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Spring Grove/Conkenner [1993] IECA 148 (18th November, 1993)
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[1993] IECA 148
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Spring Grove/Conkenner [1993] IECA 148 (18th November, 1993)
Notification
No. CA/1135/92 - Spring Grove/Conkenner.
Decision
No. 148
Introduction
1. Arrangements
for the purchase of the entire issued share capital of Conkenner Limited
(Conkenner) by Spring Grove Ireland Limited (Spring Grove) from Initial
Services (International) Limited (ISIL), were notified to the Competition
Authority on 30 December, 1992. The notification requested a certificate, or
in the event of a refusal by the Authority to grant a certificate, a licence.
The
Facts
(a) The
Subject of the Notification
2. The
notification relates to an agreement, dated 27 November 1992, between ISIL, BET
plc (BET) and Spring Grove and the P&O Services Group for the sale and
purchase of the entire issued share capital of Conkenner. The arrangements
include a number of non-compete provisions together with restrictions on the
use of certain industrial property rights (mainly trade marks). The
arrangements were notified to, and approved by, the Minister for Industry and
Commerce under the Mergers Act.
(b)
The Parties
3. ISIL
is a company incorporated in England and Wales. It is a wholly owned
subsidiary of BET. Prior to the completion of the notified agreement Conkenner
was a wholly owned subsidiary of ISIL. Conkenner is engaged in the provision
of textile rental and associated services throughout the State. ISIL is engaged
inter
alia
in the provision of such services in the UK.
4. Spring
Grove is a private limited company incorporated in Ireland. It is a wholly
owned subsidiary of Spring Grove Services which in turn is a wholly owned
subsidiary of The P&O Services Group Limited. The ultimate parent is The
Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company (P&O), a company listed on
the London Stock Exchange.
The
Product and the Market
5. Conkenner
is engaged in the business of providing textile rental and associated services
throughout the State on a contract basis to offices, schools and factories and
other establishments. Prior to this agreement Conkenner operated under the
trade names ´Initial Services', ´Swastika Laundry Limited' and
´M Laundries Limited'. The latter two are trading subsidiaries of
Conkenner. The services provided to clients include:
(a) the
provision of hand drying facilities, i.e. the sale or rental of warm air hand
dryers, hire of wall cabinets containing continuous towels, the provision of
paper towels and the hire or sale of cloth towels;
(b)
workwear rental, being the hire, largely to employers, of items such as boiler
suits, chefs' jackets and trousers, overalls and uniforms. The parties have
indicated that: ´Such garments are normally sized and marked for
particular wearers';
(c) dustmat
rental, such mats being entrance or corridor mats, either impregnated with
fluids or of special material or weave designed to remove dirt and dust from
shoes;
(d) linen
rental, being the hire of sheets, pillowcases, hand towels, bath towels, bath
mats, table cloths and napkins to hotels, restaurants, caterers and hospitals.
Spring
Grove is engaged in the first three activities.
6. The
market is that for the provision of textile rental and associated services as
described in the previous paragraph to offices, schools, factories and other
establishments. There are several other firms engaged in this business. These
include Celtic Linen, Connaught and Court Group and a number of others. The
notifying parties have estimated the breakdown of market shares as follows.
Parties
Estimate of Market Shares
%
Hand
Drying
Workwear Dustmat Linen
Facilities Rental Rental Services
Spring
Grove
10
17
14
0
Conkenner 18
21
25
27
Spring
Grove/
Conkenner
Total
28
38
39
27
Connaught
& Court
14
33
29
47
Celtic
9
10
14
19
Others 49
19
18
7
(All columns add to 100% after rounding up or down)
7. In
addition the parties have indicated that many firms and institutions provide
such services in-house and that specialist suppliers account for only a
relatively small share of the market in each case. According to the parties
in-house provision accounts for 75% or more of total use of such products and
some customers regularly switch to in-house provision when contracts come up
for renewal.
The
Arrangements
8. The
agreement relates to the sale by ISIL of the entire issued share capital of
Conkenner to Spring Grove. The agreement, as notified, included a number of
non-compete provisions which are summarised below.
