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Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland/ Rules of Professional Conduct/ Ethical Guide for Members [2000] IECA 584 (18th September, 2000)
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Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland/ Rules of Professional Conduct/ Ethical Guide for Members [2000] IECA 584 (18th September, 2000)
COMPETITION
AUTHORITY
Competition
Authority Decision of 18 September 2000 relating to a proceeding under Section
4 of the Competition Act, 1991.
Notification
No. CA/827/92E - Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland/ Rules of
Professional Conduct
Notification
No. CA/828/92E - Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland – Ethical
Guide for Members
Decision
No. 584
Price
£1.50
£2.00
Notification
No. CA/827/92E - Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland/ Rules of
Professional Conduct
Notification
No. CA/828/92E - Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland – Ethical
Guide for Members
Decision
No. 584
Introduction
1. Notification
was made of arrangements by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland
on 30 September 1992 with a request for a certificate under
Section 4(4) of the
Competition Act, 1991 or, in the event of a refusal to issue a certificate, a
licence under
Section 4(2) of
the Act.
THE
FACTS
(a)
Subject
of the Notification
2. The
Notifications the subject of this Decision concern the Institute’s Rules
of Professional Conduct (CA/827/92) and Ethical Guide for Members (CA/828/92E).
In addition, the Institute notified its Bye-Laws (CA/826/92)
[1].
The three notifications together dealt essentially with the professional rules
and guidelines for members of the chartered accountancy profession in Ireland
as well as with the internal organisational rules of the Institute itself.
(b)
The
Parties Involved
3.1 The
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI) was established by Royal
Charter on 14 May 1888. In 1999, it had a membership of over 11,000 and 2,600
students. Membership has been growing steadily, as illustrated by the figures
below.
Members
Students
1990
7,181
2,200
1992
7,982
2,200
1995
9,500
2,500
1997
10,400 2,500
1999
11,200 2,600
3.2 While
the recruitment of trainees had been running at 600 to 700 per annum in recent
years, this increased to 820 in 1999. Every person of satisfactory educational
standard who obtains a training place in any of the 588 training firms approved
by the Institute is accepted as a student and can sit the Institute's
examinations leading to membership.
3.3 The
Institute’s mission was stated to be “
to
enhance business performance through providing accounting and financial
knowledge and services of the highest professional standards, delivered with
integrity
”.
The Institute was dedicated to leading and promoting Chartered Accountancy,
assuring quality to the public and achieving excellence in education and in
support of its members. It pursued this mission through a combination of the
following measures:-
- The
education, training and qualification of prospective chartered accountants.
- The
support of members through services such as continuing professional
development,
technical advice and practice review.
- The
maintenance of high professional standards among members by regulation.
- The
representation and advancement of members’
interests
in public policy issues.
(c)
The
Products and the Markets
4.1 The
Institute claimed that the relevant market was the provision of accountancy-
related services in Ireland. Within this general market there was an important
distinction between two broad categories of work carried out by chartered
accountants: (i) the statutory audit of company accounts, which could only be
carried out by registered members of approved bodies and (ii) general work of a
financial nature carried out on behalf of industry, financial services, the
public sector or other sectors, which work drew considerably on the
professional training and expertise of chartered accountants, but which was not
necessarily confined by statute or regulation to any one professional
discipline. To illustrate this point, the Institute claimed that some 60% of
its current active membership worked in business, as opposed to being in
professional practice.
4.2 The
Institute stated that the statutory audit market was regulated by a combination
of (i) EU law, (ii) domestic statute and (iii) professional rules of conduct.
At EU level, the
Eighth
Company Law Directive
(84/523/EEC)
laid down criteria in relation to education and training of accountants,
certain requirements in relation to standards of ethics, codes of conduct and
practice, independence, professional integrity, technical standards and
disciplinary procedures, to be observed by recognised bodies and by authorised
personnel in undertaking audit work in all Member States. The Institute drew
the Authority’s attention to the provision in Section II (“
Rules
on approval
”)
and Section III (“
Professional
Integrity and Independence
”).
The Eighth Directive had been transposed into Irish law by the
Companies Act,
1990 (Sections 187-191) and by the
Companies Act 1990 (Auditors) Regulations,
1992 (SI No. 259 of 1992). Prior, and in addition, to these EU requirements,
Sections 147-
164 of the
Companies Act, 1963 provided for the proper keeping of
accounts and the audit of company accounts, as well as the appointment of
auditors and the qualifications required for such appointment.
Section 162 of
the 1963 Act, in particular, provided that, amongst other things, “
a
person shall not be qualified for appointment as auditor of a company or as a
public auditor unless - (a) he is a member of a body of accountants for the
time being recognised for the purpose of this section by the Minister
.................”.
