Irish Competition Authority Decisions
You are here:
BAILII >>
Databases >>
Irish Competition Authority Decisions >>
IAWS Group/Shamrock Foods [1994] IECA 299 (24th March, 1994)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECompA/1994/299.html
Cite as:
[1994] IECA 299
[
New search]
[
Printable RTF version]
[
Help]
IAWS Group/Shamrock Foods [1994] IECA 299 (24th March, 1994)
Notification
No. CA/692/92E - IAWS/Shamrock Foods.
Decision
No. 299.
Introduction
1. An
agreement between IAWS Group plc (IAWS), Mr. Sean P. Deignan and Mr. John F.
Deignan (the Deignans) and Brookline Limited (Brookline) was notified to the
Competition Authority on 30 September 1992. The agreement involved a
shareholding arrangement between IAWS (the Majority shareholder) and the
Deignans (the minority shareholders) in Brookline which subsequently changed
its name to Shamrock Foods Ltd. (Shamrock). Under the agreement IAWS had an
option to buy out the minority shareholders, and it did so on 30 October 1992.
The agreement included non compete provisions. The notification requested a
certificate or, in the event of a certificate being refused, a licence. The
arrangements had been notified to the Minister for Industry and Commerce under
the Mergers Acts and no Order was made in respect of the acquisition.
The
Facts
(a) The
Subject of the Notification
2. The
notification relates to an agreement dated 13 October 1989 between IAWS and the
Deignans. It arose out of the acquisition by Brookline from the Whitworth
Group of its 75% interest in Shamrock Foods and 100% interest in Shamrock
Distributors. The latter agreement was the subject of a separate decision by
the Authority
[1].
Effectively IAWS acquired a 74% shareholding in Brookline through the issue of
new shares, the company having previously been wholly owned by the Deignans.
The agreement includes some non-compete provisions.
(b)
The Parties
3. IAWS
is a public limited company quoted on the Irish Stock Exchange. It has,
through its subsidiaries, been a major supplier of materials and services to
the Irish agricultural and food industries for over 90 years. The group's
principal operating businesses consist of fish processing, fertilisers, animal
feed, energy products and food. Its turnover for the year ended 31 July 1993
was £402m. Brookline is a limited company registered in the State. The
Deignans owned the entire issued share capital of Brookline prior to the
completion of the notified agreement.
(c) The
Arrangements
4. The
notification relates to a shareholding agreement, dated 13 October 1989, which
was concluded following the acquisition by Brookline of Whitworth's interest in
Shamrock Foods and Shamrock Distributors. IAWS agreed to subscribe for 74
shares in the capital of the Company; this effectively represented 74% of the
issued share capital following the agreement. Under the terms of the agreement
the Deignans were entitled to sit on the board of Brookline. In addition there
were limits to the company's power to incur capital expenditures above certain
limits, pay dividends or issue additional shares without the consent of the
Deignans as minority shareholders.
5. Under
Clause 5 IAWS could require either or both of the Deignans to sell all or part
of their shares to it in certain circumstances, e.g. if any of them were
adjudicated bankrupt. Clause 6 provided that either or both of the Deignans
could require IAWS to purchase all or part of their shares upon delivering
written notice in the event that any of the circumstances set out in clause 5
occurred.
6. Clause
9.01 of the agreement provided that the Deignans would not for so long as the
agreement remained in force and for 18 months after they ceased to be
shareholders in Brookline either;
(i) become
involved in any way with any entity engaged in the same business as Brookline;
(ii) solicit
customers of the business either on their own account or on behalf of anyone
else;
(iii)
solicit employees of the company on their own account or on behalf of anyone
else.
7. Clause
7 provided that IAWS could require either or both of the Deignans to sell all
or part of their shares to it within 90 days of the publication of the accounts
of Brookline for any of the financial periods ending 30 September in the years
1992 to 1999. Similarly the Deignans could require IAWS to purchase all or
part of their shares in exactly the same circumstances. The Deignans sold
their shareholding with effect from 1 August 1992 by means of an agreement
dated 30 October 1992.
(d) Submissions
of the Parties.
8. IAWS
submitted detailed arguments in support of the issue of a certificate. These
may be briefly summarised here. They argued that at the time of the agreement
the parties had not anticipated the enacting of legislation prohibiting
anti-competitive agreements. They argued that the agreement was not
anti-competitive and that the restrictive provisions were reasonable and
necessary in the circumstances for the protection of their legitimate business
interests. They cited a number of Authority decisions in support of their
arguments.