9. Clause
5 provides that, for a period of 10 years from Completion, Spring Grove shall
not use and procure that no groupcompany shall use the industrial property
rights or any other marks similar to or likely to be confused with them, and
not to represent, and procure that no group company should represent, that they
have any right in or to such industrial property rights. The industrial
property rights means the trade marks and trade names of the business. Clause
5(2) provides for a number of exceptions to this provision. These essentially
operate for a period of months from completion and are designed to give the
purchaser time to remove such trade marks and logos from vehicles, staff
uniforms, name boards etc.
10. Clause
7(1)(a) provided that for a period of 3 years from the date of completion,
ISIL, BET or its subsidiaries, (the vendors), would not without the prior
written consent of the purchaser:
(i)
be engaged or concerned in any Competing Enterprise, (save as the holder of not
more than 5% of the shares of a quoted company);
(ii)
through any competing enterprise, transact business with any person who was a
customer of a Conkenner Group Company during the 12 months preceding completion;
(iii)
knowingly canvass or solicit orders for competing enterprises from any person
who was a customer of a Conkenner Group Company during the 12 months preceding
completion.
Essentially
a competing business is defined in the agreement as one competing with the
business of Conkenner.
Clause
7(1)(b) provides that ISIL and BET or its subsidiaries will not for a period of
10 years from Completion, use any one or more of the industrial property rights
to do any of the things specified in 7(1)(a).
11. Clause
7(2) provides that ISIL, BET or its subsidiaries will not without the prior
written consent of the purchaser assign licence or permit in the State the use
of any one or more of the industrial property rights by any person interested
directly or indirectly in any competing enterprise for a period of 10 years
from Completion.
12. Clause
7(3) provided that, for a period of 3 years from completion, neither BET nor
any of its subsidiaries would, without the prior written consent of the
purchaser, knowingly solicit or entice away from any Conkenner group company
any supplier who had supplied goods to it during the previous 12 months if this
would adversely affect the supply of goods or services by the supplier to that
company. Clause 7(4) provided that neither BET nor any of its subsidiaries
would solicit or entice away from any Conkenner Group Company any manager or
supervisor employed by it upon Completion, for a period of 3 years from that
date, without the purchaser's prior written permission.
13. Clause
7(5) provided that neither, ISIL, BET nor any of its subsidiaries, would
without the prior written consent of the purchaser, use or reveal to any person
any of the trade secrets, secret or confidential operations, processes or
dealings or any other confidential information concerning any Conkenner group
company or its customers. Such information includes customer lists and names,
sales statistics, reports on pricing, and information relating to sales by any
group company, until such
time
as they should fall into the public domain.
14. Clause
7(6) provides that each of the covenants and undertakings contained in clauses
7(1) to (5) shall be construed as a separate covenant and undertaking. Clause
7(8) provides that if the Competition Authority indicates that but for the
duration, extent or scope of clause 5 or 7, it would issue a certificate in
respect of the agreement, the parties shall forthwith in writing agree that
provision with the minimum variation or modification so as to give the
provision the maximum duration extent or scope permissible but so as to procure
such certificate.
Submissions
of the Parties
15. The
parties referred to the decision of the EC Commission in Reuter/BASF
[1]
and the European Court of Justice decision in Remia
[2]
to support the view that the restrictions contained in the agreement did not
prevent, restrict or distort competition and therefore merited a certificate.
They also quoted extensively from the Authority's first decision in
Nallen/O'Toole
[3],
where it granted a certificate in respect of a sale of business agreement
incorporating non-competition clauses. They stated that the periods during
which the restrictions would apply were ´related to the period during
which a potential competitor would be able to build up a market position
relevant to the life span of the goodwill'. They also claimed that the period
of three years specified under clause 7 was reasonable in the circumstances and
that it did not prevent, restrict or distort competition in trade in any goods
or services in the State or in any part of the State.
16. They
argued that it had effectively been agreed that for a period of 10 years the
industrial property rights will be used by neither party in a competing
enterprise. They claimed that this did not restrict competition but rather
regulated the use of certain intellectual property rights. They stated that
such considerations applied in respect of clauses 5, 7(1)(b) and 7(2).