4.3 The
Institute stated that there were six professional bodies of accountants in
Ireland. These were:-
1. The
Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland (ICAI)
2. The
Association of Chartered Certified Accountants (ACCA)
3. The
Institute of Certified Public Accountants in Ireland (ICPAI)
4. The
Institute of Incorporated Public Accountants (IIPA)
5 The
Chartered Institute of Management Accountants (CIMA)
6. The
Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy (CIPFA).
4.4 The
first three bodies were long-established and, together with the Chartered
Institute of Management Accountants, they formed the Consultative Committee of
Accountancy Bodies of Ireland (CCAB-I). The first three bodies were recognised
accountancy bodies for the purposes of
Section 162 of the 1963 Act and
Section
190(1) of the
Companies Act, 1990
[2].
The fourth body - the Institute of Incorporated Public Accountants - was first
recognised for audit purposes under the Companies Acts in 1996. This
recognition had been the subject of judicial review proceedings.
The
members of the Chartered Institute of Management Accountants did not audit the
accounts of companies, but rather worked mainly as professional accountants
within companies. That body had not sought recognition under
Section 190(1) of
the 1990 Act. The members of the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and
Accountancy worked primarily within the public sector, were relatively few in
number and also did not audit the accounts of companies. The Institute claimed
that, for all practical purposes, the first three bodies represented the
overwhelming majority of qualified auditors within the State and they had set
the standards and rules of conduct and performance required of an auditor.
4.5 The
Institute estimated that there were approximately 15,000 professional
accountants active in the State, of which the ICAI accounted for about 50%.
(Approximately 4,000 of ICAI's members were in Northern Ireland, Great Britain
or overseas).
4.6 On
the demand side of the market, the customers were all companies, individuals
and other organisations throughout the State which required statutory audit
services or more general business advisory services entailing expertise in
accountancy matters. The latter services were provided by accountants either
as employees within business, or as consultants/advisors in a
professional-client relationship.
4.7 The
Institute estimated that the total income generated by the provision of
accountancy services on a professional basis within the State was approx.
£500 million, of which over 80% accrues to chartered accountants.
(d)
Structure
of the Market
5.1 The
Institute stated that the audit and general accountancy markets could be seen
as two broad areas of work within the accountancy profession. From the
consumer’s perspective, the demand for audit services was distinct from
the demand for general accountancy services and they were clearly
non-substitutable. Audit was a statutory responsibility that firms have to
meet under the
Companies Act. However, in the Authority’s view, the
audit work of firms and general accountancy work are very good substitutes in
supply, in that a given chartered accountancy firm can easily shift resources
to increase its audit capacity at the expense of the general accountancy side
of its business. Furthermore, with the increasing importance of consultancy to
the fee income of chartered accountants, the audit function of firms gives them
a competitive advantage in competing for lucrative consultancy work
[3].
- A
cursory glance at
Table
1
shows that five firms dominate the landscape in terms of fee income, with 77%
of the fee income of the top 20 firms in the State.
Table
1: Estimated Fee Income of Top 20 Firms in the State 1999
Firm
|
1999
IR£M
|
Market
Share
(i.e.
share of income of top 20 firms)
|
Price
Waterhouse Coopers
|
78.00
|
24.22%
|
KPMG
|
65.60
|
20.25%
|
Arthur
Andersen
|
37.50
|
11.65%
|
Ernst
& Young
|
34.00
|
10.56%
|
Deloitte
& Touche
|
33.00
|
10.25%
|
BDO
Simpson Xavier
|
18.03
|
5.60%
|
Grant
Thornton
Group
|
10.00
|
3.11%
|
Oliver
Freaney
|
6.84
|
2.12%
|
Chapman
Flood Mazars
|
6.00
|
1.86%
|
Farrell
Grant Sparks
|
5.35
|
1.66%
|
IFAC
Accountants
|
4.79
|
1.49%
|
Bastow
Charlton
|
3.95
|
1.23%
|
Pannell
Kerr Foster
|
3.30
|
1.02%
|
Russell
Brennan Keane
|
3.15
|
Under
1%
|
VF
Nathan & Co
|
2.57
|
do.
|
O'Connor
Leddy Holmes
|
2.27
|
do.
|
Ormsby
and Rhodes
|
2.01
|
do.
|
O'Hare
& Associates
|
1.95
|
do.
|
Hopkins
O’Halloran Grant
|
1.86
|
do.
|
Ryan
Glennon & Co
|
1.85
|
do.
|
TOTAL
|
322.02
|
c.100.00%
|
Source:
Finance
magazine, September 1999.
5.3 As
many of the firms just outside the top five are also allied with international
firms, there are continuing opportunities for lower ranking firms to expand.
