High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. The applicant, having been given leave by McCracken J., has brought judicial review proceedings in which, on the basis of particular circumstances alleged by him, he challenges the right of the fourth respondent (the E.H.B.) to furnish certain information about him to the second respondent (the V.E.C.) with a view to having him excluded from a course of education at Inchicore Vocational School which leads to a City of Dublin Vocational Education Committee Certificate in Social Studies and a Community Care Award, being qualifications relating to child care and other similar work. The applicant has also challenged the decisions of the V.E.C. (i) to act upon the allegations made about him by the E.H.B. without giving him any opportunity of being heard in his defence thereto and (ii) to exclude him from the course in question.

2. Although (with one exception) the many allegations and complaints about the applicant on which the E.H.B. has concluded that he is not a suitable person to engage in child care work are strongly contested by him, the facts and circumstances which led to the removal of the applicant by the V.E.C. from the course in question are not in dispute and I find them to be as follows:-

3. The applicant is a man now in middle years. He was born into a working class family and received primary education only. He has deposed that he was obliged to leave school early consequent upon the death of his parents. In or about 1992 he decided to return to full-time education with a view to obtaining qualifications as a social worker. He has sworn that it is his firm ambition upon conclusion of his education to obtain an appointment as a social worker in the Central Remedial Clinic or St. Michael's House, both of which cater for children. From 1992 to 1995 he attended North Strand Vocational Education College (a V.E.C. institution) where he duly passed the Junior and Leaving certificate examinations. In 1995, the applicant applied to the social studies department of the V.E.C.'s school at Inchicore, where the first respondent (Mr. Gleeson) is headmaster, for a place in their social studies course and he was duly accepted. He commenced the course in September, 1995. It included three weeks of supervised practical work experience with children at a play centre in Ballyfermot. In that regard the applicant worked with a play group comprising about twenty children of 3 or 4 years of age, 2 or 3 supervisors and 2 student workers. The applicant took up work at the play centre on 15th January, 1996 and it was intended that he would continue working there until the following 2nd February. The course at Inchicore School concluded in May, 1996. It is the applicant's declared intention to use the social studies qualification which he hoped to attain there as a stepping stone to facilitate entry into a university social science degree course which would qualify him as a professional social worker.

4. From in or about 1972 until 1993 the applicant had an on-going intimate relationship with Ms. M.G. with whom he lived and by whom he had three children - K. (born on 6th May, 1974); A.M. (born on 13th May, 1975) and M. (born on 21st October, 1981). M.G. had also three children in care when she commenced her relationship with the applicant. From 1974 until 1993 many complaints were made to the E.H.B. and various matters came to their notice about the alleged conduct of the applicant towards his own children and also towards two of M.G.'s older children. Although some of the complaints are of a grievous nature, none appear to have been put to the applicant at any time prior to January, 1996; no complaints were referred to the police by the E.H.B. for investigation nor did the board seek to take any of the applicant's children into care by reason of his alleged misconduct towards them. A.M., who was born with cerebral palsy, was seriously disabled physically and mentally all her life. It appears to have been the opinion of the E.H.B. that having regard to the straightened circumstances of M.G. and the applicant, and their inexperience in dealing with a severely handicapped child, it was desirable that A.M. should be taken into care. However, no such order was made and she remained in the care and custody of her parents until she died in 1993.

5. In late 1995, the E.H.B. learned that the applicant was a student on a V.E.C. social studies course at Inchicore which leads to a qualification in child care work. In the light of their experience of the applicant and the allegations which had been made about him, the board was of opinion that he was not a suitable person to engage in child care work and that it had a statutory duty to advise the V.E.C. of its opinion and to recommend that the applicant be removed from the course. The following sequence of events then ensued:-

6. On or about the 7th December, 1995, Ms. Linda Dowling, the course director of the Social Studies department of the V.E.C. school at Inchicore, received a telephone call from the third respondent (Mr. Chance), an acting head social worker having responsibility to the E.H.B. for its area No. 7 in which the applicant resides. Without furnishing any specific information, Mr. Chance expressed on behalf of the board reservations as to the suitability of the applicant for the social studies course on which he was then engaged. Ms. Dowling investigated the matter and responded to Mr. Chance by letter dated 13th December, 1995 as follows:-

