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Part VI
Particular interests
6.1 In this Part we deal with particular categories of interest which require special treatment:
(1) Lesser interests:
(a) Minor tenancies We review the rules, under respectively the notice to treat and vesting declaration procedures, for minor tenancies (such as from year to year or less). They enable the authority, rather than “acquiring” such interests, to rely on the contractual provisions for termination. There are some differences between the two procedures. We propose that they should be brought into line, and the archaic language of the 1965 Act restated in modern form; and
(b) Easements and other private rights We make proposals to clarify the law relating to interference with easements or other rights over the subject land, including a new power for the authority to elect whether to “override” the rights (to the extent necessary to allow the proposed works and their use[1]) or to “extinguish” them altogether.
(2) Divided interests Where part of a building or holding is subject to compulsory purchase, the owner may in certain circumstances compel the authority to take the whole. We review and compare the existing provisions relating to notice to treat procedure (1965 Act, s 8) and vesting declarations (Vesting Declarations Act, s 12, Sched 1), and note the separate rules for agricultural land (1973 Act, ss 53-7). We discuss the comments of CPPRAG and the ODPM on possible reforms. We make proposals for a revised, unified set of rules for a “divided property notice”, applicable to both procedures; and suggest an extension of the existing right to enable such a notice to be served by any owner whose retained land, as a result of the acquisition, cannot reasonably be used for the previous purpose.
(3) Mortgages and rentcharges We propose that the existing provisions of the 1965 Act should be retained without substantive amendment, but invite comments.
(4) Public rights of way We note the existence of a special procedure for extinguishment of rights of way over land subject to compulsory acquisition, but propose no change.
6.2 As already explained,[2] two important categories of interest are excluded under the present law from the requirement to serve a notice to treat:
(1) Minor tenancies; and
(2) Easements and other private rights.
There are similar rules in respect of Vesting Declarations.[3]
6.3 Section 20 of the 1965 Act (headed, misleadingly, “tenants at will, etc”) embodies a special procedure for dealing with an occupant of the land “having no greater interest than as tenant for a year or from year to year”.[4] Such a person is not entitled to notice to treat, although in practice the authority may serve such a notice.[5] The authority may simply await the expiry of the contractual term, or serve notice to quit under the contract.[6] In that case, there is no right to compensation under the 1965 Act, although there may be a right to a “disturbance payment” under the 1973 Act.[7] Section 20 enables possession to be required in advance of the contractual date, by means of a specific demand by the authority and the payment or tender of compensation.[8]
6.4 The Act defines the heads of compensation to which a tenant is entitled in such cases:
(1) the value of the unexpired term or interest in the land;
(2) “any just allowance which ought to be made to him by an incoming tenant”;
(3) “any loss or injury he may sustain”;[9] and
(4) if part only of the holding is taken, compensation for severance or injurious affection.[10]
6.5 As originally enacted, the section required to be left out of account any right of a business tenant to a new tenancy under the Landlord and Tenant Act 1954.[11] This was amended in 1973, so that now the rights of both business and agricultural tenants (as well as residential tenants) to statutory protection have to be taken into account.[12]
6.6 Similarly, the vesting declaration procedure has special rules for land subject to a “minor tenancy”[13] or “a long tenancy which is about to expire”.[14] In respect of such interests, the vesting declaration does not give the authority an immediate right to immediate possession.[15] Instead, section 9 provides for a form of notice to treat and notice of entry:
(2) The right of entry conferred by section 8(1) above shall not be exercisable in respect of that land unless, after serving a notice to treat in respect of that tenancy, the acquiring authority have served on every occupier of any of the land in which the tenancy subsists a notice stating that, at the end of such period as is specified in the notice (not being less than 14 days) from the date on which the notice is served, they intend to enter upon and take possession of such land as is specified in the notice, and that period has expired.
(3) The vesting of the land in the acquiring authority shall be subject to the tenancy until the period specified in a notice under subsection (2) above expires, or the tenancy comes to an end, whichever first occurs.
6.8 As already explained,[16] the advantage of these arrangements is that the acquiring authority does not have to trouble at the outset with minor and expiring tenancies. It may well be more convenient to allow the interests to expire, or to make informal arrangements, as implementation proceeds, to deal with relocation or rehousing requirements. The Policy Statement contains no proposal to change the substance of these provisions. Although the language of section 20 of the 1965 Act is archaic and confusing, its operation in practice does not appear to give rise to difficulty, following the clarification given by the Newham case.[17] We propose that it should be restated in modern terms. There are differences between the two procedures, the reasons for which (other than historical) are not obvious. For example, it might seem sensible for “long tenancies about to expire” to be covered by both procedures. We invite views on that suggestion, and whether any other substantive amendment is required.
(2) Should section 20 of the 1965 Act be restated in modern form as proposed above?
(1) Acquisition of new rights over the subject land, without acquiring the land itself;
(2) Acquisition of the subject land (“the dominant tenement”) with the benefit of existing easements or rights over other land (“the servient tenement”); and
(3) Acquisition of the servient tenement, followed by use so as to interfere with existing easements or other rights attached to other land.
6.10 The first two raise no special issues in the context of the present project:
(1) Acquisition of new rights As explained previously,[19] this is largely a question of powers, rather than procedure. Where powers to acquire new rights are conferred (for example, under the 1976 Act), procedure and assessment of compensation generally follow the ordinary rules for acquisition of land, with detailed modifications specified in the enabling Act.
(2) Rights attached to the subject land Where an authority purchases a dominant tenement, ordinarily it acquires the benefit of any rights attached to it in the same way as any other purchaser (subject to the definition of “land” in the enabling statute), without needing to identify them specifically in the notice to treat, or vesting declaration.[20]
The third situation gives rise to more difficulty and is addressed in the following paragraphs.