Smaller companies are more likely to rely on smaller accountancy firms to
perform their audits.
5.4 The
ICAI was reported in April 1998 to have withdrawn the audit registration of two
firms for failure to hold the required professional indemnity insurance. The
ICAI conducted an investigation into possible breaches of professional
misconduct by firms named in the McCracken Tribunal
.
At the outset of this investigation, in October 1997,
Section 192(2) of the
Companies Act, 1990 was invoked by the Tanaiste to require the Institute to
allow representatives from the Department of Enterprise, Trade and Employment
to attend the proceedings. This amendment was to be extended to all
accountancy bodies and meant that representatives of the Department must be
granted unrestricted access to any committee of inquiry established by any of
the accountancy bodies. In response to the affair, the ICAI announced in May
1998 that its disciplinary procedures would be more open and transparent.
These changes were approved by the ICAI's membership at a Special General
Meeting in February 1999, revised Bye-Laws were approved by the Irish
Government and the Privy Council in Northern Ireland accordingly, and these
have been in operation since early 2000.
(e)
The
Notified Arrangements
6.1 The
Institute submitted that the
Ethical
Guide
was an aid to members in the identification of occasions where they might be at
risk of failing to recognise or conform to the professional standards required
of all members. It took the form of a reiteration of Fundamental Principles
and Statements elaborating on the behaviour required of members in specified
situations in order to uphold those Principles. Examples of typical situations
dealt with were insolvency practice, conflicts of interest, confidentiality,
dealing with threatened litigation, obtaining professional work, how to deal
with offers of hospitality which might threaten or be perceived to threaten
professional objectivity, etc. The Institute claimed that the sole overriding
concern throughout the Guide was to assist members to uphold professional
integrity. In Statement No. 10 on Fees, for example, the Institute confined
itself to elaborating on members’ entitlements to charge fees, the
advisability of clearly establishing the basis for fees in advance with
clients, the customary criteria for setting fees where a basis had not been
agreed with a client, handling fee information and disputes with clients etc.
The Institute asked the Authority to note that the former expressly disavowed
any intention to prescribe or recommend charge-out rates.
6.2 The
Institute claimed that the
Rules
of Professional Conduct
were binding on all members and students of the Institute. They were designed
to ensure that the principles which were fundamental to the professional
standing of chartered accountants in the business world were implemented and
that the public interest was protected. These principles, which were described
in
sections 101 to
104 under the heading “Fundamental Principles”,
related exclusively to questions of integrity, main professional standards and
looking after the interests of clients and employers. Among the matters
covered were -
-
The
duty of a member, before accepting any professional assignment or occupation,
to make all reasonable and necessary enquiries to ensure that the assignment
will not reflect adversely upon his/her integrity and objectivity. Where a
member was about to accept an appointment in public accounting, thereby
replacing another public accountant, there was an obligation on him to
communicate with the latter to enquire whether there were any circumstances
which should be taken into account in deciding whether or not to accept
appointment (Rule 401).
- All
members in practice and resident in the State were obliged to ensure that their
firm complied with the professional indemnity insurance regulations. These
included an obligation to take those steps that could reasonably be expected to
ensure that the firm was able to meet claims against it arising out of
professional business, to arrange insurance cover within specified limits, and
to effect insurance through policies which met the criteria of Qualifying
Insurance (Rules 500 to 533).
(f)
Submissions
by the Notifying Party
7.1 The
Institute stated that it was the professional organisation responsible for all
chartered accountants in the State. As such, it constituted an
“association of undertakings” within the meaning of
Section 4 of
the 1991 Act, although it should be acknowledged that it was in a special
category of “association” by virtue of its professional character
and its obligation, which derived from statute as well as from its professional
status, to ensure that proper standards were established and upheld. The
Institute argued that the three arrangements originally notified should be
considered together by the Authority.
Arguments
in support of request for the issuing of a Certificate
8.1 The
Institute claimed that the rules and guidelines which were the subject of its
notifications represented a “decision of an association of
undertakings” for the purpose of
Section 4 of the
Competition Act, 1991.
This view was in keeping with EU case law under Article 85 of the Treaty of Rome
[4]
and, indeed, with the Competition Authority's own thinking on such
arrangements, as indicated in its
Decision
No. 16
-
Association
of Optometrists
.
8.2 The
Institute claimed that the general case law on competition and professional
organisations could be summarised, for present purposes, as follows. Those
activities of a professional organisation which dealt with such matters as
establishing and upholding professional standards by rules on training,
registration of members, codes of conduct, disciplinary measures etc. did not
infringe competition law provided they were confined to realising these
objectives, were based on objective qualitative criteria and were not deployed
in a manner which could give rise to a restriction of competition. For example,
Rules of Conduct should be designed solely to uphold the professional integrity
of members and of the overall profession itself, and should not be a means of
co-ordinating the competitive behaviour of members. Also, there should be no
suggestion or evidence of imposing or recommending fee levels, minimum fees,
allocating or sharing customers, co-ordinating marketing strategies etc.
