THE COURT OF APPEAL Neutral Citation: [2025] IECA 114 Record Numbers: 235/2023 Kennedy J. Burns J. MacGrath J. BETWEEN/ THE PEOPLE AT THE SUIT OF THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS RESPONDENT/ - AND - Patrick Sweeney APPELLANTs JUDGMENT of the Court delivered on the 10th day of April 2025 by Ms. Justice Isobel Kennedy.
1. The appellant was convicted on the 2nd June 2023, following a 19 week trial with co-accused. This judgment concerns the appeal against severity of sentence, the appeal against conviction having been dismissed by this Court in People (DPP) v Sweeney, Beirne and O'Toole [2024] IECA 205. 2. On the 28th July 2023, the appellant was sentenced to: 5 years imprisonment in respect of 4 counts of assault causing harm contrary to s.3 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997; 15 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of false imprisonment contrary to s.15 of the Non-Fatal Offences Against the Person Act, 1997; 14 years imprisonment in respect of 3 counts of false imprisonment contrary to the same provision; 13 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of aggravated burglary, contrary to s.13 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act, 2001; 10 years imprisonment in respect of 3 counts of arson, contrary to s.2(11), (4) and (5) of the Criminal Damage Act 1991; 10 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of violent disorder contrary to s.15 of the Criminal Justice (Public Order) Act, 1994; 8 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of criminal damage contrary to s.2(1) and (5) of the Criminal Damage Act, 1991 and 5 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of animal cruelty, contrary to s.12(1) and (2). All sentences were imposed concurrently. Factual Background 3. The detailed factual background to this appeal is set out by Charleton J. in the judgment of this Court in respect of the conviction appeal, however, the facts are briefly set out herein. 4. The offending occurred at a property in Falsk, County Roscommon, which contained a family home and attached farmland. The property was the subject of a mortgage held by KBC bank, and repossession orders in respect of the property were issued by the High Court in 2012 and 2018, the latter being acted upon by Trinity Asset Management on behalf of KBC Bank. Trinity Asset Management engaged GS Agency Security Company to act as bailiffs in repossessing the property, which they did on the 11th December 2018, removing the occupants on foot of the High Court order. Following the repossession, Mr. Ian Gordan, CEO and Director of GS Agency Security Company, and up to 8 employees remained to secure the property. The security men on the property were aware that they were under some kind of observation, having noticed photographs of the property being taken. 5. The people employed by Mr. Gordon, if not actively working on a shift, either slept or rested in the house or in one of the vehicles on the property. 6. In the early hours of the morning of the 16th December 2018, a Mr. Beirne drove a cattle truck to a local pub and picked up a large group of men. The truck arrived at the property at about 05:00 and a telehandler vehicle was first used to forcefully open the locked gates to the premises. This vehicle then proceeded onto the driveway and drove one of the vehicles; a Mercedes Sprinter backwards leaving skid marks on the driveway. Mr. Gordon was of the view that some 30-40 men then spilled out of the cattle truck wearing hi-vis vests and carrying assorted weapons. Some were wearing hoods, some had their faces covered, and all appeared to be carrying weapons. 7. What can only be described as a brutal and savage attack then ensued as the men entered the property with various weapons, including a meat cleaver, a pickaxe handle, an unidentified aerosol spray, blades, sticks, baseball bats, hurleys, sledgehammers, and chainsaws. 8. Mr. Gordon went forward with his dog and then one of the men struck the animal forcefully over the head with a baseball bat. He was subsequently euthanised by a vet. Mr. Gordon was then savagely attacked, with a witness stating that he was felled with such force that the witness believed he had died as he landed on the ground. While on the ground, several people jumped on his back and on his legs. As he tried to get up, someone put a foot to his back and a shotgun was put to his head, he was ordered to crawl but he was unable to do so, due to the severity of the assault. He was forced to eat his dog's faeces. There was an attempt to remove his trousers. Mr. Gordon sustained wounds to his scalp, an injury to his wrist and finger and multiple areas of bruising. He sustained a fractured wrist and some broken ribs. The severity of the bruising is evident from photographs before this court. 9. This Court viewed footage captured on a bodycam worn by one of the victims which shows Mr. Sweeney entering the kitchen of the property wielding and revving a chainsaw, carrying a pickaxe handle and wearing a hunter style hat. Several other intruders entered with him. The security men described hearing continuous chainsaw and/or angle grinder revving. 