7. Mr. Chance wrote to the applicant on 11th January, 1996 as follows:-

8. The applicant concedes that he received the letter but alleges that he subsequently lost it. He attended the meeting on 24th January as requested but contends that he understood that its purpose was to discuss problems relating to his son, M.. I am satisfied that the applicant was aware that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss his intentions in the matter of entering a career in the area of child care. I accept Mr. Chance's deposition that, having considered the records of the E.H.B. regarding allegations against the applicant about child abuse, he had bona fide come to the conclusion that he appeared to him to be a person unsuited to a career in child care and that the purpose of the meeting was to discuss his concern in that regard with the applicant. The probability is that this would have included at least an outline of the various reasons which caused Mr. Chance to take that view, including the complaints which had been made to the E.H.B. over the years. It is common case that the meeting became acrimonious at an early stage and it had to be abandoned. Having regard to other problems which E.H.B. social workers appear to have had with the applicant in seeking his co-operation in matters pertaining to his family, it seems likely that the acrimony was caused by him and that it would have been difficult for Mr. Chance to have a meaningful discussion with him about the various allegations on which his opinion was based.

9. Immediately following Mr. Chance's abortive meeting with the applicant, he wrote again to Ms. Dowling by letter dated 25th January, 1996 which is in the following terms:-

10. Immediately on receipt of that letter and without any consultation with the applicant, Mr. Gleeson, as principal of the Inchicore Vocational School, wrote to him in the following terms:-

11. The applicant contends that he did not receive the foregoing letter and on Tuesday, 30th January, he presented himself as usual at St. Matthew's Social Services to continue his work experience placement at the play centre there. He was told to return immediately to the school where he was interviewed by Mr. Gleeson. The latter made a note of what transpired at the meeting and it broadly accords with the account given by the applicant in his original affidavit. The note reads as follows:-

12. It is accepted by the V.E.C. that the applicant was not shown a copy of the E.H.B. letter of 25th January, nor was he informed of the allegations contained therein. In the circumstances it was impossible for him to offer any defence to the case against him made by the E.H.B.

13. The applicant was removed by Mr. Gleeson from the entire of the social studies course as from 30th January, 1996. Subsequently McCracken J. made an order on consent of the parties permitting the applicant to attend classes and sit any written examinations relating to his studies at Inchicore Vocational School but excluding work placement with children.

14. Consequent upon his removal from the course, the applicant consulted his solicitors who immediately took the matter up with the school and it became evident to the V.E.C. that the applicant proposed to challenge his removal from the course. This gave rise to further correspondence between the V.E.C. and Mr. Chance commencing with a letter of 7th February, 1996 from Ms. Jacinta Stewart, Education Officer of the V.E.C. which is as follows:-

15. In response to that request a report from Mr. Chance, dated 15th March, 1996 was furnished to the V.E.C. It is in the following terms:-

16. Judicial Review proceedings commenced on 4th March, 1996 by way of an ex parte application to McCracken J. in which the applicant sought liberty to attend classes and to sit written examinations in connection with his course of studies at Inchicore Vocational School. The application was successful and led to a further order at the interlocutory hearing by consent of the parties to which I have already referred. In view of the proceedings which the applicant has brought in this matter, no further steps regarding the E.H.B. complaints have been taken by the V.E.C. Subsequently Mr. Chance and the E.H.B. were added as respondents.

17. In course of the hearing it was conceded on the applicant's behalf that there had been no mal fides on the part of either Mr. Gleeson or Mr. Chance and that the actions by each of them were taken bone fide in the course of duty on behalf of their respective employers. It was ordered on consent that Mr. Gleeson and Mr. Chance be struck out of the proceedings as no remedy or relief was being sought by the applicant against either of them as individuals.

