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Conoco Consignee Ag. [1994] IECA 286 (25th February, 1994)
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[1994] IECA 286
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Conoco Consignee Ag. [1994] IECA 286 (25th February, 1994)
Competition
Authority Decision of 25 February 1994 relating to a proceeding under Section 4
of the Competition Act, 1991.
Notification
No. CA/71/92E - Conoco Consignee Agreement.
Decision
No. 286
Introduction.
1. Notification
was made with a request for a certificate or licence by Conoco Ireland Limited
on 7 September 1992 in respect of its standard agreement with consignees.
2. Notice
of intention to take a favourable view of the agreement was published in the
Irish Times on 14 January 1994. A submission was received from the Jet
Retailers Association.
The
facts.
(a) The
subject of the notification.
3. The
decision concerns the standard consignee agreement between Conoco and the
consignees at a number of its company owned petrol stations. Each agreement
consists of a licence to operate the petrol station on behalf of Conoco and to
sell only Jet motor fuel on the premises, and there are special provisions in
the agreement in respect of a shop on the premises in which are sold products
other than motor fuels and other Jet branded products, such as grocery goods,
confectionery, cigarettes, newspapers, etc. The two parts of the agreement are
dealt with separately in this decision.
(b) The
parties involved.
4. Conoco
is a wholly owned subsidiary of Conoco Inc., which is a wholly owned subsidiary
of E.I. Du Pont de Nemours and Company, Inc., both being US companies. Conoco
is involved,
inter
alia
,
in the supply and distribution of motor fuels and other petroleum products to
the motoring public through a chain of retail outlets, most of which are owned
by independent dealers, the remainder being owned by Conoco. 23 of its company
outlets are occupied by so called consignees, who operate the petrol station
and a convenience shop. The consignees sell motor fuels for Jet Oil's account,
but they operate the shop on their own account.
(c) The
products and the market.
5. The
product with which the main part of the notified agreements is concerned
consists of motor fuels, that is petrol and diesel for use in mechanically
propelled road vehicles. The market was described in detail in the motor fuels
category licence
[1].
6. The
convenience shop primarily sells grocery goods, confectionery, newspapers,
cigarettes, etc. The market consists of all retail outlets selling goods of a
similar character.
(d) The
notified agreement.
(i) Conoco's
motor fuels and other Conoco products.
7. The
introduction states that the premises comprise and are adapted and intended for
use wholly or mainly for the carrying on of the business of a retail petrol
filling station and convenience shop. The consignee, referred to in the
agreement as a licensee, has agreed to operate the premises for the purposes
and in furtherance of Conoco's business objective of the sale by retail at and
from the premises of the company's motor fuels and other products. For the
purposes of such operation, the company has agreed to licence and permit the
licensee to occupy and make use of the premises subject to the terms of the
agreement.
8. Appendix
V describes the relationship between the licensee and Conoco and sets out some
of the licensee's responsibilities in respect of motor fuels. Regarding the
product, it states as follows:
'6. All
the Company's Motor Fuel and the Company's products delivered by the Company to
the Company to the Premises and entrusted to the custody of the Licensee for
sale shall remain the property of the Company until sold in the way of normal
retail trade from the Premises and the Licensee shall not charge, pledge or
part with possession of the same save for the purposes of sale as aforesaid'.
Notwithstanding
para 6, it is stated in para 7 that 'all products delivered to the Premises
shall be held at the sole and absolute risk of the licensee who shall be liable
to pay the Company for the same ....' in certain circumstances.
9. Appendix
V also provides for the handling of receipts from the sale of motor fuels as
follows:
'1. The
amount for which the Licensee shall be accountable and which shall be payable
by the Licensee to the Company in respect of "the Company's motor fuel" to be
sold at the premises shall be the price which the Company shall from time to
time notify to the Licensee as the price at which the same is/are to be sold by
retail at and from the Premises and applicable at the date of such sale less
the amount which the Licensee is authorised to deduct and retain by way of
commission and Value Added Tax thereon as hereinafter provided and shall be
computed and paid as provided below.
