother's rights to care for, protect and have custody of her child, whether they are categorised as constitutional or legal rights. At page 304 of the report he adopted Henchy J.'s description of the scheme envisaged by the adoption code in the G. case:-

26. In his judgment in the M.O'C. case O'Flaherty J. also stated that the consequences of placement for adoption must be explained very clearly to the mother. He quoted and affirmed the test set out by Finlay C.J. in Re. G. (D) (an infant) G v. An Bord Uchtala & Ors [1991] 1IR 491 at page 515, as follows:

27. In agreeing to place her child for adoption the mother's consent must not only be fully informed but must also be free. The nature of a free consent is considered by the learned Laffoy J. in G. (D) and G. (M) v. An Bord Uchtála reported at [1996] IFLR 263. It seems to me that it is useful to refer to this discussion in full, as follows:

28. I have no difficulty in adopting this passage as a correct statement of the law.

29. It is in this context, therefore, of a fully informed and free consent, that I must consider the evidence given before me as to the mother's agreement to place her child for adoption with Mr. and Mrs B.

30. In her evidence S.M., the mother, claims that at the time when she purported to agree to place R. for adoption firstly she was suffering from both stress and depression and was suffering the side effects of medication; secondly that she had no real understanding of the difference between fostering and adoption; and thirdly that her social worker, Keith O'Reilly, did not give her any explanation whatever of form 10, the statutory agreement to place form which she signed in April 1996. Nor, she says, did he offer her any counselling to assist her in her situation. She also claims that Mr. O'Reilly repeatedly pressed her to sign the form of Final Consent to Adoption. In reference to her meeting with Mr and Mrs B. on the 5th June, 1996 her evidence is that she considered that Mr and Mrs B were somewhat longer term foster parents and that she never understood that they were prospective adopters.

31. Dr Anne Staunton, Clinical Psychologist, gave evidence on behalf of S.M.. She had assessed S.M. for the purpose of these proceedings on the 17th April, 1998 and had carried out a number of psychological tests. She concluded that S.M. was of average intellectual ability, but at the lower end of the average range. While her reading age was only 14.7 years, and her scores on vocabulary, arithmetic and general knowledge were low, she scored well on abstract verbal reasoning and on social comprehension. There was no indication of serious emotional or personality disorder at the time of the examination. In her oral evidence, Dr Staunton said that the mother's oral comprehension could be quite weak; one needed to speak slowly and clearly to her in giving explanations. However, in reply to cross-examination she said that

32. S.M.'s reasoning was good if she could "get past the words used" . If matters were explained to her comprehensively and slowly she should be able to understand.

33. In relation to her education, S.M.'s own evidence was that she had left school at the age of 18 because her father had told her she should sign on at the labour exchange in order to bring in some money to the family; S.M. was one of thirteen children. However, after leaving school she undertook a six month training course in photography. She spoke of this with interest and enthusiasm; she hoped to get a job in the field of journalistic photography but unfortunately did not succeed in this aim. It seems to me, however, that she had been reasonably successful in this training course, which must have required a certain degree of ability and understanding. She subsequently worked in a factory and in a newsagent's shop for a period, but for much of the time relevant to this case she was unemployed and occupied in caring for her two older children.

34. In giving evidence before me S.M. appeared from time to time to have difficulty in comprehending and answering questions put to her both by her own Counsel and, more particularly, in cross examination. However, when matters were explained to her clearly and in plain language without the use of legal vocabulary it appeared to me that she had no great difficulty in understanding. On occasion I felt that what appeared to be lack of comprehension was in fact a wish to avoid what she saw (probably wrongly) as "trap" questions in cross-examination.

35. With regard to stress S.M. drew attention to her situation vis à vis M.B., the father of R. I have little doubt that her association with M.B. was not just physically violent but also a threat to her life. She gives evidence of warnings given to her by members of the Garda Siochana and eventually she states that M.B. was arrested due to information given by her to the Gardai. He was, however, arrested on the 24th June, 1995 nearly six months before the birth of R., and it was explained to her that he was most unlikely to be released on bail. His plea of guilty removed any necessity there might have been for her to give evidence. Unfortunately (although her evidence is not very clear on this point) she seems to have become involved in tabloid newspaper publicity which stated that she was the mother of M.B.'s child and gave R.'s name. This publicity was apparently what caused Mr. and Mrs B. to alter R.'s Christian name and to name him C.