6.11 Where the servient tenement is acquired, the acquiring authority, in carrying out the statutory purpose, is able to interfere with easements, covenants or similar rights, subject to payment of compensation.[21]
6.12 The right is not acquired or extinguished,[22] but continues to bind the land:
It is, I think, settled law that in all cases where land is subject to a burden which runs with it for the benefit of other land, a purchaser taking under compulsory powers takes the land subject to that burden like any other purchaser; but the covenant cannot be enforced by injunction in the Courts if the breach is attributable to the execution of the works authorised by the statute under which it was taken, or to the exercise of the statutory powers thereby conferred on the purchaser.[23]
6.13 This principle, though well established, may cause uncertainty, particularly where the authority wishes to dispose of the land for development. In the first place, it may be difficult for the authority, or those dealing with it, to be sure of the extent of such rights. Even where the land is registered, the existence of such rights will not normally be apparent from the register.[24]
6.15 This is illustrated by Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd.[25] In that case, agricultural land, which had been requisitioned by the Air Ministry in 1942, had been sold by the then owner in 1943 subject to a covenant restricting it to agricultural use; it was later acquired compulsorily by the Ministry under the Defence Acts in 1958. The issue was whether that covenant still held good when the Ministry let the land to an aviation company. It was held that the covenant could not prevent use by the Air Ministry and its agents for purposes for which it was acquired,[26] nor the use by the tenant company, so far as the company’s activity could be treated, on a “broad approach”, as done “for the purposes for which the airfield may be considered to have been acquired.”[27] On the facts, it was held that the company was protected in respect of its work on flight refuelling for the Air Force; but separate nuclear research work and contract work undertaken for the Belgian Air Force fell outside the statutory protection.[28]
The payment of compensation is in lieu of an action for an injunction or damages… If the owner of the third-party right had been awarded damages at common law for an interference with his right, he would not be entitled to make a further claim in respect of the same interference. Neither would he be likely to obtain an injunction after the expiration of a reasonable period of time from the initial interference. There seems no reason why the payment of compensation under statutory provisions should have any different effect. Accordingly, if compensation is paid, no further payment can be made in respect of the same interference. But if the original cause of interference is removed or the scheme terminated, there seems no reason in principle why the third-party right cannot then be potentially enforceable, subject of course to the statutory powers of the acquiring authority. Accordingly, if the acquiring authority were to dispose of land subject to third-party rights, and the cause of the original interference [with] those rights ceases or is removed, it may be possible to argue that the third-party right continues to bind the affected land in the hands of successors to the acquiring authority, even in cases where compensation has been paid: in the latter respect it is arguable that the Marten case is wrong. [29]
6.17 In principle this analysis seems correct. However, it may create considerable uncertainty for those acquiring land from public authorities following the initial development. In practice, it seems, the authority faced with a claim for compensation may prefer to negotiate the extinguishment or partial extinguishment of the right, thus putting the matter beyond doubt.[30]
6.18 As already mentioned,[31] the Vesting Declarations Act contains no express rules dealing with interference with easements and other rights over land acquired under that procedure. The effect of such a declaration is that the land vests in the authority as though under the 1965 Act “any power to execute a deed poll had arisen in respect of all the land and all the interests therein”, and the authority had duly exercised that power on the vesting date.[32] It might be thought that this language is apt to give the authority clear title to the land, free of any interests or rights of any kind. However, since the effect of the declaration is defined by reference to the procedure under the 1965 Act, the vesting seems to be limited to the interests which would vest under that procedure.[33] Thus, under this procedure also, easements and other similar rights over the subject land are not acquired or extinguished, but will give rise to rights to compensation when interfered with.[34]
6.19 Some statutes make special provision for extinguishing or overriding rights over the subject land. An example of “extinguishment” is in the Housing Act 1985. It provides that, where land is acquired (compulsorily or by agreement) within a clearance area, then on completion of the purchase all private rights of way, rights relating to maintaining apparatus, and “all other rights or easements in or relating to the land” shall be “extinguished”.[35] Any person who “suffers loss by the extinguishment of any right” is entitled to compensation “to be determined under and in accordance with the Land Compensation Act 1961”.[36]
6.20 The 1990 Act does not provide for the extinguishment of rights, but confers an extended power to override easements and other rights,[37] which covers those deriving title from the authority. Where land has been acquired or appropriated by a local authority for planning purposes, the “erection, construction or carrying out, or maintenance of any building or other work”, “whether done by the local authority or by a person deriving title under them”, is authorised if done in accordance with planning permission, notwithstanding interference with interests or rights over the land.[38] The purpose was described in a recent case:
The statutory objective which underlies section 237 of the 1990 Act is that, provided that work is done in accordance with planning permission, and subject to payment of compensation, a local authority should be permitted to develop their land in the manner in which they, acting bona fide, consider will best serve the public interest. To that end, it is recognised that a local authority should be permitted to interfere with third party rights.[39]
6.21 In Thames Water Utilities v Oxford City Council,[40]the court adopted a narrow interpretation of section 237. In that case, it was held that the erection and operation by the council of a football stadium and associated development was in breach of a covenant limiting its use of the land to “recreational and ancillary purposes”. Although the “erection” of the stadium and other buildings was within the protection of section 237, it was held that this protection did not extend to their “use” by the Oxford Football Club, to which they had been leased. The immunity granted by the section was limited to the “precise immunity” given by the wording of the section, the effect of which was “to set limits upon the exercise of such powers where they involve interference with third party rights”.[41]
6.22 We think the legal position should be clarified in the statute. The original reason for excluding such rights from acquisition under the ordinary notice to treat procedure was that in many cases, until the work was carried out, it would not be clear to what extent interference was required.[42] Although this may be true in some cases, there will be others in which the authority may reasonably prefer to acquire clean title from the outset. Subject to payment of compensation, it seems reasonable for the authority to have that option. The Housing Act 1985 (see above) provides a precedent.
6.23 In other cases, the authority may prefer to wait until the interference is actually required, as under the present law. We see no objection in principle to that, although, as already discussed,[43] owners of such rights should have the opportunity to object to the use of compulsory powers. For such cases, we provisionally propose that the extended power conferred by section 237 of the 1990 Act (see above) should apply generally to authorities having powers of compulsory purchase. The uncertainty created by the Thames Water case should be removed by providing that the immunity extends to both erection and use.
(1) Where the subject land is or may be subject to easements or other rights,[44] such rights may be overridden in accordance with (3) below, save to the extent that the authority elects to proceed by extinguishment of the rights, or any of them, over all or part of the land.
(2) Where the authority elects to proceed by extinguishment, it shall proceed as though the rights in question were interests entitling the owners to notice to treat; and, on completion of the purchase or on prior taking of possession by the authority, all rights or easements in the land to which the election relates shall be extinguished.[45]
(3) In other cases, the rights may be “overridden”: that is, the erection, maintenance or use of any building or other work, whether done by the local authority or by a person deriving title under them, is authorised if done in accordance with planning permission, notwithstanding interference with interests or rights over the land.[46]
(4) Subject to (5), any person who suffers loss by the extinguishment of, or overriding of, any right, is entitled to compensation to be determined under and in accordance with the Compensation Code.