2. For
the purposes of ascertaining the total amount to be paid by the Licensee and
received by the Company and of accounting between the Company and the Licensee:
2.1 The
quantity of each Motor Fuel sold each day shall be ascertained by provisional
stock assessment each of which shall be recorded by the Licensee in the manner
and form required by the Company, which shall have the right to inspect and to
take copies of such records whenever so required'.
According
to para 2.2, the licensee has to pay the amount payable under para 1 in respect
of the quantity sold into a bank account nominated by Conoco on each day it is
open for business. A full reconciliation is made each month between the
lodgments made and the amount due to be paid, on the basis of stocks and
purchases during the month. Sufficient details to allow this must be furnished
to Conoco. The commission rate, in terms of pence per gallon on minimum sales,
and percentage of the retail margin on sales above a specified level, is
included in the agreement.
10. Appendix
V also provides that the quantity of motor fuels and the turnover value of the
other products shall not fall below specified monthly values. If the quantity
of motor fuels sold falls below that specified, an agreed sum of liquidated
damages has to be paid by the licensee.
11. The
body of the agreement provides that the licence does not create any
relationship between the parties of landlord and tenant (clause 8.5), or any
partnership or any contract of agency or service, and it is expressly agreed
that, for all purposes, the licensee is an independent contractor (para 8.6).
12. Appendix
1 describes the obligations on the licensee in respect of the premises, some of
which are as follows:
(a) to
pay and discharge all outgoings of the type described (labour and insurance
costs, losses of motor fuel, telephone and postage costs, and consumable items
such as cleaning materials and shop bags) (clause 1 and Appendix VII);
(b) to
keep the premises open during normal business hours as agreed (clause 2);
(c) to
use every endeavour and due diligence to sell and promote the products (clause
3);
(d) to
keep adequate stocks (clause 4);
(e) to
be responsible for the conduct and operation of the premises, and to engage, at
licensee's own expense, sufficient and satisfactory staff (clause 5);
(f) not
to exhibit posters or signs on the premises without the company's approval
(clause 12); and
(g) not
to carry on or to be concerned or interested in any manner whatsoever directly
or indirectly in the conduct or management of any business in or through which
competing products are sold or offered for sale by retail at or from premises
situate within the radius shown.
13. The
agreement also makes provision for the duration of the licence, the obligations
of Conoco (delivery of motor fuels, subject to ability to supply, and repairs),
early termination, and minimum insurance requirements to be met by the licensee.
(ii) Obligations
regarding the shop.
14. The
agreement also contains obligations on the licensee in respect of the shop.
The licensee is permitted to sell 'other products' in the shop, 'other
products' being defined as 'such goods and products (not being the Company's
motor fuel or Company's products) as the Product Supplier (as hereinafter
defined) may from time to time provide or procure to be provided at and for the
purpose of sale by retail from the premises'. The term 'Product Supplier'
means 'such Supplier of the 'other products' as may be approved of from time
to time by the Company'. (Clause l)
15. Appendix
1 of the agreements deals with the shop in more detail, the main provisions
being as follows:
1. The
Licensee shall be free to obtain supplies of 'the other products' from any
supplier approved of by the Company in writing.
1.1 Pay
to the Company by monthly direct debit a fee equal to the aggregate of [ ] %
of the wholesale price of all cigarettes and tobacco products and [ ] % of
the wholesale price of all 'other products'.
1.2 At
all times keep full and accurate records of all 'other products' purchased and
sold by it (and furnish monthly a certificate certifying the gross turnover,
and permit the company to inspect the books and records to verify the gross
turnover).
2. Present
and merchandise 'The Products' in accordance with the initial layout
configuration and merchandising presentation implemented by or on behalf of the
Company, at the shop.
