Irish Court of Criminal Appeal
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Cite as: [2014] IECCA 30
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Judgment Title: Director of Public Prosecutions -v- Collins Neutral Citation: [2014] IECCA 30 Court of Criminal Appeal Record Number: 161CPX/12 Date of Delivery: 31/07/2014 Court: Court of Criminal Appeal Composition of Court: O'Donnell J., Moriarty J., Herbert J. Judgment by: O'Donnell J. Status of Judgment: Approved
Notes on Memo: Dismiss appeal of DPP against dismissal of charges (motion of respondent to dismiss appeal on grounds of delay also refused) | ||||||||||||
THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL CCA No. 161CPX/12 Bill No. LH17/12 O’Donnell J. Moriarty J. Herbert J.
The People at the Suit of the
Director of Public Prosecutions Prosecutor/Appellant And
Desmond Collins Defendant/Respondent Judgment of the Court delivered on the 31st of July 014, by O’Donnell J. 1. This is an appeal by the Director of Public Prosecutions (“D.P.P.” or “the Director”) against the order of His Honour Judge O’Shea sitting at Dundalk in the Eastern Circuit and made pursuant to s.4(E) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 (“the 1967 Act”) as inserted by s.9 of the Criminal Justice Act 1999, whereby he dismissed the charges against the respondent. The Court also heard a motion brought by the respondent to dismiss the Director’s application on grounds of abuse of process and inordinate and inexcusable delay based on the fact that the order of Judge O’Shea was made on the 17th of May 2012 but the Director’s submissions were not lodged until November 2013. 2. The facts upon which the learned Circuit Court Judge dismissed the charges can be shortly stated. The respondent had been charged with seven counts. Five related to an address at Drogheda, County Louth. They were:
(2) Possession of diamorphine with intent to supply at the same address; (3) Possession of diamorphine to a value in excess of €13,000 at the same address; (4) Possession of cannabis at the same address; (5) Possession of cannabis with intent to supply at the same address. 3. The warrant in this case reads as follows: “An Chúirt Dhúiche The District Court Dublin Metropolitan District Section 26 Misuse of Drugs Act 1970, 1977/1984 warrant to search. Whereas I am satisfied by information on oath of Garda Ciaran Murrihy a member of An Garda Síochána of Santry Garda Station that there is reasonable cause for suspecting:
• A controlled drug, namely Diamorphine • And that such drug is on the premises at No. 308 Rathmullen Park, Drogheda, County Louth, in the said District, • THIS IS TO AUTHORISE You Garda Ciaran Murrihy the said member of An Garda Síochána, accompanied by such other members of An Garda Síochána and such other persons who may be necessary, at any time or times within one month of the date hereof, to enter if need be by force, the said* premises at No. 308 Rathmullen Park, Drogheda, County Louth in the said District to search such premises and any persons found therein, to examine any substance, article or other thing found thereon or therein, to inspect any book, record or other document found thereon and, if there is a reasonable ground for suspecting that an offence is being or has been committed under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1997 and 1984 in relation to a substance, article or other thing found on such premises or that a document so found is a document mentioned in subsection (1)(b) of section 26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act, 1977 or as record or other document which you have reasonable cause to believe to be a document which may be required as evidence in proceedings for an offence under the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 and 1984 to seize and detain the substance, article, document or other thing as the case may be. dated the 16th day of July 2010. Signed: Patrick Clyne JUDGE OF THE DISTRICT COURT, To Garda Ciaran Murrihy of Santry Garda station.” (The portions of the warrant italicised above are the Court’s emphases in order to identify the passages upon which the argument focussed, and appear in ordinary type in the original warrant.) 4. Although no evidence was given of this in the Circuit Court, it appears reasonable to assume that this warrant was produced using a standard template and that the pieces of information underlined in ordinary print in the warrant were the individual pieces of information which were inputted into the standard form. Again, it seems probable that this form was used because the investigating garda was attached to Santry Garda Station and therefore would in the normal course of events be normally concerned with the Dublin Metropolitan District. No evidence was given in the Circuit Court as to the extent of the Dublin Metropolitan District Court but it was accepted that Drogheda is not within that District. The fact is that Judge Clyne is assigned to the District Court which is in the Louth area, and that the premises at Rathmullen Park, Drogheda, County Louth, is within that area. It follows of course that the premises was not within the Dublin Metropolitan District. There are therefore three defects (to use a neutral term), or perhaps three occasions of the same error, in the format of the warrant which have been italicised in the text set out above. The heading “Dublin Metropolitan District” and the two reference to No. 308 Rathmullen Park, Drogheda, County Louth, as being “in said District” which must be understood as referring to the Dublin Metropolitan District. The question for the Circuit Court, and for this Court on appeal, is what is the significance of these defects? 