High Court of Ireland Decisions

1. In these proceedings, the Plaintiff claims damages for injuries and loss she sustained as a result of a riding accident at the second Defendant's riding establishment, Forest Way Lodge, at Roundwood, County Wicklow, which was under the management and control of the first Defendant, on 24th November, 1990, which accident she alleges occurred by reason of negligence and breach of duty on the part of the Defendants.

2. In November 1990 the Plaintiff was 36 years of age. She had learnt to ride as a child and continued to ride during her teenage years, mainly on ponies. She ceased riding regularly at the age of 17 and she never rode after she became pregnant at the age of 20 until November 1990.

3. On 3rd November, 1990 the Plaintiff went riding at Forest Way Lodge in a group of five, the other four members of the group being her aunt, Claudette George, her friend, Judy Baker, and Robert Thomas and Anthony Thomas. This was her first time at the Defendants' establishment. She was asked by the first Defendant if she had ridden before. There was a conflict of evidence as to what she told the first Defendant. The Plaintiff's testimony was that she had told her she had ridden a lot on ponies as a child but had laid off riding for 16 or 17 years. The first Defendant testified that what she was told was that the Plaintiff had not ridden for a while, the exact length of time not being specified. In my view, nothing much turns on this conflict, as the accident did not happen until the Plaintiff's fourth visit to the Defendants' establishment. On 3rd November, 1990 the group, accompanied by the first Defendant, went on a forest trek. Judy Baker rode a four year old cob, Eddie. The Plaintiff rode a Connemara pony. From the Plaintiff's perspective the trek was uneventful.

4. The Plaintiff and Anthony Thomas and Robert Thomas returned to Forest Way Lodge on the 10th November, 1990 and, again, on the 17th November, 1990. On 10th November, 1990, the Plaintiff rode Eddie and on the 17th November, 1990, she rode the Connemara pony. On both occasions, she and her companions went for a trek through the forest. The second and third visits were also uneventful.

5. On 17th November, 1990, the Plaintiff and Anthony Thomas and Robert Thomas booked in for the following Saturday, 24th November, 1990, to do the cross-country course, which involved getting instruction in jumping from the first Defendant.

6. The cross-country course was part of a tract of land which comprised 22 acres. The jumps were laid out on the portion of this tract of land, which comprised approximately 12 acres, which was nearest to the stables. The land fell away as one travelled further from the stables. The lower ground, that is to say, below the 12 acres area was boggy and overgrown with gorse bushes. The 12 acres area had physical boundaries on three sides and the fourth boundary, where it adjoined the 10 acres, was undefined. The 12 acres area was bisected longitudinally by a man-made drain which meandered down through the 10 acres area as a stream. When the land had been reclaimed two years before the accident, stones and boulders were placed in the drain and stream.

7. The 24th November, 1990 was a cold, wet, miserable day. However, the Plaintiff and Robert Thomas decided to do the cross-country course. The Plaintiff was given Eddie to ride. The first Defendant testified that the Plaintiff had specifically reserved Eddie but the Plaintiff denied this. In my view, nothing much turns on this conflict. The Plaintiff and her companion trotted around in a circle for a while to warm up. The Plaintiff was then brought to the jumps where she was instructed how to jump. She jumped the complete circuit under instruction. There is conflict as to what happened then. The Plaintiff's testimony was that she was told to go around again by the first Defendant but she was reluctant to do so because she was cold. The first Defendant testified that it was the Plaintiff who indicated that she would like to go around again. In any event, the Plaintiff indicated that she did not put forward any strong objection. Again, in my view, nothing much turns on this conflict. There is a significant conflict, however, as to what happened in the course of the second circuit and it is a conflict which I must resolve.

8. The Plaintiff's evidence was that nothing untoward happened until she came to the first of two stone walls, the jump marked "9" on the sketch map of the course put in evidence by the Defendants. She jumped over the first stone wall successfully but during the approach to the second stone wall there was a sudden hailstorm. Eddie took off. He ducked out to the left and did not take the second stone wall. He kept going faster and faster down the course and further on into the lower boggy ground through rocks and gorse. The Plaintiff could not stop him, although she was " yanking like mad ". The saddle was wet and slippery and the reins were wet and slippery also. Suddenly, as Eddie veered around a bush to the right, she saw the stream. She grabbed the left rein in both hands to stop him jumping the stream. She thought she had succeeded, but he took off. She fell off to the right. She fell backwards and hit her back on the ground and was lying in the stream amidst boulders. She was knocked unconscious and when she came to she managed to haul herself up on to the bank.