10. Mr. Rissen, one of the victims who was in the living room was manhandled and gripped by the back of his coat and bundled out the door to be met by a scene of total chaos, with windows broken on his car, vehicles on fire, shouting and noise. His boots were removed. He saw Mr. Gordon being kicked and punched. He himself was pushed to the ground and received blows to his face, hands and legs. He later discovered his leg had been cut which required stitches. When the attackers left, he noticed that one of his colleagues had his trousers down. The judge observed in her summary of the evidence when imposing sentence, that Mr. Rissen was asked by the attackers as to Mr. Gordon's whereabouts and noted that he, Mr. Gordon, was singled out for particular attention and treatment. 11. Mr. Graham was also in the house, he was overpowered by four or five men and was struck on the head, shoulders and arms. He also noticed one man had a chainsaw, clearly, this appellant. A man with a meat cleaver hit him in the chest, but fortunately he was wearing a stab proof vest. The impact caused him to fall and as he sought to rise, he was stabbed twice in the leg. He was also struck with a sharp weapon to the head and beaten with sticks, bats, and hurls. He was doused in petrol from his lower thighs to his ankle. He was cable tied. The assault continued and he lost consciousness. 12. Mr. McCartney who had worked with Mr. Gordon previously at various events joined him in securing the property. He awoke to screaming, banging and shouting, he could hear chainsaws revving and the intruders burst in through the front door and he was struck, and dragged outside. He was forced to kneel down and was cable tied. He was struck to the head and legs. The beating to his legs was effected by a person carrying a stick with nails embedded. Another individual came behind him with a blade and pulled it along his jugular vein and ran the blade from his left ear to the front of his neck. People were screaming at him "who do you work for?" and "where do you live". 13. Three vehicles, owned by Mr. Gordan, were burned and destroyed. 14. It appears that the attack was timed and at some point someone started banging on the truck and saying "let's go". Personal Circumstances of the Appellant 15. Mr. Sweeney was 57 years of age at the time of sentencing, and has a good work history as a builder. He has 5 children, the youngest still being in school. Mr. Sweeney has also assisted in the care of his late brother's children. His long-term partner suffers from ill health, and underwent treatment during the trial. At the time of sentence, a prison governor's report was made available to the sentencing judge indicating that Mr. Sweeney had not come to any adverse attention and was a "standard prisoner". The court below received a letter from his partner, the contents of which is detailed in the transcript of the sentence hearing. Various references were also furnished to the court including from a rector, stating that he is a long time parishioner and had obliged the church by doing voluntary building work and is spoken of highly within the community. Another reference refers to him as being highly respected within his community. Reference was made to the particular difficulties as a result of his partner's illness. 16. Further handwritten letters were furnished including paintings from children. We refer in some detail to the documents furnished to the court below as there was a difficulty in producing those documents before this Court. Sentencing Judge's Remarks 17. The sentencing judge began by setting out which counts corresponded to the various appellants, and the conduct comprising said counts: "So for the record, counts 1 refers to a section 3 assault on Mr Gordon, count 2 refers to a section 3 assault on Mr Rissen, count 3 refers again to a section 3 assault, this was on Mr John Graham, count 3 relates to a section 3 assault on Gary McCourtney. Turning then to count 5, that's a false imprisonment count in respect of Ian Gordon, count 6, a similar false imprisonment count in respect of Mark Rissen, count 7, again, false imprisonment in respect of John Graham, count 8 relates to, again, another false imprisonment in respect of Gary McCartney, count 9 relates to the offence of aggravated burglary at the premises. Counts 10 to 12 inclusive relate to the arson of the vehicles -- the three separate vehicles owned by Mr Gordon that were utilised in the course of his employment at the premises in Falsk. Count 14 refers to criminal damage to the door of the house at Falsk and count 15 refers to violent disorder, count 17 relates to animal cruelty. They are the counts relevant to Mr Sweeney." 18. The sentencing judge imposed sentence with a, "global view taken in respect of the false imprisonment and in relation to the separate counts of section 3 assault." 19. She had regard to the accounts of Messrs Ian Gordan, Mark Rissen, Gary McCourtney and John Graham, and the terrifying and degrading treatment they were subjected to. In setting out the narrative, she noted several specific "highly aggravating" elements of the offences, those being: forcing of Mr. Gordan to eat dog faeces, the fact that Mr. Rissen felt trapped and vulnerable inside the house as the mob of assailants invaded the house, the violent beating given to Mr. Rissen by several men with various weapons as he was on the ground, the highly distressing and traumatic nature of the assault on Mr. Graham also with multiple weapons as he was on the ground, and the overall circumstances of the assault and false imprisonment of Mr. McCourtney. 