3. Properly
and effectively merchandise and promote "The Products" with advice and
selective assistance of the Company or its authorised representative.
4. Maintain
point of sale and window material and introduce no additional material except
with the approval of the Company.
6. Conduct
physical stock-takes as directed by the company or its authorised
representatives with or without the assistance of the Company or its authorised
representatives.
13. Pay
the Company annually in arrear the fee specified. (This fee is not payable if
the annual turnover is equal to or greater than the specified minimum turnover,
but the fee increases the lower is the turnover compared to the specified
minimum turnover).
The
licensee is also obliged to maintain adequate stock levels, to maintain a
retail environment, to ensure that the premises are kept clean and that the
attendants are properly attired, to complete and return all relevant
documentation to the company, and to try to ensure that petrol customers pay in
the shop, and to pay the amounts due to the other product suppliers.
16.
Appendix
V contains certain other provisions relating to the shop, as follows:
1. the
licensee and appropriate employees shall if so required by the company
participate in any training and support programme in retail shop sales and
interior systems which the company may arrange whether directly or by other
parties on its behalf.
It
is also stated that the company shall have no liability to the licensee in
respect of the other products, and that the company is not the agent of the
product supplier; that the licensee will indemnify the company in respect of
the other products; and that, if the company terminates the agreement, the
licensee shall remove the other products from the premises. (Similar
provisions are included in Conoco's licence agreements, where the operator of
the Conoco station is independent, and also in certain agreements for the
operation of a Jet shop on premises owned by dealers who have a solus agreement
for the sale of Jet motor fuels. These are the subject of separate
notifications).
(e) Submissions
by Conoco.
(i) Conoco's
motor fuels.
17. In
its initial submission, Conoco stated that the consignee stations were operated
by Conoco/Jet Oil for its own account and under its operational control and
direction. Other licensees, however, operated company stations in a way which
enabled them to conduct their own independent businesses for their own account,
in much the same way as an independent dealer buying exclusively from Conoco.
It went on to say that, in respect of the consignees, which it refers to as
licensees:
'Conoco/Jet
Oil engages the Licensee to undertake and perform services required by
Conoco/Jet Oil for the purpose of operating a Company station in its own name
and for its own account and in a manner in which it retains full ultimate
control over the sale of motor fuels by retail to the motorist direct.
In
this situation:
(i) Conoco/Jet
Oil is the retailer and the entity from which the motorist purchases his/her
motor fuel; and
(ii) the
Licensee is a provider of services, for the purposes of which he is authorised
and licensed by Conoco/Jet Oil to enter upon and to use the Company station on
and subject to the terms of the LA [licence agreement].
For
his services, the Licensee is remunerated by payment of a commission at a rate
which is negotiated and agreed with each Licensee individually. However, an
additional, integral and synergistic feature of the arrangement is that the
Licensee is permitted to use the Shop for the sale of goods (other than motor
fuels and Conoco/Jet Oil's other products, such as vehicle lubricants and
anti-freeze) for his own account and separately from and independently of the
business of the sale of Conoco/Jet Oil's motor fuels and other products. For
this, Conoco/Jet Oil receives the benefit of a licence fee ......'
While
such licences in the past were subject to a Restrictive Practices Order and
were usually granted for three years, the period for this licence was unlikely
to exceed ten years.
18. Conoco
also presented the following arguments for a certificate or a licence:
'Contract
operation of Company stations enables Conoco/Jet Oil to engage in
inter-retailer competition, and thereby to develop and pursue its own ideas for
innovative and creative marketing more effectively than would be possible if
its role were restricted to that of a wholesaler supplying petroleum products
to retail operators. In particular, it enables and provides an incentive for
Conoco/Jet Oil to develop and pursue and, by its own conduct and example, to
influence and enhance within the retail sector generally standards and
practices which
(a) promote
efficiency;
(b) benefit
the consumer by ensuring availability of quality assured products at
competitive prices through attractive, well-maintained premises and facilities
and providing a level of services dedicated to total customer care; and
(c) better
recognise and address topical operating issues, particularly those concerned
with health and safety and with protection of the environment.