(5) Where a claim is made for compensation for rights which have been overridden under (3), either party may elect for compensation to be paid on the basis of extinguishment or partial extinguishment of the right; on payment of compensation on that basis, the right shall to that extent be treated as extinguished or partially extinguished for all purposes.
Consultation issue (P) – Easements and other rights
(1) Where there is to be interference with (and not acquisition of) existing rights, do consultees agree that the position should be clarified in legislation?
(2) If consultees agree with (1), do they consider that the acquiring authority should elect to extinguish or to override and that the status of the interference should be clear from the outset? In the event that rights are to be extinguished, do they agree that those rights should be the subject of notice to treat?
(3) Where rights are simply to be overridden, do consultees agree
(a) that statutory immunity should apply both to erection and to use of any building or other work; and
(b) that either party should be able to elect for extinguishment or partial extinguishment?
6.27 The main relevant provisions of the existing law are found in:
(1) 1965 Act, section 8[47] (notice to treat procedure);
(2) 1973 Act, section 58 (criteria for establishing ‘material detriment’ under section 8);
(3) 1976 Act, Schedule 1 (adapting 1965 Act, section 8 to the acquisition of rights);
(4) Vesting Declarations Act, Schedule 1 (procedure for vesting declarations); and
(5) 1973 Act, sections 53 to 57 (part of an agricultural unit).
6.28 Section 8 of the 1965 Act provides the general rule that:
(1) No person shall be required to sell a part only – (a) of any house, building or manufactory, or (b) of a park or garden belonging to a house, if he is willing and able to sell the whole of the house, building, manufactory, park or garden.
This does not apply if, following counter-notice by the landowner, the Lands Tribunal determines that the part of the house, building or manufactory to be acquired can be taken “without material detriment” to that structure, or that the part of the park or garden can be taken “without seriously affecting the amenity or convenience of the house”. If it so decides, the authority may acquire part only, and the owner will be entitled to compensation for severance.[48]
6.29 The words “house, building or manufactory” have been construed so widely that, in practice, they include all types of buildings, domestic or business.[49] The 1965 Act does not provide any definition of “material detriment”. As interpreted in the cases, material detriment implies that the retained land will be “less useful or less valuable in some significant degree”.[50] The 1973 Act provides that in determining this issue, the Tribunal is to take into account not only the effect of the severance but also “the use to be made of the part proposed to be acquired”, and, where it is acquired for works or use extending to other land, the effects of the whole of the works or use.[51]
6.30 Section 8(2) has separate provision for land “which is not situated in a town or built upon”.[52] If the intersection caused by the acquisition leaves land measuring less than half an acre,[53] which cannot conveniently be “thrown into” other land in the same ownership, the landowner has the option of requiring the acquiring authority to purchase that land.[54] Conversely, section 8(3) contains provision to enable the authority to purchase an area of less than half an acre, to which it otherwise might be required to provide a bridge or other connection under the empowering Act.
6.31 A modified version of the same tests under section 8 applies, where a local authority is seeking, under the 1976 Act, to acquire new rights over land,[55] rather than the land.[56] In that case, the authority may be required to purchase the claimant’s interest in the land itself, if the Tribunal is satisfied that the right cannot be taken without “material detriment” or “serious effect”, as the case may be. In that event the order is “deemed to authorise the purchase of [the claimant’s] interest in the whole of the relevant land including, where the land consists of such a park or garden, the house to which it belongs”.[57]
6.32 Section 8(1) of the 1965 Act is mirrored in the Vesting Declarations procedure.[58] Where a declaration comprises part only of “any house, building or factory, or . . a park or garden belonging to a house”, the landowner may serve notice on the authority requiring it to purchase his interest in the whole.[59] Once that notice has been served, the procedure follows a similar course to that under the 1965 Act. The authority may serve notice either withdrawing the deemed notice to treat as respects the severed land, or extending the effect of the vesting declaration to the whole; or may refer the matter to the Lands Tribunal. The Tribunal is required to take into account not only the effect of severance, but also “the use to be made of the part proposed to be acquired and, in a case where the part is proposed to be acquired for works or other purposes extending to other land, the effect of the whole of the works and the use to be made of the other land”.[60]
6.33 While Schedule 1 to the Vesting Declarations Act specifically disapplies section 8(1) of the 1965 Act,[61] it is silent on section 8(2),(3). That appears to mean that those provisions remain intact, and apply under both the notice to treat and the vesting declaration routes.
6.34 The Vesting Declarations Act scheme differs from the 1965 Act in some respects, for example:
(1) It gives the Tribunal power to consider the extent of the owner’s land that the authority should acquire and to substitute for the whole of the land a smaller area, including the portion which was proposed to be severed;[62]
(2) It provides a normal limit for service of the owner’s notice, of 28 days from the notice of the declaration,[63] and a limit of 3 months within which the authority must respond withdrawing, agreeing or referring the matter to the Tribunal.[64]
6.35 Separate provisions relating to agricultural land were introduced by sections 53 to 57 of the 1973 Act. These apply to acquisitions by notice to treat or vesting declaration.[65] There are corresponding provisions for tenancies from year to year or less, following service of notice of entry.[66]
6.36 Where an acquiring authority serves notice to treat in respect of part of land within an agricultural unit, the recipient[67] may serve a counter-notice[68] on the authority requiring it to purchase the whole of the land on the ground that the other land is not reasonably capable of being farmed, either by itself or in conjunction with other relevant land,[69] as a separate agricultural unit.
6.37 The Lands Tribunal has held that, in deciding this issue, the nature and effect of the authority’s proposed use on the use of the remaining land are relevant, but that a claimant’s financial arrangements (such as the impact of proposed usage on land value and adequacy of security for a mortgage) are not.[70]
6.38 The acquiring authority may accept the counter-notice or, in default, the matter may be referred to the Lands Tribunal for resolution.[71] The Tribunal also has jurisdiction to deal with the terms of surrender by the acquiring authority of an acquired lessee’s interest to a lessor[72] (where the lessee but not the lessor has served a counter-notice).
