The Law Commission

 


PART VIII

UNILATERAL RECOVERY OF POSSESSION

8.1     In the First Report we recommended the replacement of the doctrine of re-entry and the law of forfeiture by a new statutory regime of landlords' termination orders. Unless the tenant consented to deliver up possession to the landlord, it would be necessary for the landlord to obtain an order from the court terminating the tenancy.^[1] Forfeiture by physical (or peaceable) re-entry would be abolished.
8.2     While this recommendation appeared radical, it must be admitted that the existing law already imposes serious restrictions on the forfeiture of tenancies by physical re-entry. It is unlawful to enforce a right of re-entry other than by court proceedings while any person is lawfully residing in the premises or part of them.^[2] It is a criminal offence to use or threaten violence in order to gain entry if there is anyone physically present on the premises who is opposed to the entry.^[3] There are also restrictions on forfeiture (whether by physical re-entry or by court order) in response to unpaid rent, service charges and other monies due under the terms of the tenancy^[4], and to certain breaches of repairing covenants.^[5] In broad terms, the effect of current statutory restrictions is to limit the availability of physical re-entry to residential premises which are no longer occupied and to commercial premises out of working hours.
8.3     The invocation of the current common law right of physical re-entry was placed under the judicial microscope in Billson v Residential Apartments Ltd.^[6] The question in Billson was whether forfeiture by means of physical re-entry was effective to deprive the tenant of the right to claim relief pursuant to section 146(2) of the Law of Property Act 1925. That statutory jurisdiction is available only where the landlord "is proceeding, by action or otherwise" to enforce the forfeiture. The Court of Appeal held that once the landlord had physically re-entered, the tenancy thereupon terminated, and the landlord was no longer "proceeding". The tenant was thereby deprived of the right to claim relief pursuant to statute, and the majority of the Court of Appeal went on to deny that there was an inherent jurisdiction to grant relief upon which the tenant could rely. This decision was subjected to trenchant criticism, as it appeared to provide an incentive for landlords to use physical re-entry rather than the court process to terminate their tenancies: Nicholls LJ, dissenting, considered it could not be right "to encourage law-abiding citizens to embark on a course which is a sure recipe for violence."^[7]
8.4     The House of Lords adopted a less literal approach to the construction of the statute, holding that section 146(2) should be broadly interpreted so as to enable the tenant to make application for relief at any time until the landlord's forfeiture of the tenancy by physical re-entry was judicially endorsed by the grant of a possession order. While there was some continued criticism of the use of forfeiture as a means of terminating tenancies- Lord Templeman castigated physical re-entry as a "dubious and dangerous method" of determining a tenancy,^[8] the practical significance of the House of Lords decision was to deny the landlord an incentive (in terms of depriving the tenant of the opportunity to claim relief) where he or she chose physically to re-enter rather than to use the court process.
8.5     Shortly after Billson, the Law Commission published its Termination of Tenancies Bill, intended to give effect to the recommendations contained in the First Report. Clause 1 of the Bill was uncompromising:

The power of a landlord to determine a tenancy by re-entry or forfeiture is abolished.

8.6     Responding to the publication of the First Report, the commercial property industry expressed serious concerns about the implications of the recommended abolition of physical re-entry. It would inevitably lead to an increase in the workload of the courts. In turn, there would be delays in obtaining hearing dates, and significant disadvantages for the operation of the commercial property market would ensue. This would lead to unacceptably long delays in the recovery of possession by landlords and there would be a danger of manipulation of court procedures by tenants seeking to gain more time at their landlord's expense.
8.7     As a result, the Law Commission published a further Consultative Document on Termination of Tenancies by Physical Re-entry in January 1998, and responses evinced overwhelming support for the retention of a limited right of physical re-entry. The Commission decided therefore to modify its original recommendations by proposing

(1) the retention of a right to terminate a tenancy by physical re-entry of the premises, but at the same time

(2) the replacement of the existing right of re-entry with a new statutory right of physical re-entry which would be subject to rational procedural and notice requirements and appropriate safeguards.^[9]

8.8     In this Part we intend to explain the extent and scope of the statutory right which we are proposing, and we shall consider its compatibility with the ECHR. We shall also consider the effect of this proposed statutory right on recommendations for dealing with the problem of abandoned premises.