The
arrangement under notification is considered to have no material or perceptible
effect on competition in trade within the relevant market and a certificate
under section 4(1) is requested on that ground. The position resulting from
this arrangement is that Conoco/Jet Oil maintains and exercises full and
complete control of the marketing of the motor fuels which are being offered
for sale at the contract operated station. The effect of this on competition
is no different from that which would arise if the station was operated by
Conoco/Jet Oil's direct employees'.
Conoco
also claimed that this was not affected by the restriction on the Licensee's
engaging in a competing business within a specified radius, which was necessary
in principle and reasonable in extent for the purpose of safeguarding
Conoco/Jet Oil's interests in the Station.
(ii) Concerning
the shop.
19. Conoco
made the following remarks about the shop:
'On
a number of contract operated stations, the Shop facility has been upgraded and
re-equipped to the high quality, modern standards established by Conoco/Jet Oil
for its Jet Shops concept ..... This has been undertaken as part of Conoco/Jet
Oil's ongoing programme for enhancement of the scope and quality of customer
services at Jet Oil branded service stations; and has required (and will
continue to require) substantial investment. In these cases, the licence fee
which Conoco/Jet Oil receives as consideration for the use of the Shop facility
("the Shop fee") is related to turnover of "other products" but with a
mechanism to ensure attainment of an agreed minimum annual fee. The level of
the minimum fee is agreed with each Licensee individually and reflects the
mutually agreed expectation of the profit earning potential for the Licensee of
the separate business for which the Shop is to be used. Relating the fee to
turnover also provides Conoco/Jet Oil with a reasonable opportunity to receive
a fair return on its investment'.
Conoco
also stated that the obligation on the licensee to purchase other products from
approved suppliers was:
'necessary
and reasonable in order better to ensure that products are purchased only from
reputable and reliable suppliers, thereby
(i)
better assuring the consumer availability of supply and of the quality and
range of goods on offer for sale; and (ii) safeguarding the proprietary
interests of Conoco/Jet Oil by avoiding any erosion of the reputation and good
standing, as perceived and identified by the consumer, of the brand name "JET"
and of the "JET Shop" identity where applicable'.
(iii) Concerning
the status of the consignee.
20. In
response to questions posed by the Authority concerning the status of the
consignee under the consignee agreement, Conoco replied as follows:
'1. Jet
Oil remains the retailer of, and the entity from which the motorist purchases,
motor fuels supplied at the contract operated station.
2. The
Licensee is engaged to conduct the physical operation of that station and, as
such, is a provider of services to Jet Oil on terms which authorise and license
him to use the contract operated station not only for the purpose of fulfilling
his obligations as a provider of services but also for the sale, through the
Shop which is part of the station, of goods (other than motor fuels and Jet
Oil's other products, such as vehicle lubricants and antifreeze; collectively
"Jet Oil products") for his own account and separately from and independently
of the sale of Jet Oil products which the licensee undertakes in his capacity
as a provider of services.
3. Thus,
the Licensee operates in two capacities: as a provider of services in relation
to the sale of Jet Oil products; and as an independent business man acting on
his own account in relation to the sale of other goods through the station Shop.
4. In
both capacities, the Licensee is an independent contractor, as is expressly
recognised in Clause 8.6 of the Licence Agreement.
5. In
relation to the sale of Jet Oil products (where, for emphasis, ownership and
financial risks remain with Jet Oil, which also retains complete control over
the determination of selling prices), we can readily agree and confirm that:
(a) the
Licensee sells in the name and for the account of Jet Oil;
(b) The
Licensee is obligated to carry out Jet Oil's instructions; and
(c) In
these circumstances, the Licensee is but an intermediary between Jet Oil and
the consumer and, as such, may be regarded as forming an integral part of Jet
Oil's undertaking in much the same way as would be the case if the relationship
were one of employer and employee.
