Part IV
Authorisation of compulsory purchase
4.2 In this Part we examine three linked topics:
(1) Ministerial and non-Ministerial orders;
(2) Making and confirming; and
(3) Legal challenge.
4.3 In relation to procedure, the Acquisition Act distinguishes between compulsory purchase orders made by Ministers, and those made by other agencies. In each case there is a two stage procedure, involving initial publication, followed by consideration of objections by a Minister (if necessary, after an inquiry). However, Ministerial orders are first “prepared in draft” and then “made” after the objection stage;[1] non-Ministerial orders are made by the acquiring authority and then “confirmed” by a “confirming authority”.[2]
4.4 There seems little purpose in this dichotomy, which results in needless duplication in the Act[3] and the rules.[4] There seems no reason why the Minister should not be treated as the confirming authority in relation to an order made by his own Department. It would seem tidier and simpler for the same procedure to be applied to both.[5] The importance given, under the current Government proposals, to the date of the first notice of the making of the order (“the first notice date”) underlines the desirability, in the interests of clarity, of using the same terminology for all types of orders.
Does the distinction drawn in the Acquisition Act between the procedures, respectively, for ministerial and non-ministerial orders serve any practical purpose?
4.6 The main features of the procedure are:
(1) Authorisation of compulsory purchase is conferred by a compulsory purchase order;[6]
(2) The form of the order is prescribed by regulations; among other requirements, it must describe by reference to a map the land to which it applies and the purpose for which the land is required;[7]
(3) Notice of the making of the order:
(a) Notices must be in prescribed form, stating the effect of the order, and its purpose, and specifying the time within which, and the manner in which objections can be made;[8]
(b) Notices must be:
(i) Published in local newspapers;[9] and
(ii) Served[10] on “owners and occupiers”;[11] and
(c) The date on which the notice is first published is to be defined as “the first notice date”;[12]
(4) Making and consideration of objections:[13]
(a) All those served with, or entitled to service of, notice of making of the order have a right to object within the time specified by the notice; those who so object are referred to as “statutory objectors”;[14]
(b) Any other person may make an objection or representations, within the time specified in the notice, but without acquiring the status of statutory objector;
(c) The confirming authority may:
(i) require any objector to state in writing the grounds of objection; and
(ii) may disregard any objection if satisfied that it relates exclusively to issues of compensation;[15]
(d) If there are no objections by statutory objectors, or they are all withdrawn, the order may be confirmed (following consideration of any other objections or representations) without any hearing or public inquiry;[16]
(e) If there are outstanding objections by statutory objectors, the confirming authority must arrange a public inquiry or hearing to consider those objections, and any other objections which it appears “expedient” to consider on the same occasion.[17] Procedure at inquiries or hearings is governed by inquiries procedure rules;[18]
(f) Following consideration of all objections and representations, and the report of the inquiry or hearing, the confirming authority may confirm the order; and
(g) The order may be confirmed (under (d) or (f)) with or without modifications, save that the area of the subject land may not be increased without the consent of all “persons interested”;[19] and
(5) Post confirmation procedure:
(a) Notices of confirmation of the order, in prescribed form,[20] must be published and served in the same way as notices of making of the order (under (3) above);[21] and
(b) Subject to the power of the court to suspend operation of an order pending resolution of a legal challenge (see below), an order will become operative on the date when notice of confirmation is first published (“the operative date”).[22]
4.7 As noted in the previous Part, the Government proposes to extend the right to notice of the making of the order, and “statutory objector status”[23] to all those with any form of interest or right to occupy, including owners of rights:
… the current definition of “statutory objector” excludes some of the categories of person who might have a direct interest in the land being acquired and who could therefore be seen as being deprived of a right of objection to the disruption of their enjoyment of the property. To remedy this, we are proposing that the new legislation should grant statutory objector status to all persons who have any private interest in any of the land included in the relevant compulsory purchase order, or have (apart from the order) a right to occupy any of that land, or are entitled to any right restrictive of the use of any of that land.[24] (emphasis added)
4.8 We agree. We further propose that the status of “statutory objector”should be defined in the statute, rather than left (as now) to the inquiries procedure rules.[25]