6.39 A similar procedure applies, under section 55, where notice of entry is served on an occupying tenant with an interest of a year to year or less.[73] The tenant may serve a counter-notice raising the same issue, namely whether the remainder of the holding is “reasonably capable of being farmed . . .as a separate agricultural unit”. If this issue is determined in favour of the tenant, the notice of entry is treated as extending to the whole unit, so far as concerns the tenant.[74] There is special provision for cases where such a counter-notice is successful, but the acquiring authority has not been authorised to acquire the landlord’s interest in the part covered by the counter-notice. If the tenant gives up possession of that land to the authority, the tenancy is terminated, and the authority must give up possession of the land to the landlord.[75]
6.40 Special provisions relate to partial acquisition of rentcharges and unexpired tenancies in the 1965 Act and the Vesting Declarations Act. Rentcharges are dealt with below.[76]
6.41 In the case of unexpired tenancies the provisions in section 19 of the 1965 Act apply to both notice to treat and vesting declarations.[77] If part only of land comprised in a lease “for a term of years unexpired” is required, the rent payable under the lease is apportioned between the subject land and the residue by agreement or (in default) by the Lands Tribunal, on the application of any of the three parties (authority, lessor, lessee).[78] We see no reason to alter this provision.
(1) The statutory terminology, especially in section 8 of the 1965 Act, is archaic and in need of modernisation and clarification;
(2) The test is “entirely subjective, the residue must be less useful or less valuable in some significant degree”;[79]
(3) No regard is paid to the compensation which would otherwise be payable for severance or injurious affection; and
(4) Confusion as to whether an acquiring authority, having withdrawn notice to treat, can then unilaterally serve notice in respect of a smaller area.[80]
6.43 CPPRAG recommended that the statutory language relating to part acquisition should be updated in a modern codification, and that the position of acquiring authorities in respect of their ability to withdraw notice to treat and to substitute notice on a smaller area should be clarified.[81]
6.44 The Policy Statement expresses the Government’s intention:
to improve the provisions which allow for the purchase of the whole of a landholding where that is in the better interests of the owner, even though only a part is actually required, including extending the provisions to include all categories of property.[82]
6.45 Its response to CPPRAG implied, on its face, a more radical approach than proposed by the Advisory Group:[83]
We see no reason for any restriction on the type of landowner able to require an acquiring authority to acquire the whole of his landholding so long as he can demonstrate that taking only a part would have a materially detrimental effect on the value of the remainder.[84]
As with most valuation issues, the final decision has to take account of subjective issues: the issue being to determine whether the purchase of the whole of the claimant’s land is necessary to put him in the same position as he would have been in if there had been no compulsory purchase.[85]
6.48 The recent Policy Response Document contains no further statement of Government policy on this issue.[86]
6.49 We consider that any new legislation should at least reproduce, in substance, the main features of the existing provisions for divided lands. There appear to be no significant reasons of policy for the differences between the two procedures. The same provisions could be applied to both notice to treat and vesting declaration procedures.[87] Generally, we would propose that the new provision should be based on the more modern Vesting Declarations Act, which includes detailed procedures, including time-limits.[88]
6.50 The language can be simplified. For example, the expression “house, building or manufactory” does not reflect the wide interpretation given by the cases.[89] Substantially the same effect would be produced if the procedure were available, where either any building, or any land attached to and used with a building, is acquired in part. In spite of the criticisms made of the “material detriment” test, we are not convinced that it causes serious problems in practice. We think it is difficult to define more precise criteria without limiting unduly the scope of the protection.
6.52 The practical need for the former of these provisions (section 8(2)) has been reduced by the enactment of a comprehensive code for agricultural land in the 1973 Act.[90] As to the latter, (section 8(3)), we doubt whether many modern statutes impose specific requirements for accommodation works, which would cause problems if applied to small parcels of land.[91] Accordingly, we do not propose to reproduce these provisions, but invite comments.
6.53 The provisions of the 1973 Act relating to agricultural land are complex, but they represent a modern scheme, and we are not aware of any strong case for altering it. Subject to what follows, we would provisionally propose that it be left unamended. The provisions for apportionment of rent under unexpired tenancies[92] may also be retained without substantive amendment.
6.54 As has been seen, the Government has made a more radical proposal, to remove any restriction on the type of landowner able to require an acquiring authority to acquire the whole of his landholding; the only criterion would be whether he could “demonstrate that taking only a part would have a materially detrimental effect on the value of the whole.”[93] Although we welcome views, our provisional view is that this would be too wide. There are many cases where it would be an undue burden on the authority to have to acquire land which it does not need, and where any material detriment can be adequately redressed by compensation for injurious affection. Buildings, and land held with buildings, are in a special category because of the direct impact of the taking on the activities of the owner.
6.55 On the other hand, it might be more appropriate to extend the rights, given to owners of interests in agricultural land by the 1973 Act, to other categories of owner/occupier.[94] The criterion would be, not material detriment, but whether the remaining land is “reasonably capable of” continuing to be used for the occupier’s purpose. It might be appropriate to limit the general right to those who have substantial interests, or at least more than a “minor tenancy”.[95] If so, if would be necessary to preserve the special provision for agricultural occupiers with lesser interests.[96] If this approach were adopted, it should be possible to rationalise and simplify the existing provisions of the 1965 Act, the Vesting Declarations Act, and the 1973 Act, into a single provision based on “material detriment”, in respect of buildings and land held with buildings; and “reasonable capability of use” for other categories of land. In the following proposal, the latter suggestion is shown in italics.
(A) Divided property notice
(1) If the land specified in a notice of acquisition comprises part only:
(a) of any building; or
(b) of any land attached to and used with a building;
any person who is able to sell the whole of the land, may by notice (“a divided property notice”) served on the acquiring authority require them to purchase his interest in the whole.
[(1A) A divided property notice may also be served by the owner of any interest in the subject land (greater than a tenancy from year to year) if, as a result of the acquisition, his retained land[98] or any part of it, is no longer reasonably capable of being used for the purpose for which he was using it at the time of the notice of acquisition.][99]
(2) In this proposal “notice of acquisition” means, as the case may be, a notice to treat or a preliminary notice of a vesting declaration; and the “relevant property” means the building or land to which the divided property notice relates.
(3) Except as provided by regulations under this section, a divided property notice shall be served within 28 days of the notice of acquisition.