This
leads us to conclude and accept that, for the purposes of the sale of Jet Oil
products, the Licensee is a trade representative or commercial agent for Jet
Oil rather than an independent trader.
6. However,
in relation to the Licensee's activities relating to the sale of the "other
goods" for the purpose of which he is authorised to use the Shop:
(a) The
Licensee is clearly an independent trader.
(b) If,
as we would submit, the majority and "essential thrust" of the restrictions
which are imposed upon the Licensee are properly to be regarded as relating to
and arising from the services which he agrees to undertake and perform for the
purpose of the sale of Jet Oil products and the general operation on behalf of
Jet Oil of the contract operated station then the only remaining "extraneous"
restrictions (i.e. those which affect his activities as an independent trader)
would appear to be those which are to be found in Part II of Appendix 1 of the
Licence Agreement.
(c) Of
those restrictions, the only one which might be regarded as being of any
consequence is that which arises from paragraph 1: and then only if this was to
be interpreted as a requirement that supplies of "other products" were to be
obtained only and exclusively from suppliers approved by Jet Oil'.
Conoco
pointed out that this issue had been covered in the initial submission, as set
out in para 19.
Finally,
Conoco stated that:
'If,
in these circumstances, it is your considered view that the Consignee Licensee
is not an "undertaking" within the meaning of Section 3 (1) and/or that our
arrangements do not otherwise need to be notified under Section 7 then, we
would not wish to argue to the contrary'.
(f) Subsequent
developments.
21. The
Authority wrote to Conoco on 5 October l993 expressing concern in relation to
clause l of Appendix l, which required the consignee to obtain supplies of 'the
other products' from suppliers approved of by Conoco in writing. It stated
that its concern would be removed by the addition of the following sentence:
'Approval will be withheld only for objectively valid reasons which shall be
disclosed to the licensee'. The Authority considered that this would still
adequately safeguard the legitimate interests of the company, while not
impinging on the commercial freedom of the independent operator. By letter
dated 29 November l993, Conoco agreed to amend the agreement by adding the
wording above and to notify all their consignees of the amendment.
(g) EC
Commission views on commercial agency.
22. The
EC Commission first gave its views on exclusive dealing contracts with
commercial agents in a Notice published in 1962
[2].
In this it stated that it considered that contracts made with commercial
agents, who acted on behalf of an enterprise, did not fall under the
prohibition in Article 85(1) of the EC Treaty. It was essential that the
commercial agent should not engage in activities proper to an independent
trader. The decisive criterion, according to the Commission, was that the
commercial agent should not assume any risk resulting from the transaction.
23. It
has long been recognised, by the Commission and others, that the 1962 Notice is
limited in scope, and that it no longer reflects economic reality and is also
legally obsolete. It also needed revision in the light of the 1986
harmonisation Directive relating to self-employed commercial agents
[3].
The Commission has been preparing, therefore, a revised Notice on commercial
agents, which has not yet been finalised.
24. The
EC Court of Justice considered the question of agency in the Suiker Unie case,
where it stated:
'If
such an agent works for his principal he can in principle be regarded as an
auxiliary organ forming an integral part of the latter's undertaking bound to
carry out the principal's instructions and thus, like a commercial employee,
forms an economic unit with this undertaking'
[4].
(h) Submission
by Jet Retailers Association.
25. Following
the publication of the Authority's intention to take a favourable view of the
agreement, a submission was received from the Jet Retailers Association, which
is comprised of 26 Jet licensees. The general view was that the Association
supported the issue of a certificate, but that the agreement did not accurately
describe the relationship between the parties and it should be modified before
a certificate was granted. It was stated that the notion of 'licensee'
accurately described the relationship under land law, but it did not accurately
describe the commercial relationship between the parties under competition law.