8.3 The
Institute claimed that each of the notified arrangements satisfied these
criteria. The arrangements were limited to discharging the Institute’s
statutory responsibility to uphold standards of audit of companies, to
promoting general professional standards of accountancy practice in the
business world and to advancing the collective interests of Institute members.
The individual members of the Institute retained complete freedom to decide on
their competitive policies on matters such as pricing, marketing services etc.;
there was no suggestion of the Institute attempting to co-ordinate these
activities.
8.4 Accordingly,
the Institute submitted that the notified arrangements did not prevent,
restrict or distort competition in the provision of accountancy services in the
State or in any part of the State and that a certificate should be granted by
the Authority.
Arguments
in Support of Granting a Licence
9.1 The
Institute claimed that a licence only arose if, and to the extent that, the
notified arrangements were deemed to restrict competition contrary to
Section
4(1) of the 1991 Act in the first place. The Institute claimed that there was
no restriction on competition in the notified arrangements. It stated, that
rather than engaging in hypothetical arguments at that stage - which would
amount to a largely artificial exercise which would hardly be of assistance to
the Authority - they proposed to reserve the right to advance arguments for a
licence on grounds set out in
Section 4(2) of the 1991 Act in the future, in
the event of the Authority concluding that the notified arrangements did
restrict competition contrary to
Section 4(1).
Other
Information
10. The
arrangements have not been notified to the European Commission pursuant to
Article 85 of the EEC Treaty. Nor are they the subject of competition law
proceedings in any jurisdiction. There were no submissions from third parties.
(g) Subsequent
Developments
11.1 The
Authority, following its initial assessment, issued Statements of Objections in
both cases on 13 October 1998, and published Notice of its Intention to refuse
a Certificate or Licence to the arrangements notified.
Ethical
Guide
11.2 As
regards the Institute’s Ethical Guide, the Authority’s Objections
centred around certain aspects of some of the Statements contained in the
Guide. These are described briefly below.
Statement
6: Changes in a Professional Appointment
- Statement
6, Section 1.0, of the Ethical Guide states that, notwithstanding the right of
clients to choose their auditors -
“...it
is necessary, in the interests of both public and the existing auditor or advisor
and prospective auditor or advisor, for a member who is asked to act by a
prospective client in respect of an audit or recurring accounting services and
taxation work of a compliance nature, to communicate with the existing auditor
or advisor, and for the latter to reply promptly as to any considerations which
might affect the prospective auditor or advisers decision whether or not to
accept appointment.”
The
Authority considered that a consumer of any good or service should, in
principle, be able to change his supplier without the hindrance of the existing
supplier having, in effect, first refusal. The Authority further considered
that the requirement in the Statement had the effect of encouraging the
incumbent accountant to overstate concerns he might have about a client who was
about to move its business to another firm. It concluded that Statement 6 of
the Ethical Guide had the object or effect of preventing, restricting or
distorting competition in the provision of auditing and other accounting
services, and that it contravened
Section 4(1) accordingly.
Statement
7: Consultancy
- Section
1.0 of this Statement provides that -
“if a member in practice (the practitioner) obtains the advice of a
member (the consultant) on a consultancy basis on behalf of a client, the
consultant, or any practising firm with which he or his consultancy
organisation is associated, should not, without the consent of the
practitioner, accept from that client within three years of completion of the
consultancy assignment, any work which was, at the time the consultant was
retained in relation to the client’s affairs, being carried out by the
practitioner.”
It
is further stated in
Section 2.0 that
“the
same considerations apply where a practitioner introduces one of his clients to
the consultant for the purposes of consultancy.”
The Authority considered this a direct and unwarranted restriction on the
commercial freedom of the consultant firm to compete for and obtain client
business. While the Authority had, in many instances, given its approval to
post-termination non-compete clauses, such approval was limited to restrictions
lasting less than 12 months (and there must normally be some intellectual
property transfer involved, such as in franchising). In the opinion of the
Authority, Statement 7 contravened
Section 4(1), as it had the object and
effect of restricting or distorting trade in services in the State.
Statement 10: Fees
“The Institute has been advised that a member is entitled in law to
charge for his/her services:
(i)
such specific fee as he or she has agreed with the client: or
(ii)
a fee calculated in accordance with any agreement with the client; or
(iii)
in the absence of an agreement, a fee calculated by reference to the custom of
the profession.”.