Some concern has been expressed by respondents that it would be unreasonable to expect an acquiring authority to track-down and notify all persons who may have any interest in the land. However, that was never our intention. As we said in the consultation paper, we consider that it should be sufficient to supplement the current newspaper advertising arrangements with a requirement to post site notices.[27]
4.11 The date of the notice of the making of the order has special significance under the Government’s proposals, since it is the trigger for the right to compensation for disturbance, and for compensation if the order is subsequently abandoned. In the Compensation Report we have defined this as “the first notice date”. [28] We have made proposals for amended rules for service in the previous Part.[29]
…there will need to be safeguards… the legislation introducing the power should also require the relevant acquiring authority to notify the Secretary of State of their intention to confirm an uncontested order, certifying that they have issued all the necessary notices and carried out the procedures properly. Such notices will need to include one announcing their intention to confirm the order and setting a time limit within which any aggrieved person could make representations to the Secretary of State, - who would then have a statutorily defined period of time in which to decide whether it was appropriate for him to call the order in for his own confirmation. [30]
We have concluded that this might best be achieved by giving the confirming authority the discretion to transfer the right to confirm (without modification) any particular compulsory purchase order to which the confirming authority has not received any statutory or non-statutory objections during the statutory objection period. The decision would then be made by the acquiring authority and would not be a delegation to make the decision on behalf of the confirming authority.[31]
Where a compulsory purchase order authorising the acquisition of any land under section 226 is submitted to the Secretary of State in accordance with Part II of the Acquisition of Land Act 1981, then if the Secretary of State-
(a) is satisfied that the order ought to be confirmed so far as it relates to part of the land comprised in it; but
(b) he has not for the time being determined whether it ought to be confirmed so far as it relates to any other such land,
he may confirm the order so far as it relates to the land mentioned in paragraph (a), and give directions postponing consideration of the order, so far as it relates to any other land specified in the directions, until such time as may be so specified.
It is proposed that a similar provision should apply generally to confirmation of compulsory purchase orders.[32]
4.15 We are not aware of any major problems in the operation of the present procedures, other than those addressed in the Government’s own proposals. Accordingly, apart from the proposed amendment in relation to the definition of “statutory objector” (see above)[33], we make no further specific proposals of our own, but invite comments on the following issue.
4.16 The Acquisition Act, like a number of other statutes in the planning field, contains a special procedure, subject to a strict 6 week time limit, for challenging orders in Court.[34] No other form of legal challenge is permitted, and after the expiry of the time limit the order becomes immune from challenge.[35] The grounds for challenge, as stated in the Act, are that the authorisation “was not empowered to be granted” or that the applicant has been “substantially prejudiced” by failure to comply with “relevant requirements”.[36] In practice, the grounds are not treated as materially different from those applying in judicial review,[37] and they may now include grounds based on the Human Rights Act 1998.[38]
4.17 Although there have been criticisms of this form of procedure, there are no immediate proposals to change it;[39] and there are particular advantages in providing a clear termination date for any possibility of challenge. We do not, therefore, propose any fundamental change to the statutory procedure. There are, however, certain points of substance which could usefully be addressed.
4.18 The procedure is available to “any person aggrieved” by the order. This test for standing, used in many different statutory appeal contexts, originally required an applicant’s legal rights to be directly affected[40] and was derived from the restrictive approach to standing in cases of certiorari and prohibition.[41] However, this test has gradually been given a wider interpretation by the courts.[42]
4.19 Since the introduction of the “sufficient interest” test for standing for judicial review in 1981,[43] which redefined the general approach to standing, the ‘‘person aggrieved’’ test has received a wider interpretation by the courts.[44] In practice, the courts are recognising that the statutory procedures for “persons aggrieved” are “doing little more than giving a statutory right to judicial review”.[45]
4.20 However, ‘person aggrieved’ remains the test for standing in many different statutory appeals including those under planning and housing provisions.[46] Although it may seem appropriate to adopt a “sufficient interest” test in a modern statute, a global approach would be needed to adjust the various statutory provisions which retain the ‘person aggrieved’ test. Whilst a single test would be helpful in the context of judicial review and statutory appeals as a whole, it would be difficult to justify replacing the ‘person aggrieved’ test in the context of compulsory purchase alone.