17. The
parties also claimed that the acquisition itself, as distinct from the
ancillary restrictive clauses, might not be properly reviewable under Section
4(1) of the Competition Act. While recognising that the Authority had given
its views on the applicability of Section 4(1) to mergers and acquisitions in
Woodchester
[4],
the parties argued that the Authority's decision was essentially wrong in law.
Specifically they submitted that the maxim
generalia
specialibus non derogant
was applicable. They cited certain court judgements in support of this
[5].
They also argued that the Competition Act did not contain any specific
direction that the jurisprudence at Community level was to be used and that
such omission suggested that the Oireachtas did not intend that such
jurisprudence was to be given any particular weight. They also claimed that EC
precedents indicated that mergers and acquisitions were not subject to Article
85(1).
18. The
parties also submitted that the acquisition satisfied the test set by the
Authority in Woodchester for establishing whether or not a merger could offend
against Section 4(1). Specifically they stated that the markets were highly
competitive with all of the users being competitors or potential competitors
and consequently the acquisition could not be said to have resulted in, or be
likely to result in a lessening of competition.
Subsequent
Developments.
19. Following
discussions with the Authority the parties presented further arguments in
support of the arrangements. They contended that BET possessed secret trading
information which would allow it, at the end of two years, to solicit lucrative
business away from Conkenner.
20. The
parties indicated, however, by letters dated 6 July and 23 September 1993,
that they would amend a number of the provisions of clause 7 by means of a
supplemental agreement. These amendments are as follows.
Clause
7(1) as amended provides that:
(a)
for a period of 2 years from the date of completion, ISIL, BET or its
subsidiaries, will not without the prior written consent of the purchaser:
(i)
be engaged or concerned in any Competing Enterprise, (save as the holder of not
more than 5% of the shares of a quoted company);
(ii)
through any Competing Enterprise, transact business with any person who was a
customer of a Group Company at or about the date of Completion;
(iii)
knowingly canvass or solicit orders for Competing Enterprises from any person
who was a customer of a Group Company at or about the time of Completion;
(b) for
a period of three years immediately following the date of completion:
(i)
through any competing enterprise, transact business with any person who was a
customer of a Group Company at or about the date of completion where such
transaction or dealing arises directly or indirectly as a consequence of any
canvassing or solicitation of orders as set out in subclause B below;
(ii)
knowingly canvass or solicit orders for competing enterprises from any person
who was a customer of a Group Company at or about the date of completion;
For
the purpose of subclause 7(1)(b), canvassing or soliciting orders shall include
contacting customers directly or indirectly with a view to informing customers
that BET or any of its subsidiaries is operating/doing business in the Republic
of Ireland or with a view to securing business from them.
Clause
7(1)(b), dealing with the use of Industrial Property rights, now becomes 7(1)(c).
Clause
7(1)(d) defines the term 'at or about the time of completion ' as a period of
two months prior to the date of completion.
Clause
7(4) as amended provides that neither BET nor any of its subsidiaries will
solicit or entice away from any Conkenner Group Company any manager or
supervisor employed by it upon Completion, for a period of 2 years from that
date, without the purchaser's prior written permission.
Clause
7(5), which relates to confidential information, was amended by the addition of
the following.
´The
foregoing provisions of this subclause shall not apply to the extent that
(i)
BET or a subsidiary of BET is required by law to reveal the same; or
(ii)
BET or a subsidiary of BET would, by virtue of such provisions be deemed to be
prohibited itself from doing any one or more of the acts matters or things
referred to in the foregoing subclauses of this clause 7 after the expiry of
the respective periods of time specified in those subclauses.'
The
parties confirmed by letter dated 27 October 1993, that both sides had agreed
to the text of the supplemental agreement and that they were prepared to
execute it as soon as practicable subject to a satisfactory response from the
Authority. In a letter to the Authority dated 6 December 1993, the parties
indicated that arrangements had been made to have the supplemental agreement
executed.
Assessment
(a) Section
4(1)
21. Section
4(1) of the Competition Act states that ´all agreements between
undertakings, decisions by associations of undertakings and concerted practices
which have as their object or effect the prevention, restriction or distortion
of competition in trade in any goods or services in the State or in any part of
the State are prohibited and void.'