In
the opinion of the Authority, the reference to “a fee calculated by
reference to the custom of the profession” had the effect of
“directly or indirectly fixing purchasing or selling prices” and
contravened
Section 4(1). Although subsections (i) and (ii) of Statement 10
allowed firms to agree their own prices with clients, the Authority considered
that, in the absence of an agreement, stated reliance on industry-wide norms
could lead to floor prices being set for the provision of accounting services.
11.6 In
relation to
fees for audit work
,
Section 2.4 of Statement 10 states that -
“Firms
obtaining work having quoted levels of fees which they have reason to believe
are significantly lower than those charged by an existing auditor or quoted by
other tendering firms, should be aware that their objectivity may appear to be
threatened.”
The
Authority considered that this provision could have the object or effect of
restricting or distorting competition in trade in services in the State.
Auditors had a legal obligation under the Companies Acts to be objective in the
performance of their statutory function and, if they did not do so, could leave
themselves open to civil or criminal proceedings. Furthermore, a resigning
auditor was legally obliged to issue a notice indicating the circumstances
surrounding his resignation. There was also a statutory obligation on auditors
to carry out their audits with professional integrity. Thus, auditors had to
behave objectively, irrespective of the fees they were charging. The Authority
considered that
Section 2.4 of Statement 7 had the object or effect of
dampening price competition between firms, as it associated aggressive price
competition with the suspicion of unprofessional conduct and that it
contravened
Section 4(1).
Statement
11: Obtaining Professional Work
11.7 Statement
11,
Section 1.4, of the Ethical Guide states that
“Members
should not make comparisons in such (promotional) material between their fees
and the fees of other accounting practices, whether members or not.”
The Authority considered this to be in contravention of
Section 4(1), as it
was an essential element of competition that consumers were able to compare
prices (on a commensurate basis) across firms. In the opinion of the
Authority, the extension of this to non-members in
Section 1.4 could, in
addition, facilitate collusion between the various accounting bodies in the
areas where their members were in direct competition with each other. The
Authority considered that this contravened
Section 4(1).
11.8
Section
4.0 of Statement 11 deals with “
cold
calling
”,
stating that
“in
relation to audit or other financial reporting work, a member should not make
an unsolicited personal visit or telephone call to a person who is not a client
with a view to obtaining professional work from the non-client.”
The Authority had previously held that, while some consumers may find
cold-calling a nuisance, it can enhance the level of competition in a market.
In this instance, accountants would not, typically, be soliciting business from
ordinary consumers, but from businesses, whom the Authority felt were generally
capable of making rational judgements about their choice of accountants,
without feeling threatened or unduly pressurised. To suggest that members
should not use cold-calling as a method for obtaining business was, in the
Authority’s opinion, a restriction on accountants’ ability to
compete for business and, as such, contravened
Section 4(1).
Rules
of Professional Conduct
12.1 As
regards the Institute’s Rules of Professional Conduct, the
Authority’s Objections centred around certain aspects of Rules 401 and
402 (These Rules are part of overall Rule 400 - “Professional
Engagements”). Several of these provisions mirror statements in the
Institute’s Ethical Guide for members (see paragraph 11 above), and the
Authority’s concerns were accordingly the same, and need not be repeated
here. These are described briefly below.
12.2 Rule
401.2 states -
“Members
shall not accept appointment with respect to any function relating to the
practice of public accounting, where they are replacing another public
accountant, without first communicating with such public accountant and
enquiring whether there are any circumstances they should take into account
which might influence their decision whether or not to accept appointment.”
The
Authority had the same concerns with this Rule as with Statement 6,
Section 1.0
of the Ethical Guide, and considered that it contravened
Section 4(1)
accordingly.
12.3 Further
rules also raised competition concerns. These were -
“402.1
Members invited to undertake professional work additional to that already
being carried out by another public accountant, who will still continue with
his existing duties, shall notify the other public accountant of the work they
are undertaking. The notification need not be given if the client advances a
valid reason against it. Members who are so notified shall co-operate fully
with the members undertaking the additional work.
402.2
Members who accept special assignments, whether by referral or otherwise, from
a client of a public accountant who is continuing in his relationship with that
client shall not take any action which would tend to impair the position of the
other public accountant in his ongoing work for his client.
402.3
Members who accept an assignment for specific services by referral from
another public accountant shall not provide nor offer to provide any different
services to the referring accountant’s client without the consent of the
referring accountant. The interest of the client being the overriding concern,
members who have made such a referral shall not unreasonably withhold such
consent.”
12.4 The
Authority considered that the obligation on a competitor to notify an incumbent
of work additional to that which the incumbent was currently carrying out (Rule
402.1) could lead to a lessening of competition between firms, since it would
tend to make it harder for accountants to gain a reputation with the clients of
others. The Authority was concerned at any obligation or practice which made
it difficult for clients to shop around for other providers of services they
required, or which might discourage them from doing so. In the
Authority’s opinion, therefore, the obligation on prospective competitors
in Rule 402.1 was anti-competitive and contravened
Section 4(1).