Statutory nature of the right

8.9     We must begin with a point which is fundamental to the proposed scheme. Once legislation comes into force, the only lawful means by which a landlord may bring a tenancy to an end without obtaining the prior sanction of the court will be in accordance with the statutory scheme which will replace in its entirety the common law right of "peaceable re-entry". If a landlord re-enters otherwise than in accordance with the statutory scheme, it may amount to an eviction at common law and leave the landlord open to a claim in damages.^[10]
8.10     The new statutory right is not a right to terminate the tenancy as such. It is a right for the landlord to recover possession of the premises and thereby to suspend the tenant's right to possession until either:

(1) the tenancy is terminated; or

(2) the court grants an application for relief or makes an interim order restoring the tenant to possession of the premises.

8.11     The tenancy would not terminate immediately on recovery of possession by the landlord. It would only terminate on the expiry of a period of one month commencing with the date of recovery of possession. During that period, the tenant (or members of the derivative class) would be entitled to apply to the court for relief, including an interim order restoring the tenant to possession. This is in addition to the right the tenant has to apply to court from the date of service of the pre-action notice. Given that that notice must indicate a period until the expiry of which the landlord may not take possession of the premises, it is entirely possible that by acting pre-emptively the tenant will not at any stage lose possession.
8.12     We do think that referring to the landlord's right to recover possession in these circumstances as involving the exercise of a "right to re-enter" is misleading, not least because to do so retains something of the mystique of the current law which we are seeking to dispel. We have therefore decided to call this the "right to recover possession unilaterally". That is what it is, no more and no less. The landlord's action does not require the prior sanction of the court; in that sense it is unilateral. It does not terminate the tenancy itself; only following expiry of a further period of time during which the tenant fails to respond will termination occur. In so far as it is a form of self-help, we intend it to be both extremely limited in its extent and strictly regulated in its exercise.

Restrictions on statutory right unilaterally to recover possession

8.13     In common with the present law governing forfeiture by physical re-entry, we propose that the exercise of this right is to be subject to a number of restrictions. As we explain further below, we do not intend that a landlord should be able to exercise this right in circumstances where he or she could not apply for a termination order. It is essential, in our view, that the landlord is not given any undue incentives to use self-help in preference to the legal process.
8.14     This principle will mean, for example, that a landlord seeking unilaterally to recover possession where the tenant default comprises breach of a repairing covenant must comply with the repairs regime (set out in Part V).
8.15     In Part X below we consider at some length the difficult questions arising in cases of tenant insolvency. We conclude that a landlord should not be permitted to recover possession unilaterally where the tenant is insolvent. In the event of tenant insolvency, the landlord will be required to invoke the process of the court in order to terminate the tenancy.^[11]
8.16     In Part XI below we discuss the problems posed by landlords seeking to terminate residential tenancies for non-payment of service and administration charges. We believe that there is a strong case to provide that landlords should not be entitled to exercise the right to recover possession unilaterally in respect of such tenant default unless and until the tenant has admitted the amount due or a court (or tribunal) has finally determined the tenant's liability. This admission, or determination, should be clearly stated in the pre-action notice. The tenant should be able to contest this allegation by referring the matter to the court and thereby preventing the landlord from taking unilateral action.^[12]

Recovery of possession must be peaceable

8.17     We do not propose any particular restrictions on the time of day at which unilateral recovery of possession may be effected (for instance during hours of daylight). The exercise of the right will however be subject to the provisions of section 6 of the Criminal Law Act 1977 which makes it a criminal offence to use or threaten violence in order to gain entry to premises if there is anyone physically present on the premises who is opposed to the entry.

Recovery of possession inapplicable to residential premises

8.18     We propose that the statutory right shall be subject to the provisions of section 2 of the Protection from Eviction Act 1977. It should not therefore apply in respect of premises in which, or in part of which, any person is lawfully residing. The statutory right will however be applicable to residential premises which are not being currently occupied as a residence.^[13] We do have some concern here in relation to agricultural tenancies which may comprise both farmland and a farmhouse. While the Protection from Eviction Act would prevent the unilateral recovery of possession of the farmhouse, being premises occupied as a residence, that would not be the case in relation to the farmland. We would welcome the views of consultees as to whether in such circumstances a landlord should be entitled to recover possession of the farmland pursuant to the statutory right.