18. No issue arises in that regard as to the E.H.B. In conveying to the V.E.C. its opinion about the unsuitability of the applicant for employment in the area of child care and in seeking his removal from the social studies course at Inchicore Technical School, the E.H.B. did so as a public body acting within the public domain pursuant to what it perceived to be a duty in law to protect children from possible harm in the future should the applicant achieve his stated ambition of qualifying for employment in child care work. Accordingly, it is not in dispute that the applicant is entitled to challenge by way of judicial review what the E.H.B. did in seeking to prevent him from pursuing a course of education in that area.

19. The next question is whether the conduct of the V.E.C. in removing the applicant from the course in question, permanently or by way of temporary suspension, is also justiciable by way of judicial review or is a matter of private contractual law which is outside the public domain and, therefore, not within the ambit of judicial review. In my opinion the conduct of the V.E.C. in response to the information about its student which it received from the E.H.B., being part of the transaction initiated by Mr. Chance, is also a proper subject for judicial review. If an allegation by a public body against a third party which is within the public domain and reviewable accordingly is communicated to another body, public or private, which has an interest to receive the complaint, and a decision is required to be taken by the latter body which transpires to be against the interest of the third party complained of, then the whole transaction should be regarded as being within the public domain. It would be quite unreal to remove a crucial part of what was done from the scrutiny of the court in judicial review proceedings because, per se, the particular act excluded was not within the public domain. Even if that were not so, the expulsion or suspension from a V.E.C. course of a student, who has distinguished himself thereon and against whom no complaint has been made as to his performance or conduct as a student, because of a request from another public body raises an important question regarding the relationship between two statutory bodies which operate in the public domain, thus bringing the conduct of both within the ambit of judicial review on that ground. I note that, notwithstanding the formal grounds of opposition furnished by the V.E.C. in response to the applicant's claim in which this issue is raised, Mr. Ó Brolachain has not sought to challenge the foregoing propositions.

20. Elsewhere in the 1991 Act health boards are given wide powers to assist them in the protection and care of children who are found to be in need of such help. The Act (and other legislation providing for the welfare of children) is silent on the obligations of health boards in taking appropriate measures to protect unidentified children who may be put at risk in the future by a person who, to the knowledge of a board, intends to enter the realm of child care work and who the board has good reason to believe is unsuited for such work and represents a potential hazard for children who may come under his/her care.

21. The specific statutory obligation placed on every health board "to promote the welfare of children in its area who are not receiving adequate care and protection" is, inter alia, directed towards identifying the categories of children to which a health board owes a duty of care under the Act. That duty is not owed to all children in its area but only to those who are not receiving adequate care and protection. The categories thus identified include children who by reason of a potential situation in the future are liable to require protection at that time from a prospective danger the nature of which is presently known to or reasonably suspected by a health board. It is present knowledge or reasonable suspicion of potential harm which is the essence of the health board's obligation to children.

22. In my opinion once a situation comes to the knowledge of a health board relating to children being put at risk, there is no real distinction between present and future risk. In terms of the instant case the perceived harm which might be done to children if after qualification the applicant obtains employment in the area of child care, is essentially no different from perceived harm which might be done now if he were already so employed. Furthermore, the concern about the applicant expressed by the E.H.B. also had an immediate aspect, i.e., his removal from that part of the social studies course which involved work experience with children. The board perceived that the children with whom he was working as part of his course of instruction were at risk from him and required its protection.

23. I have no doubt that in the exercise of their statutory function to promote the welfare of children, health boards are not confined to acting in the interest of specific identified or identifiable children who are already at risk of abuse and require immediate care and protection, but that their duty extends also to children not yet identifiable who may be at risk in the future by reason of a specific potential hazard to them which a board reasonably suspects may come about in the future. Subject to the proper exercise of its functions in the matter of complaints about child abuse and its duty to afford the applicant the benefit of fair procedures, I have no doubt that in the instant case, on the premise that it had taken appropriate steps to inform itself, the board would have been entitled to form an opinion that the applicant was unfit for child care work and would have had an obligation under Section 3(1) of the 1991 Act to communicate its opinion to the V.E.C. with a view to having him removed from the social studies course on which he was engaged. The board was not obliged to wait until a child or children had been actually abused by the applicant after he had taken up child care employment. On the contrary, on becoming aware that he proposed to embark on a career in child care and that he was attending an educational course to qualify for such work, the board had an obligation to protect children who in its considered opinion would be at risk of abuse by the applicant should he carry out his stated intention of embarking on a career in that area. Such an obligation would require the communication by the board of its opinion to the V.E.C. coupled with a request to remove him from the course in question.