20. The sentencing judge had regard to the various victim impact statements read in court. 21. The judge noted the overall circumstances of the offending in respect of the accused and she then turned to note further aggravating features: the planning and premeditation involved in the offences, the volume and number of persons involved, the weapons used to instil fear, the danger created by setting fire to the three vehicles, the impact on Mr. Gordon's livelihood as a result, the number of victims, the gross violation of the bodily integrity and human rights of the victims, and the physical and psychological traumatisation of the victims. 22. In light of the aggravating factors, the sentencing judge found the appellant's moral culpability to be high. 23. Turning to mitigation, the judge had regard to the personal circumstances of the appellant, noting that his previous convictions were not relevant, that he has a family and is a working man, she took account of the age of his family members, his age, the illness of his spouse, the effect a custodial sentence would have on his family, his work history, the fact he has not come to adverse attention since the offending, that he has complied with all the conditions of his bail. 24. In light of the above, the sentencing judge considered the relevant maximum sentences where appropriate, and nominated the following sentences; 5 years imprisonment in respect of 4 counts of assault causing harm against Messrs Gordon, Rissen, McCourtney and Graham; 15 years imprisonment in respect of the false imprisonment of Mr. Gordon; 14 years imprisonment in respect of 3 counts of false imprisonment of Messrs Rissen, McCourtney and Graham; 10 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of violent disorder; 8 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of criminal damage to the door of the property; 5 years imprisonment in respect of 1 count of animal cruelty and 10 years imprisonment in respect of 3 counts of arson regarding Mr. Gordon's vehicles. 25. The judge imposed those sentences concurrently with credit given for time served. 26. After an adjournment the court dealt with another matter, but following this, counsel for the Director asked if the sentencing judge wished to nominate a headline sentence, and she stated as follows: "Bearing in mind the severity of matters, I had indicated in my head, and I'd planned on saying a year more in relation to each matter, but having regard to the counts in relation to the violent disorder, assault and animal cruelty, they were to remain as is." 27. The judge subsequently nominated a headline sentence of 14 years for aggravated burglary which was reduced to 13 years imprisonment in light of mitigation. Grounds of Appeal 1. The learned sentencing Judge erred in law in imposing a sentence which was excessive and unduly harsh in all the circumstances; 2. The learned sentencing Judge erred in law in failing to structure a sentence balancing punitive, deterrent, and rehabilitative elements, and in failing to structure a sentence proportionate to the circumstances of the offender; 3. The learned sentencing Judge erred in law in failing to have adequate account of the mitigating factors arising in the matter; 4. The learned sentencing Judge failed to take into account that the Appellant had no previous convictions at the time of the offence and had committed no offences since being charged with the offences of which he was convicted; 5. The learned sentencing Judge failed to have any or any adequate regard to the fact that the Appellant had no previous convictions of a similar nature to the offence charged; 6. The learned sentencing Judge failed to attach sufficient weight to the Appellant's personal circumstances and to the effect which a custodial sentence would have on him and his family; 7. The learned sentencing Judge erred in principle in failing to consider the punitive nature that a suspended portion of a sentence can have and in lieu imposed a sentence which was wholly custodial; 8. The learned sentencing Judge erred as regards where the offence was placed on the scale of offending behaviour and what the appropriate sentence was taking into the mitigating factors and applying the required mitigation discount; 9. The learned sentencing Judge failed to have regard to the individual culpability of the Appellant.
The Sentence was excessive and disproportionate, failed to have regard to sentencing principles, mitigation and the prospect of rehabilitation Submissions of the Appellant 28. Counsel for the appellant submits that the sentence imposed was excessive, disproportionate, and aimed solely at punishing the appellant. Counsel also submits that the decision by the sentencing judge not to suspend any portion of the sentence amounted to a failure to give due weight to the public interest in rehabilitation of the appellant, and that due weight was not afforded to the appellant's absence of relevant previous convictions. 29. Counsel for the appellant relies on the following cases in support of these submissions: People (DPP) v McCormack [2000] 4 I.R. 356, People (DPP) v O'Driscoll [1972] 1 Frewen 359, People (DPP) v McGinty [2007] 1 IR 633, People (DPP) v McDermott [2015] IECA 136, DPP v Stronge [2011] IECCA 79, People (DPP) v O'Hara [2019] IECA 111. 