Excluded tenancies

8.19     As we explained in our 1998 Consultation Document, exercise of the statutory right of re-entry would be inappropriate in cases where the tenancy is itself a valuable capital asset. Typically, the tenancy has been granted for a lengthy term in consideration of a substantial premium and at a small ground rent. The landlord's reversionary interest is therefore insignificant, and premature termination may bestow an unjustifiable and disproportionate windfall gain on the landlord at the tenant's expense.
8.20     We believe that it is necessary to ensure that those with long tenancies (whether commercial or residential) are fully protected against the possible abuse of landlord self-help. Following the 1998 consultation, we propose that this can be most effectively achieved by excluding certain tenancies from the statutory right to recover possession unilaterally. It is however essential that tenancies falling within the excluded category should be readily identifiable.
8.21     That being the case, we reject a test based on whether the tenancy has been granted at less than a market rent. We believe such a test would give rise to considerable practical difficulties. Not only would expert valuation evidence be necessary in many marginal cases, the potential for dispute over the threshold would be great.
8.22     We prefer therefore a test based on the length of the unexpired term of the tenancy. This has the benefit of certainty and will be simple to apply. The longer the tenancy, the less likely it is that it will be granted for a full market rent. We therefore propose that tenancies which have unexpired terms of more than 25 years should be outside the scope of the statutory right to recover possession unilaterally. The statutory right would therefore be applicable to the vast majority of rack rent commercial tenancies.

Effect of unilateral recovery of possession

8.23     Under current law, actual physical re-entry operates to terminate the tenancy with immediate effect. This consequence of physical re-entry, together with the fact that the tenancy can be subsequently "revived" by a grant of relief, is one of the principal defects of the current law. The scheme we propose will avoid the unfortunate consequences which ensue. We propose that following exercise of the statutory right to recover possession unilaterally, the tenancy will continue for a period of time during which the tenant, and any person holding a derivative interest, may apply to the court for relief. At the end of that period, in the absence of an application for relief, the tenancy will terminate automatically.
8.24     In the 1998 consultation exercise, we proposed that the tenancy should continue for a period of three months from the date the landlord recovered possession. This period was generally considered by consultees to be too long. The point was made that, when the landlord has physically re-entered premises, any application for relief should be (and, in practice, is) made, if at all, very soon after the event. It was felt that a period of one month would normally be sufficient for a tenant to commence proceedings for relief ^[14], although parties would be free to agree a longer period if they wish. If proceedings for relief are commenced during the one month period, the tenancy will automatically continue until the matter is resolved by the court or by agreement between the parties.
8.25     We therefore propose that following exercise of the statutory right, the tenancy should continue for:

(1) a period of one month; or

(2) such longer period as may have been agreed by the parties for this purpose.

8.26     The tenancy should then terminate automatically unless:

(1) there is an outstanding application for relief before the court; or

(2) the landlord has served a notice on a member of the derivative class^[15] following exercise of the statutory right.

8.27     In either of the cases referred to in the above paragraph, the tenancy should terminate on whichever is the later of:

(1) the date on which any such application for relief is finally determined by the court and such relief is withheld; or

(2) the date which is one month after the last notice was served on a member of the derivative class, unless an application for relief is made in the interim, in which case the tenancy will not come to an end until that application has also been finally determined.

8.28     Once the tenancy has terminated, there is to be no possibility of further applications for relief. Even if a member of the derivative class does not have the opportunity to make an application owing to the landlord's failure to serve the requisite notice on them, it will be too late to apply for relief, although in such circumstances the aggrieved party may have a claim in damages against the landlord.

Circumstances in which the statutory right may be exercised

8.29     We propose that the landlord's statutory right to recover possession unilaterally is to arise if and only if:

(1) a tenant default has occurred;

(2) the terms of the tenancy do not exclude the landlord's right in respect of the tenant default in question;

(3) the landlord has served a pre-action notice on the tenant which has clearly stated his or her intention to recover possession unilaterally;

(4) the notice conditions are fulfilled;^[16]

(5) had the landlord applied for a termination order on the day the notice was served, the court would have power to make a termination order in respect of the tenant default in question.

8.30     The statutory right to recover possession unilaterally would therefore only arise in circumstances where the landlord has the right to commence termination order proceedings. It does not follow that the statutory right will arise in every case where such proceedings may be commenced. It will be open to the parties to a tenancy to have agreed either that the statutory right to recover possession unilaterally should not apply at all in respect of the tenancy being granted or that it should be restricted to certain types of tenant default. The parties should not however be free to agree that the statutory right should be available in circumstances where they have agreed that the landlord should not be able to seek a termination order.
8.31     The statutory right to recover possession unilaterally will cease to be exercisable following expiry of a specified period from the date of service of the pre-action notice. The length of this period (which must be clearly stated on the pre-action notice) will itself depend on whether the landlord has required the tenant to take remedial action in relation to the breaches complained of and what that action involves.