5. First, it is necessary to appreciate that the question here is entirely one of the formalities shown on the warrant: there is no question but that the judge had substantive jurisdiction to issue the warrant both in terms of geographical jurisdiction, being a judge with jurisdiction to issue a warrant in respect of these premises, and also in terms of subject matter jurisdiction, because the statutory requirements for a warrant under s.26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977 had been fulfilled. 6. It is necessary first to deal with the application by the respondent seeking an order dismissing the appeal herein on grounds of delay. In this regard it was explained that although the Notice of Appeal had been filed within the time limited by the statute, it is the practice of the Court of Criminal Appeal not to list cases until submissions are available. In this case the submissions of the D.P.P. did not become available until November 2013 and were then responded to. A date for hearing was sought and obtained, a week before this motion issued. On the hearing of this appeal counsel for the D.P.P. frankly and properly accepted that the responsibility for the delay rested largely with him, and was due to an oversight. 7. For the purposes of this argument the Court is prepared to accept that it has jurisdiction to dismiss an appeal for want of prosecution. The Court also accepts that it is desirable that the jurisdiction for an appeal of a ruling under s.4(E) of the 1967 should be operated with considerable expedition. It has been emphasised that the procedure itself is useful in seeking an early hearing and determination of issues which may be determinative of the trial. But it follows, almost with even greater force, that when a ruling has been made favourable to an accused, it may be tantamount to an acquittal and it is very undesirable that the person should nevertheless be in doubt as to their status, for any prolonged period of time. It greatly adds to the ordeal that a criminal trial must necessarily involve if the person having perhaps waited a substantial time for a trial, obtains a favourable preliminary ruling determining the trial, but then faces an indefinite delay during which that ruling is questioned with the prospect of a trial restarting. Indeed, the possibility arises that a ruling under s.4(E) of the 1967 Act might involve the dismissal of only some of the charges against the person and accordingly a trial may be held up pending the prosecution appeal against such dismissal. In such circumstances any delay in prosecuting the appeal is particularly undesirable, and it is to be expected that rulings under s.4(E) of the 1967 Act should be processed very promptly. However here, the respondent took no step to seek to have the case expedited or even the minimum step of corresponding with the D.P.P. threatening a motion such as this in the event that the matter was not proceeded with. The application here did not issue until almost six months after the Director’s default had been remedied, and only a week before the hearing of the appeal. In the circumstances of this case, accordingly the Court does not consider it appropriate to make any preliminary order dismissing the appeal. 8. The leading case on the formal requirements of a warrant is Simple Imports Ltd. v. The Revenue Commissioners [2000] 2 I.R. 243 (“Simple Imports”). This Court in The People (The Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Mallon [2011] 2 IR 544 (“Mallon”) described the ratio of that case as being that a warrant must show jurisdiction on its face. In fact, it may be more precise and correct to say that the case establishes that a warrant must not positively demonstrate a failure to comply with statutory jurisdiction. However analysed, Simple Imports, though a majority decision of a three judge Supreme Court remains the authoritative statement of the law. A warrant must be regular on its face at least insomuch as it must not state matters showing a lack of jurisdiction, even where jurisdiction exists in fact. 9. The particular issue in this case was considered in two factually similar cases to which this Court has been referred in argument and which shed some light on it. The first was the unanimous decision of a five person Supreme Court in The People (The Director of Public Prosecutions) v. Edgeworth [2001] 2 IR 131 (“Edgeworth”). Significantly that Court contained both Keane C.J. who delivered the majority decision in Simple Imports and Hardiman J. who had appeared in that case as counsel for the successful party. The decision in the Supreme Court in Edgeworth was delivered by Hardiman J. 10. The facts in Edgeworth were straightforward. That case too concerned a warrant which had been issued under ss.26 and 27 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, in that case by a peace commissioner. However the form was erroneously headed “The District Court”. The peace commissioner had signed the warrant and in doing so crossed out the words on the printed form “Judge of the District Court” and had written in the words “Peace Commissioner”. The warrant however did not state that the peace commissioner was authorised to issue a warrant for the area containing the dwelling that had been the subject of the search. 11. The Dublin Circuit Criminal Court found that the warrant was invalid. The D.P.P. exercised the power under s.34(1) of the Criminal Procedure Act 1967 of referring the matter to the Supreme Court without prejudice to the verdict in favour of the accused. The Supreme Court (Keane C.J., Denham, Murphy, Murray and Hardiman JJ.) unanimously held that the warrant was valid. The warrant correctly recited the statutory requirements imposed by s.26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, for the grant of a warrant. The term “District Court” was a misdescription and an error but that did not invalidate the warrant. At page 137 Hardiman J. referred to earlier cases including Simple Imports and said:
14. However a relatively recent decision of this Court in The Director of Public Prosecutions v. McCarthy [2010] IECCA 89 (“McCarthy”) on closely related facts resulted in a warrant being held invalid. Again the case related to a warrant issued under s.26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended. This is not necessarily surprising. Many cases where the offence is committed by possession of items or substances such as controlled drugs, firearms explosives or child pornography will involve a search of premises and thus necessitate a warrant. This observation does however emphasise the significance of the law relating to the validity of warrants and the consequent exclusion of evidence. In that case, like Edgeworth, the warrant had been issued by a peace commissioner. Again, like Edgeworth, the warrant was entitled erroneously “The District Court”. Again, it was signed by the peace commissioner, but in this case the printed words “Judge of the District Court” were not deleted, although there was an annotation beside the signature which was difficult to read, but which the prosecution alleged were the letters “P.C.” meaning presumably, peace commissioner. The trial judge ruled that the warrant was invalid, and the Court of Criminal Appeal (Macken, Budd and O’Keeffe, JJ.) agreed. 15. At first sight it is somewhat difficult to reconcile this decision of the Supreme Court in Edgeworth, with that of the Court of Criminal Appeal in McCarthy at least on a broad reading of the decision in Edgeworth. The reasoning of the Court of Criminal Appeal in McCarthy is however contained in the final substantive paragraph of the judgment:
16. It is necessary to observe that the fine distinctions made by the case law (of which Edgeworth and McCarthy are only a sample) and the careful debate over what in another context would seem to be obvious but forgivable errors, is given particular focus by the rigidity of the rule laid down in Kenny, which has been understood (and was understood in the case) as requiring that once a warrant is invalid, any search would be treated as a deliberate and conscious breach of the constitutional right of the citizen, and accordingly that all evidence obtained thereby must be excluded, almost automatically, subject to exceptions which certainly do not arise in this case. 17. The reasoning in Edgeworth might lead the conclusion that since the statutory requirements of s.26 of the Misuse of Drugs Act 1977, as amended, have been complied with, the reference to “Dublin Metropolitan District” in this case and “within the said District” are merely erroneous and of less significance than the error in Edgeworth, since there was no error as to the status of the person issuing the warrant. On the other hand, the reasoning in McCarthy could be understood as holding that where a warrant asserts, states, or suggests a jurisdiction that is incorrect (even if the person authorising the warrant had a jurisdiction in fact) then it is invalid. If that reason is applied here then the fact that the warrant asserts an incorrect jurisdiction by reference to the Dublin Metropolitan District is fatal to its validity. 18. In this case, the Court considers it cannot distinguish this case satisfactorily from the decision in McCarthy. In one sense the problem here was more substantial. The District Court is a court of local and limited jurisdiction. The geographical area of the Court’s jurisdiction is essential to the jurisdiction of the judge. The decision in McCarthy treats Edgeworth as being a case in which there was no confusion in fact because the status of the person issuing the warrant was clear and the heading could be ignored. Here the heading “Dublin Metropolitan District” is relevant to the content of the warrant since it relates to the jurisdictional district within which the premises are alleged to be found. The warrant states a jurisdiction which the District judge did not have, and which would not justify the issuance of the warrant for the location in question. The learned Circuit Court Judge in this case treated this error as one which was fundamental and in the context of a local and limited jurisdiction it was perhaps appropriate to so describe it. It is not a ‘mere error’ which ‘does not mislead’, as in the case of Mallon. Accordingly, on the basis of authority, this Court must conclude that the learned judge was correct to hold the warrant invalid and the evidence inadmissible. It is apparent however, that these distinctions are very, and perhaps excessively, refined. It is also the case that the law on the validity of warrants cannot be viewed in isolation from the consequences of such invalidity. Whether warrants should be held to be invalid on such a basis is a matter that could usefully be reviewed by the Supreme Court. The significance of a decision on the validity of the warrant for the admissibility of evidence (which is the crucial question) is a closely related issue which deserves consideration. The current position on warrants and the admission of evidence obtained thereunder is far from satisfactory, but given the decision in McCarthy in particular, this Court does not consider it can come to any other conclusion, without overruling that decision, which this Court does not have power to do, and bringing further confusion to this area.
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