12.5 The
Authority considered that Rule 402.2 had the object and effect of restricting
competition between accountants, since there were a wide range of actions which
could be taken by an accountant to whom additional work was referred which
could “tend to impair the position” of the incumbent. For example,
if the second accountant were to set very competitive fees, this could be
regarded as impairing the position of the incumbent, if the latter’s fees
were not as competitive. Equally, if the second accountant were simply to be
more effective and efficient than the incumbent, all the actions which served
to make him so could, under this Rule, be equally regarded as impairing the
incumbent’s position. Given the importance, for a client, of gaining
experience with a particular firm in choosing to move more business to that
firm, Rule 402.2 made it difficult for the entrant firm to compete
aggressively, as to do so might lead to charges by the incumbent that the
client account was lost due to a breach of the Rule.
12.6 The
Authority considered that Rule 402.3 made it even more difficult for the
referred accountant to compete with an incumbent for extra business with the
client concerned since, effectively, he had to seek the incumbent’s
permission to compete. The Authority considered that this rule clearly
dampened the incentive of the referred firm to compete aggressively for
business, and that it acted as a brake on the turnover of accountancy
appointments. The Authority therefore considered that Rule 402.3 contravened
Section 4(1).
Oral
Hearing
13.1 The
Institute made a written response to the Authority’s Statement of
Objections, and its representatives elaborated on this at an Oral Hearing held
by the Authority on 18 December 1998.
13.2 The
Institute explained that it had been established by Royal Charter in 1888 to
ensure that the highest professional standards were maintained when providing
accounting and financial knowledge and services. The Institute dealt with
complaints and made sure that the rules and guides were adhered to, even where
this was contrary to the member’s self-interest. In summary, the main
points covered at the Oral Hearing were as follows.
Definition
of the Market
13.3 The
Institute claimed that the market could be split into two markets - audit work
and non-audit work. Large amounts of non-audit work could be undertaken by
people who were not accountants. It also stated that the Ethical Guide and
Professional Conduct rules would be enforced slightly differently in audit and
non-audit situations, and that the Ethical Guide and the mandatory guidance in
the handbook laid down much stricter criteria for audit than for non-audit work.
Ethical
Guide
Professional
enquiry process (Statement 6)
13.4.1 In
relation to changes in professional appointment, it was extremely important
that the accountant communicate with the existing auditor so that he knew his
client, especially in these times of increased crime and money laundering. The
Institute felt very strongly on this issue. The Institute stressed the
importance, in relation to work of a compliance nature, of the new auditor
contacting the outgoing auditor to find out if there is any reason that would
affect his decision to accept the audit assignment, i.e. lack of records,
contacts etc., the aim being to ensure that the incoming person was able to
carry out the audit to the highest standard. However, the Institute
acknowledged the concern expressed by the Authority and agreed to consider
amending the wording of this rule.
Consultancy
and special assignments (Statement 7)
13.4.2 This
rule was important to encourage accountants, especially sole practitioners, to
get specialist assistance without fear of losing their clients. However, it was
accepted that three years was a long non-compete period and an amendment to one
year was suggested.
Fees
(Statement 10)
13.4.3 The
Institute felt that the Authority had misunderstood this statement. It was not
intended to prevent members from quoting low fees. However, where low fees were
charged, the member might be requested to prove that the standard of work was
sufficiently high. Nonetheless, the Institute could fully understand the
Authority’s concerns on the actual wording of this statement, and
suggested the following replacement for paragraphs 1.0 and 1.1 of Statement 10 -
“1.0
The Institute has been advised that a member is entitled in law to charge for
his or her
services:
(i) such a fee as he or she has agreed with the client; or
(ii) a fee calculated in accordance with any agreement with the client; or
(iii) in the absence of an agreement a fee which is fair and reasonable
calculated by reference to -
•
the seniority and professional expertise of the persons necessarily
engaged on the work;
•
the time expended by each;
•
the degree of risk and responsibility which the work entails;
•
the priority and importance of the work to the client
together
with any expenses properly incurred.”.
13.4.4 As
regards its previously-expressed fear that low fees for audit work might lead
to perceptions of lack of objectivity, the Institute maintained that there was
no prohibition at all on setting a level of fees between the accountant and the
client at any particular level - an accountant could set a low fee if he
wished. Nonetheless, the Institute submitted that the perception existed that
if a low fee were quoted, the quality of work would be poor. If an accountant
was charging an extraordinarily low fee, the question arose as to whether the
accountant was doing all the work required. While the Institute insisted that
price competition was “alive and well in the Industry”, it
nevertheless agreed to consider re-wording
Section 2.4 of Statement 10 in a way
which concentrated more on fees which could not be deemed appropriate to the
work being performed.