(4) Where a divided property notice has been served, the authority may, within 3 months of the notice:
(a) serve notice withdrawing the notice to treat (or deemed notice to treat);
(b) serve notice to acquire the whole; or
(c) refer the matter to the Lands Tribunal;
If it fails to act within 3 months, it is deemed to have served a notice under (a).[100]
(5) The Lands Tribunal (on an application, as under (4)(c) above, made in accordance with regulations under this proposal) may determine that:
(a) in the case of a building, the part proposed to be acquired can be taken without material detriment to the building or its use; or
(b) in the case of land attached to a building, the part proposed to be acquired can be taken without seriously affecting the amenity or use of the building;
(c) [in the case of other land, the part proposed to be acquired can be taken without the effect mentioned in (1A)].
(6) In determining any such reference, the Tribunal:
(a) shall take into account not only the effect of the severance but also the use to be made of the part proposed to be acquired and, in a case where the part is proposed to be acquired for works or other purposes extending to other land, the effect of the whole of the works and the use to be made of the other land; and
(b) may determine the area of the relevant property which the acquiring authority ought to be required to take.
(7) If the authority does not so refer the notice to the Tribunal within 3 months, or if, following a reference, the Tribunal determines it against the authority, the notice to treat or (as the case may be) the declaration shall be treated as having effect as though the whole of the relevant property (or the part determined under (6)(b)) were included.
(B) Agricultural land
The provisions of 1973 Act ss 53-57[101] will continue to apply [so far as not superseded by (1A)]].
(C) Unexpired tenancies
1965 Act, section 19 (apportionment of rent) will continue to apply.[102]
6.57 When an acquiring authority compulsorily purchase land, that land may be subject to a variety of encumbrances. A mortgagee (lender) has an interest in land upon which his loan is secured and is entitled to a notice to treat under section 5 of the 1965 Act.[103] However, failure to serve a notice on the mortgagee means no more than that his interest cannot be prejudiced by exercise of the compulsory powers.[104]
6.58 Section 14 of the 1965 Act[105] provides that an acquiring authority may purchase or redeem a mortgagee’s interest either:
(1) immediately, by paying the mortgagee the principal (the outstanding capital sum of the loan) and interest due on the mortgage plus any costs and charges incurred, together with 6 months’ additional interest; or
(2) by giving 6 months’ notice to the mortgagee that the authority will pay to the mortgagee all the principal and interest due at the end of the notice period, plus any costs and expenses incurred.
6.59 In the event that the mortgagee fails to release his interest in the mortgage or fails to make good title, the acquiring authority may pay the composite sum (principal, interest, costs) into court and then execute a deed poll transferring the mortgagee’s interest to the authority and authorising the lawful taking of possession.[106]
6.60 The mortgagor (borrower) has no right to compel the authority to exercise this power, nor does the Lands Tribunal have jurisdiction to determine the date when an acquiring authority should have exercised their power. This may leave the mortgagor in a difficult position if his own interest has been acquired, but compensation has not yet been paid to enable him to pay off the mortgage. Substantial arrears may accrue for which the claimant, and not the authority, is liable. The power in section 14 is not a duty to redeem, and it exists for the benefit of the authority and not for the mortgagor.[107] The mortgagor’s only remedy in such a case is to expedite the compensation procedure:
A person whose property is being compulsorily purchased can do a number of things to hurry along the process of acquisition. If he cannot agree a price, he can refer the dispute to the Lands Tribunal… If he needs money to pay off the mortgage he can, after the authority have taken possession, ask for compensation on account.[108]
6.61 Section 15 deals with the situation where the mortgage debt exceeds the land value. It provides that the value of the compensation shall be assessed by tripartite agreement (mortgagor, mortgagee and acquiring authority) and, failing that, the matter will be determined by the Lands Tribunal. The Tribunal’s jurisdiction is limited to determination of valuation. As with the section 14 procedure, if the mortgagee fails to transfer his interest or to make good title the authority can make payment into court and execute a deed poll to vest the interest in itself.[109]
6.62 Compensation is not payable if the value of the mortgaged land does not exceed nil, e.g. where the remediation costs of contaminated land, or the costs of demolition and clearance of derelict buildings (either of which would fall to the authority) exceeds its present value.[110]
6.64 Acquisition of part only of mortgage land is governed by section 16 of the 1965 Act. This makes provision similar to that in section 15. Where the part to be taken has less value than the mortgage on the whole, and the mortgagee is unwilling to release that part, then the value of the land to be taken (and the compensation for severance) must be agreed between the mortgagee, the mortgagor and the authority, or determined by the Tribunal;[111] and paid to the mortgagee, upon which he must release his interest to the authority.[112] In default of transferring the compensatable interest or making good title, the authority can make payment into court and execute a deed poll.[113] The mortgagee retains under this provision his right to sue the mortgagor on his original covenant for repayment of any balance due, although that right is no longer secured over the land. [114]
6.65 If a mortgage is paid off under these arrangements before the contractual date in the mortgage deed, the mortgagee is entitled to be compensated both for the expenses involved in reinvesting the paid-off sum (taxed if necessary[115]) and for any loss resulting from achieving a lower rate of interest on reinvestment than was provided for under the mortgage.[116]
6.66 All other forms of “payment or incumbrance” charged on land which is to be acquired compulsorily are grouped together as “rentcharges” and are governed by section 18 of the 1965 Act.[117] The acquiring authority may require the person entitled to benefit of the rentcharge to execute a release and to make good title. If the owner fails to do so, the authority may make payment of compensation (agreed or determined by the Lands Tribunal[118]) into court and execute a deed poll extinguishing the charge.[119]
6.67 Where only part of the land affected by a rentcharge is required by an authority, the rentcharge will be apportioned between authority and owner and rentcharge beneficiary by agreement or, in default, by the Tribunal. If the remaining (untaken) part of the land is still adequate security for the whole rentcharge, the person entitled to the charge may (with the landowner’s consent) release the acquired part of land from the effects of the charge, and attach the whole charge to the remaining parcel of land.[120] Under the vesting declaration arrangements, similar procedure applies, so that the rentcharge can be apportioned and released as respects the part to be acquired.[121]
6.68 Section 18 is applied with modifications to acquisitions under a general vesting declaration.[122]
6.69 The Rentcharges Act 1977 abolished rentcharges[123] as defined in that Act,[124] by making them redeemable on application to the Secretary of State for a “redemption certificate”.[125] However, the provisions of section 18 are still relevant for cases not covered by the 1977 Act, notably in relation to “estate rent charges” which are not redeemable.[126]
6.70 We are not aware that these provisions have given rise to difficulty in practice. The problems of delay for the mortgagor, highlighted by the Shewu case, seem to have been exceptional, due to the very protracted nature of the procedure in that case, and the absence of the owner abroad.[127] The proposals in the Policy Statement for imposing tighter time-limits on the exercise of compulsory powers,[128] and the proposed amendments to the advance payment procedure[129] should help mitigate such problems.[130]
6.72 Where a public right of way exists over the land proposed to be acquired by compulsory purchase order, the acquiring authority may seek an “acquisition extinguishment order”, so as to extinguish the right of way.[131] It seems that this procedure is available, whichever method of implementation is adopted.
