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Bord Telecom Eireann / L M Ericsson Holdings Ltd. [1998] IECA 506 (16th June, 1998)
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Bord Telecom Eireann / L M Ericsson Holdings Ltd. [1998] IECA 506 (16th June, 1998)
Competition
Authority Decision of 16 June 1998 relating to a proceeding under Section 4 of
the Competition Act, 1991.
Notification
No. CA/683/92E
Bord
Telecom Eireann/L M Ericsson Holdings Ltd.
Decision
No 506
Introduction
1.
Notification was made on 30 September 1992 with a request for a certificate
under
Section 4(4) of the
Competition Act, 1991 or, in the event of a refusal
by the Competition Authority to issue a certificate, a licence under
Section
4(2), in respect of a Shareholders Agreement relating to Broadcom Eireann
Research Ltd (Broadcom).
The
Facts
(a)
Subject of the Notification
2.
The notification concerns the shareholders agreement dated 30 June 1987
between Bord Telecom Eireann (BTE), L.M. Ericsson Holdings Ltd (Ericsson) and
Firmhold Properties Ltd relating to the subscription for shares in Firmhold
Properties Ltd. Firmhold Properties Ltd, originally a shelf company, changed
its name to Broadcom Eireann Research Ltd on 20 July 1987.
(b)
The parties involved
3.(i)
Broadcom was acquired by BTE and Ericsson in 1987 as the joint venture vehicle
for their participation in the EU programme for communications technologies
[1]
(RACE programme and latterly the ACTS programme) and to engage in
telecommunications research projects under the programme. By 1994 the main
activity of the company was research and consultancy in advanced
telecommunications mainly through carrying out studies on behalf of BTE and
Ericsson and participation in projects approved under the RACE programme. In
1994 Broadcom had a total research income of £2.4m. In 1994 the company's
issued share capital was £100 in ordinary shares of £1 each with BTE
and Ericsson holding 45 shares each and Trinity College, which subsequently
became a shareholder, holding 10 shares.
(ii)
BTE is the State owned company established in 1984 for the operation of the
national telecommunications services. From BTE Annual Report, turnover in the
year ended March 31 1997 was IR£1.22b.
(iii)
Ericsson, a subsidiary of Telefonaktiebolaget LM Ericsson, Sweden, is an Irish
registered company engaged in the manufacture of telecommunications equipment
together with the production and development of related computer software and
the provision of computer services. Ericsson, including its subsidiaries in
Ireland, is a major product and service provider to telecommunications
operators. A subsidiary supplies advanced telecommunications systems to
industrial and commercial customers while another subsidiary is engaged in the
provision of software for fixed and mobile telecommunications systems. From its
Annual Report Ericsson had a turnover of IR£106.5m in 1995.
(c)
The RACE and ACTS Programmes
4.
Broadcom was established primarily to carry out research for its
shareholders and participate in projects under the EU funded RACE programme.
RACE formed part of the EU's Third Framework Programme of Research, Technical
Development and Demonstration and was concerned with research into advanced
communications. A prerequisite of EU funding was that companies from at least 2
Member States should participate in each project. Each research consortium
retains the benefit of the research undertaken, with the right to exploit
discoveries, while the EU Commission funded 50% of the cost. Tendering for EU
funded projects was open, without restriction, to companies and consortia in
all Member States. The RACE programme, which operated from 1989 to 1994,
involved an EU budget of around 1,000m ECUs.
5.
An Eolas report indicated that up to 1994, Irish participants in RACE had
secured contracts worth around £12m spread among 28 organisations in
industry, the public sector and higher education. In 1992 Broadcom was the sole
Irish partner in 8 RACE projects and was involved with other Irish partners in
another 5 RACE projects. BTE on its own account was engaged, with other Irish
partners, in another two RACE projects. When RACE terminated at the end of
1994 it was replaced by a similar EU funded programme, the ACTS programme.
6.