Obtaining
Professional Work (Statement 11)
13.4.5 As
regards its ban on comparative advertising, the Institute submitted that it had
moved substantially from a position where advertising had been prohibited, to
the present situation to allow advertising; however, it felt that advertising
which quoted a fee could never be included. There was no fixed product,
therefore a price could not be set, as it would depend on the condition of the
records available, the expertise required etc. It was not possible to say that
an audit for a pub, for example, would cost a certain amount. There was no
accredited independent benchmark which was definitive on a certain product.
The Institute nonetheless agreed to consider its position on the matter.
13.4.6 As
regards its ban on
cold-calling,
the Institute submitted that it had had a number of complaints from third
parties about this practice, but nonetheless again agreed to re-consider its
position, if required to do so by the Authority.
Professional Conduct Rules
13.5.1 As
regards the Rules of Professional Conduct, the Institute submitted that those
Rules (in Section 400 - “Professional Engagements”), to which the
Authority had objected, were essentially a repeat of corresponding provisions
in the Institute’s Ethical Guide. It was suggested that the outcome of
the Authority’s deliberations on the Ethical Guide would also determine
the outcome as regards the Rules of Professional Conduct.
Further
Exchanges
14.1 Following
the Oral Hearing, the Institute forwarded further responses and proposals to
the Authority on 1 February 1999.
Ethical
Guide
14.2 As
regards Statement 6 (Changes in a Professional Appointment), the Institute
submitted a substantially revised version of the whole Statement, with a view
to recognising the Authority’s concerns regarding the timing of contacts
between “incoming” and “outgoing” advisers, and any
concern that the existing wording implied that a system of “first
refusal” was allowed.
14.3 As
regards Statement 7 (Consultancy), the Institute proposed that its current
three-year non-compete provision be reduced to 12 months.
14.4 On
Sections 1.0 and
1.1 of Statement 10 (“calculation of fees by reference
to the custom of the profession”), the Institute proposed to merge these
two Sections as follows -
“1.0
The Institute has been advised that a member is entitled in law to charge for
his or her services:
- such
a fee as he or she has agreed with the client; or
- a
fee calculated in accordance with any agreement with the client; or
- in
the absence of an agreement a fee which is fair and reasonable calculated by
reference to -
•
the seniority and professional expertise of the persons necessarily engaged on
the work;
•
the degree of risk and responsibility which the work entails;
•
the priority and importance of the work to the client;
together with any expenses properly incurred.”.
14.5 As
regards
Section 2.4 of Statement 10 (possibility of perceived lack of
objectivity through low fees), the Institute suggested a minor amendment, as
follows (amendments highlighted) -
“Assurance
engagements are special in nature, because of the public and professional
interest in the objectivity of practitioners’ work
.
Firms obtaining work having quoted levels of fees which they have reason to
believe are significantly lower than those charged by an existing auditor or
quoted by other tendering firms,
for
example
,
should be aware that their objectivity,
and
the quality of the work they do
,
may appear to be threatened. Such firms should ensure that their work complies
with Auditing Standards and Guidelines and Audit Regulations and, in
particular, quality control procedures.....”).
14.6 As
regards the ban on comparative advertising (Statement 11,
Section 1.4), the
Institute continued to strongly disagree with the Authority’s objections,
believing that, as no standard product or price structure existed, to remove
this prohibition would conflict with an EU Directive dealing with Comparative
Advertising
[5].
Article 1 of that Directive provided that the advertising concerned should
objectively compare one or more material, verifiable and representative
features of goods and services (“which may include price”), and
compare goods or services meeting the same needs or intended for the same
purpose. The Institute also pointed out that the Directive did not “
prevent
Member States from maintaining or introducing bans or limitations on the use of
comparisons in the advertising of professional services, whether imposed
directly or indirectly or by a body or organisation responsible, under the law
of the Member State, for regulating the exercise of a professional activity
”.
14.7 Finally,
the Institute agreed to remove its prohibition (in
Section 4.0 of Statement 11)
on cold-calling.
Rules
of Professional Conduct
14.8 As
already noted, the Institute accepted that the offending requirements in Rule
400 were already included in the Ethical Guide. The Institute thus indicated,
in its letter of 1 February, 1999, that, so long as acceptable corresponding
provisions were included in the Ethical Guide, it would be prepared to remove
Rule 400 from the Rules of Professional Conduct).