6.73 The power to make such an order is subject to the proviso that the acquiring authority be satisfied that a “suitable alternative right of way has been or will be provided, or that the provision thereof is not required”.[132] Such orders are subject to confirmation by the Secretary of State,[133] and he must consider whether he is satisfied that a suitable alternative right of way has been or will be provided or whether an alternative is required or not.[134]
6.74 The acquisition extinguishment order cannot be made earlier than:
(a) confirmation of the [compulsory purchase] order, or if the Secretary of State is the acquiring authority, the making of the order;
(b) if in the exercise of the power conferred by section 11(1) of the Compulsory Purchase Act 1965, or by agreement, the acquiring authority takes possession of the land, the date on which the authority takes possession of the land;
(c) if the acquiring authority does not take possession of the land in exercise of any such power, the date on which the acquisition of the land is completed.[135]
6.76 The provisions also provide for protection of the apparatus of statutory undertakers.[136] The procedures for the making of the extinguishment order are prescribed in the Highways Act 1980, Schedule 6.[137] It provides for notices to be served and published,[138] and for objections.[139]
6.77 We have no information as to how often this procedure is used in practice. There appears to be considerable overlap with powers of highway authorities and planning authorities, under the Highways Act 1980 and the 1990 Act, respectively, for stopping up rights of way.[140] However, it seems useful to have a specific power directly relate to compulsory purchase. Accordingly, we provisionally propose that it should be retained without amendment.
Can consultees comment on how frequently the Acquisition Act procedure is used in practice, and whether it gives rise to any practical difficulty?
[1]This would remove the uncertainty created by the distinction drawn in some cases between the erection of the works and their use: see Thames Water Utilities v Oxford City Council [1999] 1 EGLR 167 (see para 6.21 below).
[2]Part V, paras 5.20-5.22 above.
[3]Part V, paras 5.47-5.50 above.
[4]It is derived from 1845 Act, s 121. It does not apply to a person occupying under a mere licence: cf Frank Warr & Co v LCC [1904] 1 KB 713.
[5]A practice sanctioned by Newham LBC v Benjamin [1968] 1 WLR 694, 701, CA.
[6]See Newham LBC v Benjamin,above, for a modern explanation of the procedure.
[7]1973 Act, ss 37-8; see Compensation report Part VIII, para 8.81.
[8]1965 Act, s 20(4). There must be a specific demand, even if notice to treat has in fact been served (see the Newham case, above).
[9]1965 Act, s 20(1), covering the first three heads.
[10]Ibid, s 20(2).
[11]1965 Act, s 20(6), applying Landlord and Tenant Act 1954, s 39.
[12]1973 Act, ss 47- 48.
[13]Defined as “a tenancy from year to year or any
lesser interest”: Vesting Declarations Act,
s 2(1).
[14]In summary, a tenancy having at the vesting date such period (longer than a year) as specified in the declaration: Vesting Declarations Act, s 2(2).
[15]Nor is there a deemed notice to treat: Vesting Declarations Act, s 7(1)(ii) (see Part V, para 5.49 above).
[16]Part V, para 5.20-5.22 above.
[17]Newham LBC v Benjamin [1968] 1 WLR 694 (para 6.3, n 5, 6above)
[18]See note 17 and para 6.3 above.
[19]Part III, para 3.12 above.
[20]See Butterworths, para B-447.
[21]See Compensation Report Part IX, and Part III, para 3.17 above. For a modern discussion of the case law, see Re Elm Avenue, New Milton [1984] 1 WLR 1398. The same rules apply whether the servient tenement is acquired compulsorily, or by agreement: ibid.
[22]There is a suggestion to the contrary in Marten v Flight Refuelling Ltd [1962] Ch 115, 141 (see below), where Wilberforce J mentioned Clarke v School Board for London (1874) LR 9 Ch 120 as establishing “that by procedure in the Lands Clauses Consolidation Act 1845, an easement can be got rid of”. It is a possible interpretation of the judgment of Mellish LJ in that case (p 126) that such rights may be “acquired” by the authority, if necessary; however, the judgment of the Lord Chancellor proceeds on the basis that the acquisition procedures are inapplicable to them (p 124).
[23]Per Luxmoore J, Re Simeon and Isle of Wight RDC [1937] Ch 525, 535 See also Manchester, Sheffield and Lincs Ry Co v Andersen [1898] 2 Ch 394, 404, per Chitty LJ: “The covenant… is not gone; but the remedy by action has been taken away.”
[24]The position is summarised in Butterworths, para B- 462-3: “in respect of registered land, overriding interests and minor interests noted on the register will continue to bind the land, unless specifically acquired or extinguished. Similarly, in respect of unregistered land, legal interests in the land under the LPA 1925, s 1(2) registered as land charges under the Land Charges Act 1972 and other equitable interests which are not registrable as land charges and of which the acquiring authority has notice, will continue to bind the land, unless specifically acquired or extinguished”. The effect of the Land Registration Act 2002, when it comes into force, will be to limit the circumstances in which interests can be overridden: see Law Com No 271, Land Registration for the Twenty-First Century, Part VIII.
[25][1962] Ch 115 (Wilberforce, J).
[26]Ibid, p 145 (reference was made to Hawley v Steele (1877) 6 Ch D 521 at 528).
[27]Ibid, p 148.
[28]Ibid, p149.
[29]Barry Denyer-Green, Compulsory Purchase and Compensation (6th Ed, 2000), p 115.
[30]See Butterworths, para B-465.
[31]Part V, para 5.50above.
[32]Vesting Declarations Act, s 8(1).
[33]This restricted view is reinforced by, ibid, s 8(2), which provides that the reference to a “deed poll” is to “any deed poll whether for vesting land or any interest in land in the acquiring authority, or for extinguishing the whole or any part of any rent-service, rentcharge, chief or other rent, or other payment or incumbrance.” The effect of this provision is somewhat obscure, but it seems to be designed to ensure that the vesting declaration procedure extends to all the categories of interest referred to in Schedule 1 to the 1965 Act (which do not include easements and other such rights).