The ACTS programme objective is to develop advanced communications systems and
services for economic development and social cohesion in Europe. The programme
covers such areas as interactive digital multimedia services, photonic
technologies, high-speed networking, mobility and personal communications
networks, intelligence in networks and service engineering and the quality and
safety of communication services and systems. The programme which ends in 1998
is part of the Fourth Framework Programme.
7.
Together with Telecom Eireann acting as a National Host partner, Broadcom are
at present performing trials of applications/services that involve real time
users. A National Host is a focal point of people and facilities organised to
support trials in the ACTS context. Broadcom is participating in two distinct
project areas within ACTS
viz
(a)
Mobility
and Personal Communications Networks
:
the objective is to accommodate the foreseeable demand for personal and mobile
communications beyond the year 2000 and to permit the European industry to
retain its leadership position in this area and (b)
Intelligence
in Networks and Service Engineering
:
the objective is to develop technology for flexible and real-time management of
communication assets, reflecting the requirements of users, service providers
and network operators.
(d) The Market
8.
The market in which Broadcom operates is that for research and development in
advanced telecommunications. Many companies in the telecommunications sector
have their own in-house R&D facilities and a number, such as Siemens
Nixdorf, Mentec and Telecom Eireann have participated in RACE projects
themselves. Other participants have been the Universities, the State and
private companies. The main customers of Broadcom are essentially the
shareholders themselves, who fund, and benefit from, the research work
undertaken, and to an extent EU institutions. While the EU Commission provides
50% of the funding for approved RACE/ACTS projects and obtains reports, the
Authority does not regard these programmes as representing the relevant market.
9.
The Authority considers the relevant market to be the market for R&D
(research and development) into advanced communications technologies. This is
a world-wide market with innovations originating in one place quickly being
disseminated across the world. There are numerous bodies involved in the
research including universities, research centres and firms involved in the
advanced communications industries generally. The customers are the advanced
communications companies which use the innovations to make communications
technologies more reliable, fast and economical.
(e)
The Notified arrangements
10.(i)
The notified agreement was executed on 30 June 1987. Recital B of the
agreement states that it was established by the Initiating Shareholders:
(1) to
be a participant in the European Economic Community programme in communications
technologies (RACE) on the basis of the RACE programme as defined in the
Proposal for a Council Regulation on RACE (Commission document Com. (86) 547
final dated 29 October, 1986);
(2) to
identify development projects suitable for RACE and to secure and obtain
contracts for the Company under the RACE programme;
(3) to
engage in telecommunications research generally for purposes of the RACE
programme; and,
(4) to
identify and communicate with suitable partners in order to establish groupings
that can successfully bid for RACE development projects.
(ii)
Under the agreement each of the initiating shareholders (BTE and Broadcom)
agree to subscribe for 25% of the intended issued share capital of the company
and agree that up to 4 other shareholders may, if agreed by them, be admitted
to membership provided that the maximum shareholding of any other shareholder
shall not be more than 25%. BTE and Ericsson retain pre-emption rights to
jointly acquire at any time the shares of new shareholders. BTE and Ericsson
shall be entitled to nominate 2 directors each with the Chairman/Managing
Director to be appointed on the votes of the BTE/Ericsson directors. Any
further shareholder shall be entitled to nominate 1 director.
(iii)
Clause 7 states that the business of the company shall be as stated in Recital
B and as elaborated in the Company's Memorandum of Association, which extends
it to participation in telecommunications research generally, developing and
producing telecommunication systems and the provision of consultancy services.
Clause 8 provides that where the board has agreed on a proposed project the
shareholders shall be liable for the cost of the project in proportion to their
percentage shareholding and that a full audited account of expense of the
project shall be furnished to each shareholder. Provision is made for regular
reports, including quarterly financial reports, to the shareholders who also
will have free and full access to the company records. Under clause 10
provision is made for initial funding of the company by the shareholders
equally, over and above their subscriptions for shares.
(iv)
Standard restrictions are placed on company transactions, largely relating to
any dilution of assets, which require the agreement of all the shareholders.
The agreement continues until all the shares in Broadcom are vested in the one
person or the company is wound up.