30. In essence, it is argued that the judge failed to structure a sentence which would in light of the personal circumstances of the appellant, punish and deter others but also provide for greater encouragement for the appellant on his release from custody. It is submitted that the judge erred in failing to consider a suspended sentence to incentivise rehabilitation. 31. It is said that the final sentence imposed was disproportionate and unduly severe, constituting an error in principle. 32. Moreover, counsel for the appellant submits that, on a proper analysis, the sentencing judge's approach to mitigation and structuring the sentences imposed amounted to an error in principle. This was expanded upon in oral argument with counsel for the appellant contending that the judge failed to give an adequate discount for mitigation in the appellant's instance, to include his family circumstances, his standing in his community, his partner's ill health and the character references furnished. This failure, it is argued, is underlined by the fact that the judge did not differentiate between this appellant and his co-accused, Mr. O'Toole, who did not offer any plea in mitigation, yet was afforded the same level of discount. 33. The complaint is also made that that there ought to have been some relief from the maximum sentence insofar as the offences of assault causing harm, violent disorder and animal cruelty are concerned and that the judge failed to do so. 34. In support of the proposition that that a "staged approach" should be adopted to sentencing, counsel for Mr. Sweeney places reliance upon the decisions of this Court in People (DPP) v Molloy [2018] IECA 37, People (DPP) v Friel [2018] IECA 216, People (DPP) v Feng Ji & Anor [2020] IECA 348 and People (DPP) v Joyce [2021] IECA 124. While counsel accepts that a failure to adopt this approach will not always amount to an error in principle, counsel submits that it does in this case in circumstances where the different reductions for mitigation as between the different sentences were not explained by the sentencing judge. Submissions of the Respondent 35. The respondent submits that sentencing is not an algorithmic exercise, and that each sentence is individual to the case at hand. The respondent further submits that the jurisprudence of this court is clear in that the court will be slow to interfere, and that the sentencing judge must be afforded a significant margin of appreciation in exercising their discretion in sentencing matters. 36. It is submitted that in the instant case, the sentence imposed was not so excessive as to render the sentence severe, particularly in light of the high level of organisation and premeditation. It is also submitted that the sentencing judge had regard to all the surrounding circumstances in reducing several of the headline sentences in a fair and reasonable manner. 37. The respondent places reliance upon the cases of: People (DPP) v O'Brien [2018] IECA 2, People (DPP) v Cunningham [2015] IECCA 2, People (DPP) v Maughan [2018] IECA 343, People (DPP) v Stanescu [2020] IECA 55, People (DPP) v Black [2019] IECA 238 and a passage from Emmins on Sentencing (4th Ed. 2001) approved in the judgment of this court in People (DPP) v FE [2021] 1 IR 217. 38. The respondent submits that the sentencing judge identified various headline sentences which reflected the seriousness of the offences, and applied a discount for mitigation in respect of some of these offences. The respondent submits that the sentencing judge appreciated and took full account of all mitigating factors, as evidenced by her considered judgment, and the time taken between the pleas in mitigation and the delivery of the judgment during which she reflected upon said factors (30th of June to the 28th of July). 39. The respondent places reliance upon The People (DPP) v M [1994] 3 I.R. 306 and the comments of Denham J therein. Discussion Staged approach 40. We commence our discussion by a consideration of the argument that the judge failed to properly engage in the "staged approach" to sentencing. In this regard it is argued that it is difficult to assess how the judge arrived at the final sentence and the factors taken into account in terms of mitigation. Moreover, where the judge stated that the headline sentence constituted the final sentence for violent disorder, s.3 assault and animal cruelty and, in respect of the other counts that the headline sentence was one year higher than the sentence imposed, such manifestly constitutes an error justifying intervention by this Court. 41. There is no doubt that the judge approached the matter of sentence with conspicuous care. It cannot be ignored that she was the trial judge who had heard the evidence during a very lengthy trial. 42. The argument is advanced that the manner in which she imposed the sentences is not of sufficient transparency to determine as to how she arrived at the ultimate sentences she imposed. 43. It is true that initially, the judge did not nominate the notional sentence for each offence. It is also true that she rectified this when requested to do so. Moreover, it is readily apparent that in doing so, she indicated what had been in her mind regarding the appropriate notional sentences. This is in the context of a most comprehensive assessment and recitation of the evidence regarding the offending conduct. 