[34]This seems to be the assumption of the editors of Butterworths (see para D 350-60, n 6).
[35]Housing Act 1985, s 295(1).
[36]Ibid, s 295(3). The 1961 Act does not make specific provision for compensation for extinguishment of rights, but the intention appears to be that compensation will, in accordance with the ordinary rules for injurious affection, be based on diminution in the value of the dominant tenement (see Compensation Report, Part VIII, paras 8.5, 8.6).
[37]The rights to which it applies are extensively defined by s 237(2): “ any easement, liberty, privilege, right or advantage annexed to land and adversely affecting other land, including any natural right to support…” (but excluding rights of statutory undertakers).
[38]1990 Act, s 237(1). Compensation is assessed in accordance with the rules for injurious affection: s 237(4).
[39]Per Dyson J, R v City of London Corporation, ex p. Mystery of the Barbers of London [1996] 2 EGLR 128. In this case the court decided that section 237 applied so as to authorise both an original development and subsequent redevelopment if done for “planning purposes”.
[40][1999] 1 EGLR 167, ChD (Judge Rich, QC).
[41]Arguably, this narrow view was at odds with the “broad approach” adopted in the Marten case (see para 6.15 above), which was apparently not referred to in the Thames Water case.
[42]See Clark v School Board for London (1874) LR 9 Ch 120, 124.
[43]See Part III, paras 3.23ff above.
[44]Defined as in the 1990 Act, s 237(2) (see n 37 above).
[45]Cf Housing Act 1985, s 295(1). There would need to be exceptions for special categories, such as right of statutory undertakers.
[46]Cf 1990 Act, s 237(1).
[47]Re-enacting 1845 Act, ss 92, 94.
[48] 1965 Act, s 8(1). Neither the 1845 Act, s 92 nor the 1965 Act, s 8 provided any rules for the manner and timing of service of counter-notices to take the whole. It was held that verbal notice could be sufficient: Binney v Hammersmith Rly (1863) 8 LT 161; Spackman v GW Rly (1855) 1 Jur (NS) 790; Richards v Swansea Improvement Co (1878) 9 ChD 425. The authority could respond to the counter notice, by withdrawing the notice to treat (contrary to the normal rule: see Part VIII, para 8.3 below), but this did not preclude the service of a new notice: King v Wycombe Rly Co (1860) 28 Beav 104; Ashton Vale Iron Co Ltd v Bristol Corporation [1901] 1 Ch 591, CA. As to timing, it was held that the counter-notice must be served before entry by the authority on the part: Glasshouse Properties v Department of Transport (1994) 66 P & CR 285. The effect of counter-notice is that (in default of agreement or of withdrawal of the notice to treat for part) the matter goes to the Lands Tribunal for determination. If the authority enters the part before determination, it is then at risk of having to take the whole without the option of withdrawal: see Butterworths,vol 1, para D[388].
[49]See Ravenseft Properties v Hillingdon London Borough Council (1968) 20 P & CR 483, LT andcases noted in Butterworths, para D385.
[50]Ravenseft Properties (above).
[51]1973 Act, s 58(1). The words necessitate a “whole scheme approach” so that “all damage or disbenefit to the claimant” in the use of the property will be considered including, e.g. impact on amenity caused by traffic using an adjoining highway: Blyth v Humberside County Council (1997) 73 P & CR 213, LT.
[52]Agricultural land is dealt with separately: see paras 6.35ff below.
[53]On one side or both sides of the works.
[54]Section 8(2) of the 1965 Act. The term “thrown into” is used in the proviso, which states: “Provided that this subsection shall not apply if the owner has other land adjoining the land so left into which it can be thrown so as to be conveniently occupied with it, and in that case the acquiring authority shall, if so required by the owner, at their own expense throw the piece of land so left into the adjoining land by removing the fences and levelling the sites thereof, and by soiling it in a satisfactory and workmanlike manner.”
[55]Ie “rights which are not in existence when the order specifying them is made”: 1976 Act, s 13(1).
[56]Ibid, Sched 1, para 7, substituting a modified s 8 in the 1965 Act.
[57]1965 Act, section 8(1) as substituted. 1973 Act, s 58(1) (see para 6.29 above) is also modified: Sched 1, para 7.
[58]Vesting Declarations Act, s 12, Sched 1. These provisions are derived from Land Commission Act 1967, Sched 3, paras 3ff, as incorporated by the Town and Country Planning Act 1968, Sched 3, para 9.
[59]This is referred to as a “notice of objection to severance”: Vesting Declarations Act, Sched 1 para. 1
[60]Ibid, Sched 1, para 8(2), reflecting the words used in section 58 of the 1973 Act (see para 6.29 above).
[61]Ibid, Sched 1, para 2(3).
[62]Ibid, Sched 1, para 9.
[63] Ibid,Sched 1, para 2. There is provision for extension of time if notice of the declaration was not received: para 10.
[64] Ibid, Sched 1, para 4. If they fail to respond within three months, they are treated as having withdrawn from the purchase: para 5.
[65]1973 Act, s 53(1),(5).
[66]1973 Act, s 55; para 6.39 below.
[67]Being a person who has an interest greater than ‘tenant for a year or from year to year’ (whether or not in occupation): 1973 Act, s 53(1).
[68]Counter-notice must be served within 2 months of the date of service of the notice to treat: s 3(1).
[69]“Other relevant land” in this context includes other land in the same agricultural unit (occupied in whatever interest), and any other agricultural unit in which he has an interest greater than from year to year: 1973 Act, s 53(3).
[70]Johnson v. North Yorkshire County Council (1992) 65 P & CR 65.
[71]1973 Act, s 54(1). Once the counter-notice is accepted or declared valid, the authority is then deemed to have served notice to treat in respect of the additional land: section 54(2)
[72]1973 Act, s 54(6).
[73]Such a tenant is not entitled to notice to treat: see Part V, para 5.20 above.
[74]1973 Act, s 56(2).
[75]1973 Act, s 56(3). None of the former tenant’s pre-existing rights against (or liabilities to) the landlord or the acquiring authority are extinguished (s 56(3)(c); any enhancement in the value of retained land caused by the landlord taking possession will be discounted from compensation in respect of his interest in the remainder of the holding (s 56(3)(e).
[76]See paras 6.66ff below.
