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Jones Engineering Ltd. [1994] IECA 371 (28th October, 1994)
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[1994] IECA 371
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Jones Engineering Ltd. [1994] IECA 371 (28th October, 1994)
Competition
Authority Decision of 28 October, 1994 relating to a proceeding under Section 4
(1) of the Competition Act, 1991.
Notification
No. CA/60/93 - Jones Engineering Ltd.
Decision
No. 371.
Introduction
1. The
present arrangements involve a shareholders agreement which was notified to the
Competition Authority on 22 September 1993. The shareholders agreement arose
from a management buy out of Jones Engineering division which was previously
part of the Jones Group. The notification requested a certificate, or, in the
event of a refusal by the Authority to grant a certificate, a licence. On 14
September, 1994, the Authority issued a Statement of Objections to the parties
indicating its intention to refuse a certificate or a licence in respect of the
notified agreement. Jones Engineering responded in a letter dated 7 October,
1994, stating that they were amending the clauses which the Authority
considered offensive.
The
Facts
(a)
The Subject of the Notifications
2. The
notification relates to a shareholders agreement in respect of Jones
Engineering Ltd. (previously known as Sanara Ltd.), dated 21 April 1993,
between Aldwych Investment Company Limited (Aldwych), Mr. Eric Kinsella, Mr.
Des Collins, Mr. Jim Curley, Mr. Brendan Daly and Sanara Limited (Sanara).
Aldwych and Mr. Kinsella each own 40% of the shares in Jones Engineering with
the remaining 20% owned by Messrs. Collins, Curley and Daly.
(b)
The Parties
3. Aldwych
is a private limited company established for investment purposes. Its ultimate
shareholders are the trustees of a trust set up by Mr. Christopher Jones, a
director of the Jones Group plc who is also the chairman of Jones Engineering.
Jones Engineering is a private limited company incorporated on 3 November 1992,
through which the shareholders have acquired the engineering division of the
Jones Group. This division consists of several companies, namely: H.A. O'Neill
Limited, Patrick Lynch Limited, Climate Engineering Limited and Irish Sprinkler
& Fire Protection Limited. These companies provide various mechanical and
electrical contracting services and were all wholly owned by the Jones Group
prior to their acquisition by Jones Engineering. Messrs. Kinsella, Collins,
Curley and Daly are former managers of the Jones Group.
(c)
The Product and the Market
4. Jones
Engineering, through its subsidiary companies, is engaged in the business of
providing mechanical and electrical contracting services in the construction
industry and in the design and installation of fire protection systems. Such
work is carried out mainly on new and refurbished non-residential buildings.
These include hotels, factories, hospitals, schools, office buildings, shopping
centres and other premises. The companies which make up Jones Engineering bid
for projects throughout the country. They stated that there was intense
competition with at least 20 other companies capable of bidding for all major
projects. For some major projects companies from other EU countries may also
tender. The companies have a combined turnover of £30m and their market
share was said to be less than 20%. According to the parties work is obtained
mostly through a competitive tendering process.
5. Some
information on activity in the various segments of the construction industry
can be obtained from the Census of Building and Construction. The latest
published Census data are for 1991. Summary details for the segment which
includes mechanical and electrical contracting are given in the table below.
The table shows that in 1991 there were 67 firms employing 20 or more persons
engaged in this business. Between them these firms employed almost four
thousand people, both directly and indirectly, and had a combined turnover of
over £200m. Of this total £102m was due to work done as a principal
contractor while a further £97m was due to work done as a sub-contractor.
Building
and Construction - Installation*.
1990 1991
Number
of Firms
70
67
Persons
Engaged ('000)
3.3
4.0
Turnover
(£m)
166.3 203.2
*
This consists of NACE industrial category 503 which is defined as comprising
contractors engaged in plumbing, heating and electrical contracting together
with other specialist installation contractors (including mechanical services
contractors).
Source:
CSO, Census of Building and Construction 1991, Irish Statistical Bulletin,
December 1993.