44. It is well settled that even if a sentencing judge fails to nominate a headline sentence, this will not necessarily amount to an error in principle. In the present case the judge ultimately nominated headline sentences for each of the counts and, in the instance of some counts, reduced that sentence by one year. 45. On the point that she indicated the headline sentence constituted the final sentence for the offences of violent disorder, s.3 assault and animal cruelty, it is noteworthy that not only does she set out her reasoning for imposing the maximum sentence in the instance of the s.3 counts and the animal cruelty count, but she does so while imposing sentence and so the criticism that she failed to state the notional sentence at the initial stages of sentencing for those counts cannot be sustained. She stated as follows: "So, taking that global view in relation to the section 3 assaults perpetrated against Mr Gordon, Mr Rissen, Mr McCourtney and Mr Graham, having regard to the severity of the offending, these are at the high end and the high end of the range of offending, and the headline sentence matches the actual sentence in respect of section 3 assaults, and they are all sentences of five years' imprisonment. [...] In respect of the offences of animal cruelty, I've had regard again to the maximum penalty as provided by law, and having regard to the severity of the offending it is a five-year sentence." 46. While she did not initially include the offending of violent disorder, when asked by counsel for the prosecution, she stated:- "[B]ut having regard to the counts in relation to the violent disorder, assault and animal cruelty, they were to remain as is." Conclusion 47. We are not satisfied that any issue arises with the nomination of headline sentences. Whilst the judge was requested to do so after the imposition of sentence, it is apparent that she was well aware of the notional sentence intended by her and she clarified the position when asked. 48. Insofar as she imposed the maximum penalty for some offences, it is quite clear that the judge was of the view that these offences fell within the upper range of penalty in each instance and moreover, that the appropriate penalty was the maximum in each instance. 49. It is of course the position that sentences must be proportionate to the personal circumstances of an offender. However, there is no doubt whatsoever that these were grave offences and therefore required a substantial sentence in each instance. The judge was clearly aware of the maximum penalty in each instance and was of the opinion, given the severity of the offending, that the appropriate penalty was the maximum penalty in the instance of those three categories of offending and it is not a view with which this Court disagrees. 50. This was offending of a most serious order, the offending involved organisation, communication, planning and in the appellant's case, travelling to the location. The offending was premeditated and was calculated to instil fear and terror in the victims who were lawfully going about their task of securing property which was the subject of a court order. 51. Maximum sentences are reserved for the most serious instances of the particular offence. As has previously been stated by this Court, s.3 offences vary widely in character, sometimes such offences will require the maximum penalty of 5 years as was the maximum at the time of these offences. In People (DPP) v Loving [2006] 3 IR 355, referred to in Prof. O'Malley's Sentencing Law and Practice (3rd ed. 2016), in reference to the imposition of maximum sentences allowed by the legislature, it was said that such: "[N]ecessarily implies that the particular offence is at the highest of seriousness capable of being envisaged for that offence, both as to its intrinsic quality and as to the circumstances in which it was committed." 52. The violence inflicted as part of the common purpose was simply appalling and the brutal attack on the animal unconscionable. The description in the evidence of the scene faced by the victims is horrific; the numbers present, the weapons used, the noise and general melee all point towards a sentence in the upper range of sentencing. The judge considered all the factors and notwithstanding the presence of mitigating factors clearly decided that the circumstances of the commission of these offences was such which demanded the maximum sentence. There are offences which are so grave that the maximum is required notwithstanding the presence of mitigating factors. The fact that the judge imposed the maximum for these offences was entirely within her margin of appreciation given the severity of the offending involved and we are not persuaded on this aspect of the appeal. Excessive and Disproportionate 53. It is contended that the judge failed to have regard to the principles of sentencing and in particular failed to structure the sentences imposed to allow for a suspended element and to take account of the prospect of rehabilitation. 