Notice to the tenant

8.32     We observed, in 1998, that one of the most serious defects of the current law was the lack of a requirement that a landlord contemplating physical re-entry in cases of non-payment of rent should give notice to the tenant of his or her intentions.^[17] We accordingly proposed this as a minimum requirement. This recommendation was in the context of a statutory scheme for landlord termination orders which did not require a pre-action notice to be served in all cases. As we have explained in Part V above, we now propose that in every case the landlord intending to terminate a tenancy for tenant default should be required to serve a pre-action notice on the tenant.

Notice to the derivative class

8.33     We have already indicated that the landlord must serve the pre-action notice on those members of the derivative class of whom the landlord has knowledge. This will apply equally to a pre-action notice where the landlord is intending to recover possession unilaterally.^[18]

Method of recovery of possession

8.34     The landlord may exercise the statutory right unilaterally to recover possession by going into possession of the premises and securing them against the tenant. It would not be necessary for the landlord to go into occupation him- or herself, although this may be the clearest indication that unilateral recovery of possession had occurred. It would be sufficient for the landlord (or his or her agent) to enter the premises and to change the locks, even if the landlord then leaves them vacant.
8.35     It is essential however that the tenant be made aware of the fact that unilateral recovery of possession has occurred. We do not believe that a further mandatory notice requirement is desirable, not least because it will usually be obvious what has happened, and formal notice would therefore be superfluous. If a tenant, on turning up one morning, finds that the locks have been changed and entry cannot be gained to the premises, the tenant should realise that unilateral recovery of possession by the landlord has taken place. There is something to be said, however, for providing a means whereby a landlord can unequivocally assert that the tenant has been made aware of the fact of recovery of possession, and we propose that it should be deemed sufficient (although not necessary) protection for the landlord to post a notice on the exterior of the premises stating that recovery of possession has taken place.

Rights and obligations during the continuation period

8.36     When the landlord has recovered possession by exercise of the statutory right, one month will elapse before it will be safe to re-let. The question arises as to liability under the covenants of the tenancy during that period. Although the tenant will be out of possession, we nevertheless believe that his or her liability under the covenants should persist unless and until the tenancy is formally terminated. We realise that it can be strongly argued that the tenant should not be obliged, for example, to pay rent for a period of time during which the benefits of possession are being denied. That may be so, but it is the tenant's own default which has brought about that state of affairs. More importantly, it is open to the tenant, at any time during that period, to apply to the court for relief, and, in the interim, to be restored to possession. We would anticipate that the court would be extremely likely to make an interim restoration order as a matter of course where the tenant was still trading on the premises.

Abandoned premises

8.37     Part XI of the First Report considered whether the landlord termination order scheme should incorporate a special facility for cases where the premises let had been abandoned. Two statutory provisions were mentioned and discarded, one on the ground of obsolescence, one on the ground of inapplicability.^[19] The common law doctrine of re-entry is clearly useful as far as abandoned premises are concerned. Its abolition would necessitate its statutory replacement dealing with the problems occurring in as efficient a manner.
8.38     The First Report made two recommendations in this regard:^[20]

(1) The landlord who reasonably believes the premises let to have been abandoned should have the right to secure and preserve them.

(2) Such a landlord should be able to serve notice on the tenant and on all members of the derivative class which would operate to terminate the tenancy if no response were evoked within six months. This notice could however only be served if there was a "termination order event" in respect of which the landlord could seek a termination order. Actual service would not be required if a recipient could not be found. In the event of a response being made by the tenant, the landlord would then have to seek a termination order from the court in the normal way.