(b) The
Undertakings and the Agreement
22. The
parties to the present agreement are Spring Grove, ISIL and BET. Each of these
is a body corporate which is engaged in the provision of a service or services
for gain. Consequently they are undertakings within the meaning of section
3(1). The present arrangement is, in the Authority's view, an agreement
between undertakings.
(c) Applicability
of Section 4(1)
The
Sale Agreement
23. Under
the agreement Spring Grove has purchased Conkenner from ISIL. The Authority
has given its views for believing that mergers are not automatically excluded
from the prohibition in section 4(1) at length in its decision on Woodchester.
It does not propose to restate those here. To the extent that the parties have
raised issues not covered in that decision the Authority proposes to deal with
them briefly.
24. The
parties have claimed that the Authority's interpretation of the Act in
Woodchester is wrong in that an acquisition
per
se
,
as distinct from the ancillary restrictive clauses, is not subject to section
4(1), since specific provisions for dealing with acquisitions are provided
under the Mergers Act. In the Authority's view it is inconsistent to claim
that an acquisition agreement is not subject to section 4(1) but that certain
clauses of such an agreement are subject to such provisions. The Authority
does not believe that the legislation could be interpreted as implying that
certain aspects of an agreement are subject to section 4(1) while others are
not. Thus if the parties interpretation is correct then all aspects of the
acquisition should properly be regarded as not reviewable under section 4(1)
and non compete clauses regardless of their duration or extent would not be
subject to its provisions.
25. The
parties have argued that the Act does not include any specific direction that
the jurisprudence at Community level was to be used and that such omission
suggests that the Oireachtas did not intend that such jurisprudence was to be
given any particular weight. The Authority, however, notes the comments of
Finlay CJ in VHI
[6].
Having relied upon the definition of gain established in Arthur Average he went
on to state that, although he did not find the word ´gain' in Section 3(1)
of the Competition Act ambiguous,
´if
it were so found it would be appropriate to look at the long title of the Act,
where it was stated that the purposes of the Act included the prohibition by
analogy with Articles 85 and 86 of the Treaty establishing the European
Economic Community, and in the interests of the common good, the prevention,
restriction or distortion of competition and the abuse of dominant positions in
trade in the state. Articles 85 and 86 undoubtedly applied to a body corporate
engaged in the supply of services even if it did not have as its objects the
making of commercial profits..'
In
the Authority's view such sentiments appear to indicate that where there is any
ambiguity in the legislation, one should look to the long title of the Act and,
as that provides that it is an Act to do certain things by analogy with
Articles 85 and 86, EC decisions under those Articles should be considered.
26. The
Authority also notes that, in decisions where it found that restrictive clauses
in sale of business agreements infringed Article 85(1), the EC Commission
stated that it was the sale agreement and not the restrictive clauses which
constituted an agreement between undertakings
[7].
The Authority believes that the exclusion of the acquisition and the
associated restrictive clauses would mean that the provisions of the
Competition Act differed substantially from those of Articles 85 and 86 and it
considers this to be inconsistent with the long title to the Act and the
interpretation placed on that in the VHI judgment.
27. There
is no obligation on parties to notify agreements under the Competition Act. If
the parties' arguments are accepted then the present agreement is not an
agreement of a kind described in Section 4(1) and it may not be notified. The
Authority could not issue a certificate or licence in respect of such an
agreement since it can only issue these in respect of notified agreements.
Since a certificate or licence can only be granted in respect of an agreement,
the Authority could not issue one in respect of the non-compete provisions in
the present agreement since, if the parties were correct, they are part of an
agreement which could not be notified. Indeed the implication of the parties
argument is that they should not have notified this agreement. The Authority
considers that, on balance, the reasons stated in Woodchester for concluding
that mergers are not automatically excluded from the scope of the Act remain
valid.
28. The
parties' figures on market share imply that the relevant markets are fairly
highly concentrated and that the degree of concentration would increase
significantly as a result of this agreement. In two instances, namely workwear
and dustmat rental, the merged entity will have a market share of almost forty
percent according to these figures, while in hand drying and linen services its
share will be 28 and 27 percent respectively. In the latter case admittedly
the agreement has no impact on concentration, since Spring Grove was not
engaged in this market.