54. This was a case in our view where the necessity for general deterrence was high. These offences were committed in order to terrorise the victims who were acting lawfully on foot of a court order. The judge noted that the intention was to ensure the victims left and did not return. Therefore, the reasons for general deterrence are apparent. A sentence must be proportionate to the gravity of the particular offence but it should also reflect an element of deterrence to others. This type of offending against persons acting in accordance with a court order needs censure and requires a message to society that this kind of conduct cannot be tolerated and so deter others from committing similar offending. 55. This Court has viewed the bodycam footage of this appellant entering the property late at night when some of the occupants were trying to rest. He is wearing a hunter's hat and is wielding a chainsaw which he revs up, he is also carrying a pickaxe handle. His actions are horrifying. He travelled some considerable distance for the purpose of engaging in acts of violence and terror. 56. The experience was absolutely terrifying for the victims and the aggravating factors of each offence are many and varied. In short, this was a meticulously planned, organised attack of savagery. 57. The appellant contends that the judge failed to structure the sentence so as to punish and deter but also to provide for greater encouragement for the appellant on his release from custody. Therefore, it is said that there should have been a suspended element to the sentence to foster rehabilitation. 58. It must be recalled that the appellant contested his trial as was his right, however, this obviously deprives him of the credit available for a plea of guilty or genuine remorse. Counsel in the court below made an eloquent plea for the appellant pointing to the mitigating factors and emphasising that the appellant is a family man, hardworking and respected in his community. Counsel sought to have the sentence structured in such a way so as to give the appellant hope that he could return to his family, community, and work. Conclusion 59. There is the public interest in fostering rehabilitation to reduce the risk of reoffending and on occasion a judge may consider it appropriate to part suspend a sentence to give effect to this. However, there must be an evidence based realistic prospect of rehabilitation, such as proof that an individual is drug free. 60. However, the present case was not one where the judge could truly engage with the prospect of rehabilitation in circumstances where there was no evidence of insight, no remorse, no apology. The judge clearly decided that the appropriate sentence was one without a suspended element, this determination was one entirely within her remit. The judge has a wide margin of discretion regarding the structure of a sentence and which objective of sentence to prioritise as stated in Stanescu. 61. We do not find any error in principle in the judge's approach to how she structured the sentences imposed. Inadequate reduction for Mitigation 62. The appellant contends that his mitigating factors were not taken into account adequately or at all by the sentencing judge. It is said that this is neatly illustrated by the fact that his co-accused, Mr. O'Toole, received the same sentences even though he offered no mitigation whatsoever on his behalf. 63. It is the position there were mitigating factors on behalf of the appellant including the factors which we have already outlined above. These factors were referred to in some detail by the sentencing judge. She considered the personal circumstances as she was obliged to do of each of the accused persons and set the factors out in some detail in her sentencing remarks. She had regard to the documents furnished to her and his particular family circumstances including that his partner had serious health issues, his own health issues, that he cares for not only his own children but also his young nephews and nieces. He is a person held in high esteem and well regarded in his community and without previous convictions. 64. Insofar as Mr. O'Toole was concerned, notwithstanding the fact that he did not offer any material or submissions in mitigation, the judge took account of the fact that he is a father of seven children and did not have any relevant previous convictions. 65. The impact on dependants of a person on whom a prison sentence is imposed may be significant, and in this case, the judge was urged to take particular account of this factor. This is a relevant mitigating factor but the jurisprudence is quite clear; it will not be a reason to avoid a custodial sanction where the offence is serious but may justify some mitigation. In People (DPP) v Lyons [2014] IECCA 27, the Court of Criminal Appeal stated: "While the Court can take into account the totality of hardship which has resulted for a convicted person, particularly having regard to punishments imposed by the court, it cannot give too much weight to burdens or hardships which are an inevitable or possible consequence of the offender's own wrongdoing." 66. On this issue, the judge was sentencing the appellant for extremely serious offending, this was not a case which was on the cusp, there was never a possibility of a non-custodial sanction. The custody threshold was well and truly passed. The only issue was the level of mitigation to be afforded for the fact that this appellant's family were to be deprived of his society and financial assistance and the fact that his partner suffered ill health. 