8.39     The 1998 Consultative Document, in accepting that there should be some continuing, albeit limited, role for physical re-entry, revisited the recommendations concerning abandoned premises. The Commission provisionally concluded that its retention of physical re-entry rendered redundant its original recommendation that a tenancy of abandoned premises should be terminable by notice.^[21] It also took the view that the common law rules governing the protection and re-letting of abandoned premises operated satisfactorily and were not in need of reform.^[22]
8.40     There is however one remaining matter relating to abandoned premises. Although for the most part, it was felt that landlords could simply invoke the "statutory right of re-entry" in order to terminate the tenancy, it was not thought necessary to preserve a tenancy of abandoned premises for as long as three months (the period then being proposed for the tenant to bring an application for relief). It was accordingly proposed that where premises had been abandoned, the landlord should be entitled to re-let at any time following lawful exercise of the statutory right. The grant of a new tenancy by the landlord would operate to terminate the old tenancy and curtail the right of any person to apply for relief.^[23]
8.41     Following consultation, the proposal that there be a period of three months in which the tenant may apply for relief has been modified. It is now being proposed that that period be one month. In such circumstances, the question arises whether it is necessary to have any separate regulation affecting abandoned premises or whether the general rules we have set out for the unilateral recovery of possession can do the work.
8.42     It would clearly be advantageous in terms of simplicity of operation if we could apply the procedure for unilateral recovery of possession to premises which have been abandoned. If the one month period applied in such cases, there would be no need to define, and no issues would arise concerning, the abandonment of premises. At the same time, it might be thought invidious that landlords would be obliged to wait (even for as short a period as a month) to recover possession of premises which have clearly been abandoned. We invite the views of consultees.

Human Rights Act 1998

8.43     We believe that the promulgation of a statutory right to recover possession unilaterally, as described above, will be compatible with our obligations under the European Convention on Human Rights. There are three provisions which require consideration.

Article 8

8.44     Article 8 is not likely to be engaged as we are proposing that the statutory right should not be available where premises are occupied as a dwelling.

Article 6

8.45     It is possible to predict argument that the statutory conferment of this right which can be invoked, ultimately, to terminate a tenancy without any court proceedings amounts to a denial of entitlement to a fair and public hearing.
8.46     It is not however the case that the exercise of this statutory right would bar the tenant from taking the dispute to court. Central to the recommendations is the principle that for a period of one month following exercise of the right, the tenant may apply to the court for relief. The court will also be empowered to set aside the termination if the tenant shows that the landlord has acted unlawfully, for example by failing to comply with the requirement of prior notice. This is not a denial of the right to a fair and public hearing.
8.47     The right of access to a court is in any event not absolute. It is subject to regulation by the state within the margin of appreciation. Where certain institutions have been prevented by statute from bringing proceedings in relation to their property, the restriction is likely to be held to be in breach of the Convention. Where access to the court is subject to conditions, on the other hand, the restriction may well be upheld.

Article 1 of the First Protocol

8.48     The second rule of this Article outlawing the deprivation of possessions would seem to be significant to the legality of terminating a tenancy before its natural term has ended. The termination is itself a deprivation. The question arises, however, whether it is a deprivation by the state. The act must be one "by which the state seizes, or gives another the right to seize, a specific asset to be used for realisation of a goal in the public interest."^[24] The Article is therefore concerned to protect property against the activities of the state.
8.49     It is doubtful whether the action of a landlord in exercising a right to recover possession of the property in order to terminate the tenant's interest can be characterised as an act of the state. In every case, the tenant has the right to bring the matter before the court. In so far as there is a clear public interest that landlords should be entitled to terminate tenancies expeditiously in circumstances where the tenant has been clearly warned of the consequences of failing to comply with the terms of the tenancy, then this Article is unlikely to prove a fruitful means of challenging the landlord's actions.
8.50     The Commission considered the English law of forfeiture in Di Palma v United Kingdom.^[25] Under the legislation as it then stood, the applicant, whose long tenancy of her dwelling had been forfeited for non-payment of the service charge, could not obtain relief in the county court before which the landlord had brought forfeiture proceedings.^[26] She alleged that this was a breach of Article 1 of the First Protocol. While the Commission did not consider the question whether a state was obliged to protect the property rights of one individual as against another such individual, it emphasised the importance that the deprivation had arisen as a result of a private agreement between individuals.
8.51     It has been remarked that Di Palma indicates that cases involving forfeiture are unlikely to be challenged successfully under the Convention.^[27] The Commission pointed out that forfeiture provisions were "a common feature of tenancy agreements under the legal systems of all the member states of the Council of Europe."^[28] This is however premised on the landlord and the tenant having agreed on the inclusion of a forfeiture clause in the tenancy agreement. Under our proposals, the right of re-entry would be implied by statute into each tenancy agreement within the parameters of the scheme.
8.52     Although our proposals would confer a right to terminate for tenant default into every tenancy to which they apply, it will remain possible for the parties to make contrary provision. In particular, they can provide, in the terms of the tenancy, that breach of a certain covenant (or, indeed, breach of all covenants) shall not comprise tenant default. This is in our view an important component of the scheme which will both respect the autonomy of the parties and ensure that no effective challenge can be made under the Convention.

summary of provisional proposals in this part

right to recover possession unilaterally

(1) A landlord should be entitled to exercise the right to recover possession unilaterally whenever there is tenant default, save in the following circumstances, and subject to the following restrictions.

restrictions

(2) It may not be exercised where the tenancy expressly excludes its operation either generally or in respect of any specified form of tenant default.