29. The
Authority indicated in Scully Tyrrell
[8]
that, where the four firm concentration ratio post merger was below 40%, it
believed an acquisition would be unlikely to have any adverse effect on
competition and in such circumstances it would generally find that the
acquisition did not offend against section 4(1). It indicated, however, that,
where the four firm concentration ratio exceeded this threshold, it would
conduct a more detailed examination of the arrangements. The parties figures
would place this agreement into the latter category. While the detailed
information needed to estimate the Herfindahl Hirschman Index (HHI)
[9]
is not available from the table, it is clear that in some, if not all, of the
relevant markets the threshold set by the Authority in Scully Tyrrell is also
exceeded on this measure.
30. The
parties have submitted that many businesses provide the relevant products
themselves. Clearly an alternative to renting workwear from the parties is for
a firm to buy it themselves and supply it to their employees and let them make
their own cleaning arrangements. Similarly businesses and institutions can
purchase and install hand dryers, or cloth or paper towels on their premises
and likewise in the case of dustmats. Indeed the parties have submitted that
the vast majority of businesses and institutions do just this and that some
proportion of their customers decide, each year, to provide such services
themselves, rather than continue to obtain them from the notifying parties.
31. The
important issue here is the question of the definition of the market.
Specifically should the market be defined to include only sales by firms
specialising in providing such products to others or should it include the self
provision of such products by the users. A similar issue has arisen in respect
of other notifications, including one involving the purchaser's parent company
[10].
The market should properly be defined so as to include those products which
are close substitutes and important competitors to the products in question.
Clearly the range of products which may properly be regarded as close
substitutes or important competitors will be confined within quite narrow
limits. Products to which only a relatively small number of users might switch
in the event of a variation in price ought not to be considered close
substitutes. In Carrolls Catering the Authority stated that:
´In
the Authority's view it is unlikely that contract catering firms either
individually or collectively are in a position to exercise market power. It
seems likely that if they attempted to do so, users of catering services would
respond by providing such services in-house. In the Authority's view the costs
of switching to in-house provision of such services would not represent a
deterrent. Consequently it would appear legitimate to regard self operated
services as sufficiently close substitutes for bought in catering services for
them to be regarded as part of the same market.'
The
Authority has previously considered that insurance companies could substitute
in-house provision of services for those of loss adjusters
[11].
32. The
Authority believes that the argument advanced in Carrolls Catering could also
be applied in this instance to justify regarding self-provision of the products
by users as constituting a part of the market. Specifically the Authority
believes that, were the enlarged firm to attempt to exercise market power, many
of its customers would choose to provide such products in-house. Indeed the
parties have indicated that the vast majority of firms and institutions do in
fact rely on in-house provision. Allowing for the level of in-house provision
suggests that specialist providers of such services account for a quarter or
less of the relevant markets. This indicates that in-house provision is a
sufficiently close substitute for bought-in services for it to be considered
part of the same market. The inclusion of in-house provision indicates that
post-merger levels of concentration are considerably below the thresholds at
which the Authority believes a merger might pose problems for competition and
therefore merit closer examination. Consequently the Authority concludes that
the present acquisition does not offend against section 4(1).
Non-Compete
Provisions
33. The
agreement as notified contained a number of non-compete provisions. These
included restrictions on the vendor competing with the business for a period
following completion as well as restrictions in relation to industrial property
rights. The former type of restriction has been dealt with on a number of
occasions by the Authority. The Authority has indicated that in the case of a
sale of business it normally regards a restriction on the vendor competing with
the business following completion as necessary to secure the complete transfer
of the goodwill of the business. It has stated that provided the restriction
on the vendor is limited in terms of duration, geographic scope and subject
matter to what is necessary to achieve that purpose, then it does not, in the
Authority's view offend against section 4(1). The Authority has indicated that
it regards a period of two years as sufficient to secure the transfer of
goodwill.