(d)
The Arrangements
6. The
arrangements involve a shareholding agreement dated 21 April 1993 between
Aldwych, Messrs. Kinsella, Collins, Curley and Daly and Sanara for the purpose
of regulating the management and control and the future conduct of the business
of the company then known as Sanara and now known as Jones Engineering. Both
Jones Group and Aldwych provided certain loan facilities to Jones Engineering
and the subsidiary companies. The associated Share Purchase Agreement provides
that for so long as Jones Group and Aldwych have shares/loans outstanding in
Jones Engineering the Board of Jones Engineering will consist of three
groupings each of which has one vote and all board decisions, with certain
limited exceptions, are to be by majority vote. The three groupings are; A a
Jones Group nominee, B Mr. Chris Jones and a Nominee and C comprising the other
four shareholders.
7. Clause
2.2 of the agreement provides that immediately before completion each
shareholder, (except in the case of Aldwych), would simultaneously subscribe
in cash at par for a specified number of shares and enter into a Contract of
Employment. The agreement includes a number of restrictions on the
shareholders which are set out below. Clause 2.5 provides that each
shareholder would not, without the consent of the other shareholders, for so
long as he or it should remain a director or member of the company, be engaged
or interested, either directly or indirectly, in any capacity in any trade,
business or occupation, other than as a director/employee of the company or one
of its subsidiaries. This restriction does not prohibit the shareholder
holding quoted investments, provided such holdings do not exceed ten per cent
of the shares or stock of any class of any one company. The expression
occupation includes any public or private work which may hinder or otherwise
interfere with the performance of the shareholders duties as director and
employee.
8. Clause
2.6 provides that where the shareholder ceases to be an employee pursuant to
his employment contract, the restriction in clause 10 of the employment
contract should apply and the restrictions in clauses 2.5, 4.1 and 4.2 of the
Shareholders agreement would not apply, unless for some reason the restrictions
in clause 10 of the employment contract are in whole or part invalid, illegal
or unenforceable. It further provides that the shareholder would not be
subject to any restriction under either clause 10 of the employment contract or
clauses 2.5, 4.1 or 4.2 once the relevant periods in clause 10 of the
employment contract had expired. Clause 10 of the employment contract provides
that for two years after termination of employment the director shall not
solicit or accept business from any person, firm or corporate body that was a
customer of the companies in the previous year. In addition clause 10
prohibits the director for one year after termination of employment from being
concerned or interested either directly or indirectly in any business within
the geographical area of Leinster in the business of mechanical and electrical
contracting or any other business of a similar nature to the business of the
companies at the date of termination of employment. These restrictions do not
apply where the director is wrongfully dismissed or where the company serves
notice on the director in accordance with clause 1(a) terminating employment on
expiry of the notice.
9. Clause
4.1 provides that each of the shareholders shall not for a period of two years
from the date on which they cease to be shareholders either on their own behalf
or on behalf of anyone else, canvas or solicit orders in respect of goods or
services competing with the business of the company or any of its subsidiaries
from any person, firm or company who was a customer of the company at that time
or during the previous 12 months. Clause 4.2 prohibits the shareholders for
one year from the date they cease to be shareholders from being concerned or
interested either directly or indirectly in any business within the
geographical area of Leinster in the business of mechanical and electrical
contracting or any other business of a similar nature to the business of the
companies at that date.
10. Clause
5.1 provides
inter
alia
that where a shareholder (a) ceases to be a director of the company or (b)
ceases to be employed by it, the other shareholders shall be entitled to serve
notice in writing requiring the first shareholder to sell all his shares.
Clause 5.2 provides that in the event of any breach of the agreement by a
shareholder the other shareholders may, within six months of learning of such a
breach, require the shareholder to sell his entire shareholding in the company
to the other shareholders, if he has failed to remedy the breach within 14 days
of being notified of it.
11. Clause
7 provides that none of the shareholders shall divulge to any person any trade
secret or manufacturing process or any confidential information concerning the
business or finances of the company or its subsidiaries except in the proper
course of his duties as director or employee.
(e)
Submissions of the Parties
12. The
parties submitted that neither Aldwych nor any of the other shareholders were
undertakings and that consequently the agreement did not constitute an
agreement between undertakings. They argued that Aldwych was a holding company
which did not own or control any undertakings and was not therefore an
undertaking. They referred to the Authority's decision in AGF-Irish Life
Holdings in support of this.
[1]
The parties then referred to the Authority's first decision in Nallen/O'Toole,
[2]
where it considered the question of whether individuals could be regarded as
undertakings, and also to its decisions in ACT/Kindle
[3]
and Cambridge/Imari.