67. A balance must be struck between the circumstances of the commission of an offence and the circumstances of the offender. Included in the circumstances of an offender may be the issue of dependents and their needs, however, a balance must be struck between these circumstances and the objectives of sentencing. 68. Where an offence is very grave, a lengthy prison sentence may be required and in those circumstances, the needs of dependents will attract much lesser weight than in the instance of a case on the cusp. Conclusion 69. There is no doubt that the sentences imposed on the appellant were severe, however, the question for this Court is whether the sentences imposed are outside the available range of penalty amounting to an error in principle justifying this Court's intervention. 70. Sentencing is a complex process; it is not an exact science. Courts take account of the gravity of an offence, which is assessed with reference to culpability and the harm done. We have not mentioned thus far the impact on the victims which on any rational analysis must be significant. There can be no doubt but that these offences are very serious indeed. 71. Grave offences must be sanctioned by a lengthy prison sentence, but a sentence must be proportionate to the personal circumstances of an offender. While the appellant in this case had mitigating factors, he did not have the factors available to him which would have provided a more significant discount from the notional headline sentences nominated by the judge. Sentencing for these offences was particularly complex and one with which the sentencing judge took conspicuous care. She applied the relevant principles, assessed the evidence, considered the aggravating and mitigating factors, and adjourned the imposition of sentence to consider the appropriate sentence in each case. She was entitled to and did consider the nature and circumstances of the offending and to consider the level of reduction to be afforded for the mitigation present. 72. The fact that she did not reduce the appellant's sentence by a greater amount than that of the reduction afforded to Mr. O'Toole in light of mitigation does not render the sentences imposed on this appellant to be outside of the margin of appreciation afforded to a sentencing judge. It simply means that Mr. O'Toole was given every possible benefit, and more besides, in terms of the mitigation available to him. 73. That does not mean that the judge fell into error in the sentence she imposed on this appellant, and we are satisfied that the sentences imposed fell within the margin of appreciation afforded to a trial judge. Participation Submissions of the Appellant 74. It is said that while the appellant was convicted of the majority of counts on the basis of joint enterprise, the judge ought to have assessed his particular level of culpability regarding the false imprisonment of Mr. Gordon and failed to do so. 75. In particular, it is argued that the appellant should not have been held responsible for the actions of an individual, (not before the courts) who forced Mr. Gordon to eat his dog's excrement. It is contended that great emphasis was placed on this aggravating factor by the sentencing judge, thus increasing the sentence imposed for the false imprisonment of Mr. Gordon. Counsel for Mr. Sweeney submits that while the appellant was convicted of the false imprisonment of Mr. Gordon, there is no evidence that he was the actual perpetrator of those actions, found by the sentencing judge to be highly aggravating. 76. The appellant relies upon the judgment of this Court in People (DPP) v MB [2023] IECA 215 and an extract from Prof. O'Malley's Sentencing Law and Practice (2nd ed. 2006) cited with approval therein, to the effect that even in cases of joint enterprise, "account may (and usually should) be taken of differences in culpability". 77. Counsel submits that the same can be said in relation to other highly aggravating elements of the offences as a whole. 78. Counsel also submits that there was no evidence of the appellant being involved in the organisation of the offences, and that in summary, the sentencing judge failed to differentiate the roles and culpability of the co-accused. Submissions of the Respondent 79. The respondent places reliance upon a passage in Prof. O'Malley's Sentencing Law and Practice (3rd ed. 2016), as well as the comments of this court in The People (DPP) v McDonnell [2022] IECA 200 to the effect that co-offenders should receive the same or similar sentences unless there is an appreciable difference in culpability or personal circumstances as between offenders, in line with the principle of parity. 