1. This
is an Application for an Interlocutory Injunction to restrain proposed
alterations to the sanctuary of Carlow Cathedral. The items involved are the
altar rails, the pulpit and the floor.
These
and other proposed alterations have over the last two years being the subject
of considerable local dissension. It is not necessary to deal with such matters
in detail. When the original proposals were made known there was considerable
opposition in the local community. This resulted in two separate reports, one
by the Heritage Council and one by an Independent Forum. As a result of these
reports, the proposals have been altered. These are still opposed strenuously
by the Plaintiff, who while objecting to the alterations to the sanctuary to
which I have referred is also critical of the absence of precise plans of the
current proposals.
It
is not part of the function of the Court to express views as to the suitability
or otherwise of the proposed works. That is the matter for the Bishop and his
advisers. What is of concern to the Court and the only matter with which it is
concerned is whether the Bishop has the legal power to carry out his proposals.
Carlow
Cathedral is Church property. The legal title is vested in Trustees for the
benefit of the community of the Diocese. There is no written trust instrument.
The
Plaintiff seeks relief upon several grounds:-
(1)
that there is strong local opposition to the proposed changes because of the
architectural merit of the features which it is intended to alter;
(2)
that, although the reason for the proposed alterations is said to be founded in
the requirements of Church Law, such is not the case;
(3)
the balance of convenience favours the granting of relief.
The
Plaintiff further seeks to rely upon the provisions of the planning code in
that the Cathedral is a listed building; and to postpone determination of his
application pending implementation of an Order for Discovery of documents to
which he has brought a separate application.
In
reply, the Defendants submit that they are empowered to carry out the proposals
under the terms of Canon Law; and that in any event the Plaintiff has no locus
standi by virtue of the provisions of Section 51 of the Charities Act, 1961.
The
real issue arising on this application is whether the Plaintiff can show an
arguable case that in carrying out these alterations the Defendants would be in
breach of the Trust under which the Cathedral is held. The Plaintiff's sole
argument under this heading is that the changes proposed are not mandatory
under Church Law. But to make this submission he relies upon a document which
so indicates but at the same time further states that it is the right and duty
of the local Bishop to decide questions of the type in issue here. Perhaps
realising this, Counsel for the Plaintiff seeks discovery, hoping thereby to
obtain documents contradicting the assertions made by the Defendants as to
their powers.
The
Defendants maintain that the property is held subject to Canon Law and that
they have the right under Canon Law to do as they propose. Nothing which the
Plaintiff has submitted raises a substantial issue as to the validity of this
contention; the contrary is the case. Nor has the Plaintiff made out a case for
discovery.
In
the course of the hearing an opportunity was given to the parties to make
submissions as to the rights of the beneficiaries of a Public Charitable Trust
and whether or not they could enforce their views on the Trustees.
Consideration of the authorities to which I was referred establish in my view
that the powers given to the Trustees cannot be overset by the beneficiaries.
Although there was no authority directly dealing with the control of the
Trustees' powers by the beneficiaries, the tenor of the authorities was against
any such right. Nor was it at any time suggested that any such right existed in
Canon Law.
I
do not consider the fact that the Cathedral is a listed building in the
development plan for the county as meaning that the interior features of the
Cathedral are likewise listed. This dispute has now been going on for in or
about two years and at no time has the local authority taken any steps to
indicate that it would regard the proposed alterations as being a breach of its
development plan.
The
Defendants maintain that these proceedings cannot be continued by the Plaintiff
in the absence of the consent of the Attorney General. Section 51(1) of the
Charities Act, 1961 provides as follows:-
"In
every case of a breach or supposed breach of any Trust for Charitable purposes
or whenever the direction or Order of the High Court is considered necessary
for the administration of any Trust for Charitable purposes, the Board or, with
the consent of the Attorney General, any person may apply to the Court for such
relief as the nature of the case may require and the Court may make such Order
thereon as the Court thinks fit."
It
is submitted that the Attorney General must be a party to any proceedings of
the type now before the Court and that the Plaintiff cannot maintain any such
proceedings by virtue of the provisions of this section. There is no doubt that
the authorities support totally the contentions of the Defendants. However, in
my view, the Plaintiff even if entitled to proceed in his own name would not be
entitled to the relief which he seeks. It is not necessary now to determine the
issue of locus standi. In any event, the Attorney General has refused to give
his consent.
The
final argument made on behalf of the Plaintiff is that the balance of
convenience lies with the Plaintiff. Obviously, if the sole motivation of the
Court was to prevent an irredeemable step being taken, then this balance would
favour the Plaintiff. However, that is not the sole question arising on this
issue. My view, it would be unfair to the Defendants to hold up their plans
further balancing their case with that of the Plaintiff.
In
the circumstances, the reliefs claimed will be refused.