[4]
They also referred to the decision of the EU
Commission
in Reuter/BASF
[5]
and the European Court of Justice decision in Remia
[6]
on this point. They argued that the Authority had erred in ACT/Kindle in that
none of the individuals concerned could be shown to be more than a minority
shareholder. They also argued that the situation in the present case differed
from that in Cambridge/Imari as there was no sole shareholder/managing
director. They argued that where a group of individuals controlled an
undertaking each of them were not undertakings because it is only the group
collectively which could be said to control the undertaking.
15. The
parties argued that the restrictions under clause 2.6, on a shareholder who
ceases to be an employee without necessarily ceasing to be a shareholder were
reasonable given the management's financial services and personal resources
commitments to the management buyout and were less restrictive than those
provided in clauses 2.5, 4.1 and 4.2. In addition, they referred to the
Authority's decisions in Scully Tyrrell/ Edberg
[7]
in support of the restrictions in clause 2.5 of the Shareholders Agreement. A
number of arguments were also advanced in support of the request for a licence
but these are not considered here.
(f)
Subsequent developments
16.
The Authority issued a Statement of Objections to the parties on 14
September, 1994 indicating its intention to refuse a certificate or licence in
respect of the notified agreement. By letter of 7 October, 1994 Jones
Engineering stated that the provision concerning the post termination non
compete clause in the employment agreements had been deleted and the period of
the post termination non solicitation clause amended to one year. These
amendments were given effect by means of a supplemental agreement dated 5
October, 1994.
Assessment
(a) Section
4(1)
17. Section
4(1) of the Competition Act states that ´all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition in trade in any goods or services in the State or in any part of
the State are prohibited and void.'
(b) The
Undertakings and the Agreement
18. Section
3(1) of the Competition Act defines an undertaking as ´a person being an
individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for
gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a
service.' The parties to the present agreement are Aldwych, Messrs. Kinsella,
Collins, Curley and Daly and Jones Engineering (Sanara). Jones Engineering is
a corporate body engaged in the construction business for gain and is therefore
an undertaking within the meaning of the Act. Aldwych owns 40% of Jones
Engineering. The Authority does not accept the parties claim that Aldwych is
not an undertaking. Its purpose in holding 40% of the shares in Jones
Engineering is to use that entity as a vehicle to engage in the provision of
services which are provided for gain by Jones Engineering. As far as Messrs.
Kinsella, Collins, Curley and Daly are concerned the Authority again rejects
the parties claim that they are not undertakings. The Authority indicated in
Nallen/O'Toole that individuals who were partners in a business which they
jointly owned were undertakings. The Authority does not believe that where a
partnership involves more than two people they could not be regarded as
undertakings simply because no one of them could be said to control the
business. The individuals concerned in this instance were formerly service
managers of the Jones Group Engineering Division and have come together to
effect a management buyout of the business; as a result of this they own a
large shareholding in the business and are actively engaged in running that
business jointly with the other shareholders and with the Jones Group and are
therefore undertakings. The arrangements therefore constitute an agreement
between undertakings.
19. The
shareholding agreement constitutes an agreement between the parties to engage
in business together. The individuals involved had previously managed the
business concerned when it was a subsidiary of the Jones Group. Such an
agreement is not
per
se
anti-competitive and does not offend against section 4(1) of the Competition Act.
20. The
agreement imposes a number of restrictions on the shareholders. Clause 2.5
prevents them engaging in any other trade, business or occupation for so long
as they remain a
director
or member of the company. The Authority has stated in Scully Tyrrell that:
´An
agreement between parties to engage in business together could not operate if
the parties were free to compete with the business or with each other. The
Authority believes that individuals could not jointly engage in business
together if they were free to compete with each other. It is clear, even if it
is not explicitly stated, that an agreement between parties to carry on
business together, implies that they will not compete against the business or
against each other so long as they remain in business together.'
In
the Authority's view clause 2.5 is designed to ensure that each of the parties
devote all of their efforts to the successful operation of the business. It
does not, in its view, offend against section 4(1).
21. Clauses
4.1 and 4.2 provide that, if and when any of the shareholders cease to hold
shares in the company, they will not, for two years from that date solicit
customers of the business and, for one year, be engaged in any way in a
competing business within Leinster. Again the Authority does not regard such a
restriction as offending against section 4(1) as it believes it to be no more
than is absolutely necessary, in terms of its duration, geographic scope and
subject matter, to protect the goodwill of the business in the event of a
shareholder disposing of his shares. It has already indicated in Scully
Tyrrell that in such a situation a restriction on a shareholder competing with
a business for so long as he remains a shareholder and for up to two years
thereafter does not offend against that section, but that such considerations
would not apply where only a nominal shareholding was involved, or in respect
of shares held purely for investment purposes. The Authority does not believe
that the latter considerations arise here.