36. Evidence in regard to S.M.'s physical and mental health was given both by her general practitioner Dr Malone and by Dr John Sheehan, Consultant Psychiatrist of the Rotunda Hospital. Reports from both doctors were also handed into Court. Dr Malone had been the mother's General Practitioner since 1985. I found his evidence impressive; it was clear that his interest in and care for his patient was of high quality. It appears from Dr Malone's report that during 1990 S.M. suffered from depression after the birth of C., her eldest child, and had been admitted to St Vincent's psychiatric hospital in Fairview. It is stated that she had a history of physical abuse of her baby C. and had taken an overdose. This would coincide with the period when C. was taken into care by the Eastern Health Board. S.M., in her evidence, made no mention of this admission to hospital or of the difficulty with C. She attributed blame for C.'s being taken into care to an untruthful report by C.'s paternal relatives whom she had asked to babysit. S.M. appears to have made a good recovery and did not suffer depression at the time of the birth of her second child J. Between 1990 and 1995 her complaints appear to have been of various assaults, possibly by the father of J.

37. Both prior to and after the birth of R., S.M. attended Dr Malone complaining of stress and anxiety and difficulties with sleeping. Twice during 1996 she complained of panic episodes. In his oral evidence, Dr Malone explained that at these times he had prescribed an anti-anxiety drug and a drug to help her sleeping difficulties. He had prescribed short courses and low doses of these drugs so as to prevent any danger of addiction. It seems probable that S.M. was on a course of the drug to help her sleep at the time when she signed Form 10 in April 1996. Dr Malone in reply to Counsel for S.M. said that the possible side effects of the drug which he had given her to help her to sleep could include drowsiness and light-headedness. It could interfere with concentration. In reply to cross-examination, however, he said that S.M. had never complained of side effects. I myself asked the doctor whether in fact S.M. appeared from his own observations to suffer from side effects and he replied that she did not.

38. S.M. appears to have been given no prescriptions by Dr Malone after June 1996. This coincides with the beginning of her relationship with F O'D. However, she attended Dr Malone again on the 25th September, 1996 complaining of feeling down following attempted sexual abuse on her by a member of her own family. There was no reference to this episode in S.M.'s own evidence but I completely accept Dr Malone's evidence and his contemporaneous note.

39. Dr Malone accepted that S.M. was of limited intelligence but was now doing a reasonable job of rearing her children. In his experience with her if one explained anything to her slowly she was then able to understand.

40. Dr Sheehan, Consultant Psychiatrist, stated in evidence that S.M. had been referred by Dr Malone to him in the Rotunda in October 1995 prior to the birth of R.. She stated to him that she had never before attended a psychiatrist and that she had a good relationship with her father and her siblings. She complained of anxiety and sleeping difficulties. On interview with him she appeared to be drinking fairly heavily and he advised her to give up alcohol and to try to arrange for a member of her family to live in with her until after the birth of her child. She told him of the background to her pregnancy and of her plan to have her child adopted.

41. He saw her again on 5th December, 1995, shortly before the birth. She had stopped drinking and was coping better. She said she was benefiting from the help of her social worker. He felt that there was no need for intervention or treatment. She reiterated her plan to put up her baby for adoption. He felt she was suffering from stress but not from any mental illness. He felt that while she had limited abilities, she did understand him.

42. S.M. was also interviewed and assessed by Dr Gerard Byrne, Consultant Child Psychiatrist. This interview was carried out in the context of advising as to the best interests of R. Dr Byrne in evidence said that he felt that S.M.'s powers of understanding were limited to some degree, but that this depended on the language used in speaking to her. He used simple language and checked that she understood. His belief was that she understood what he said.

43. S.M.'s second contention is that she never had any real understanding of the difference between adoption and fostering and that this was not explained to her by any of the social workers with whom she dealt. I would have to say that I find this aspect of her evidence unreliable for a number of reasons. Firstly, she had experience of adoption within her own family, as one of her sisters was adopted. It appears that this sister was in fact the child of another of her siblings and it is not clear whether the adoption was formal of informal. However, in her answers to Miss Dooge in cross-examination, it was clear that she knew that this adopted sister was a permanent member of the family and was her sister in the same way as her other sisters. Her mother also used the words "adopted" and "adoption" in regard to this sister.