[77] Applied by Vesting Declarations Act, Sched 1, para 12 (under which the “time of vesting” is substituted for the time of apportionment under the 1965 Act).
[78] After apportionment the lessee becomes liable only for the rent apportioned for the remaining part of the land, and the lessor retains his original rights and remedies for that part: 1965 Act, ss 19(3), (4).
[79]Applying the language of the Ravenseft Property case(para 6.29 above).
[80]CPPRAG, para 133.
[81]CPPRAG, para 135.
[82]Policy Statement, para. 4.13
[83]CPPRAG had recommended simply that “as part of the codification of the existing law, the language relating to the acquisition of part of a person’s land should be reviewed to bring it into line with modern parlance”: para 135.
[84]Policy Statement, App, para 3.42. We understand from our discussions with the Department that the word “value” in this context was intended as shorthand for the existing test, as explained in the Ravenseft case: see para 6.29above.
[85] Policy Statement, App, para 3.43.
[86] The Policy Response Document is silent on the issue.
[87] As a consequential matter, the version applied to acquisition of rights, in the 1976 Act, s 13, Sched 1, para 7 (see para 6.31 above), will need to be adapted.
[88]The 1965 Act contains very little detail as to procedure; see paras 6.28-6.30 above. The Vesting Declarations Act is a consolidation of provisions mostly derived from the Town and Country Planning Act 1968, which introduced this form of procedure.
[89]See para 6.29 above.
[90]See para 6.35ff above.
[91]The Policy Response Document makes clear that Government considers provision of accommodation works to be a matter better left to the discretion of acquiring authorities: para 17(iv).
[92]See para 6.39 above.
[93]See para 6.45 above.
[94]This might be seen as a logical extension of the policy decision already made to extend the right to disturbance payments under the 1973 Act (currently available to limited categories, including agricultural occupiers)to all categories of occupier: see Policy Statement App para 3.52 (Compensation Report Part IV, paras 4.49-4.68 and Proposal 4).
[95]i.e. more than a tenancy from year to year; cf Vesting Declarations Act, s 2(1) (para 6.6 above).
[96]1973 Act, s 55 (para 6.39 above).
[97]This procedure will apply under both notice to treat and vesting declaration procedures.
[98]“Retained land” would be defined as in relation to the rules for compensation for injurious affection: see Compensation Report Part V, para 5.35, Part XI, para11.2 (A) General Definitions.
[99]See para 6.55 above.
[100]See Vesting Declarations Act, Sched 1, para 4, on which this part of the proposal is based.
[101]Where the test is that the separated land is “not reasonably capable of being farmed, either by itself or in conjunction with other relevant land, as a separate agricultural unit”.
[102]See para 6.53 above.
[103]See Martin v London, Chatham etc Rly (1876) 1 Ch App 501.
[104]Shewu v Hackney London Borough Council [1999] 3 EGLR 1 CA, at p 4H. Failure to serve a notice to treat does not apparently detract from the authority’s right to acquire the mortgagee’s interest under the following provisions.
[105]Derived from ss 108, 109 of the 1845 Act.
[106]Section 14(4)-(6) of the 1965 Act.
[107]See Shewu v Hackney London Borough Council [1999] 3 EGLR 1, CA. In that case, the compulsory purchase order had been confirmed in 1985; notice to treat was served on the owner, but not the mortgagee, in 1987; notice of entry was served in 1994, but entry was not taken until 1996. In the meantime, as the owner alleged, he was unable to sell the property so as to redeem the mortgage. It was held that he had no redress against the authority, either by way of increased compensation or damages.
[108]Ibid, per Schiemann, LJ at p 5E. “Compensation on account” appears to be intended as a reference to the provision for advance payment under 1973 Act s 52 (see Compensation Report, Part VIII, paras 8.21ff) However, it is to be noted that under the present law, the amount of the advance payment is reduced by the amount needed by the authority to redeem the mortgage: ibid s 52(6). We propose, in line with the Policy Statement, to amend this provision to enable the advance payment to be made to the mortgagee: Compensation Report, Part VIII, paras 8.25-6.
[109]Section 15(3)-(5).
[110]McNichol v Glasgow Corporation (1974) 14 RVR 587.
[111]1965 Act, s 16(1).
[112]1965 Act, s 16(2)-(3).
[113]Ibid, s 16(5).
[114]Ibid, s 16(6).
[115]See 1965 Act, s 23(3)-(5). These subsections provide for the taxation of costs of conveyances etc., under s 23(1)-(2) by a Master of the Supreme Court on an order of the court obtained by either parties, in the absence of agreement.
[116]Ibid, s 17(1), (2).
[117]“Rentcharge” is defined as “any other payment or incumbrance charged on the land not provided for in the foregoing provisions of this Act”: ibid, s 18(6).
[118]Ibid, s 18(1).
[119]Ibid, s 18(3).
[120]Ibid, s 18(2).
[121] Vesting Declarations Act, Sched 1, para 11.
[122]Vesting Declarations Act, Sched 1, Part II.
[123]Rentcharges Act 1977, s 2.
[124]“Any annual or periodic sum charged on or issuing out of land, except: (a) rent reserved by a lease or tenancy, or (b) any sum payable by way of interest”: ibid, s 1.
[125]Ibid, s 8.
[126]Ibid, s 2(3)(c). An “estate rentcharge” is one created for the purpose of making covenants enforceable, or meeting the cost of performance of covenants etc: ibid, s 2(4).
[127]See para 6.60, n 107 above.
[128]Since modified in the ODPM Policy Response Document (July 2002) para 12(iii).
[129]See n 108 above.
[130]We have also proposed giving the County Court power to enforce the authority’s duty to make an advance payment: see Compensation Report, Part VIII, paras 8.28-8.29.
[131]Acquisition Act, s 32(1)(a). The procedure is also available where land is acquired by agreement, in circumstances where it could be acquired compulsorily: s 32(1)(b).
[132]Acquisition Act, s 32(2).
[133]Ibid, s 32(3)(a).
[134]Ibid, s 32(3)(b).
[135]Ibid, s 32(4).
[136]Ibid, s 32(6) and (6A).
[137]Applied by virtue of Acquisition Act, s 32(2).
[138]Highways Act 1980, Sched 6, para 1.
[139]Ibid, s 2.
[140]E.g. Highways Act 1980, ss 116-120 (stopping up and diversion of highways); ss 124-125 (stopping up private means of access); 1990 Act, ss 209-217.