22. Clause
2.6 then provided that, where a shareholder ceased to be employed by the
business, the restrictions in clause 10 of their employment contract would
apply instead of those in clauses 2.5, 4.1 and 4.2. The employment contract
was, in the Authority's view, an integral part of the shareholding agreement
since it was a requirement of the agreement that the parties enter into such an
agreement, and because the Shareholders Agreement provided for clause 10 of the
employment agreement to operate in specific circumstances. In fact clauses
10(a) and (b) of the employment contract were almost identical to clauses 4.1
and 4.2 of the Shareholders Agreement. If the individual concerned ceases to
be an employee of the business then, by virtue of clause 5 the other
shareholders are entitled to purchase his shares in which case clauses 4.1 and
4.2 would apply. Thus clause 10 could be regarded as imposing the obligations
of clause 4.1 and 4.2 on a shareholder who ceased to be employed by the firm
where the other shareholders decline to exercise the right to buy out his
shares. In such circumstances clause 2.5 would not apply so that once the
periods specified in clause 10 had expired, the individual could compete with
the business whilst remaining on as a shareholder. On the other hand the
individual could be retained as an employee after he had ceased to be a
shareholder. In that case he would first of all be bound by the provisions of
clause 4.1 and 4.2 and could then be subsequently bound by clause 10 if and
when his employment ceased. The Authority's view on post-term non-compete
clauses in situations such as this have been made clear in a number of previous
decisions. It believes that such a restriction offends against section 4(1).
A restriction on soliciting customers for up to 12 months after cessation of
employment is not considered to offend against section 4(1).
[8]
Nonetheless in the present circumstances clause 10 of the employment contract
and hence clause 2.6 of the Shareholders Agreement offended against section
4(1) in the Authority's opinion. The parties have now amended the employment
agreements by means of a supplemental agreement deleting the post termination
non compete provision and by amending the period of post termination non
solicitation to one year. Consequently, these clauses no longer offend against
Section 4(1) of the Act.
Decision
23. In
the opinion of the Competition Authority, the shareholders agreement in respect
of Jones Engineering Ltd. (previously known as Sanara Ltd.), dated 21 April
1993, between Aldwych Investment Company Limited (Aldwych), Mr. Eric Kinsella,
Mr. Des Collins, Mr. Jim Curley, Mr. Brendan Daly and Sanara Limited (Sanara),
(notification no. CA/60/93), notified on 29 September 1993, under Section 7,
constitutes an agreement between undertakings. The Authority considered that
the restriction in clause 2.6 of this agreement and the associated restriction
in clause 10 of the employment agreements, offended against section 4(1) of the
Competition Act and did not satisfy the requirements for a licence under
section 4(2). As the offensive provisions have now been amended the agreement
no longer offends against Section 4(1).
The
Certificate
24.
The Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
The
Competition Authority certifies that in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the agreement of 21 April, 1993 in respect of Jones
Engineering Ltd (previously known as Sanara Ltd) between Aldwych Investment
Company Ltd, Mr. Eric Kinsella, Mr. Des Collins, Mr. Jim Curley, Mr. Brendan
Daly and Sanara Ltd, (notification no. CA/60/93), notified on 29 September,
1993, under Section 7, and amended by the supplemental agreements of 5 October,
1994, does not offend against
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
Massey
Member
28
October, 1994.
[1]Competition
Authority decision no. 2, 15 May 1992.
[2]Competition
Authority decision no.1, 2 April 1992.
[3]Competition
Authority decision no. 8, 4 September 1992.
[4]Competition
Authority decision no. 24, 21 June 1993.
[5]Case
no. 76/743/EEC, (OJ L254, 17.9.76, p. 40).
[6]Nutricia/de
Rooij and Nutricia/Zuid Hollandse Conservenfabriek, case no. 83/670/EEC, (OJ
L376, 31.12.83,p.22).
[7]Competition
Authority decision no. 12, 29 January 1993.
[8]
See Competition Authority decision no. 20, 10 June 1993.
© 1994 Irish Competition Authority