44. Secondly, she had considered the possibility of adoption when she was pregnant with her second child J in 1993. She herself denies this in her evidence, but it is clearly evidencedby contemporary documentary evidence and by the evidence of Sheila McRory, a social worker in the Rotunda Hospital, which I accept. In a letter dated 15th October, 1993 from Nora Mannion, who was then head social worker in the Rotunda Hospital, interviews with S.M. are detailed in which she discussed the possible adoption of her expected child either by one of her own sisters or through an adoption society. At that stage she agreed to a referral to St Louise's Adoption Society. However, towards the end of that pregnancy she became more accepting of it and when J was born she decided to care for the baby herself. I have, however, no doubt that the nature of adoption, as opposed to fostering, was fully explained to her at that time.

45. Again, when S.M. first called to see Sheila McRory in the Rotunda on the 27th September, 1995 before the birth of R.. she explained her fears that because of the circumstances of R.'s conception and the crimes of M.B., R.'s father, she would take out her anger at M.B. on the baby and would not be able to care for it. She clearly requested adoption. Ms McRory described a number of meetings with S.M. during the period September to December 1995 and when S.M. was in the Rotunda at the time of R.'s birth. She discussed the nature of adoption with S.M. at these meetings on a number of occasions. She explained the role of the adoption society and the link between St Louise's Adoption Society and the Eastern Health Board. She put S.M. in touch with the social workers of St Louise's Adoption Society and with Keith O'Reilly, the social worker who would be dealing with her in her own community care area. Her evidence is that at all times S.M. was adamant that she wanted adoption; she was not interested in counselling about any alternative. In the light of Ms McRory's evidence, which I accept and which is confirmed by contemporaneous documents, I cannot accept S.M.'s evidence that Ms McRory never used the word adoption and that she cannot recall any reference to an adoption society. Thirdly, S.M. had had actual experience of relatively long term fostering in the case of her first child C. who had been in the care of the Eastern Health Board pursuant to an order made by the District Court from December 1990 to February 1992. During this period of fostering S.M. had frequent access visits to C. These were arranged and encouraged by the Eastern Health Board with a view to maintaining her relationship with C. It appears that she was urged to increase and maintain the frequency of these visits. She was also urged to attend, and did attend, a course in parenting skills provided by the Health Board at Claide Mor so as to prepare her for the possible return of her child. She had the advice of an experienced legal aid Solicitor, Mr. Hugh Cunniam, in working towards the return of her child. It appears from her own evidence that she somewhat resented Mr. Cunniam's (perfectly correct) insistence that she should complete the parenting course on which the decision of the District Court to return her child to her custody might depend. Senior Counsel for the mother, Mr. McGrath, urged upon the Court that S.M.'s experience of having had a child in fosterage and having been able to reclaim that child would tend to convince her that the same would apply to the adoption procedure. I cannot accept this submission. The circumstances of C.'s fosterage, which was the result of an initial place of safety Order and a subsequent Care Order, were entirely different from the later placement of R. It is also incorrect to imply that S.M. could by her own decision "reclaim" C. This decision fell to be made by the judge of the District Court on the evidence available to her or him as regard S.M.'s ability to care for C.

46. The evidence of Keith O'Reilly, social worker is that at his first contact with

47. S.M. when he visited her at her home on the 1st November, 1995 she was firm in her request that her expected baby be adopted. He explained the difference between fostering and adoption, stating in his evidence as follows:-

48. Later he discussed with her alternatives to adoption as follows:-

49. Mr. O'Reilly believed at the time, and still believes, that S.M. understood the distinction he was making between adoption and fostering.

50. There is a fundamental clash between the evidence of S.M. and the evidence of Keith O'Reilly on this as on many other points. I accept Mr. O'Reilly's evidence that he did make clear to S.M. the difference between adoption and fostering on this and on other occasions and I do not accept her evidence that she did not understand the difference.