24. To answer these questions it is necessary, first, to consider the purpose and function of health boards in the context of child care and protection. I accept Mr. McEntee's submission that a health board has a child protection function which differs fundamentally from that of the prosecutorial function of the police and the D.P.P.. In the former, the emphasis is on protection of vulnerable children. In the latter, the objective is the detection and conviction of child abusers. There are many circumstances which may indicate that a particular person is likely to be (or to have been) a child abuser, but there is insufficient evidence to establish such abuse in accordance with the standards of proof required in a criminal or civil trial. For example, the abused child through fear, family pressure, age or mental capacity may be unable to testify against the abuser or, in the case of repeated physical injuries sustained by a child, there may not be sufficient evidence to rule out accidents and to establish proof of abuse in law by a particular suspect. However, there may be evidence sufficient to create, after reasonable investigation, a significant doubt in the minds of competent experienced health board or related professional personnel that there has been abuse by a particular person. If such a doubt has been established then it follows that a health board cannot stand idly by but has an obligation to take appropriate action in circumstances where a person who the board reasonably suspects has indulged in child abuse is in a situation, or is planning to take up a position, which may expose any other child to abuse by him/her.

25. Arising out of its obligation to investigate allegations of child abuse made to it or of which it becomes aware, a health board is entitled to keep records of such allegations, whether substantiated or not, and, indeed, has an obligation so to do in the interest of professional competence. (The only exception which I perceive in that regard would be where on investigation an allegation is found to be positively false. In such circumstances it would be unfair to record the identity of the innocent alleged abuser, although the fact that the complainant had made a false allegation might itself have subsequent relevance in regard to that person. In such circumstances, the record should not identify the alleged abuser and should specify in terms that the allegation has been found to be false). The health board's records in each case should include factors favourable to the alleged abuser. The board's assessment of the weight it attaches to each such allegation should be stated and should be objectively based. The purpose should be to create a fair, reasonable assessment of each complaint or finding about an alleged wrongdoer. This also necessarily entails reasonable investigation of each such complaint by the health board. In the ordinary course in serious cases the complaint should be put to the alleged abuser in course of the investigation and he/she should be given an opportunity of responding to it. However, an exception in that regard may arise where the board official concerned has a reasonable concern that to do so might put the child in question in further jeopardy as, for example, where the abused child is the complainant. An obligation to offer an alleged abuser an opportunity to answer complaints made against him/her would arise in circumstances where the board contemplates making active use of the particular information against the interest of the alleged wrongdoer - such as publication to a third party as in the present case or embarking on proceedings to have a child or children taken into care.

26. The right of a health board to disseminate information about alleged child abuse by a particular person raises the question of the duty owed by the board to the alleged abuser. There are two cardinal rules of natural justice (or constitutional justice as it is referred to by Walsh J. in McDonald -v- Bord na gCon , [1965] I.R. 217) which are crucial to the duty owed by the E.H.B. to the applicant. First, a person charged with wrongdoing should be informed of what is being alleged against him and, secondly, he should be given a reasonable opportunity to make his defence - see judgments of Butler J. and of the Supreme Court in The State (Gleeson) -v- Minister for Defence, [1976] I.R. 280 and the judgment of the Supreme Court in Beirne -v- Commissioner of An Garda Siochana , [1993] I.L.R.M. 1). Furthermore, in view of the gravity of the allegations made by the board; the seriousness of the consequences for the applicant if removed from the social studies course as sought by the E.H.B. and the harm done to him by publication of its complaints to the V.E.C., the board also had a duty of fairness to the applicant as to the reliability of the information it furnished to the V.E.C.. A health board ought always to remember that such complaints, if unfounded, have of their nature a potential for great injustice and harm, not only to the person complained of but perhaps also to the particular child or children sought to be protected and others in the family in question. A false complaint of child abuse, if incorrectly interpreted by a health board, could involve the destruction of a family as a unit by wrongfully having the children it comprises taken into care. If may also destroy or seriously damage a good relationship between husband and wife or long-standing partners. In the instant case, I am satisfied that before raising the issue of the applicant's course of education with the V.E.C., the board had a duty to take all reasonable steps to interview the applicant; to furnish him before interview with notice of the allegations against him in short form; to give him a reasonable opportunity to make his defence and to carry out such further investigations as might appear appropriate in the light of information furnished by him in response to the complaints. No opinion as to the weight to be attached to each complaints should have been formed until the foregoing investigations relating to the applicant had been made and information derived therefrom had been carefully assessed. The need to take that course was all the more important in that Mr. Chance had no prior experience of the applicant, his family or other concerned persons.

