Irish Court of Appeal

UNAPPROVED

REDACTED. NO FURTHER REDACTION NEEDED.

Neutral Citation Number: [2021] IECA 117

 

 

THE COURT OF APPEAL

Record No: 198/2020

 

Birmingham P.

Edwards J.

McCarthy J.

 

 

Between/

THE PEOPLE (AT THE SUIT OF

THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS)

Respondent

V

V.T.

Appellants

 

JUDGMENT of the Court delivered by Mr Justice Edwards on the 15th of April 2021.

Introduction

1.                  The matter came before the Central Criminal Court on the 27^th of July, 2020, where the appellant pleaded guilty to one count of defilement of a child between the ages of 15 and 17 contrary to s. 3(1)(a) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act, 2006. The appellant was originally charged with a count of rape, but the Director of Public Prosecutions accepted the plea of defilement and entered a nolle prosequi in respect of the rape charge.

2.                  The sentencing hearing began on the 19^th of October, 2020, and on the 20^th of October, 2020, the eve of the appellant’s 18^th birthday, Judge White sentenced the appellant to 18 months’ detention. The appellant now appeals against the severity of the sentence.

Factual background

3.                  The court heard from Garda Brian Law, who stated that at 2.20 p.m. on the 10^th of August, 2018, he followed a report of a male, J., aggressively banging on the appellant’s door, attempting to gain entry. J. approach Garda Law with his girlfriend, the injured party, and alleged that V.T. had carried out unwarranted sexual activity with her the previous night.

4.                  Garda Law received a report and an outline of the allegation from the injured party. The injured party was subsequently interviewed on the 19^th of August, 2019, during which she stated that she and J. were out drinking together in an estate in Carrigmore, Tallaght, with the appellant, two other males, and another female. J. and the appellant went to purchase alcohol and returned outside to the group. They drank and smoked a cannabis joint at around 9.30 p.m.

5.                  The other female went home, leaving the injured party with the four males. The injured party felt cold and went to retrieve a jacket from her house, accompanied by the males. As they were walking away from the house, three of the males engaged in their own conversation in front, whilst the injured party and the appellant had their own conversation behind. They arrived at a park, where the injured party sat on a bench, and the appellant sat beside her. The injured party described being in a confused state of intoxication, but became conscious of the appellant with his trousers down and penetrating her vagina with his penis. She had one leg up on the bench, and the appellant was holding her hand. The injured party froze and pretended to be asleep while this continued for a few minutes. The appellant then pulled up his trousers and told her to get up, and said that they should go and find J. They then shared a cigarette.

6.                  The injured party had given the appellant her telephone, and got him to call J. She then started quickly walking up to the rest of the group. When she met them, she told the appellant to “fuck off”. The appellant stood there, and she repeated herself, at which point he walked away. The injured party then hugged J. He asked what was wrong with her, at which point she told him what had happened, and proceeded to give further details over the next while.

7.                  The appellant was arrested for interview and cautioned on the 1^st of September, 2019. He confirmed during the interview that he attempted sexual activity, that he had put his penis in the vagina of the injured party, that he did not put it all the way in, and that it lasted for around two minutes. He confirmed how he shared a cigarette with the injured party, and their state of intoxication. He confirmed that there was a confrontation.

8.                  It was accepted by Garda Law under cross-examination that the appellant pleaded guilty at an early point, and did not seek the disclosure of any counselling notes. It was further accepted that the appellant and the injured party had previously been in a relationship, but that there was no suggestion of sexual activity in the course of such. Garda Law confirmed that neither J. or the injured party had called the gardaí, and that the appellant himself had rang the gardaí to avoid the violent confrontation waiting outside his door. Garda Law agreed that during interview, the appellant did not seem to understand that sexual intercourse had still occurred despite the penetration being only slight, and had to have this explained to him. It was accepted by Garda Law that the appellant had not attempted to separate the injured party from the group and that she had sat on the bench with him consensually, and that the pair conversed quite normally in the immediate aftermath.

Impact on the victim

9.                  The victim prepared an impact statement, in which she stated that she suffered pain and discomfort when using the bathroom following the incident. She received three hepatitis B injections over a three-month period. The injured party describes feeling guilty, ashamed and angry, which has led to further embarrassment, debilitating flashbacks and a diagnosis of anxiety. She developed agoraphobia which has greatly affected her social and academic life to the degree that she failed her Leaving Cert due to low attendance. She said she had missed 160 days of school that year, but the previous year had missed none. She said that she had lost a lot of weight and had developed acne which required medication. The injured party spoke of trust issues arising from the betrayal of a close friend, and this has impacted her other relationships. She is however determined not to let the actions of the appellant impact her life going forward.