9. The first Defendant's account of what happened on the second circuit was that the Plaintiff jumped the first jump and then turned right and headed for the jumps marked "2" and "3" on the sketch map. These were two parallel sides of a four sided pen. When the Plaintiff had jumped jump "2" and was in the middle of the pen there was a sudden hailstorm. The horse was startled for a few strides but cleared jump "3". The first Defendant thought that the Plaintiff was going to carry on and turn left to jump jump "4". However, the Plaintiff went straight down the course. The first Defendant called to her to turn left in the belief that she was just swinging wide. It did not seem to the first Defendant that there was a problem. Eddie looked to be under control. He was cantering at a normal steady canter. He had been frightened for no more than three strides. The Plaintiff continued down the course in a straight line diagonally toward the drain. She continued on to the furthest obstacle, jump "11" on the sketch map, and beyond that Eddie jumped the stream and the Plaintiff went in. The first Defendant did not know why the Plaintiff was unable to control Eddie. Perhaps the Plaintiff panicked, she suggested, or perhaps she could not see where she was going because of the hail.

10. The significant difference between the two versions is that, according to the Plaintiff's version, Eddie bolted when the hailstorm started and was uncontrollable until the Plaintiff came off, whereas, according to the version of the first Defendant, Eddie regained his composure after about three startled steps but for some reason the Plaintiff subsequently lost control. Although the version of the first Defendant was corroborated by Anthony Thomas and Robert Thomas, their testimony was too pat to be credible. The first intimation the first Defendant received that the Plaintiff was contemplating suing her was when she received a solicitor's letter in July 1993, almost three years after the incident. I think that at this remove the first Defendant's recollection of what happened after the hailstorm commenced is faulty, because her version does not make sense, whereas the Plaintiff's version is entirely plausible. I find that Eddie bolted when the hailstorm started and galloped off out of control and was uncontrollable up to the point in time when the Plaintiff came off in the stream.

11. Before addressing the allegations of negligence made against the Defendants, I want to dispose of two further issues of fact which arose. First, Judy Baker testified that when she was riding Eddie on 3rd November, 1990 he bolted, but her testimony, which was corroborated by Claudette George, was refuted by the first Defendant. Whatever caused Ms. Baker's uneasiness on that occasion, in my view, it is not of significance in determining whether the Defendants were negligent on the 24th November, 1990. I am not satisfied, on the evidence, that Eddie had a propensity to bolt. Secondly, it was alleged that on the 24th November, 1990, Eddie's harness did not include a neck strap. I accept the evidence of the first Defendant that it did.

12. The Plaintiff contended that the Defendants were negligent and in breach of their duty of care to her in supplying her with a horse which was unsuitable for her and was unsafe and dangerous for her having regard to her limited riding experience. Furthermore, it was contended, the cross-country course was unsafe because it was not segregated by a physical boundary, such as a fence, from the boggy overgrown ground with which it was contiguous.

13. Two equestrian experts testified: Colonel William Ringrose for the Plaintiff and John Watson for the Defendants. The first Defendant testified that she had purchased Eddie in March 1990. He had been broken as a two and half year old. He had been used for a year in a riding school and he had been hunted over the previous winter.

14. In the opinion of Colonel Ringrose, a four year old is only half trained. He is easily alarmed and his behaviour is unpredictable. If his flight response is triggered, he is liable to get out of control of any other than an experienced rider. The Plaintiff had ridden mostly ponies. She had not ridden for 16 years except on three occasions, on two of which she rode a pony. Colonel Ringrose was of the view that the Plaintiff should not have been put up a four year old horse. He was also of the view that had there been a fence or a boundary at the bottom of the cross-country course, Eddie would have run only as far as the boundary or fence and he would have been contained by it and prevented from going out into the countryside where the difficulty of getting him under control was exacerbated by the nature of the countryside which, in his view, was dangerous for both the horse and the rider. Because of a combination of factors - the age of the horse, the inexperience of the rider and the absence of a physical boundary or fence to contain the horse within safe terrain - the cross-country exercise was not carried out in safety. His conclusion was that because of these factors, when the sudden hailstorm occurred and the horse ran out at the fence and the rider and the horse became alarmed, an accident was almost inevitable.

15. Mr. Watson rode Eddie in June 1996, six years after the accident, and found him easy to control and extremely biddable and of even disposition. He accepted that a four year old horse is a young horse but, in his view, the important factor is the stage his training is at. Eddie, on the evidence, had been working for one year and had been hunting and was well used by November 1990. Mr. Watson did not agree with Colonel Ringrose's opinion that a four year old should not be used in a riding school. He did acknowledge that the terrain below jump "11" as shown on the Defendants' sketch was not suitable for teaching in that it was boggy and footing would be unsure. However, he did not see the need to enclose the 12 acres area in which the cross-country course had been laid out, because to do so would negate the whole notion of the cross-country experience, the purpose of which is to learn how to ride over natural terrain and how to manage a horse in open countryside. The sudden hailstorm was unnatural and freakish and was an alarming and unsettling experience for the horse. When the horse is unsettled, it becomes unpredictable and anything can happen.