51. The mother's third contention is that when she signed form 10 (the Agreement to Placement for Adoption Form) on 9th April, 1996 her social worker Keith O'Reilly did not give her any explanation whatsoever of the form and that she had no understanding of it. She denied that Mr. O'Reilly had even read the form to her. She did, however, admit in reply to cross-examination that Mr. O'Reilly told her she might have to see a Solicitor and go to Court if she wanted her child back. She also repeatedly denied that any counselling help was offered to her at any time. This is in total contradiction of the evidence both of Mr. O'Reilly and of Ms McRory who state that all times she was offered counselling help but refused to avail of it.

52. Form 10, which is the statutory form under the Adoption Acts, is divided into two parts. (The form is reproduced as an appendix to the judgment of the Supreme Court in O'C. v. Sacred Heart Adoption Society .) The first part is a memorandum setting out the effect of an Adoption Order, a summary of the process of consent to the making of an Adoption Order, the bases on which the consent of the natural mother may be dispensed with, and instructions as to what steps the natural mother should take should she wish to reclaim her child. This memorandum is headed "Memorandum to be furnished by Registered Adoption Society to a Mother, Father or Guardian who proposes to place a child with a Registered Adoption Society for Adoption" and is to be detached from the second part which is headed "Receipt for Form 10". This part acknowledges the receipt of the Memorandum as follows:-

53. It also allows the mother to state any wishes she may have as to the religion in which her child may be brought up.

54. S.M. acknowledged that she signed this form and that it correctly reflected her wish that she wanted her child to be brought up as a Roman Catholic. However, in addition to stating that Keith O'Reilly did not give any explanation of the form, she stated that she did not receive the Memorandum from him and that she did not remember ever having such a document. She had, however, in fact given the Memorandum to her solicitor who produced it to the Court.

55. Mr. O'Reilly's evidence is that he explained Form 10 to S.M. carefully and in simple language. In particular he made it clear that if she wanted to reclaim R., the adoptive parents might go to Court and seek an Order dispensing with her consent. If this happened the Court would decide whether or not her child would be returned. After reading and explaining each paragraph of the form, he asked S.M. if she understood and she stated that she did.

56. I cannot accept the mother's evidence that she signed Form 10 with no explanation being offered. Mr. O'Reilly had not dealt with this situation before but he was a fully trained and qualified social worker, working under the supervision and management of a senior social worker and in close touch with St. Louise Adoption Society. It is inconceivable that he would behave in the way suggested by S.M. Dr. Gerard Byrne, Consultant Psychiatrist, in his report relates that S.M. said to him of Mr. O'Reilly, "He is a sleeveen and a gangster. I want him done for that". On my assessment of Mr. O'Reilly as a witness giving evidence before me for some two days, this is a totally unwarranted allegation and I accept Mr. O'Reilly's account of the meeting on the 9th April, 1996.

57. My conclusion from this necessarily somewhat detailed survey of the evidence is that S.M. on the 9th April, 1996 agreed to place her child R. for adoption. This agreement to place, and my conclusions in regard to it, are confirmed by the evidence in regard to the meeting held at the Health Centre on the 5th June, 1996 at which both S.M. and Mr. and Mrs B. were present with their respective social workers. S.M. states that she thought this meeting dealt only with a change of foster parents. This is in complete contradiction with the evidence not only of Keith O'Reilly but also of Mr. and Mrs B. and of Ann Valentine, their social worker. Ms Valentine, a social worker with extensive experience in the field of adoption who has worked for over 20 years with St. Louise Adoption Society, gave evidence that it was quite clear to all that the meeting was for the purpose of introducing S.M. to Mr. and Mrs B. as the couple who would, with her approval, be adopting R. There was discussion of R's education in future years and no discussion at all with regard to access by S.M. to R. S.M. agreed that Mr. and Mrs B. should proceed to have R. baptised. There was also discussion of a photograph or photographs to be sent to S.M. in the future. Mr. and Mrs. B. also gave similar evidence of the nature of this meeting. Their memory is that S.M. asked them to send her a photograph of R. each year and a short note about his progress. Mrs B. says that S.M. explained the reasons why she had decided to place R. for adoption and told them that he had been conceived as a result of rape (Mr. and Mrs B. had not hitherto been aware of this). S.M. went on to speak of what might happen when R. was 18 - that he might be interested in finding out about her. Mr. B. recalls S.M. explaining why she had to make this difficult decision to place R. for adoption so that they could explain this to him in the future. All this evidence, which I accept, shows S.M. as a mother who had, for the best of reasons and in the interests of the welfare of R., agreed to place her child for adoption and had specifically approved Mr. and Mrs. B. as adopters.