The Association considered that its members were non-exclusive distributors for
the shop products, but that they were effectively commercial agents of Conoco
for motor fuels. It claimed that the agreement, in clause 8.6, denied this
reality. It maintained that either this clause should be redrafted to state
positively that there was a relationship of commercial agency subsisting
between the parties, or that the phrase 'or any contract of agency or service'
should be deleted. The Association stated that this was very important since,
as agents, its members were entitled to rely on the EC Directive on Commercial
Agents, including the right to compensation on termination of the agency in
certain circumstances. The Association objected to the issue of a certificate
for the agreement as currently drafted. The Authority has taken full account
of the views of the Association in the following assessment of the agreement.
It does not consider, however, that, for the purposes of the Competition Act,
it is necessary to require that the position of the licensees as commercial
agents should be specifically recognised in the agreement.
Assessment.
(a) Applicability
of Section 4(1).
26.
Section
4(1) of the
Competition Act, 1991 prohibits and renders void all agreements
between undertakings which have as their object or effect the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition in trade in any goods or services in
the State or in any part of the State.
27. Conoco
and the consignees are engaged in the sale of motor fuels for gain, and the
consignees are also engaged in the sale of other products for gain, and they
are therefore undertakings within the meaning of
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act. The standard consignee agreement is an agreement between
undertakings. The relevant product markets are those for (a) motor fuels, and
(b) the products sold in the shop on the petrol station premises. The relevant
geographic market is the State.
(i) The
status of the consignee.
(1) In
respect of the sales of motor fuels.
28. In
operating the petrol station premises and selling motor fuels, the consignee is
not an employee of Conoco and there is no contract of employment or service
between them. He is a self-employed contractor. At the same time, while the
consignee is stated to be an independent contractor, the consignee does not
purchase motor fuels from Conoco for resale to the public. Unlike the Conoco
licensee or independent dealer, the consignee sells motor fuel, not on his own
account, but on behalf of Conoco. He does not pay for the motor fuels, and the
motor fuels remain the property of Conoco until they are sold at retail, even
though they are held at the consignee's risk. All receipts from the sale of
motor fuels, less the agreed commission, must be lodged daily to Conoco's bank
account. Out of his commission, the consignee must pay for certain outgoings,
such as labour and insurance costs, the balance representing the consignee's
remuneration. The consignee is responsible for employing staff. Conoco
determines the prices at which the motor fuels are to be sold. The petrol
station is effectively under the operational control and direction of Conoco,
and is operated for Conoco's own account, and the consignee is obliged to obey
Conoco's instructions. The relationship between Conoco and the consignee is an
ongoing one, and the agreement may have a duration of up to ten years.
29. The
Authority considers that the question of agency is quite complex, and that each
case must be examined on its own merits in relation to the
Competition Act, in
the light of certain general considerations. In the first place, it is not
conclusive that one party is referred to as an 'agent' in the agreement, since
he may not perform the functions of an agent in any real sense. Conversely, it
does not matter if the agreement states that there is no relationship or
contract of agency between the parties. This may be done, for example, to
limit one party's ability to undertake binding obligations on behalf of the
other, without the latter's knowledge or consent. From the point of view of
the
Competition Act, the Authority is concerned with whether the relationship
between the two parties is such that one of them may be termed a 'commercial
agent' of the other. It is not intended that the views of the Authority about
whether a person is a commercial agent or not should have any implications for
the legal relationship between the parties.
30. The
Authority considers that a commercial agent is a self-employed intermediary
between the principal and a purchaser or seller. The commercial agent
concludes the sale or purchase of goods and services on behalf of the
principal, on a continuing basis. The commercial agent is an auxiliary organ,
forming an integral part of the principal's business, and is bound to carry out
the instructions of the principal, and his position is similar to that of an
employee. Being integrated into the principal's business, the commercial agent
can undertake no autonomous commercial behaviour, under the agreement, and
certain restrictions on him are fundamental to the relationship. The Authority
considers that profits or losses essentially accrue to the principal and not to
the commercial agent.
