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Irish Court of Appeal
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> Irish Court of Appeal >> Director of Public Prosecutions v Babayev [2019] IECA 247 (08 October 2019)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ie/cases/IECA/2019/2019_IECA_247.html
Cite as: [2019] IECA 247
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Peart J.
McCarthy J.
Kennedy J.
THE COURT OF APPEAL
207/2018
BETWEEN
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS
RESPONDENT
AND
TEYMUR BABAYEV.
APPELLANT
JUDGMENT of the Court (ex tempore) delivered on the 8th day of October 2019 by Ms.
Justice Kennedy
1. The appellant appeals against his sentence on a count of burglary contrary to s.12 of the
Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 to which he pleaded guilty and a
sentence of three and a half years’ imprisonment was imposed.
2. The offence took place in the early hours of the 15th June, 2014 when the injured party
was asleep in her bed. She awoke just before 3am to feel a hand on her leg, she
wrapped the duvet around herself and moved to the end of the bed whilst Mr. Babayev
mirrored her movements. She tried to get him to leave the apartment and shouted at
him and pushed him in pursuit of this objective, but to no avail. The injured party noted
that the chain lock was fixed on the door and this unnerved her, as this was not
something she was in the habit of doing. She described the appellant lunging towards her
and her quilt fell down slightly. Ultimately he left, she was unable to get back to sleep
and the following day she contacted the Gardaí. Two phones were taken in the course of
the burglary.
3. The Gardaí attended the scene and fingerprint marks were found in the apartment, one of
which matched those of the appellant. A warrant was obtained in respect of the
appellant’s home address. This was executed on the 16th June, 2014. During this
search, two mobile phones belonging to the injured party were recovered from the
appellant’s car. The appellant was then arrested and taken to Rathmines Garda Station.
He made no admissions during the course of his detention and he denied being present at
the scene.
4. The appellant pleaded guilty to the burglary count at an early stage and he sought to
vacate that plea but this application was refused.
5. Mr Dwyer S.C., on behalf of the appellant submits that there is a clear error in principle in
respect of the sentence imposed on this count. The appellant had originally faced two
counts on the indictment, one for burglary and the other for sexual assault. He contested
the sexual assault matter and was convicted by a jury. On appeal the conviction was
quashed. As a consequence, Mr Dwyer contends that there is now an error in principle in
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that when the trial judge sentenced the appellant, he imposed three and a half years on
the burglary count and he initially took the sexual assault count into consideration. Whilst
he then imposed eighteen months on the sexual assault count, nonetheless, Mr Dwyer
contends this is an error which necessitates the sentence to be quashed.
6. Ms. McGowan B.L. for the respondent contends that there is no error and that the judge
imposed a discrete sentence on the sexual assault count. We cannot agree with the
submission. During his sentencing remarks, the judge stated that the appropriate
sentence, having taken all the factors into account including the mitigating factors, was a
term of imprisonment of three and a half years on the burglary count and he stated his
intention to take the sexual assault count into consideration. As the only matter now
before this court is the sentence imposed on the burglary count given that the conviction
in respect of the sexual assault count has been quashed by this Court, we are satisfied
that there is now an error in principle through no fault whatsoever of the trial judge. In
those circumstances we will quash the sentence imposed and we will move to re sentence
the appellant as of today’s date.
7. In this respect, we are satisfied to impose a post mitigation sentence in the same terms
as the Circuit Court judge. We will now explain our reasoning for so doing. We have
already set out the factual matrix surrounding the offending on the night in question. To
that we add to the impact on the victim and we have considered the redacted impact
report in this respect and it is clear that the intrusion into her dwelling has had an
understandably serious impact upon her.
8. There are a number of mitigating factors which can be stated on behalf of the appellant
and these include the fact that he pleaded guilty at an early opportunity although this is
adversely affected to a modest degree by virtue of the fact that he sought to resile
unsuccessfully from that plea.
9. He has no relevant previous convictions. We take into consideration the letters which
were furnished to the court below on his behalf and we also take into account to a very
limited degree, the fact that he is a non-national serving a sentence in this jurisdiction.
He has however resided here since 2001 and his family are resident in this jurisdiction.
We also note his progress whilst in custody.
10. In considering the aggravating factors, we refer to this Court’s decision in The People
(DPP) v Casey and Casey [2018] 2 I.R. 337 and we are satisfied that this case falls in the
lower end of the mid-range of sentence.
11. The aggravating factors in this case were significant. The appellant intruded into the
victim’s home when she was asleep in her bed, it involved a verbal and physical
confrontation with the unfortunate victim. His behaviour was particularly unpleasant, not
only by virtue of the fact that he refused to leave the apartment when asked to do so, but
he also taunted the injured party by mirroring her actions when she got up from her bed.
There is also the issue of the chain being placed on the door which unnerved the injured
party.
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12. We are satisfied that the pre mitigation sentence is one of a five and a half years’
imprisonment, taking into consideration the mitigating factors already identified, we will
discount that sentence to one of three and a half years’ imprisonment being of course the
sentence which was imposed by the Circuit Court judge.
Result: Allow and Vary