Circumstances of the appellant

10.              The appellant was born on the 21^st of October, 2002, and was 15 years old at the time of the incident. He is 10 days younger than the injured party. He has no previous convictions. He was in employment at the time of sentencing, and began residing with his sister once it became clear that the allegation was being made. His parents had recently separated, and his father then died suddenly shortly before the incident, which appeared to deeply affect the appellant.

Remarks of the sentencing judge

11.              After outlining the facts of the case, the sentencing judge noted the conflict in principles between the Children’s Act, 2001, and the general principles of sentencing, particularly that under the general principles of sentencing, a headline sentence should be fixed, while under the Children’s Act, detention is regarded as a last resort. He noted section 96 of the Act of 2001 which requires a court to have due regard to the best interests of the child and the victim, as well as the protection of society and specific matters relating to the child. The sentencing judge then cited s. 1(42) as allowing the court to impose a detention order, and s. 1(43) as requiring the court to be satisfied that detention is the only suitable response. He then noted that s. 1(56) prohibits the passing of a sentence of imprisonment, even though the appellant would be becoming an adult the following day. The sentencing judge was satisfied that if he was an adult, an appropriate headline sentence would be 5 years.

12.              In terms aggravating factors, the sentencing judge noted that the huge breach of trust and bodily integrity involved, considering the appellant was a close friend, akin to a brother to the injured party. The appellant was aware that she was in the company of her boyfriend at the time. The sentencing judge recounted how badly the victim’s education had been affected, as well as her relationships and ability to trust. Not only was the appellant unable to consent due to her vulnerable state, but she was unable to consent in law due to her age. The sentencing judge characterised this as a very serious offence.

13.              Turning to mitigation, the sentencing judge concluded that the appellant’s state of intoxication could not be a mitigating factor, but did take into account the following: his young age; his previous good character and lack of previous convictions; his genuine remorse; his low risk of reoffending and his cooperation and admissions; and his plea of guilty. The sentencing judge went so far as to describe the appellant as “clearly a good young man”, and indicated that the court would take that into consideration.

14.              The sentencing judge acknowledged s. 1(44) of the Act of 2001 which would allow the imposition of a deferred sentence followed by a subsequent suspended sentence, but concluded that to do so would be unduly lenient in the circumstances.

15.              Concluding that a detention order was unavoidable, the sentencing judge was mindful to take into consideration s. 96 of the Act of 2001. The sentencing judge in his approach spoke of the need for the length of the detention period to reflect the significance of such a punishment on a child, and in light of the significant mitigating factors present, arrived at the detention period of 18 months. He did not consider the appellant at risk of future re-offending, and thus imposed no post-release supervision.

Grounds of Appeal

16.              The appellant appeals against the severity of his sentence on the following grounds:

(i)                 The sentencing judge erred in law or in fact in placing the headline sentence at a term of 5-years imprisonment for an adult offender, in circumstances where the headline sentence was excessive.

(ii)               The sentencing judge failed to place adequate or sufficient weight upon the fact that the appellant, at the time of his return for trial, had almost attained the age of majority, by virtue of the considerable lapse of time in the processing of his case, due for which he bore no fault. The offending behaviour occurred on the 9^th August 2018 and, although the injured party had been interviewed by specialist interviewers by 19^th August 2018, it was not until 25^th August 2019 that the prosecuting member made contact through the appellant’s sister, and as a result of an arrangement made, the appellant was arrested on 2^nd September 2019 and he provided his account in a Garda interview. It would appear that the Gardai had attempted to contact him on three occasions between February and April, 2018, at an address at which he was no longer resident and it seems the investigating Gardai had not received the SATU report until the 8^th January 2019, notwithstanding the fact that the report was sent to the Gardai on the 27^th November 2018. 

(iii)             The sentencing judge failed to take into account the expedition with which the appellant progressed the case, having entered a plea of guilty to Count No. 2 on the indictment when he first appeared before the Central Criminal Court on 27^th July 2020.