16. To state that horse riding and jumping is a risky sport, as both experts acknowledged, is to state the obvious. The Plaintiff in participating in this sport accepted the normal hazards and dangers inherent in it. The question I have to determine is whether the Defendants exposed the Plaintiff to risk of injury which was reasonably foreseeable but which is not normally inherent in undergoing instruction in cross-country riding in an equestrian centre.

17. I do not think that the fact that Eddie was a young horse, a four year old, of itself rendered him unsuitable as a mount for the Plaintiff, nor do I think that the combination of his age and the absence of recent riding experience on the part of the Plaintiff rendered them a mismatch. However, somewhat diffidently, I have come to the conclusion that the absence of a physical boundary or fence segregating the cross-country course from the unsafe terrain below it, rendered the cross-country course unsafe for instructing novices in that equestrian discipline. Had a fence been in situ, on the basis of Colonel Ringrose's evidence, I think it unlikely that the horse would have jumped it and I think it would probably have contained the horse and rider within safe terrain. The absence of a fence exposed the frightened and relatively inexperienced rider on an alarmed and relatively inexperienced horse to the dangers of the boggy and overgrown terrain which, in my view, were reasonably foreseeable and caused the accident. Accordingly, I hold that the Defendants were negligent and in their breach of duty of care to the Plaintiff.

18. In their amended Defence, which was admitted at the hearing of the action by consent, the Defendants, in addition to denying that they were negligent or in breach of duty, pleaded the following defences:-

19. The second notice was in the following terms:-

20. In my view, neither of the above notices is open to the construction that the Defendants, as distinct from A.I.R.E., were disclaiming liability for negligence and breach of duty.

21. Following the accident, the Plaintiff was hospitalised in Loughlinstown Hospital for approximately one month. She was treated by Mr. S. Kieran O'Rourke, Consultant Orthopaedic Surgeon. Two medical reports of Mr. O'Rourke, dated respectively 30th November, 1993 and 20th July, 1995, were admitted in evidence. In his first report, Mr. O'Rourke recorded that the Plaintiff had sustained a crush fracture of L1 in a horse riding accident. X-rays showed a moderately severe burst fracture of L1 with some retropulsion of bone into the canal. However, in the absence of neurological deficit, he had treated the fracture conservatively with a brace. By November 1993, the Plaintiff had made a very full recovery from a potentially serious injury. In his second report, Mr. O'Rourke gave his opinion and prognosis as follows:-

22. Prior to the accident, the Plaintiff worked as a cook. She was employed by Campbell Catering Limited at the Packard Electric factory in Tallaght. She was "kept on the books" for one year after the accident. On 29th October, 1991, she was examined by Dr. Anthony J. Hynes for Campbell Catering Limited, who advised her employer that she was then unfit for employment as a chef. Her employment was terminated in November 1991 and subsequently she was in receipt of unemployment benefit.

23. The Plaintiff is a university graduate with a B.A. Degree from the National University of Ireland. Between 1975 and the date of her accident, she worked in various capacities in the catering business, including in a management capacity, and must have gained considerable experience of the catering business. On the basis of the reports of her treating doctor, Mr. O'Rourke, I can only conclude that within three years of the accident at the outside she was physically capable of work in the catering industry which would have netted her an income of the same level as she would have netted had she remained in the employment of Campbell Catering Limited as a cook. There is no evidence that the Plaintiff has at any time since her accident sought alternative employment in the catering sector. Since she recovered from her injuries, she has pursued training courses in skills employed in the advertising business - copy writing and graphics and such like. While the Plaintiff has not returned to full-time employment since the accident, in my view, this is attributable to a deliberate choice on the part of the Plaintiff to change her career rather than to incapacity for or an inability to procure work of the type she was engaged in prior to her accident. In short, in my view, the Plaintiff has failed to mitigate her loss. All she is entitled to recover, in my view, is loss of earnings for three years following her accident, which, on the basis of the evidence, I calculate at £16,000. In my view, the Plaintiff cannot sustain a claim for future loss of earnings.

24. In relation to general damages, I consider that the appropriate level of damages to compensate the Plaintiff for pain and suffering to date is £20.000 and for pain and suffering in the future is £20,000.

25. Accordingly, the total award of damages to which the Plaintiff is entitled is £56,000.