80. Is it said that there is no error in principle because all of the parties who arrived at the location were persons who intended to cause harm, who committed a violent disorder, and who intended to commit aggravated burglary amongst their numbers. Moreover, it is argued that Mr. Gordon received extensive injuries and that factor should be taken into account should this Court consider there is an element of inelegance in the extra year with respect to the eating of the excrement. Discussion 81. Each person convicted of an offence where each was party to a joint enterprise must be sentenced separately taking into account their respective personal circumstances and in some instances the level of involvement or the role of that person. The appellant relies on the judgment of this Court in MB. 82. It is for this Court to determine whether the sentence imposed was objectively justified. The appellant contends that the primary reason the notional headline sentence for the false imprisonment of Mr. Gordon was set at a higher level than the false imprisonment of the other victims was due to the aggravating factor of compelling him to eat his dog's faeces. As this Court stated in MB: "This Court must consider the issue at the heart of the appeal and that is whether a distinction can be drawn between the appellant and his co-accused in terms of moral culpability in a case of joint enterprise in determining the appropriate headline sentence. It seems to us in most instances of joint enterprise, there will be limited scope for such a distinction, but of course each case is fact dependent." 83. While it is so in instances of joint enterprise, the level of a participant's involvement may vary: it is difficult to see how that contention holds true in the present case. On occasion, one participant may have a greater level of involvement in terms of organisation or planning for example, whereas another may have held a peripheral and much more limited role. This is not a feature in the present case. 84. The Court in People (DPP) v Cunningham considered the issue of disparity in sentencing co-offenders to a joint enterprise and indicated that where there is an unjustified disparity, then the court should adjust the sentence so as to remove or reduce the difference in sentence to a justifiable level. 85. The issue in this appellant's case is somewhat different in that the argument is made that this appellant ought to have received a lesser sentence, not in terms of any disparity of sentence imposed on his co-accused but on the basis that he was not involved in the situation, which it is argued, the judge considered highly aggravating. The argument therefore is not predicated on parity of sentence but on the basis of the particular moral culpability of this appellant. 86. It seems to this Court that the argument advanced stems from an extract from the judge's sentencing remarks when considering the issue of the humiliation visited upon Mr. Gordon where she says:- "I am going to indicate that this was gratuitous degradation and humiliation in respect of what transpired in relation to Mr Gordon, and I find this highly aggravating under the circumstances." 87. Whilst this was indeed the comment of the judge, the argument advanced on behalf of this appellant ignores the other factors relevant to the assessment of the gravity of this offence and the nomination of the headline sentence of 16 years as opposed to that of 15 years in respect of the other counts of false imprisonment. 88. It is quite clear from the transcript that Mr. Gordon had approximately 8 men employed by him to secure the property, he had three vehicles which were the subject of the arson counts, he was singled out for attention by the mob, with one of the security men, Mr. Rissen, being asked on two occasions as to Mr. Gordon's whereabouts, he was struck with such force that another of his colleagues believed him to be dead, he sustained significant injuries, with the level of bruising to his body clearly apparent from the photographs but he also sustained additional and more serious injuries, there was an unsuccessful attempt to remove his trousers, this, we note is in circumstances of the presence of active chainsaws and angle grinders and the use of petrol to douse another of the security men and finally, Mr. Gordon sustained the financial loss of the vehicles, impacting his occupation as director of his security company. There was of course also the personal impact on him. 89. Therefore, there were significant aggravating features present in respect of the offending concerning Mr. Gordon and whilst this does not of course reduce the severity of the offending regarding the other victims, it appears from the evidence that Mr. Gordon was targeted by the appellant and his co-accused which is an aggravating factor. It is noteworthy that Mr. Rissen was asked as to Mr. Gordon's whereabouts, Mr. Rissen being one of the men in the living room when the appellant gained entry. It is clear that Mr. Gordon was in charge of securing the property. 90. The purpose of this enterprise was to inflict as much fear and terror as was possible on the security men who were operating within the law. The fact that direct responsibility may not be laid at this appellant's door for compelling Mr. Gordon to eat dog faeces does not render the notional sentence nominated by the judge unjust or absolve him from moral culpability in terms of a joint enterprise to terrorise and attack the individual in charge of the security operation. In our view the nomination of that sentence given the factors we have just outlined and referenced by the sentencing judge was entirely justified. 91. Accordingly, we are not persuaded on this aspect of the appeal. Decision 92. We do not find any error of principles and accordingly, we dismiss the appeal against sentence. Result: Dismiss