(iv)             The sentencing judge failed to adequately reflect in the sentence imposed the multiplicity of mitigating factors, to include:-

a) The appellant had pleaded guilty upon his first mention date in the Central Criminal Court.

b) He had no previous convictions.

c) He had not come to the adverse attention of the Gardai since the incident in question, a period of over two years.

d) By virtue of the allegations, the appellant had suffered from considerable anxiety, suicidal ideation and depression.

e) The appellant was then in full-time employment.

f) By virtue of the breakup of his parents, he had, undergone significant trauma in his life.

g) He had expressed remorse at all stages which the Court accepted as genuine.

h) The appellant was assessed as being at low risk of re-offending.

i) He was observed to have insight and empathy for the injured party.

j) He consistently accepted responsibility for his actions.

(v)               The sentencing judge refused to defer any element of the 18-month term of detention that he imposed, notwithstanding the significant delay in bringing the matter before the Court, and wherein had the Court imposed that sentence at an earlier stage, possibly 12 months beforehand, the appellant would have served a sentence of detention in a detention facility as opposed to in an adult facility which inevitably shall come to pass at some stage in the sentence process for an offence that was committed as a 15-year old child.

(vi)             It is respectfully submitted that the passage of time has potentially compromised the ability of this Court to impose such sanction as it may have imposed at first instance, in the event that the Court reaches a determination that the sentence imposed was excessive in all of the circumstances, referable to the Court’s ability to only impose a sanction as of the date of any such finding which by definition would require a term of imprisonment as opposed to detention.

(vii)           The sentencing judge erred by placing too much weight on the Victim Impact Report, including reference to a substantial number of school days missed by the complainant in comparison to the period prior to the incident, and which information was incorrect.

(viii)         The appellant, by virtue of his plea of guilty, spared the victim the considerable distress associated with what would otherwise have been a two-year period of time before the trial would have come on for hearing (in the List to Fix Dates on the 28^th October the Court was assigning trial dates into the Summer and Autumn of 2022).

(ix)             The appellant, by virtue of his approach to the case, did not seek personally intrusive material pertaining to the complainant which the Defence had been informed may have touched upon relevant personal matters.

(x)               In all of the circumstances the sentencing judge erred in imposing the sentence that he did

Submissions of the appellant

Sentencing remarks

17.              The appellant submits that by denoting a headline adult sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment, the sentencing judge was placing the behaviour at the upper end on the scale of gravity, which is submitted to be an error. The appellant contends that the aggravating factors typical in such cases were not present in his own, such as:

(i)                 Prolonged period of grooming or sexualisation by an older male.

(ii)               A considerable disparity in age.

(iii)             Pre-meditatively identifying and targeting a vulnerable young person.

(iv)             The use of social media or otherwise to embarrass or blackmail.

(v)               Repeated instances.

(vi)             A breach of trust albeit without authority as defined under s. 17 of the Act of 2017.

(vii)           Deliberately inducing intoxication for the purpose of the offence.

18.              The court is referred to its judgement in DPP v Farrelly [2015] IECA 302, wherein the defendant, aged 27 years, had pleaded guilty to the defilement of a girl aged 16 years and 9 months. Contact had been made through social media and the parties had met in person. The defendant in that case had no previous convictions for sexual matters. A Probation Report determined him to be a moderate risk of re-offending and a Forensic Psychological Services Report indicated he was at a low risk of re-offending.  The court accepted the absence of aggravating factors such as threats or violence accompanying the sexual activity, and that no pregnancy or STD resulted. A headline of 3 years was reduced to 1 year after mitigation. On appeal, it was held that the sentencing judge did not fully evaluate the option of a non-custodial sentence, and a suspended sentence of 1 year was imposed in its place.

19.              It is submitted that the present case warrants a much shorter sentence given the absence of aggravating factors to the degree present in Farrelly.

Delay

20.              It is submitted that the significant delay in the advancement of this case and the manner in which it was dealt with by the respondent was unsatisfactory. Written correspondence and reminders had been sent by counsel for the appellant, but it was not until cross-examination of the prosecuting member that it transpired that they had been attempting to reach the appellant at an address at which he no longer lived. The appellant was not arrested until 13 months after the incident, and was not sentenced until the day before reaching majority.

21.              It is submitted that had the respondent taken reasonable steps to contact the appellant, he would have been detained in a more appropriate setting given his age.