58. At the time of her agreement to place S.M. was undoubtedly suffering from a degree of stress. However, unlike the natural mothers in many of the cases with which this Court has dealt in the past, there is no suggestion whatever that she was put under any pressure to have her child adopted by either her parents or any other person. She had adequate accommodation and an income in the form of Social Welfare payments. She had already learned to cope as an unmarried mother and was a good mother to her two older children. She was 27 years of age.

59. On the test set out by Laffoy J. in G.D. v. C.M . her decision was manifestly her own decision, and I do not consider that it was vitiated either by stress or by lack of understanding of what she was doing.

60. Later in 1996 when she had established her relationship with F.O'D., who impressed me as being both loving and supportive to her, her circumstances had changed and she changed her mind and wished to reclaim R. It seems to me that a factor in her change of mind and wish to reclaim R. was that she believed that she and F. O'D. were unable to have children of their own for medical reasons. Happily, that fear has proved to be unfounded. However, as was clearly stated by Finlay P. (as he then was) in S. v. Eastern Health Board , a change of mind, whether sooner or later, does not vitiate the original agreement to place.

61. I should perhaps at this point refer to the fact that during the course of S.M.'s evidence, there were a number of other matters which cast doubt on her credibility and which inclined me to prefer the evidence of other witnesses. As an example, she stated clearly that while F.O'D. purchased various items for her, he did not pay her regular maintenance. F.O'D. also gave evidence and I found him an impressive and reliable witness. His evidence was that he paid S.M. £200 per week regularly by way of maintenance for herself and their child. This I accept.

62. More importantly, it was clear from contemporaneous documentary evidence from the Rotunda Hospital that in 1993 S.M. claimed that the father of her expected second child J. was one Michael Dixon. Nora Mannion, head social worker, in her letter of 15th October, 1993 gives details of S.M.'s account of Michael Dixon. There is also evidence that S.M.'s eldest child C. named Michael Dixon as having been violent to her mother. Yet in her evidence before this Court, S.M. repeatedly stated that the father of J. was P.H. who was also the father of C. In reply to cross-examination, she stated that she had never heard of Michael Dixon.

63. Having accepted that S.M. is, in the words of the section, a person who has agreed to place her child for adoption, I now pass to consider what is in the best interests of R. In previous considerations of Section 3 of the 1974 Act, it has been held that the use of the term "best interests" as opposed to the term "welfare" as used, for example, in Section 3 of the Guardianship of Infants Act, 1964, implies a consideration of long-term factors affecting the child's future life in addition to matters which would affect the child's present welfare. I am happy to adopt this approach.

64. There is no challenge to the evidence both of Dr. Byrne and of Ms Valentine that R's placement with Mr. and Mrs B. has been extremely successful. R. has formed a strong and loving bond with both adoptive parents whom, naturally, he regards as his mother and father. He has also formed bonds with members of their extended family. Mr. B. has well paid and secure employment and is well qualified to pursue his career as an analytical chemist. Mrs B's professional qualification as a primary teacher will assist the couple in providing a good education in future for R., a matter stressed by S.M. herself at the meeting of the 5th June, 1996. At present Mrs B. is a full time mother but no doubt as R. gets older she will be able to return to her career which will fit in well as regards hours of work with R's needs.

65. Ms Valentine gave detailed evidence of the assessment process used by St Louise's Adoption Society through which Mr.. and Mrs B. were selected as suitable parents for R. She was particularly impressed by their openness in discussion and their ability to seek professional advice and to plan for the future.

66. The position of S.M., the natural mother, has very greatly improved since the birth of R. Her relationship with F.O'D, to whom she is now engaged to be married, has given her both financial and loving support which she completely lacked in her earlier relationships. Mr.. O'D. impressed me as a sensible, capable and caring person. He is in good employment at present and has practical plans for the future. He will shortly be in receipt of a capital sum from the disposal of his father's business and will, I have no doubt, be able to achieve the couple's plan of purchasing a house.