27. If a health board takes all reasonable steps to investigate the likely veracity of a complaint of child abuse, including its obligation to the accused as stipulated herein, and it forms a considered opinion that the complaint may be well-founded, then it has an obligation to take appropriate action which may include a report to the police and/or, as in the instant case, a report to the V.E.C. that the alleged abuser may not be suitable for a particular course of education which leads to employment as a child-care worker.

28. The principles of natural or constitutional justice to which I have referred apply also in the context of the duty owed by the V.E.C. to the applicant. They had an obligation to him, a student in good standing, to afford him the benefit of fair procedures in their assessment of the complaints made against him by the E.H.B. and in the context of the decision required of the V.E.C. as to the applicant's continued participation in the social studies course.

29. In my opinion this duty entailed taking the following steps in sequence:-

30. The V.E.C. has no obligation to carry out its own investigation of the various charges and may rely upon the opinion of the E.H.B. if satisfied that it appears to be reasonably based, unless the applicant's defence establishes that there is no reasonable justification for it or at least that there are serious grounds for doubting its validity.

31. A perusal of the records of the E.H.B. which have been introduced in evidence relating to the applicant, his three children, M.G. and her three older children, and consideration also of the many affidavits filed in the action, disclose that there is a sharp conflict between the board and the applicant as to the allegations of physical and sexual abuse and negligence made against him. However, there are certain significant facts which seem to be established on the balance of probabilities:-

32. In deciding whether or not the E.H.B. failed in its duty to the applicant in publishing complaints about him to the V.E.C. and in seeking to have him removed from the social studies course at Inchicore Technical School, it is necessary to review the situation in the light of the legal obligations of the board as specified herein.

33. I accept, having regard to the board's on-going experience of the applicant since 1974, Mr. Chance bona fide believed that the applicant was not a suitable person to enter child-care work or to engage in a course of instruction leading to a qualification in that area. The board had an abundance of information which, if found to be credible after proper investigation, would lead to that conclusion. However, Mr. Chance, a newly appointed head social worker for the area where the applicant resides, had no personal experience of the latter or of his family. He would have learned from a perusal of the health board's records that, with the exception of the beating of K. episode, there was no proof of any of the allegations of child abuse made against the applicant and it also would have emerged on investigation that he had not been confronted with any of them. Mr. Chance also would or should have been aware that his intention to inform the V.E.C. of the board's opinion as to the unsuitability of the applicant for child care work and the desirability of removing him from the social studies course at Inchicore, involved by implication a serious attack on the character of the applicant, even if the reasons for the board's attitude were not disclosed. This is the background to Mr. Chance's first encounter with the V.E.C. in this matter, i.e., his telephone conversation with Ms. Linda Dowling on 7th December, 1995.

34. A review of the facts establishes that from the beginning Mr. Chance made a series of mistakes in and about informing the V.E.C. of the board's opinion that the applicant is unsuitable for child care work. The conduct of Mr. Chance amounts to a denial of the applicant's right to constitutional justice and fair procedures as defined herein. The mistakes in sequence are as follows:-

35. The foregoing contains allegations of a most grievous nature against the applicant. In my opinion the letter is unfair and misleading in that the reasonable inference to be drawn from it is that the E.H.B., after appropriate investigation, regards the allegations as being correct or likely to be well-founded. In fact, the health board records indicate that some of them at least are probably untrue.