4.21 The special procedure applies where it is sought to question “the validity of a compulsory purchase order”. No other form of legal challenge of the order is permitted “either before or after it has been confirmed, made or given”.[47] Thus, the procedure applies not merely to a challenge to confirmation of the order, but also at earlier stages following making of the order by the acquiring authority. Conversely, it does not apply to a decision of the confirming authority to refuse confirmation.[48] Where the statutory procedure is not available, the remedy is by way of judicial review, but the boundaries may not always be clear.[49]
4.22 In principle, it would seem better to confine the statutory procedure for challenge (and immunity from challenge in other proceedings) to decisions of the confirming authority to grant or refuse confirmation of the order.[50] A rigid time limit is appropriate at that stage, at least in relation to confirmation. That approach would also accord with the position under, for example, the 1990 Act, where the corresponding procedure applies to decisions by the Secretary of State on appeal, but not to decisions of planning authorities.[51] Furthermore, the statutory procedure is particularly suitable to decisions which are the subject of a fully reasoned decision letter, as are those at the confirmation stage. Challenges at earlier stages are more likely to depend on other forms of evidence for which judicial review provides more flexible procedures. In practice, as a matter of discretion, the court would be unlikely to intervene before confirmation, other than in exceptional cases, where for example it is alleged that the inquiry is proceeding on a false basis. [52]
4.23 On such an application, the court may
(1) by interim order suspend, until final determination, the operation of the order or any provision in it;[53] and
(2) if satisfied that the grounds of challenge are made out, quash the order or any part of it, either generally, or so far as it affects any property of the applicant.[54]
(1) The statutory procedure for challenging the validity of an order (and the statutory immunity from challenge in other proceedings) should apply to the decision of the confirming authority to confirm or refuse to confirm the order, and not to earlier stages (which would be subject to judicial review).
(2) The court should have power to quash simply the decision of the confirming authority, or make such order as is appropriate.
[1]Acquisition Act, Sched 1, paras 1(2), 4(1).
[2]Ibid, ss 11, 13.
[3]The only difference in the two procedures seems to be that Sched 1 (in relation to ministerial orders) includes provision, in highway acquisitions, for a joint consideration by the highways minister and the planning minister: Sched 1, para 4(2)-(6). This could be dealt with by a specific provision without need for wholesale duplication of the procedures.
[4]The respective procedures are set out in Part I of, and Sched 1 to, the Acquisition Act. There are also separate sets of inquiries procedure rules (Compulsory Purchase by Non-Ministerial Acquiring Authorities (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1990, SI 1990 No 512; Compulsory Purchase by Ministers (Inquiries Procedure) 1994, SI 1994 No 3264).
[5]See e.g. Part VIII below.
[6]Acquisition Act, s 2(1).
[7]The standard prescribed form is Form 1 in the Schedule to Compulsory Purchase of Land Regulations 1994 SI 1994 No 2154 (as amended by SI 1996 No 1008) It includes a requirement for the “purpose” to be stated. The note (e) to the form reads: “Describe the purpose in precise terms. Where practicable the words of the relevant Act may be used, but where those words are in general terms covering a range of purposes, the particular purpose for which the land is required should be stated.”
[8]Acquisition Act, ss 11(2), 12(1).
[9] Acquisition Act, s 11(1).
[10]The requirements for “service” will be as under Proposal 1 above.
[11] Cf Acquisition Act, s 12(1), which requires service on “every owner, lessee and occupier (except for tenants for a month or any period less than a month)”.
[12]See Part II, para 2.9(1), n 11 and Part VIII, para 8.23below; see also Compensation Report, Part III, para 3.8 and Part IV, para 4.65.
[13] Acquisition Act, s 13(1) provides for objections to be made “by any such owner, lessee or occupier as is mentioned in section 12.”
[14]See Part II, para 2.9(2) and Part III, para 3.23 above.
[15]Acquisition Act, s 13(4).
[16] Acquisition Act, s 13(1).
[17]Acquisition Act, s 13(2), (3). The Government proposes that provision will be made for consideration of written representations where parties agree: Policy Statement, para 3.7 and App, para 2.15; Policy Response Document, para 8(ii). (The DTLR is of the view that the preferences of statutory objectors should prevail over those of non-statutory objectors where the latter are the only party seeking inquiry: Policy Statement, App, para 2.15).
[18]The current rules are made under the Tribunals and Inquiries Act 1992: see e.g. Compulsory Purchase by Non-Ministerial Acquiring Authorities (Inquiries Procedure) Rules 1990 SI 1990 No 512. There are separate (but practically identical) rules for Ministerial acquisitions in SI 1994 No 3264. They could usefully be amalgamated. The Government proposes to introduce “unified inquiry rules with clear deadlines for preparatory procedures”: Policy Response Document, para 9.
[19]Acquisition Act, s 14. The term “persons interested” is not defined.
[20]The Policy Statement proposed that the notice of confirmation should include details of the proposed right to serve “reverse notice to treat”, and of the time limits for taking possession: Policy Statement, App, para 2.24. The proposal for “reverse notice to treat” has since been abandoned (see Part V, para 5.12 below and Policy Response Document, para 12(iii)).
