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The Parole Board for England and Wales


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> The Parole Board for England and Wales >> Pearson, Application for Reconsideration by, [2025] PBRA 116 (30 May 2025)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/PBRA/2025/116.html
Cite as: [2025] PBRA 116

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[2025] PBRA 116

 

 

Application for Reconsideration by Pearson

 

 

Application

 

1.   This is an application by Pearson (the Applicant) for reconsideration of a decision of the Parole Board following a Parole Board paper decision of 4 April 2025 not to direct his release.

 

2.   Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended by the Parole Board (Amendment) Rules 2024) (the Parole Board Rules) provides that applications for reconsideration may be made in eligible cases (as set out in rule 28(2)) either on the basis (a) that the decision contains an error of law, (b) that it is irrational and/or (c) that it is procedurally unfair. This is an eligible case, and the application was made in time.

 

3.   I have considered the application on the papers. The papers comprise:

 

a.    The dossier now comprising 182 pages including the decision letter (DL) the subject of this application and submissions put before the panel on his behalf by the Applicant following the hearing.

 

b.    The Grounds dated 17 May 2025 submitted by the Applicant in support of the application.  

 

Background

 

4.   The Applicant is now 49 years old. In August 2013 he was sentenced to 18 years imprisonment with 4 years extended licence for 8 counts of rape, 5 of sexual assault of a child under 13 and assault with penetration of a child under 13. His conditional release date is in 2031 and his sentence will expire in 2035.

 

Request for Reconsideration

 

5.   The Grounds are set out in summary - insofar as they relate to the decision whether to order a reconsideration of the case.

 

a.    Reason 1 refers the reader to the DL paragraph 1.3 and to two documents submitted by the Applicant for the purposes of the appeal, which, he submits, were adduced at his trial in 2013. He goes on to set out his recollections of his trial concerning certain events and to submit that false documents have been inserted - by the alteration of genuine documents - in order to paint an unfair picture of him and thus prejudice him in respect of his prospects of release on parole, by the trial judge or court staff. In essence the Applicant claims that documents dating back to this trial have been falsified either at the time or since and culminated in the false conclusion that the Applicant had "a sexual interest in prepubescent and pubescent girls."

 

b.    Reason 2 also focuses on paragraphs 2.1, 2.3, 4.3, and 4.8 of the DL and the question of whether the perceived need for the Applicant to 'engage in an intervention programme' may be met even if he continues to deny his guilt. The ground goes on to quote from the judgment in Taplin v The Parole Board [2004] EWHC 515 (Admin) and to invite a conclusion in his favour because - unlike the offender in Taplin he has never admitted his guilt of any of the offences of which he was convicted. The (lengthy) submissions on these grounds which follow can be simply summarised. Because I am innocent I should be judged on that basis - and on the basis of my behaviour while in prison serving the sentence which all agree has been good - and thus the index offences should effectively be ignored when a panel is considering my case. This should lead inexorably to a direction for release.  

 

c.    Reason 3 focuses on paragraph 1.5 of the DL which refers to allegations made at around the time of his conviction against the Applicant - which allegations were never pursued - and refers to the case of R (on the application of Pearce) v Parole Board of England and Wales [2022] 1WLR 2216.

         

Current parole review

 

6.   Following the Applicant's recall the case was referred to the Parole Board by the Secretary of State (the Respondent).

 

The Relevant Law

 

7.   The panel correctly sets out in its decision letter the test for release and the issues to be addressed in making a recommendation to the Secretary of State for a progressive move to open conditions.

Parole Board Rules 2019 (as amended)

 

8.   Rule 28(1) of the Parole Board Rules provides the types of decision which are eligible for reconsideration. Decisions concerning whether the prisoner is or is not suitable for release on licence are eligible for reconsideration whether made by a paper panel (rule 19(1)(a) or (b)) or by an oral hearing panel after an oral hearing (rule 25(1)) or by an oral hearing panel which makes the decision on the papers (rule 21(7)). Decisions concerning the termination, amendment, or dismissal of an IPP licence are also eligible for reconsideration (rule 31(6) or rule 31(6A)).

Irrationality

 

9.   The power of the courts to interfere with a decision of a competent tribunal on the ground of irrationality was defined in Associated Provincial Houses ltd -v- Wednesbury Corporation 1948 1 KB 223 by Lord Greene in these words "if a decision on a competent matter is so unreasonable that no reasonable authority could ever have come to it, then the courts can interfere". The same test applies to a reconsideration panel when determining an application on the basis of irrationality.