36. This allegation, which many would regard as the most serious of all, ought never to have been published.

37. In the light of the foregoing, the conclusion is inescapable that the E.H.B. failed in its duty of affording the applicant the benefit of constitutional justice and fair procedures in not furnishing him with information as to the charges against him; in not giving him an adequate opportunity to defend himself; in not taking reasonable care in checking the accuracy of information furnished to the V.E.C. and in taking a crucial decision adverse to the applicant regarding his suitability for child care work without first taking the foregoing steps and reviewing the matter in the light of whatever defence he might raise.

38. If the E.H.B. now wishes to pursue the matter and seek the removal of the applicant from the social studies course, then it should first comply with the requirements laid down herein and review the situation in the light of the defence (if any) which may be put forward by or on the applicant's behalf.

39. On receipt of the information contained in Mr. Chance's letter of 25th January, 1996, Mr. Gleeson, headmaster of Inchicore Vocational School, decided that the applicant should be removed from the social studies course and he wrote to him on 26th January to that effect. This letter is crucial to the V.E.C. case. Mr. Ó Brolachain has conceded that if it is construed as amounting to notification of an expulsion of the applicant from the course, then it must be unlawful as the V.E.C. had failed in its duty to the applicant of providing a fair procedure for his dismissal which would have entailed, inter alia, notifying him of the complaints made against him and giving him an opportunity of being heard in his defence. However, it is urged on behalf of the V.E.C. that the letter amounted to no more than a suspension of the applicant from the course pending a final decision and, being a suspension only, the principles of natural justice did not apply at that stage and the procedure adopted was fair.

40. Mr. Gleeson in his letter to the applicant, having referred to Mr. Chance's letter of 25th January which raised questions as to his suitability to be involved in the supervision of children, continued:

41. It will be noted that Mr. Gleeson's decision, as communicated was based solely on the facts alleged in Mr. Chance's letter of 25th January without seeking any response from the applicant and before the detailed List was furnished in March.

42. In referring to withdrawal of the applicant from the course "until your suitability to be involved in the area of social care is demonstrated" Mr. Gleeson was making the point that the applicant's removal from the course would remain until he demonstrated his suitability to be re-instated. In short, the ball was played into the applicant's court, but he was being put into an impossible situation as he was not informed of the allegations against him and therefore could not respond in a meaningful way. His request at the meeting on 31st January to see Mr. Chance's letter of 25th January, on which the V.E.C. decision was based, was refused by Mr. Gleeson. I am satisfied that if the applicant had not consulted his solicitor and challenged his removal from the course, the probability is that the V.E.C. would have taken no further action in the matter. This is not consistent with alleged suspension from the course. I have no hesitation in finding that Mr. Gleeson's letter amounted to a formal notification to the applicant that he was being indefinitely removed from the course in question. It follows that the decision of the V.E.C. in that regard must be struck down as unlawful. It is also pertinent to add that even if Mr. Gleeson's letter might reasonably be interpreted as no more than a suspension of the applicant from the social studies course pending further investigation, it has no validity on that basis either. Suspension, in the context of this case, is a holding operation to enable specific complaints by the E.H.B. against the applicant to be fully considered by the V.E.C., having given the applicant an opportunity to answer the allegations made against him, and an assessment of whatever explanations he might put forward. In my opinion, suspension is an expedient which ought not to be resorted to save in serious exceptional circumstances. The school also had a duty to its student and it should appreciate that when a person is suspended from attending a school or college, it implies that the authorities believe that the suspended person may be guilty of substantial wrongdoing. In those circumstances, all of his peers and many more will know of his suspension and are likely to share that belief. Even if in the end he were to be entirely exonerated, some harm to the applicant's reputation may linger on. It follows that where suspension is for good reason deemed to be unavoidable by a school authority, its extent should go no further than is necessary in all the circumstances. In the present case the only possible risk of interim danger was to children at the play centre with whom the applicant would have been in contact in the final few days of his supervised practical instruction and work experience there, having already performed well and to the satisfaction of his instructors in that regard. There is a reasonable argument to be made that removal of the applicant from the play centre in his final week of instruction, was in the circumstances unjustified and that whatever his prior history with children may have been, it has also been established that children at the play centre were at no risk from him. However, be that as it may, there is certainly no doubt that the applicant presented no risk whatever to children or anyone else in relation to the remainder of the course which was academic in nature and no such case is made by the V.E.C.. Mr. Ó Brolachain seeks to justify suspension of the applicant from the entire course on the ground that in joining it he had impliedly represented that he was a suitable person to go forward for training as a child carer. That argument proceeds from the premise that the V.E.C. had already concluded on the basis of the unspecific information furnished to them by the E.H.B. in the letter from Mr. Chance of 25th January, and without hearing the applicant in reply, that he was unfit for a career in child care. This negates the purpose of the suspension. The V.E.C. was not entitled to exclude the applicant from the entire course until he had been informed of and had been given a reasonable opportunity to respond to the allegations made against him. In short, even if Mr. Gleeson's letter to the applicant might reasonably be interpreted as indicating his interim suspension from the course, the comprehensive nature of the suspension was far wider than was necessary and was unfairly harmful to the applicant. I am satisfied that the decision of the V.E.C. to remove him from the social studies course at Inchicore was unlawful.