Further
Response by Institute
14.9 In
a letter dated 24 July, 2000, the Institute stated that the revisions to its
Ethical Guide which it had proposed to the Authority, as outlined above, had
now been made and were being circulated to its membership, with an effective
date of 1 September, 2000. Members were also being notified that, also from 1
September, 2000, Rule 400 of the Institute’s Rules of Professional
Conduct had been withdrawn.
ASSESSMENT
- Applicability
of Section 4(1)
15.1
Section
4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991, states that
“all
agreements between undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and
concerted practices, which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition in goods or services in the State or
in any part of the State are prohibited and void”.
A significant number of ICAI members are self-employed (some 40% are in
private practice) and as such are considered by the Authority to be
undertakings. Consequently, the Authority considers that the ICAI is an
association of undertakings within the meaning of
Section 4(1). The
arrangements have effect within the State.
15.2 As
indicated at paragraph 14 above, the Institute, in a letter of 1 February,
1999, made a number of proposals for amendments to its Ethical Guide, following
the Authority’s Statement of Objections and the Oral Hearing. By further
letter of 24 July, 2000, the Institute stated that these proposals had been
promulgated to members, to come into effect on 1 September, 2000. The Authority
has fully considered these proposals.
Ethical
Guide
15.3 The
Authority considers that the amendments now made by the Institute to Statements
6, 7 and 10, as well as the removal of the ban on cold-calling in Statement 11,
meet its concerns.
15.4 As
regards
Section 1.4 of Statement 11 (ban on comparative advertising), the
Authority notes the issues raised by the Institute concerning the EU Directive
in this area. In particular, the Authority notes that the Directive concerned
allows Member States 9 to maintain a ban on comparative price advertising in
the advertising of professional services (but not, notably, a ban on price
advertising as such); further, that the Directive allows self-regulatory bodies
recognised by law (which would include the Institute) to maintain such a ban.
In addition, the Authority notes that the general law on misleading advertising
applies to professional services as much as to any other sector. The Authority
has also considered the Institute’s claim that objective comparisons on a
price basis between two providers in the accountancy services sector would be
extremely difficult. The Authority accepts that such comparisons would be very
difficult to make or sustain, and that this is a contributory factor to the
exception made in the EU Directive concerned. In the circumstances, the
Authority accepts that the Institute has satisfactorily addressed its concerns
on
Section 1.4 of Statement 11.
Rules
of Professional Conduct
15.5 The
Authority notes that the Institute has now removed Rule 400 (which includes
those provisions to which the Authority had objected) from its Rules of
Professional Conduct.
The
relevant market
15.6 The
preliminary view of the Authority was that the relevant market in this case was
the market for accounting services, including audits, in the State. The
Institute disagreed, claiming that there were two markets involved, i.e. audit
work and non-audit work. Following further consideration, and taking into
account the changes which have now been made by the Institute to its Ethical
Guide and Rules of Professional Conduct to meet the Authority’s detailed
concerns, the Authority can now leave open the question of the definition of
the market in this case.
DECISION
16 In
the Authority’s opinion, the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
Ireland is an association of undertakings within the meaning of
Section 3(1) of
the
Competition Act, 1991, and the notified arrangements constitute a decision
by an association of undertakings. In the Authority’s opinion, the
Institute’s Ethical Guide for Members and Rules of Professional Conduct
do not contravene
Section 4(1) of
the Act.
CERTIFICATE
17. The
Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
The
Competition Authority certifies that, in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the following arrangements notified under
Section 7 of the
Competition Act, 1991, as amended, on 30 September 1992, do not contravene
Section 4(1) of that Act.
Notification
No.CA/827/92E - Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland/ Rules of
Professional Conduct
Notification
No.CA/828/92E - Institute of Chartered Accountants in Ireland/ Ethical Guide
for Members
For
the Competition Authority
Declan
Purcell
Member
18
September 2000.
[1]
This was the subject of
Decision
No. 520
of 12 October 1998.
[2]
The Authority understands that the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales and the Institute of Chartered Accountants of Scotland are
also recognised for this purpose.
[3]
The
Economist
of 25/10/1997 stated that 33% of the world-wide fee income of Ernst & Young
and KPMG was accounted for by their consultancy arms and that this area of
their business was growing at twice the rate of their fees from tax and
auditing. This can lead to arguments over corporate governance, as witnessed
by the dispute between the accountancy and consulting arms of Arthur Andersen (
London
Times
,
18/12/1997).
See,
for example, Bellamy & Child
Common
Market Law of Competition
Fourth Edition, paras 2-031 to
2-033,
4-025 and 4-084 to 4-087, as well as Chapter 4 more generally).
[5]
Directive
97/55/EC amending Directive 84/450/EEC concerning misleading advertising so as
to include comparative advertising.
© 2000 Irish Competition Authority