Submission
of the parties
11.(i).
In their original submission in September 1992 the parties stated that the
business carried on by Broadcom in essence, consisted of undertaking research
projects (by direct contract or participating in a consortium organised for the
purpose) promoted and facilitated by the Commission of the European Communities
("C.E.C.") to foster the advancement of research and development and scientific
learning so as to assist the better progression of the European
telecommunications/information technology software and software tools. The
projects were organised, promoted and co-ordinated by C.E.C. (D.G. XIII) and
brought together representatives of research institutions, universities and
manufacturers.
(ii)
In general, the parties did not believe that the Agreement restricted them in
their freedom to take independent business decisions contending that the
provisions of the Shareholders' Agreement were minimal, non-restrictive and a
mere overlay on the basic corporate documents, namely, the Memorandum of
Association and the Articles of Association. They contended that neither the
provisions nor the Agreement itself had as their object or effect the
prevention, restriction or distortion of competition in trade in any goods or
services in the State or in any part of the State within the meaning of the
Competition Act and that the Agreement was effectively devoid of restrictive
provisions.
12.(i)
In a subsequent submission in October 1995 the parties contended that
Broadcom was primarily a research vehicle and not engaged for "gain" and was
therefore not an "undertaking" within the meaning of the
Competition Act, 1991.
This reasoning was based upon the fact that Broadcom Eireann Research Limited
was funded entirely by the shareholders of Bord Telecom Eireann and L M
Ericsson Holdings Limited, and was not established as a "profit centre" in its
own right or in the reasonable expectation that it would generate a significant
profit in its own right. It could not be maintained on the ordinary
remuneration of capital principles.
(ii)
They acknowledged that in the decision in Deane & Others
v
The Voluntary Health Insurance Board [1992] 2IR319 the Supreme Court held that
the word "gain" was not equivalent to the word "profit" and thus the phrase
"engaged for gain" was merely an activity carried on or a service supplied
which was done in return for a charge or payment. Nevertheless, it was
contended that insofar as Broadcom Eireann Research Limited levied charges or
derived income from external sources this was merely by way of contribution to
overhead thereby reducing the ultimate cost to the principal shareholders, Bord
Telecom Eireann and L M Ericsson Holdings Limited. The contribution of Trinity
College Dublin was mainly in the nature of the making available of scientific
expertise;
(iii)
They added that 50% of the cost of RACE/ACTS programs was recovered from the
European Commission and RACE project sales are disclosed in the profit and loss
account of the Annual Accounts. They stated that the RACE programme was
administered by the European Commission and was financed under the standard
contracts for each project in which Broadcom participated. The allowable costs
reimbursed by the European Commission were 50% of the actual costs of
performing the work. The remaining costs were covered by shareholder
companies. The direct beneficiaries of work undertaken as regards delivery of
reports were the European Commission. The shareholders benefited from RACE and
ACTS from the fact that they were involved more closely in the standard setting
process in Europe and were made aware of the areas of research being undertaken
in Europe.
(iv)
They also indicated that Broadcom intended to continue to operate as a
research company in relation to RACE's replacement ACTS [
vide
para 5].
EU
Notice on Co-operative Joint Ventures
13.
In its Co-operative Joint Ventures (Antitrust) Notice 1993
[2]
the EU Commission stated that
"Joint
ventures between non-competitors created for research and development ....do
not in principle fall within Article 85(1). The non-application of the
prohibition is justified by the combination of complementary knowledge,
products and services in the joint venture. That is, however, subject to the
reservation that there remains room for a sufficient number of R&D centres,
...in the respective area of activity of the joint venture."
(h) Assessment
(a)
Applicability of Section 4(1)
14.
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act states that “all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted
practices, which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or
distortion of competition in goods or services in the State or in any part of
the State are prohibited and void”.
(b)
The Undertakings and the Agreement
15.
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act defines an undertaking as "a person being
an individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged
for gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of
a service".
16.