34. Clause
7(1)(a) as notified restricted the vendor from being engaged in a competing
enterprise, from transacting business with any former customers through a
competing enterprise and from soliciting orders from former customers for any
competing enterprise for a period of 3 years from completion. The duration of
this restriction went beyond what was necessary to secure the transfer of the
goodwill of the business as the Authority does not believe that a restriction
of more than 2 years was justified in this instance. In this context it is
relevant that Spring Grove is already active in the relevant markets and that
the combined business would operate under the Spring Grove name. The Authority
concluded that clause 7(1)(a) as notified offended against section 4(1).
35. The
duration of the restriction on being engaged in a competing enterprise has now
been reduced to 2 years by an amending agreement submitted to the Authority and
no longer offends against section 4(1). The restriction on doing business with
or soliciting customers (now clause 7.1(b))is now limited to those firms or
individuals who were customers at or about the date of completion as opposed to
those who were customers at any time during the 12 months preceding completion.
The parties argued strongly, however, that a period of three years from
completion was justified for this restriction as a significant proportion of
Conkenner's customer contracts would not come up for renewal for more than two
years and BET would be free to approach such customers knowing that their
contracts were due to expire. By letters dated 6 July and 23 September 1993,
the parties indicated their intention to amend the clause so that the three
year restriction on the vendor preventing it from transacting business with
persons who were customers at or about the time of the agreement only applied
'where such transaction or dealing arises directly or indirectly as a
consequence of any canvassing or solicitation of orders...'. Canvassing or
soliciting orders is defined as including '...contacting customers directly or
indirectly with a view to informing customers that BET or any of its
subsidiaries is operating/doing business in the Republic of Ireland or with a
view to securing business from them'. The Authority remains of the view that
a restriction of 2 years on a vendor competing with a business which he has
sold is normally adequate to secure the complete transfer of the goodwill and
provide sufficient protection to the purchaser. However, the Authority
considers that a three year restriction on soliciting former customers may be
necessary in this case. Therefore, clause 7(1)(c), as amended, does not, in
the Authority's opinion, offend against section 4(1).
36. Clause
7(1)(c)
[12]
restricts the vendor and BET from being engaged in a competing enterprise, from
transacting business with any former customers through a competing enterprise
and from soliciting orders from former customers for any competing enterprise
for a period of 10 years, using any of the industrial property rights of the
business. Clause 7(2) provides that the vendor and BET will not licence or
permit the use by any competing enterprise of any of the industrial property
rights for a period of 10 years from completion. The Authority has accepted in
previous decisions that a restriction of unlimited duration on the vendor of a
business using any of the trade names associated with the business is necessary
to prevent the vendor from representing itself as being associated with the
business
[13].
In the Authority's view this restriction would not prevent the vendor
re-entering the market or markets involved following the expiry of a legitimate
non-competition clause on the same basis as any other new entrant.
Consequently it has neither the object or effect of preventing, restricting or
distorting competition and does not offend against section 4(1).
37. Clause
7(3) provides that, for a period of 3 years, neither the vendor nor BET will
knowingly solicit or entice away any supplier to the business, without the
purchaser's prior written agreement, if the effect of such a move would be to
reduce the supplier's supply of goods and/or services to the business. This
provision does not, in the Authority's view prevent the vendor or BET doing
business with such suppliers or from re-entering the market once a legitimate
non-competition clause has expired and hence does not offend against Section
4(1).
38. Clause
7(4), as notified, restricted the vendor and BET soliciting or enticing away
from any group company any manager or supervisor employed by the business upon
completion for a period of 3 years. The Authority has already accepted in a
number of decisions that a restriction on a vendor soliciting former employees
to take up employment with it may be necessary to secure the transfer of the
goodwill of the business being sold. It has previously accepted a restriction
of 3 years in such clauses were necessary in certain decisions
[14].
The Authority has already indicated in para 35 that it considers a period of 2
years sufficient to secure the transfer of goodwill in this instance.
Consequently clause 7(4), as notified, offended against section 4(1). As it
has now been amended so as to reduce the duration of this restriction to two
years, the Authority considers that it no longer offends against section 4(1).