31. The
relationship between Conoco and its consignees has been summarised in para 28.
The agreement also states that there is no contract of agency between the
parties. Conoco has argued that, in respect of the sale of motor fuels, the
consignee is an intermediary, and forms an integral part of Conoco, like an
employee. They said that the effect on competition was no different to that
which would have occurred if the station had been run by a direct employee of
Conoco.
32. The
consignee is a self-employed intermediary between Conoco and the purchasers of
Jet motor fuels. He concludes the sale of goods on behalf of Conoco, on a
continuing basis, for up to ten years. He does not own the stocks, the resale
prices are set by Conoco, and the consignee lodges the proceeds of sale, less
the commission, to the credit of Conoco's bank account. While the consignee
accepts some risk, in relation to stock and cash losses, and is responsible for
hiring and paying employees, the profits and losses of the motor fuels business
as a whole accrue to Conoco, and the consignee must obey Conoco's instructions
and may undertake no autonomous behaviour in respect of the operation of the
petrol station. The Authority considers that the consignee, in operating the
petrol station and selling Conoco products, is an auxiliary organ, forming an
integral part of Conoco's distribution business, and it concludes that he can
be considered to be a commercial agent. This conclusion is not affected by the
fact that the consignee also operates the shop supplied by Conoco on the same
premises, since the operation of the petrol station constitutes a significant
proportion of the whole business, and there is also a relationship between the
consignee and Conoco in relation to the shop.
(2) In
respect of the shop.
33. The
consignee sells products other than motor fuels and Jet products in the shop
for his own account and separately from and independently of the sale of Jet
Oil products. Although he pays a commission on sales to Conoco, and is bound
by certain obligations imposed by Conoco regarding the operation of the shop,
he is in no sense a commercial agent of Conoco in respect of the shop on the
petrol station premises. He is an independent trader in the shop.
(ii) The
commercial agency agreement.
34. The
Authority considers that undertakings are entitled to decide how to operate
their distribution systems, and, in particular, to appoint commercial agents to
sell their goods on their behalf. Suppliers of motor fuels are free to choose
to sell their products through independent dealers or through company-owned
outlets; these latter may be operated by lessees, licensees, employees or by
consignees and commercial agents. Since the commercial agent is an auxiliary
organ, similar to an employee, the agreement between a principal and a
commercial agent does not, in principle, offend against
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act.
35. In
the present case, the Authority has concluded that the consignee is a
commercial agent. It considers that the agreement between Conoco and the
consignee, insofar as it creates a relationship between the principal and a
commercial agent, does not offend against
Section 4(1).
36. Even
though the basic arrangement of commercial agency might not offend against
Section 4(1), certain clauses in the agreement might occasionally do so. In
the case of motor fuels agreements, the Authority has published a category
licence, which permits the imposition of certain obligations upon resellers of
motor fuels and upon their suppliers. The Authority considers that the
obligations which are not regarded as offending against
Section 4(1) in the
case of independent traders would equally not offend in the case of commercial
agents. More fundamentally, the Authority recognises that there are certain
features of commercial agency agreements which define and confirm the
relationship, and are intrinsic to the commercial agency. Since the commercial
agent is closer to being an employee than an independent trader, the Authority
considers that certain restrictions may be imposed upon a commercial agent
without offending against
Section 4(1), whereas they would offend against
Section 4(1) if they were imposed on an independent trader. In the Authority's
opinion, none of the provisions in the notified agreement offend against
Section 4(1).
(iii) The
shop agreement.