(3) It may not be exercised unless the landlord could apply to the court for a termination order in the circumstances which have arisen.

(4) It may not be exercised where the tenant is insolvent, even where this is in breach of an express condition as to the solvency of the tenant.

(5) If the tenant default comprises breach of a repairing covenant such as to activate the repairs scheme, or failure to pay a service or administration charge, the relevant regimes pertaining to those circumstances must be complied with.

(6) It may not be exercised in relation to premises in which any person is lawfully residing. Violence must not be used or threatened in exercise of the right. The Protection from Eviction Act 1977 (and the Criminal Law Act 1977, s 6) will apply to its exercise.

(7) It may not be exercised in relation to any tenancy with an unexpired term of more than 25 years.

conditions for exercise

(8) The landlord must serve a pre-action notice on the tenant and on any members of the derivative class in the usual form stating expressly that the landlord intends to terminate the tenancy and for that purpose to recover possession of the premises.

effect of exercise

(9) Recovery of possession will not itself terminate the tenancy. Following recovery of possession, there will commence a period of one month during which application for relief may be made to the court by the tenant or by any other person entitled to apply.

abandoned premises

(10) There will be no special procedure applicable to abandoned premises.

Note 1    Exceptions were contemplated in relation to premises which had been abandoned or which the tenant had permitted to be used as a brothel (and had been convicted of the offence under the Sexual Offences Act 1956).    [Back]

Note 2    Protection from Eviction Act 1977, s 2.    [Back]

Note 3    Criminal Law Act 1977, s 6.    [Back]

Note 4    Housing Act 1996, s 81 as amended by the Commonhold Leasehold Reform Act 2002, Part 5.    [Back]

Note 5    Leasehold Property (Repairs) Act 1938. See further Part V, paras 5.24 et seq.    [Back]

Note 6    [1992]1 AC 494.    [Back]

Note 7    Ibid, at 525.    [Back]

Note 8    Ibid, at 536.    [Back]

Note 9    Law Commission Press Release, 30 June 1999.    [Back]

Note 10    It is usual for landlords to have a contractual right, reserved in the tenancy, to enter the premises for various purposes during the term. Such rights are typically reserved for the purposes of inspecting the premises or neighbouring premises or of carrying out works. Exercise of such rights is not intended to result in the termination of the tenancy, and they are not therefore affected by the Commission’s proposals.    [Back]

Note 11    See paras 10.18- 10.19.    [Back]

Note 12    See paras 11.4- 11.6.    [Back]

Note 13    The facts of Billson, above, provide an example under the current law of re-entry of residential premises which at the relevant time were not occupied.    [Back]

Note 14    In addition the tenant may apply for relief or other order of the court following the service of the pre-action notice. See paras 8. 11 above.    [Back]

Note 15    See generally Part VII.    [Back]

Note 16    This refers, for example, to specific requirements concerning regulation of termination for disrepair or non-payment of service charges.    [Back]

Note 17    Where the landlord intends to forfeit for other breaches of covenant, written notice must be served on the tenant under the Law of Property Act 1925, s 146.    [Back]

Note 18    As to who is a member of the derivative class for the purposes of the scheme and the steps the landlord should take to identify and serve them see Part VII, paras 7.9 et seq.     [Back]

Note 19    Distress for Rent Act 1736, s 16; Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, s 54: see First Report, paras 11.5 to 11.7.    [Back]

Note 20    Recommendations (87) and (88).    [Back]

Note 21    Para 3.15.    [Back]

Note 22    Ibid.    [Back]

Note 23    Para 3.26.    [Back]

Note 24    Bramelid and Malmstrom v Sweden (1982) 5 EHRR 249, 255.    [Back]

Note 25    (1988) 10 EHRR 149.    [Back]

Note 26    The legislation, County Courts Act 1984, s 138, was subsequently amended by the Administration of Justice Act 1985, s 55.    [Back]

Note 27    Charles Harpum [2000] Landlord & Tenant Review 28, 30.    [Back]

Note 28    (1988) 10 EHRR 149, 155.    [Back]