43. If a claim for damages is maintainable against either respondent, and I make no finding in that regard, it seems to me that it is premature at this stage to assess compensation for loss or damage (if any) he may have sustained through the unlawful actions of the respondents. Consequent upon the orders of Mc Cracken J., the applicant has been allowed to complete his social studies course (with the exception of the last two or three days of work placement at the childrens' play centre) with minimal loss of time and no additional expense. Any other claim for damages which might be pursued by the applicant against either respondent would depend on establishing that even if fair procedures were adopted by the respondents, the E.H.B. has no lawful power to seek his removal from the social studies course, whatever justification it might have for so doing. I have found that it has such a power in law and that, subject to principles of fair procedures and constitutional justice, it is entitled to exercise it. Likewise, subject to the same principles, the V.E.C. is entitled to act upon a lawful request received from the E.H.B. in circumstances such as these in the present case.

44. Finally, I would add the following postscript. In seeking to understand the trials and tribulations of the applicant's life since he first formed a relationship with Ms. M.G. and decided - apparently against great odds, economic and emotional - to set up a family unit with her three children then in care and subsequently with their own three children, one must examine the background against which these apparently well-intentioned efforts were made by him. Up to the time when he and Ms. G. ended their relationship in 1993, they and their family lived in a tough, soul-searing environment, tinged with potential disaster, physical and emotional, which was likely in the end to bear too heavily upon them. Those from more privileged sectors of society who are cushioned from many of the problems which were part and parcel of the applicant's life, should be hesitant in condemning what appears to have been his laudatory ambitions in very difficult circumstances. However, there is a Catch 22 situation for the applicant which it seems he cannot avoid. The E.H.B. in particular, and also the V.E.C., have an obligation to protect children from foreseeable risk of abuse. The applicant's history as a family man since 1974 has in it numerous incidents which in all probability can never be either proved or disproved, but collectively point to a reasonable conclusion that he may not be a suitable person for work involving care of children. In the end the E.H.B., having again reviewed the situation in the light of its obligations as herein specified, may regard itself as obliged to retain its opinion that the applicant is not suitable for such work. In that event it will so inform the V.E.C. and the probability is that the latter will finally withdraw the applicant from the child-care course. I hope that in the light of this likely scenario that the applicant will recognise that he has done his best to prepare for the career of his choice, but that in all the circumstances the time has come to turn his intellectual energies towards qualifying for a meaningful, satisfying career in some other area which is not spancelled by a social and family history which to a significant degree may have been unavoidable. A vital plus factor is that he still has the good-will of the V.E.C. and I hope that he will build on that important advantage.