37. In
the opinion of the Authority, all but one of the relevant provisions regarding
the shop in the notified agreement do not have the object or effect of
preventing, restricting or distorting competition. They reflect the fact that
the shop is owned by Conoco, and is licensed to the consignee for the purpose
of enhancing earnings at the station, for the mutual benefit of the owner and
the consignee, while ensuring that the reputation of Conoco and the Jet brand
name is not damaged. Since a fee which is related to the turnover of different
classes of goods is payable by the consignee, it is essential for accurate and
detailed records to be furnished to Conoco, and for Conoco to have power to
verify these. Such provisions do not interfere with the freedom of the
consignee to operate the shop and they do not interfere with competition. In
the view of the Authority, they do not offend against
Section 4(1) of
the Act.
38. The
Authority was concerned, however, with the clause which stated that 'the
licensee shall be free to obtain supplies of 'the other products' from any
supplier approved of by the company in writing.' The Authority considered that
this clause could be used to limit the freedom of the consignee to determine
what products to sell and from whom he might obtain supplies. This could
affect the ability of the consignee to compete with other retailers in the
area. It could also limit competition between suppliers to obtain the custom
of the consignee. The consignees would have no voice in deciding which
suppliers they should deal with for their purchases. While the effect of this
requirement to obtain Conoco's approval of every supplier might have little
effect upon competition in the case of an individual consignee, the cumulative
effect of this obligation in respect of all Conoco's consignees, licensees and
dealers with a Jet shop, who are similarly bound, might not be insignificant.
Since this practice might also be followed by other petrol companies in
convenience shops attached to their company and dealer outlets, and since such
convenience shops are growing rapidly in number and importance, the overall
effect was thought likely to be considerable. The Authority considered that
this clause offended against
Section 4(1) of
the Act. (The Authority also
considered that this clause would not satisfy, at least, the indispensability
requirement of
Section 4(2) of
the Act, and so would not qualify for the grant
of a licence).
39. At
the suggestion of the Authority however, as stated in para 21, Conoco have
agreed to provide that approval of a supplier 'will only be withheld for
objectively valid reasons which shall be disclosed to the licensee.' The
Authority considers that this would adequately ensure the reputation and good
standing of Conoco and of the Jet and Jet Shop tradenames, as required by
Conoco, but in a less restrictive way. The Authority considers that the part
of the agreement relating to the shop no longer offends against
Section 4(1).
(b) The
Decision.
40. In
the Authority's opinion, Conoco and its consignees are undertakings within the
meaning of
Section 3(1) of the
Competition Act, and the notified standard
consignee agreement for the operation of a Conoco-owned petrol station and
associated shop constitutes an agreement between undertakings. In the
Authority's opinion, the consignee is a commercial agent of Conoco in the
petrol station, and an independent operator in the shop, and the arrangements,
as amended, do not have, as their object or effect, the prevention, restriction
or distortion of competition. The standard Conoco consignee agreement, as
amended by the letter of 29 November l993, does not, in the Authority's
opinion, offend against
Section 4(1) of the
Competition Act, l99l.
The
Certificate.
The
Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
The
Competition Authority certifies that in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the standard agreement between Conoco and its consignees for
the operation of a Conoco-owned petrol station and shop (notification no
CA/71/92E), notified on 7 September l992 under
Section 7, and amended by Conoco
in its letter of 29 November l993, does not offend against
Section 4(1) of the
Competition act, l99l.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
M. Lyons
Chairman.
25
February 1994.
[ ] 1 Motor
fuels category licence, 1 July 193, paras. 7 to 9.
[ ]2 EC
Commission Notice on exclusive dealing contracts with commercial agents , OJ
139, 24.12.1962, p. 2921.
[ ]3 EC
Directive of 18 December 1986 relating to the coordination of the laws of the
Member States relating to self-employed commercial agents, OJ L382, 31.12.86,
p.17.
[ ]4 Judgment
of the Court of Justice of 16 December 1975 - Suiker Unie and Others v
Commission of the European Communities. [1975] ECR p. 1663, at p.2007.
© 1994 Irish Competition Authority