[21]Acquisition Act, s 15,
[22]Acquisition Act, s 26. Under s 26(1), this does not apply to orders subject to special Parliamentary procedure, for which specific provisions apply under the Statutory Orders (Special Procedure) Act 1945. These special procedures are not within the scope of this project: see Part I, paras 1.21-1.22 above.
[23]See Part II, para 2.9(2) above.
[24]Policy Statement, App, para 2.12.
[25]See Part III, para 3.23 above.
[26]See Part III, para 3.23 above.
[27]Policy Response Document, para 8(ii).
[28]See Compensation Report, Part III, para 3.8 and Part IV, para 4.65.
[29]Part III, paras 3.22-3.24 and Proposal 1 above.
[30]Policy Statement, App, paras 2.17-2.18. This procedure would ensure that “there would be little incentive for an authority to try to ride roughshod over the concerns of any non-statutory objectors”.
[31]Policy Response Document, para 8.
[32]Policy Statement, App, para 2.22
[33]See paras 4.7-4.8 and Proposal 2 above.
[34]Acquisition Act, ss 23-25. The time limit runs from the date on which the notice of confirmation is first published. For discussion of such “statutory applications to quash”, see generally De Smith, Woolf and Jowell, Judicial Review of Administrative Action, (5th ed, 1995), p 681ff; See also the Law Commission’s report: Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals, (1994), Law Com No 226, para 12.11ff.
[35]See R v Secretary of State ex p Ostler [1977] QB 122.
[36]Acquisition Act, ss 23(1)-(2), 24(2)(b).
[37]See e.g. Ostler (above); De Smith, op cit, para 15-066.
[38]See e.g. R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2001] 2 WLR 1389, HL.
[39]See Law Com No 226, paras 12.13-14.
[40]“ A ‘person aggrieved’ must be a man who has suffered a legal grievance, a man against whom a decision has been pronounced which has wrongfully deprived him of something, or wrongfully refused him something, or wrongfully affected his title to something”: Ex parte Sidebotham (1880) 14 Ch. D 458, 465, CA.
[41]See, for example, R v Thames Magistrates Court ex parte Greenbaum (1957) 55 LGR 129.
[42]See Attorney General of the Gambia v N’jie [1961] AC 617 at 634, where the Privy Council held that the Attorney General was a ‘person aggrieved’ for the purpose of petitioning the Crown for special leave to appeal, and described the term as of ‘wide import and ‘not to be subjected to restrictive interpretation.’ In Arsenal FC v Ende [1979] AC 1, the House of Lords endorsed the liberal approach, holding that a ratepayer was within the class of persons aggrieved even when he had not suffered personal financial or other loss from an alleged under-assessment of rates on land in his borough.
[43]Supreme Court Act 1981, s31(3). In R v IRC ex parte National Federation of Small Businesses [1982] AC 617, 613C, the House of Lords found that this new broader test moved the focus away from the applicant’s particular grievance or specific legal right and accorded the court a wider discretion on standing, presenting a “mixed decision of fact and law which fell to be decided on legal principles”; per Lord Wilberforce. This “increasingly liberal approach to standing on the part of the courts” (per Rose LJ in R v Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, ex p World Development Movement [1995] 1 WLR 386, 395F) has continued to develop: see, for example, Sedley J in R v Somerset County Council, ex parte Dixon [1998] Env LR 111, 121.
[44]See Cook v Southend on Sea BC [1990] 2 QB 1.
[45]See Cook (above), 18; per Woolf LJ. See also the discussion of this topic in its wider context and previous approaches to reform in Law Com No 226, paras 12.17ff.
[46]See, for example, ss 287-288 of the 1990 Act, which provides a remedy for “any person aggrieved by a unitary development plan or a local plan…”; a list of all these provisions can be found in Annex 2 to the Law Commission’s Consultation Paper on Administrative Law: Judicial Review and Statutory Appeals (1993), Consultation Paper No 126, and those providing additional specific standing rules can be found in Annex 3 to the Paper.
[47]Acquisition Act, s 25.
[48]Islington LBC v Secretary of State (1980) 43 P&CR 300.
[49]See e.g. R v Camden LBC ex p Comyn Ching & Co Ltd (1984) 47 P&CR 417 (judicial review available to challenge the resolution of the authority, prior to making the order); Law Com, No 226, para 12.13.
[50]This would include the decision of the acquiring authority itself on an unopposed order transferred to it under current proposals: see paras 4.12ff above.
[51]1990 Act, ss 277-288.
[52]See e.g. R v Secretary of State, ex p Kensington and Chelsea RBC (1987) 19 HLR 191.
[53]Acquisition Act, s 24(1).
[54]Ibid, s 24(2).