BTE is engaged for gain in the operation of a national telecommunications
service and is therefore an undertaking. Ericsson is engaged for gain in the
manufacture and sale of telecommunications equipment and software. The parties
have contended that Broadcom is primarily a research vehicle and not engaged
for gain and is therefore not an undertaking within the
Competition Act. They
have also contended that insofar as Broadcom levies charges or derives income
from external sources this is merely by way of contribution to overheads
thereby reducing the ultimate cost to the principal shareholders. The Authority
does not accept this contention. Broadcom is a separate corporate entity
engaged in the provision of R&D services for which it receives payment. It
is therefore an undertaking. In any event the principal parties to the
agreement, BTE and Ericsson, are undertakings and the agreement between them is
an agreement between undertakings, regardless of the status of Broadcom.
(c)
The Economics of R&D and Intellectual Property Rights
17.
Human capital accumulation and R&D expenditure are directly linked with
improvements in technology and with the introduction of new technologies.
Improvements in technology are markedly discrete and random which mirrors the
probability of success in research and development. Only a small proportion of
research and development projects are successful and often in ways which were
not originally intended. The attendant risk associated with R&D often
leads to a sub-optimal amount of research being undertaken.
18.
The Authority is aware of the trade-off between the dynamic growth inducing
effects of innovation and the static loss due to the sub-optimal diffusion of
the innovation. The economics profession has consistently found that the
dynamic gains outweigh the static losses
[3].
This is due to the public good nature of innovation, which can be very costly
to achieve but can often be disseminated virtually costlessly. A firm by
increasing its R&D expenditure will simultaneously increase its probability
of success whilst lowering the probability of all rivals succeeding. As every
firm has the same incentive there can be too much R&D relative to the
social optimum. The problem is that due to the public good nature of R&D
the innovators incentive to innovate is lowest precisely when the positive
externalities on other firms (the spillovers) are large.
19.
Therefore schemes (such as RACE and ACTS) are designed primarily to increase
the amount of R&D undertaken, though not without attendant risks of cost
padding and the probability that the market may be a better selector of which
research and development projects to undertake. Under the RACE and the ACTS
programmes, the Commission chooses work programmes and calls for proposals from
companies such as Broadcom to undertake the research. The establishment of
(patent) rights over R&D output confers an intellectual property right on
the innovator which is necessary to encourage the innovators to undertake the
R&D expenditure.
20.
If firms can choose between different routes in terms of R&D spending
there is an incentive to go for more risky R&D technologies in a winner
takes all environment. In these type of industries there is over-investment in
risky projects
[4].
In terms of any welfare analysis, if the private surplus from innovation is
lower than the social surplus then agents have too little incentive to invest
in R&D. In this scenario, the innovator is unable to appropriate
sufficient private gains to give them the incentive to undertake costly
R&D. This is termed the
appropriability
effect
.
If however, the opposite is the case and the innovator does not see the
business
stealing
aspect of their innovation then the private benefit outweighs the social
benefit and too much R&D is undertaken. These effects are in essence
negative externalities which impinge on the returns of other innovators.
21.
Research joint ventures enable companies to exploit complementarities,
undertake research with large fixed costs (thus exploiting returns to scale),
avoid perhaps wasteful duplication and if patent protection is incomplete
enables firms to jointly internalise the positive externality that their
individual research would yield. Conducting R&D efficiently is the
objective from both an industry and society’s point of view. While
there may be some concerns expressed in the literature that research
co-operation between competitors may lead to collusive behaviour - this will
not occur if the parties to the research joint venture are not competitors
[5]
- it is the view of the Authority that such concerns are not an issue in this
particular case.
(d)
Applicability of Section 4(1)
22.
Under the notified agreement two companies engaged in the telecommunications
business formed, in 1987, a co-operative joint venture company to undertake
research and development in particular projects, in partnership with other
companies or consortia in other Member States, so as to qualify for funding
under a EU Research and Development programme. One of the parties to the joint
venture, BTE, is engaged in providing a telecommunications service and is
primarily a user of telecommunications equipment and systems. Ericsson,
however, is engaged in the manufacture of telecommunications equipment and in
the supply of telecommunications software and systems. Such an agreement does
not
per
se
contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act.