39. Clause
7(5) is a restriction on the vendor and BET using or revealing to anyone any
confidential information relating to the business being sold. While it refers
to trade secrets and processes, the Authority does not believe that any
´technical know-how' is covered by this provision but that it simply
relates to confidential business information. The Authority has stated in
previous decisions that such restrictions are acceptable provided it is not
intended that they be used to prevent the vendor re-entering the relevant
market once a legitimate non-competition clause has expired
[15].
Clause 7(5), as notified, included no such provision and, in the Authority's
opinion, it offended against section 4(1). Clause 7(5) as amended, however,
does not offend against section 4(1).
40. Clause
5 provides that, following an initial period designed to afford the purchaser
the opportunity to remove the name and logos of the business from its vehicles,
staff uniforms etc., the purchaser will not use any of the vendor's industrial
property rights. Such rights are defined to include the trade marks, logos and
other marks which were the property of Conkenner. The Authority does not
believe that this restriction is designed to or will have the effect of
impairing the purchaser's ability to compete in the relevant markets since the
purchaser is already well established in those markets. The European Court of
Justice has indicated that an agreement not to market goods under a trademark
infringes Article 85(1) if the purpose is to secure market protection
[16].
In Penneys
[17]
the Commission granted a negative clearance to an agreement which involved one
party agreeing not to make use of a disputed trade mark for 5 years, in a
situation where the party restrained was already carrying on business
successfully under other names. This case involved a dispute concerning trade
marks and the Commission accepted that the agreement was the least restrictive
solution to a genuine dispute. In the Authority's view clause 5 does not
offend against section 4(1).
The
Decision
41. The
agreement between Spring Grove Ireland Limited and Initial Services
(International) Limited and BET plc for the sale of the entire issued share
capital of Conkenner Limited is an agreement between undertakings since the
parties to the agreement are undertakings.
42. In
the Authority's opinion, the sale of the business of Conkenner Limited does not
have the object or effect of preventing, restricting or distorting competition
within the State or any part of the State and does not offend against section
4(1). The restrictions contained in clause 5 and in clause 7, as amended by a
Supplemental Agreement, do not offend against section 4(1) of the Competition
Act.
The
Certificate
43. The
Competition Authority has issued the following certificate:
The
Competition Authority certifies that in its opinion, on the basis of the facts
in its possession, the agreement of 27 November 1992 between Spring Grove
Ireland Limited, P&O Services Group Limited, Initial Services
(International) Limited and BET plc for the acquisition of the entire issued
share capital of Conkenner Limited by Spring Grove, (notification no.
CA/1135/92), notified on 30 December 1992 under Section 7 as amended by a
Supplemental Agreement, does not offend against
Section 4(1) of the
Competition
Act, 1991.
For
the Competition Authority
Patrick
M. Lyons
Chairman
18
November 1993.
[ ] 1 Reuter/BASF
OJ L254, 17.9.76, p.40.
[ ]2 Remia
BV and Others v European Commission, Case 42/84[1985],ECR 2545.
[ ]3 Competition
Authority decision no.1, Nallen/O'Toole (Belmullet), (CA/8/91), 2 April 1992.
[ ]4 Competition
Authority decision no. 6, Woodchester Bank/UDT Bank, (CA/10/92), 4 August 1992.
[ ]5 The
Vera Cruz (1884) 10 APP., Cas. 59, 68 and DPP v Grey IR (1986) 317,327
[ ]6 Mary
Deane & Others v Voluntary Health Insurance Board, Supreme Court judgement
of 29 July 1992, unreported.
[ ]7 See
for example the Commission's decision in Reuter/BASF.
[ ]8 Competition
Authority decision no. 12, Scully Tyrrell/Edberg, (CA/57/92), 29 January 1993.
[ ]9 This
is an alternative measure of market concentration which was also applied in
Scully Tyrell.
[ ]10 Competition
Authority decision no. 29, Carrolls Catering/Sutcliffe, (CA/1136/92), 9
September 1993.
[ ]12 This
was clause 7(1)b in the original agreement.
[ ]13 Competition
Authority decision no. 8, ACT/Kindle, (CA/9/91), 4 September 1992.
[ ]16 BAT
v EC Commission [1985] ECR 365.
© 1993 Irish Competition Authority