Assessment
(a) Section
4(1)
9. Section
4(1) of the Competition Act states that 'all agreements between undertakings,
decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices which have as
their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion of competition
in trade in any goods or services in the State or in any part of the State are
prohibited and void'.
(b) The
Undertakings and the Agreement
10. Section
3(1) of the Competition Act defines an undertaking as ´a person being an
individual, a body corporate or an unincorporated body of persons engaged for
gain in the production, supply or distribution of goods or the provision of a
service.' IAWS and Brookline are corporate bodies engaged for gain and are
therefore undertakings. The Deignans were the owners of Brookline at the time
of this agreement and they also were undertakings
[2].
The notified arrangements constitute an agreement between undertakings.
(c) Applicability
of Section 4(1)
11. Although
described as a shareholding agreement, the arrangements were tantamount to a
sale of business since they resulted in IAWS acquiring 74% of the issued share
capital of the business with an option to acquire the remainder at a future
date. As IAWS had acquired a majority shareholding in Brookline prior to 1
October, 1991, the date on which the Competition Act came into force, this
element of the agreement had been discharged by performance before the Act
commenced. The property, which was the subject of the agreement, had been
acquired. In the Authority's view, the prohibition in Section 4(1) only
applies to a current or continuing contractual commitment or one entered into
subsequent to the coming into force of the Act
[3].
As the acquisition of the 74% shareholding was discharged prior to the
commencement of the Act, that aspect of the arrangements does not come within
the scope of Section 4(1). The purchase by a majority shareholder in a
business of any or all of the remaining share capital of the business does not,
in the Authority's view, have any impact on competition and hence does not
offend against Section 4(1).
12. The
restrictions on Brookline's ability to do certain things were included to
protect the interests of the minority shareholders. The Authority has
previously decided that restrictions of this type do not offend against Section
4(1)
[4].
13. The
agreement contains a non-compete clause for 18 months from the date on which
the Deignans ceased to be shareholders in Brookline. The Authority has stated
in Scully Tyrrell that, in the event of a sale of business where the vendors
remain on as shareholders and/or employees of the business, a restriction on
their competing with the business for so long as they remain as shareholders
and employees and for two years after they cease to be shareholders does not
offend against Section 4(1)
[5].
As the restriction on competing in this instance was only for so long as the
Deignans remained shareholders and for 18 months after they sold their shares,
in the Authority's opinion, it did not offend against Section 4(1).
The
Decision
14. In
the Authority's opinion, IAWS and the Deignans and Brookline are undertakings
within the meaning of Section 3(1) of the Competition Act, and the notified
arrangements for the acquisition of 74% of the issued share capital of
Brookline by IAWS constitutes an agreement between undertakings. The Authority
believes that as the acquisition of Brookline was effectively completed prior
to the commencement of the Competition Act, the agreement for the purchase of
shares in Brookline does not come within the scope of Section 4(1) of the Act.
The subsequent purchase of the minority shareholding by the exercise of the
option contained in the agreement does not offend against Section 4(1). The
non-compete clause was ancillary to the main agreement and did not offend
against Section 4(1).
The
Certificate
15. The
Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
The
Competition Authority certifies that in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the agreement between IAWS Group plc, Brookline Ltd. and Mr.
Sean P. Deignan and Mr. John F. Deignan for the acquisition by IAWS of 74% of
the issued share capital of Brookline Ltd., and the subsequent acquisition of
the remainder, (notification no. CA/692/92E), notified on 30 September 1992
under Section 7, did not offend against
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act,
1991.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
Massey
Member
24
March 1994.
[ ] 1 Competition
Authority decision no. 32, Shamrock Foods/Brookline, 9 September 1992.
[ ]2 This
is consistent with the approach taken by the Authority in a number of previous
decisions. See, for example, Competition Authority decision no. 8 ACT/Kindle,
4 September 1992.
[ ]3 Competition
Authority; 'Notice in respect of Mergers and Takeovers which predate the
Competition Act' Iris Oifigiuil, 14 May 1993, p.367.
[ ]4 Competition
Authority decision no. 24, Cambridge - ACT/Imari, 21 June 1993.
[ ]5 Competition
Authority decision no. 12, Scully Tyrrell/Edberg, 29 January 1993. In that
decision the Authority pointed out that it would take a different view if the
shareholding was held for purely investment purposes or if the shareholding or
employment arrangements were an artificial arrangement designed to extend the
duration of any non-compete provisions.
© 1994 Irish Competition Authority