23.
The notified agreement contains a number of standard restrictions on the
company relating to its internal management and are designed to protect the
position of each of the shareholders. The Authority has decided in a number of
decisions that such restrictions do not contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act. The agreement does not contain any restrictive provisions on
the shareholders.
24.
Under clause 8 of the notified Agreement the shareholders are liable for the
cost of research projects undertaken in proportion to their percentage
shareholding in Broadcom. Apart from some third party contracts, the Broadcom
business is essentially a joint R&D facility for use by its own
shareholders who stand to benefit ultimately from the R&D. The shareholders
are not obliged to channel all their R&D activities through Broadcom, nor
do they do so. To the extent that the shareholders use their own facilities or
the joint facilities of Broadcom for R&D, other research companies are
unable to bid for that business.
25.
However it is a matter for commercial decision by companies whether to use
their own facilities or contract out their work to third parties and this does
not raise any issues under the
Competition Act. The Authority considers the
relevant market to be the market for R&D into advanced communications
technologies. It is clear from para. 5
op.cit.
that there are a large number of other R&D organisations within the State
engaged in telecommunications R&D, a number of which collaborate in
projects with Broadcom. Therefore, in the opinion of the Authority the notified
arrangements have not restricted the development of other R&D centres. In
the Authority's opinion the notified agreement does not contravene
Section 4(1)
of the
Competition Act.
26.
The Authority is of the opinion that research joint ventures between
non-competitors do not contravene
section 4(1). This is because they
facilitate research and development which may not occur in the absence of such
co-operation. The Authority considers research and development one of the
engines of growth in the economy. The RACE and ACTS programmes encourage firms
to take on research in a co-operative manner exploiting any complementarities
and economies of scale in research there may be between them and thus avoiding
unnecesary duplication.
27.
The Authority considers that there is sufficient competition in the market for
R&D into advanced communications technologies. The research is in areas
marked by the Commission for research and are in areas that the Commission has
identified as crucial to the future development of the communications
industries in the EU. The Authority has contended in previous decisions [
vide
Decision No. 502] that there should be no presumption that intellectual
property rights create market power.
The
Decision
28.
In the Authority's opinion Bord Telecom Eireann, L.M. Ericsson Holdings Ltd
and Broadcom Eireann Research Ltd are undertakings within the meaning of
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991 and the notified Shareholders
Agreement is an agreement between undertakings. In the Authority's opinion the
notified agreement does not contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act.
The
Certificate
29.
The Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
The
Competition Authority certifies that, in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the Shareholders Agreement dated 30 June 1987 between Bord
Telecom Eireann, L.M. Ericsson Holdings Ltd and Broadcom Research Eireann Ltd
notified under
Section 7 on 30 September 1992 (Notification No. CA/683/92E)
does not contravene
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act.
For
the Competition Authority
Professor
Patrick McNutt,
Chairperson,
16
June 1998
[1]
RACE = Research and Development in Advanced Communications Technologies in
Europe and ACTS = Advanced Communications Technologies and Services
[ ] 2para.
33, O.J. C43/2 (16 February 1993)
[3]
See Barro R., Economic Growth in a Cross-Section of Countries,
Quarterly
Journal of Economics
,
May 1991, 106:2, pp 407-444.
[4]
Dasgupta P. and J. Stiglitz (1980) “Uncertainty, Industrial Structure
and the Speed of R&D.”
Bell
Journal of Economics
11: pp 1-28
[5]
See Grossman, G. and C. Shapiro (1986) “Research Joint Ventures: An
Antitrust Analysis.”
Journal
of Law, Economics and Organization
2: pp 315-337 and Ordover, J and R. Willig (1985) “Antitrust for
High-Technology Industries: Assessing Research Joint Ventures and
Mergers.”
Journal
of Law and Economics
28: pp 311-333.
© 1998 Irish Competition Authority