C39
Judgment Title: D.P.P.-v- M.J. Composition of Court: Finnegan J., Edwards J., McCarthy J. Judgment by: Finnegan J. Status of Judgment: Approved
Outcome: Reasons stated for quashing conviction | ||||||||||
COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEAL 236/06 Finnegan J. Edwards J. McCarthy J. DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS RESPONDENT .v. M. J. APPLICANT Judgment of the Court delivered on the 14th day of March 2008 by Finnegan J. On the 27th July 2006 the applicant was convicted on four counts of indecent assault contrary to section 6 of the Criminal Law (Amendment) Act 1935 before the Circuit Criminal Court sitting at Naas. On the application to this court two grounds are relied upon by the applicant:- 1. That the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact in amending the indictment after the close of the prosecution case. 2. That the learned trial judge erred in allowing the jury to continue its deliberations until after 10 p.m. in circumstances where they had been sitting since 9.30 a.m. and deliberating since 5 p.m. It is proposed to deal firstly with the second ground. At the conclusion of the first day of the trial in speaking to the jury the learned trail judge said:-
On the following morning counsel agreed among themselves to dispense with a number of witnesses and counsel were able to tell the learned trial judge that they expected the matter to complete by midday on the third day. Good progress was made on the second day of the trial. At the conclusion of the day’s proceedings the learned trial judge addressed the jury as follows:
At this juncture the learned trial judge asked counsel if there was a prospect that the case might conclude that evening and counsel for the prosecution replied that he would like to think so. The learned trial judge before sending the jury to their lunch told them:-
In the absence of the jury the following discussion took place between counsel for the applicant and the trial judge:-
Judge: No, no, that is what I understood, that is what I asked, that we would conclude the case today. However we will work towards that event if we possibly can. The jury looked very pleased with that. The hearing resumed at 2.08 p.m. and the two defence witnesses gave evidence. There followed a discussion with the learned trial judge in the absence of the jury in relation to his charge, specifically on the issues of delay and corroboration. Thereafter there were the prosecution’s closing speech, which was very short consuming just two pages of the transcript, and counsel for the defence’s closing speech, which again was short consuming seven pages of the transcript. The jury retired at 5 p.m. There was one requisition and the jury, having been recharged in relation to that, retired at 5.06 p.m. At 8 p.m. the learned trial judge discussed with counsel whether he should invite the jury to consider a majority verdict. The learned trial judge remarked that the jury had had a relatively long day and expressed concern that they might be beginning to wilt under the pressure of the negotiations. Counsel for the applicant expressed a concern to the trial judge in the following terms:-
At 9.04 a.m. the learned trial judge spoke to counsel as follows:-
It appears from the foregoing that the jury had been engaged in the hearing and had been either in court or in their room for a full period of twelve hours with just over one hour break for lunch. The transcript contains a number of references to the weather. It is clear that the day was hot, oppressive, clammy and draining. The length of time for which the jury had been engaged was clearly a matter of concern to the learned trial judge and to the applicant’s counsel and each of them had referred to the nature of the weather on that day. The former practice which required the jury to continue deliberating until they had reached a verdict or until it became apparent that they would be unable to agree was discontinued as it carried with it the danger that verdicts would be reached due to exhaustion or a desire to be released rather than on a full consideration of the evidence. The reason for the practice of sending a jury to a hotel for a meal and overnight stay when they had not reached a verdict nor reached the stage of being unable to agree was remarked on in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Gavin (unreported) Court of Criminal Appeal 27th July 2000:-
In The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v Finnamore (unreported) Court of Criminal Appeal 21st November 2005 the jury was sent out to consider their verdict at 4 .07 p.m. At 6.44 p.m. they were directed that they could bring in a majority verdict. At that time they had in fact reached a verdict on Count No. 2. Just after 7 p.m. they were called back into court when the learned trial judge explained the position with regard to an overnight stay in a hotel if they had not reached a verdict. He also told them that there was a normal procedural rule whereby a jury should not sit consistently beyond three and a half hours but if they said they were nearly there and only wanted another half hour or so then that would be alright. He also told them that normally a jury should not sit beyond 7.30 in the evening. The learned trial judge asked the foreman if he thought the jury could reach a decision by 8 p.m. The jury retired at about 7.30 p.m. but were told that they should continue to consult until 8 p.m. At 8.05 p.m. the jury had still not agreed on a verdict but asked for more time, possibly an hour at the worst. The judge agreed to give them that time if they felt they were up to it but that it was a matter for the jury. The jury finally returned at 8.47 p.m. with a verdict of guilty. Accordingly the jury had been deliberating for four hours and forty minutes before reaching their verdict. In the course of the judgment McCracken J. said:-
In the present case the court has regard to the following circumstances:- 1. The hearing commenced at 9.30 a.m. on that day. 2. The jury had been in court or confined to their room throughout the day with the exception of the one hour period for lunch. 3. The total time for which the jury were involved on that day extended from 9.30 a.m. until 10.26 p.m. that is for just short of thirteen hours. 4. The jury had been engaged in deliberations from 5 p.m. until 10.26 p.m. that is for just short of five and a half hours. 5. The jury completed their deliberations well after 7.30 p.m. the same continuing for a further three hours. 6. The day in question, the 27th July 2006, was regarded by the trial judge as hot, oppressive, clammy and draining. It is a not a matter for the jury as to how long they will deliberate. It is a matter for the trial judge who because of his experience will be aware of the dangers of a jury sitting for too long and reaching a decision when overtired and perhaps influenced by pressure of time. In this case there are comments by the learned trial judge in the course of the day’s proceedings from which it is clear that he was indeed conscious of these dangers. Nonetheless rather than himself deciding for how long the jury should sit he allowed the jury to decide. In so doing he was in error. He may, and perhaps should, ascertain the jury’s views but the ultimate decision must be his. Having regard to this error by the learned trial judge but principally having regard to the circumstances listed at 1 to 6 above it would not be safe to allow the verdict to stand in relation to the four counts on which the jury returned a verdict of guilty. The court will treat the application for leave as the hearing of the appeal and will allow the appeal and direct a re-trial. |