22.              It is further submitted that there may be an issue in terms of the capacity of this court to re-sentence the appellant as he is now an adult. Although he is currently in a detention campus for children, it is submitted that if this changes, he will be ill-suited for serving a sentence in an adult prison for a crime committed at the age of 15.

Rape sentences

23.              Bearing in mind that the headline sentence for ordinary rape offences was recognised as 7 years in DPP v FE [2019] IESC 85, it is submitted that the sentencing judge herein sanctioned the appellant for his behaviour bordering on rape despite the Director having accepted the plea to defilement in its stead.

Failure to account for mitigating factors

24.              It is submitted that the appellant presented every possible mitigating factor he could have, and this was not reflected in his sentence. Further it is submitted that while intoxication is not a mitigating factor, it was nevertheless the case that the group of teenagers were drinking heavily together, and the appellant had never been intoxicated to such a level before. Whilst the sentencing judge stated that the appellant had taken advantage of the injured party’s condition, it is submitted that his actions were in no way pre-meditated or manipulative.

25.              The court is referred to the case of DPP v Durcan [2017] IECA 3 to the effect that the concept of imprisonment itself has the most impact, and the actual length of the sentence is of secondary importance.

Submissions of the respondent

26.              The appellant submits that the sentencing judge erred in placing a headline sentence of 5 years’ imprisonment. The respondent disputes that this was the reality of the remark, as the sentencing judge was simply indicating what would be the hypothetical sentence for an adult.

Delay

27.              The respondent disputes that there was any prejudicial delay in the investigation and prosecution of the case. It was acknowledged by the sentencing judge that the delay was not the fault of the appellant.

The plea

28.              It is submitted that the sentencing judge took full account of the guilty plea and its early stage, as well as the benefit this conferred on the injured party. If it is taken that the sentencing judge began with a headline of 5 years, the ultimate sentence would show a 70% reduction, which would indicate a very high level of credit given.

Mitigation

29.              The respondent submits that it is evident from the remarks of the sentencing judge that he was very mindful of the mitigating factors presented by the appellant.

Victim Impact

30.              The appellant asserts that the victim impact report was incorrect insofar as the academic impact is concerned. It is submitted that there was no evidence to support this challenge, nor were any concerns raised before the sentencing judge.

Disclosure

31.              While the sentencing judge did not specifically acknowledge that the appellant did not seek personally intrusive material, the injured party nonetheless consented to such disclosure, and the relevant material was taken up by the investigators. 

 

Discussion and Decision

Ground No 1

Alleged error in assessing gravity

32.              In our recent decision in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. J McD [2021] IECA 31 we made the point that there are myriad circumstances in which defilement offences may be committed. In some cases, the offending conduct amounting to defilement may approximate conduct that could also found a charge for rape, while in other cases it may be very far from it and be manifestly less culpable.

33.              While it is only in the very limited circumstances of s. 17(8) of the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences) Act 2017 (the Act of 2017) that consent may provide a substantive defence to a person charged with a s.3 defilement offence, if a person pleads guilty or is convicted it may be a very relevant issue at sentencing. The existence of true consent, particularly in a case such as the present where the injured party and perpetrator were both minors and close in age at the time of the offence, can indicate reduced culpability and be relied upon as a mitigating factor.

34.              Lack of consent is an essential ingredient in respect of rape offences, and clearly a defilement case in which a defendant was unable to secure acquittal in reliance on s.17(8) of the Act of 2017, but nevertheless involving actual consent on the part of the injured party, or a reasonable belief that the injured party was consenting, notwithstanding a legal inability on his/her part to consent, will mark out the case as being a very different one from one involving offending conduct that might also found a charge of rape. Such a situation might arise between a boyfriend and girlfriend engaging in consensual experimentation. Reflecting this, the renowned sentencing scholar Mr Thomas O’Malley suggests in his work on Sexual Offences, 2nd edn, (at para 23-85) that:

“Where both parties are teenagers of similar age and equally consenting, a sentence at or towards the lower end of the range will be appropriate, and all the more so in circumstances where the female party enjoys a statutory immunity towards prosecution. Absent exceptional circumstances, a custodial sentence would be very difficult to justify in such a case. A stricter view might be taken where there was a significant age gap, such as where the female was 13 and the male 17 years.”