67. It is also agreed that, whatever may have been her difficulties in the past, S.M. is now a good and capable mother to her three other children. However, on my observation of her in the witness box, I would have to agree with the evidence of Dr. Gerard Byrne that she was somewhat lacking in insight and did not properly understand or appreciate what it would mean to R., at 3 years of age, to be removed from the care of those he knows as his parents and transferred to the care of persons who, from his point of view, are strangers.

68. The probable and possible effects of such a move have been discussed in many previous cases and there is no need to repeat them in detail here. They are summarised in the report of Dr. Byrne, a very experienced and highly regarded child psychiatrist who has given evidence in many of these cases, as follows:-

69. These considerations must weigh heavily with this Court, as they have in earlier cases.

70. However, in this case there is an additional factor in regard to R's long term future which must be considered. This is the history and indeed the future of his father M.B., together with S.M.'s reaction to it. Before and at the time of R's birth, S.M. completely rejected him on account of her feelings about M.B. This was a very understandable reaction. She now feels, I accept very sincerely, that she has put all this behind her and can love and care for R. However, one cannot but be concerned as to what would be the long term effect of this somewhat vulnerable woman's very natural hatred and fear of M.B. on her relationship with M.B.'s child. There is also the extremely difficult question as to how much R. should be told in the future about his father's background and history and when he should be told this. S.M. comes from a family and a community which will be aware of her past relationship with M.B. and the paternity of R. I do not wish to attribute blame to her for this, but she has proved unable to prevent intrusive and undesirable newspaper publicity about both herself and her child in the past. Newspaper interest in the details of M.B.'s crimes continues; even since the hearing of this case, the main daily newspapers on the 20th November, 1998 carried major accounts with photographs of the inquest into the deaths of M.B.'s two victims. It would prove difficult for S.M. to protect R., in his early years at least, from undesirable references to his paternity and background, and I have some doubts as to her understanding of the necessity to do so.

71. Mr. and Mrs B., on the other hand, are now fully aware of the facts of R's paternity. They have discussed the difficult question of what R. should be told and when at great length with Ms Valentine. She feels that they have the ability to seek professional support in this regard in the future and that they will be able to handle the situation in R's best interests. In their care, R. also has the advantage that his background is unknown to those who will surround him as he grows up and he will be accepted as and for himself.

72. I have carefully weighed up the evidence available to me in regard to R's best interests and it appears to me that his best interests lie in remaining in the custody and care of Mr. and Mrs B. and, if An Bord Uchtala so decides, in having the security of becoming their child through adoption.

73. I will accordingly make an Order dispensing with the consent of the mother, S.M., to the making of an Adoption Order in respect of R., together with an Order granting Mr. and Mrs B. sole custody of R. for a period of six months to enable An Bord Uchtala to consider the making of an Adoption Order. In the case of any delay which occurs, I will give liberty to apply.

74. In his judgment in O'C. v. Sacred Heart Adoption Society , O'Flaherty J. drew attention to the desirability of the Court in these cases also making an Order pursuant to the Guardianship of Infants Act proceedings so as to cover the situation which might arise if, under any circumstances, the making of an Adoption Order proved impossible. While I respectfully accept the dictum of the learned Supreme Court Judge, I do not at present feel that it is possible for me to make such an Order which would involve considerations such as access to R. by his mother. During the course of the hearing, and bearing in mind the view of the learned O'Flaherty J., I specifically put to Mrs B. what her attitude would be to a situation where she and her husband would have custody of R. but where no Adoption Order would be made and S.M. would have access. She replied that the couple had not fully considered such a situation. Naturally and rightly she wished to discuss the matter fully with her husband before coming to any such decision. While, therefore, I consider on the general evidence that it would be in the interests of R's welfare to remain in the custody of Mr. and Mrs B., I do not feel able at this point to make an Order in the Guardianship of Infants Act proceedings. Should the necessity arise, this Court would have to hear further evidence before making such an Order. I will therefore make no Order in the Guardianship of Infants Act proceedings brought by the mother.