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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> High Court of Ireland Decisions >> Casey v. Minister for Agriculture [1987] IEHC 10 (6 February 1987)
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Cite as: [1987] IEHC 10
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Casey v. Minister for Agriculture [1987] IEHC 10 (6 February 1987)\
Cork Circuit No. 3035 1981
BETWEEN/
THE HIGH COURT
AINDREAS CASEY
Plaintiff
and
THE MINISTER FOR AGRICULTURE
Defendant
JUDGMENT OF MCCARTHY J. delivered the 6th day of February 1987
The plaintiff's claim falls under two headings:
1. The Calved Heifer Scheme in 1983
2. The Bovine Brucellosis Eradication Scheme operated under the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966.
1. The Calved Heifer Scheme. This is a non-statutory scheme operated by the Minister for Agriculture with the object of encouraging the expansion of the cattle breeding herd by providing grants on additional calved heifers kept by herd owners above their normal cow herd replacements. The scheme is set out in detail in application form HE 83 and, so far as relevant, included terms and conditions, in particular, Condition 9 which read:
"The Minister may refuse payment or recover payment already made in whole or in part in any case where he is satisfied that the applicant
(a) has failed to comply fully with these terms and conditions: or
(b) has made a false or misleading statement in his application or declaration or to ;
an inspecting officer or to any other officer of the Department under this Scheme or under any other livestock headage scheme operated by the Department; or
(c) has failed to comply fully with the provisions of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966 or of any official scheme in operation for the eradication of animal disease.
The Minister's decision on all matters relating to the operation of this Scheme shall be final."
The latter provision as to the finality of the Minister's decision is, of course, only in the administrative sense - there can be no further administrative appeal or other action taken once the Minister's decision is made. This cannot exclude the supervisory role of the Courts.
2. The Bovine Brucellosis Eradication Scheme. The conditions attaching to this Scheme, so far as relevant, are contained in Form TB 3O4B (revised in 1982) and, in particular, in Condition 6 which prescribes:
"The Minister may, in any event, at his discretion refuse payment in whole or in part of the reactor grant(s) payable in any case where he is satisfied that the owner has not complied with the provisions of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966 or with movement, identification or other controls under any official scheme for the eradication of animal diseases."
It will be seen, accordingly, that the two schemes it while both concerning the farming industry, are quite different in their immediate purpose; at the same time 1''f. they are administered by the same Department of State.
The plaintiff, a farmer at Carberrytown, Glanmire, Co. Cork, claimed the reactor grant in respect of two animals tagged on the 28th October 1983 and the calved heifer grant in respect of 42 animals which first calved in 1982 and 1983; the amounts recoverable if the grants were payable would be £400 and £1,540 respectively.
At hearings of the District Court on the 18th October and 25th November 1983, the plaintiff was prosecuted for certain offences alleged to have been committed under the provisions of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966. Whilst in both cases the offences were held proved in one instance the District Justice applied the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act and dismissed the charge. The plaintiff successfully appealed against the other conviction and in respect of the application of the Probation Act (18th October 1983) for the offence of failure to give information as required by s. 48 of the 1966 Act, whilst he appealed, he withdrew that appeal although, of course, no conviction had been entered having regard to the provisions of the 1908 Act. By letter of the 18th January 1984, the appropriate official of the Department of Agriculture notified the plaintiff of the refusal to pay the reactor grants "since you were convicted in the District Court for breaches of the Animal Health Regulations...". When the plaintiff's former solicitors contested this refusal, there was an elaboration or, indeed, a slight change of emphasis by the Department which stated (22nd February 1984) having quoted Condition 6 of the reactor scheme:
"Notwithstanding the outcome of any appeal against the Court decisions of 18th October and 25th November 1983, the Minister is satisfied that your client has not complied with Condition 6 and the grants totalling £400 have accordingly been disallowed."
On the 9th July 1985, the departmental official stated:
"The position is that grants amounting to £1,540 under the 1983 Calved Heifer Scheme and grants totalling £400 under the Disease Eradication Schemes have been disallowed for breaches of this Department's Animal Health Regulations."
An elaboration was given by letter of the 11th August 1985 stating:
"For your information the details of offence and of conviction etc. are:-Conviction imposed on 18th October 1983 -Probation Act applied - for failure to give information as required by s. 48 of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966 to Garda O'Brien on 14th June 1983.
Since Mr. Casey, on 24th April last, withdrew his appeal relating to this offence the conviction still stands."
A little additional padding was given by letter of the 17th October 1985 which again quoted Condition 6 and added:
"Notwithstanding that the application of the Probation Act is technically not a conviction it nevertheless does not amount to an acquittal. It means that the charge has been proved and as such the Minister is quite entitled to exercise his discretion and refuse payments of the grants on the grounds that there is evidence and that he is satisfied that your client did not comply with the provisions of the Diseases of Animals Act, 1966 or with identification or other controls under any official scheme for the eradication of animal diseases."
Whilst the claim for the plaintiff was framed in more than one form, it is, essentially, that the fact of the dismissal of the charges against the plaintiff precludes the Minister, through his officials, from denying the payment of the grants. It may be that there are cases where the grounds for refusal are so entwined with the facts of a criminal case that it can be shown that the dismissal of the criminal charge amounts to a judicial finding that the alleged facts upon which the Minister would seek to base a decision to refuse payment are not open to an adverse conclusion - that, in effect, the Minister is bound by what can be demonstrated to be the finding of fact by the judicial power. This is, clearly, not such a case. I have no satisfactory evidence as to what was the reason for the appeal being allowed in the Circuit Court, but, more to the point as a self-evident feature, there is no doubt but that on the 18th October 1983 the facts amounting to a criminal offence were held proved but that before proceeding to a conviction the District Justice decided to apply the provisions of the Probation of Offenders Act for the plaintiff's benefit; the plaintiff appealed against that decision but did not proceed with the appeal and the order still stands. It is the obverse side of the coin that the Minister might well not be found to reject a claim on the mere production of the District Court Order; it is sufficient to determine this case, however, that I hold, as I do, that the Minister is not precluded from coming to a conclusion adverse to the plaintiff under the two separate conditions, each relevant to its scheme, which I have quoted at the commencement of this judgment. It may be that the handling of the plaintiff's claim for the payment of the grants was not the most felicitous; that does not deny the Minister the right to have the exercise of his discretion upheld, its good faith not being impugned.
I dismiss the claim.