35.              Conversely, a defilement case involving a lack of actual consent, and in which the offending conduct was committed, either in the knowledge that the injured party was not consenting or being reckless or indifferent as to whether the injured party was or was not consenting, involves significantly greater culpability. The case of The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. J McD was an example of the latter. In that case, we said (at para 68):

“The difficulty in this case, however, is that the evidence does not suggest that both parties had been equally consenting. There was certainly evidence that the victim may have been infatuated by the appellant and did as she was instructed, but it is also clear that the appellant was in a dominant position vis a vis the victim, that they were not in an equal power relationship, and that aspects of what occurred, particularly on the second occasion were coercive. We do not feel that in those circumstances the fact that the appellant may have believed the victim to be 14, rather than 12 and a half, mitigates his culpability. This was not a case of two teenagers close in age sexually experimenting on a genuinely consensual basis, such as might mitigate culpability. The transaction, even if partially consented to by the victim, was culpably abusive in the circumstances in which it occurred.”

36.              While the circumstances of the present case are very different from those in The People (Director of Public Prosecutions) v. J McD, particularly in terms of the absence of the egregious aggravating factor that was present in that case involving the photographing and filming of the act of defilement, we nevertheless think that much of what was said in the passage just quoted was also apposite in this case.

37.              The evidence heard by the sentencing court in the present case established that the injured party’s vulnerability in the present case, given her highly intoxicated state, was exploited by the appellant, albeit that there was no violence or abuse in the nature of physical coercion.  The evidence did not suggest that the injured party was fully consenting.  Accordingly, this was also a transaction, even if the victim did not voice objection or resist, which was culpably abusive in the circumstances in which it occurred.

38.              We think that in the circumstances that this was a case in which a custodial term was unavoidable, notwithstanding that the appellant was only 15 years and months, or thereabouts, at the time of committing the offence. We see nothing wrong in the sentencing judge’s observation that, had the appellant been sentenced as an adult, the appropriate headline sentence would have been one of five years. We agree with counsel for the respondent’s submission that it is not correct to view the observation complained of as the setting of a headline sentence of five years in the appellants case, and that the   reality of the remark was that the sentencing judge was simply indicating what would be the hypothetical sentence for an adult.

39.              We find no error on the part of the sentencing judge in how he assessed the gravity of the case. On the contrary, his analysis was careful and conscientious and fully in accordance with established sentencing principles and legislative policy with respect to the sentencing of children. We therefore dismiss ground of appeal no 1.

Grounds Nos 2., 5 & 6.

Alleged failure to take adequate account of the appellant’s minority,

and of prosecutorial delays.

40.              We have already observed that the trial judge’s analysis was careful and conscientious. Any fair reading of the transcript requires it to be acknowledged that the trial judge had at the forefront of his mind that this offence was committed when the appellant was fifteen years and nines months, and that because the appellant had still not attained his majority at the date of sentencing the provisions of the Children Act 2001 applied in his case. However, the trial judge was of the view, and in our view correctly so, that this was a case in which a custodial sentence was required, notwithstanding the available mitigation including the early plea. The Children Act 2001 provides for detention as a last resort and in our judgment the sentencing judge, who properly acknowledged that that was legislative policy, is not to be criticised for adjudging that this was one of those cases in which a sentence of detention was unavoidable.

41.              The appellant makes the arguably somewhat more substantive secondary point under this heading that, but for prosecutorial delay, he might have been sentenced many months earlier and have had the opportunity to serve his detention, or a substantial part thereof, in a juvenile custodial facility rather than in an adult institution. While it is accepted by the respondent that there was some delay, due to difficulty on the part of Gardai in locating the appellant for a time, the respondent disputes that this delay was culpable or gross. Moreover, the respondent makes the point that in any case the sentencing judge was cogniscent that regardless of whose fault it was, or even if there was fault at all, there had been some delay, and took that into account. We are satisfied that the sentencing judge did take account of the delay, and note his commentary in response to defence counsel seeking to press him to revisit his sentence on the grounds of delay, that:

“…the way the Court has approached it is that it has discounted the sentence much further than it would have normally because of all the factors and particularly the fact that he was a child.  And I certainly can't see myself in any way interfering now with the sentence that the Court has pronounced”.