 

10.In R (DSD and others) v the Parole Board [2018] EWHC 694 (Admin), the Divisional Court set out the test for irrationality to be applied in judicial reviews of Parole Board decisions. It said, at para116, "the issue is whether the release decision was so outrageous in its defiance of logic or accepted moral standards that no sensible person who had applied his mind to the question to be decided could have arrived at it."

 

11.In R(on the application of Wells) -v- Parole Board 2019 EWHC 2710 (Admin) Saini J set out what he described as a more nuanced approach in modern public law which was "to test the decision maker's ultimate conclusion against the evidence before it and to ask whether the conclusion can (with due deference and with regard to the panel's expertise) be safely justified on the basis of that evidence, particularly in a context where anxious scrutiny needs to be applied)". This test was adopted by a Divisional Court in the case of R(on the application of the Secretary of State for Justice) -v- the Parole Board 2022 EWHC 1282(Admin).

 

12.As was made clear by Saini J this is not a different test to the Wednesbury test. The interpretation of and application of the Wednesbury test in Parole hearings as explained in DSD was binding on Saini J.

 

13.It follows from those principles that in considering an application for reconsideration the reconsideration panel will not substitute its view of the evidence for that of the panel who heard the witnesses.

14.Further while the views of the professional witnesses must be properly considered by a panel deciding on release, the panel is not bound to accept their assessment. The panel must however make clear in its reasons why it is disagreeing with the assessment of the witnesses.

 

Procedural unfairness

 

15.Procedural unfairness means that there was some procedural impropriety or unfairness resulting in the proceedings being fundamentally flawed and therefore, producing a manifestly unfair, flawed, or unjust result. These issues (which focus on how the decision was made) are entirely separate to the issue of irrationality which focusses on the actual decision.

 

16.In summary an Applicant seeking to complain of procedural unfairness under rule 28 must satisfy me that either:

 

(a)         express procedures laid down by law were not followed in the making of the relevant decision;

(b)         they were not given a fair hearing;

(c)         they were not properly informed of the case against them;

(d)         they were prevented from putting their case properly;

(e)         the panel did not properly record the reasons for any findings or conclusion; and/or

(f)          the panel was not impartial.

 

17.The overriding objective is to ensure that the Applicant's case was dealt with justly.

 

Other

 

18.It is possible to argue that mistakes in findings of fact made by a decision maker result in the final decision being irrational, but the mistake of fact must be fundamental. The case of E v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2004] QB 1044 sets out the preconditions for such a conclusion: "there must have been a mistake as to an existing fact, including a mistake as to the availability of evidence on a particular matter; the fact or evidence must have been "established", in the sense that it was uncontentious and objectively verifiable; the appellant (or his advisors) must not have been responsible for the mistake; and the mistake must have played a material (though not necessarily decisive) part in the tribunal's reasoning." See also R (Alconbury Developments Ltd) v Secretary of State for the Environment, Transport and the Regions [2003] AC 295, which said that in order to establish that there was a demonstrable mistake of fact in the decision of the panel, an Applicant will have to provide "objectively verifiable evidence" of what is asserted to be the true picture.

 

19.In Oyston [2000] PLR 45, at paragraph 47 Lord Bingham said: "It seems to me generally desirable that the Board should identify in broad terms the matters judged by the Board as pointing towards and against a continuing risk of offending and the Board's reasons for striking the balance that it does. Needless to say, the letter should summarise the considerations which have in fact led to the final decision.  It would be wrong to prescribe any standard form of Decision Letter and it would be wrong to require elaborate or impeccable standards of draftsmanship."

 

The reply on behalf of the Secretary of State

                                                                                   

20.The Respondent has offered no representations in respect of this application.

 

Discussion

 

21.As will be clear from the summary above at paragraphs 5 a-c above, the application is based on the contention that the Applicant did not commit the index offences and therefore should not be in prison at all, and thus - a fortiori -immediately be released back into the community. The Parole Board is bound to begin from the fact that an offender has been convicted on the index offence(s) and has not had the conviction(s) quashed on appeal. The application is thus misconceived from the beginning. Likewise, the possibility that documentation has somehow been altered before, at or since the Applicant's trial is not a matter for the Parole Board but - if relevant to the safety of the Applicant's convictions - for the appeal process following the trial. I have however studied the decision for signs of irrationality and/or procedural unfairness or irregularity and found nothing which would merit the order sought.

 

Decision

 

22.The application is thus refused.

 

 

Sir David Calvert-Smith

30 May 2025

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