42.              While an accused has a right to an expeditious criminal investigation, trial (if necessary) and sentencing, there will always be some margin of appreciation in that regard. The delay in this case, such as it was, was neither gross nor inordinate in our view; and given the existence of the margin of appreciation we have spoken of the appellant could have had no expectation, as opposed to perhaps hoping, that his case would be dealt with sooner. He still got the considerable benefit of being sentenced while still a minor, and as already stated the sentencing judge took such delay as had occurred into account. We find no error of principle on the sentencing judge’s part in terms of how he dealt with the delay issue.

Grounds Nos 3 & 4

Alleged failure to give adequate credit for the early plea and other mitigating factors

43.              Again, we must emphasise that we found the sentencing judge’s overall approach to the case to be thorough, careful and conscientious. It is complained that the sentencing judge did not indicate the precise level of discount he was affording for overall mitigation, much less any specific discount for individual mitigating factors such as the early plea. This is true. The sentencing judge arrived at his sentence by instinctive synthesis. However, while instinctive synthesis is not this court’s preferred methodology, we have said many times that it does not represent an error per se. It is clear from his sentencing remarks that he was fully alive to all of the relevant mitigating factors, including that of the early plea. The relevant factors were specifically referenced in the sentencing judge’s remarks. However, his dilemma finds reflection during the following exchanges with defence counsel:

JUDGE: … if he was an adult, I mean the Court wouldn't have any hesitation in sentencing him to prison for three or four years.  So, I mean there's been considerable mitigation by the Court because of the fact that he was a child, but I mean the Court cannot ignore the seriousness of the offence.

MR BOWMAN:  I accept that.

JUDGE:  And the factors that it's taken into consideration and the impact on Ms S.  But also, a very fundamental breach of trust which the Court considers to be quite an aggravating factor as well.

MR BOWMAN:  And clearly the Court views that that crosses the custody threshold.

JUDGE:  Yes.

MR BOWMAN:  And I fully accept that, that's clear from the Court's ruling.

JUDGE:  Yes.

44.              The sentencing judge said that if the offence had been committed by an adult it might have attracted a headline sentence of five years imprisonment, and in the passage just quoted  indicated in substance that in those circumstances the ultimate sentence to be imposed, all other things being equal in terms of available mitigation, would likely have been in the range between three years’ and four years’ imprisonment. However, the sentencing judge properly recognised that all things were not equal as this accused was legally a child at the time of the offending and was still a child (albeit only just) on the date of sentencing. While the discount he afforded for mitigation may not have been precisely quantified, and we have indicated in the past that a failure to do so is sometimes problematic, it is clearly to be inferred from the circumstances of this case, and the fact that the ultimate sentence was one of just eighteen months imprisonment, that very substantial discount was in fact afforded, reflecting all of the available mitigation including the early plea and the appellant’s status as a minor both at the time of commission of the offence and at the time of sentencing. We see nothing to indicate a failure to properly reflect the mitigating circumstances in the sentence ultimately imposed and are not therefore disposed to uphold the complaint of inadequate account being taken of mitigation.

45.              On the contrary, it is clear to us from the transcript that all relevant mitigation was considered and taken into account. However, notwithstanding the existence of considerable mitigation it was still insufficient, in the sentencing judge’s judgment, to enable the appellant  to avoid custody. We consider that this was a matter within the legitimate discretion of the sentencing judge. There was no manifest error and we are therefore not disposed to uphold these grounds of appeal.

Ground No. 7

Alleged reliance on incorrect information in the Victim Impact Statement

46.              We dismiss this point in limine. The respondent is correct to say that there was no evidence to support the suggestion that the victim impact statement contained incorrect information, nor were any concerns raised before the sentencing judge. In addition, there is no motion before us to adduce new or additional evidence.

 

Grounds No. 8 and 9.

Sparing the victim additional distress

47.              These grounds assert a failure to take account of an aspect of the mitigation that accompanies a plea of guilty and a taking of responsibility for the offending conduct charged. An accused who does so at an early stage will usually forego the entitlement to disclosure, and where this happens, as it did in this case, it may spare the victim the additional stress and distress that can sometimes accompany the disclosure process. We are satisfied that the sentencing judge was prepared to, and did, afford the appellant all appropriate credit for his early plea of guilty, including that it spared unnecessary distress being caused to the victim notwithstanding that this aspect of the matter is not alluded to in terms. We are not therefore disposed to uphold these complaints.

Conclusion

48.              In circumstances where we have not seen fit to uphold any of the complaints embraced within the grounds of appeal pleaded, we must dismiss the appeal.

Result:     Dismiss