Rigby v Wheatley [2005] EWLands LRX_84_2004 (30 June 2005)
LRX/84/2004
LANDS TRIBUNAL ACT 1949
SERVICE CHARGE – insurance rent – fair proportion of cost of insurance payable by tenant – fair proportion to be determined by the landlord's surveyor – demands issued at figures not determined by landlord's surveyor held to be invalid and not payable – appeal allowed – Landlord and Tenant Act 1985, ss18(1) and 27A
IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL AGAINST A DECISION OF A LEASEHOLD VALUATION TRIBUNAL OF THE LONDON RENT ASSESSMENT PANEL
BETWEEN LIONEL RIGBY Appellant
and
MICHAEL JOHN WHEATLEY Respondent
Re: Flat 8 & Garage 8
Moray House
Rickmansworth Road
Northwood
Middlesex HA6 2QT
Before: P H Clarke FRICS
Sitting at Procession House, 110 New Bridge Street, London EC4V 6JL
on 17 June 2005
The following cases are referred to in this decision:
Jervis v Harris [1996] 1 All ER 303
Concorde Graphics Limited v Andromeda Investments SA [1983] 1 EGLR 53
Investors Compensation Scheme Limited v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896
Finchbourne Limited v Rodrigues [1976] 3 All ER 581
CIN Properties Limited v Barclays Bank [1986] 1 EGLR 59
Yorkbrook Investments Limited v Batten [1985] 2 EGLR 100
J E Kennedy, solicitor, J E Kennedy & Co, for the appellant
T C Dutton of counsel for the respondent
DECISION
Facts
(i) the insurance premiums for 2000-2004 are relevant and reasonably incurred and properly chargeable to the service charge account (para 24);
(ii) the determination by the landlord's surveyor of a fair proportion of insurance costs payable by the tenant is not a condition precedent to the tenant's obligation to pay the insurance rent (paras 29 and 30);
(iii) the insurance for the separate garage block should not be stripped from the costs of insurance for the block of flats and, on a broad brush approach, each tenant should pay one-ninth of the cost of the annual insurance premium for 2000-2004 (paras 31-34);
(iv) these determinations are limited to the years in dispute and the parties are free to revert to the lease terms and to instruct a surveyor to determine the apportionment for future years (para 35).
Appellant's case
Respondent's case
Discussion
"An application may be made to a leasehold valuation tribunal for a determination whether a service charge is payable and, if it is, as to –
(a) the person by whom it is payable,
(b) the person to whom it is payable,
(c) the amount which is payable,
(d) the date at or by which it is payable, and
(e) the manner in which it is payable."
Under subsection (2) these provisions apply whether or not any payment has been made and under subsection (5) payment by a tenant (as in this case) is not to be taken as an agreement or admission, which, by subsection (4)(a), would have prevented application to an LVT under subsection (1). Section 175(1)-(3) of the 2002 Act give a right of appeal to the Lands Tribunal (with permission) and subsections (4) and (5) provide that this Tribunal may exercise "any power which was available to the" LVT and allow a decision of the Lands Tribunal "to be enforced in the same way as a decision of the" LVT. Thus, in service charge disputes, the initial tribunal is the LVT, with a right of appeal to the Lands Tribunal (with permission). On appeal this Tribunal has the same powers as the LVT and its decision may be enforced in the same way as an LVT decision.
"In the following provisions of this Act 'service charge' means an amount payable by a tenant of a dwelling as part of or in addition to the rent –
(a) which is payable, directly or indirectly, for services, repairs, maintenance improvements or insurance or the landlord's costs of management, and
(b) the whole or part of which varies or may vary according to the relevant costs."
"In this case, it has been admitted by the Respondents that there has been a breach of the lease. In the view of this Tribunal if, on the pertinent facts, there is a loss, this can be remedied by damages (if appropriate) rather than such a breach being considered a condition precedent which would allow all the tenants to obtain a refund of all the insurance premiums paid for the service charge years in dispute. The Tribunal considers that if this had been the intention of the parties when the leases were drawn up, the wording would have gone much further and been more mandatory. The Tribunal would have expected the clause to have made it plain that unless a surveyor's determination had been made, the landlord would lose his right to demand payment of the insurance premium. The clause is not framed as a condition precedent. The provision in the lease merely refers to a determination and not, for example a certificate to be issued. Can it really be the case that if no determination is made by the landlord's surveyor, the parties to the original leases (which have not been varied in this respect) could have intended that no insurance premiums could be demanded? The Tribunal rejects this contention."
The tribunal then made its own apportionment, concluding that each tenant should pay one-ninth of the annual insurance premiums for 2000-2004 (paras 31-34) with the comment that these determinations are limited to the years in dispute and that the parties are free to revert to the lease terms and instruct a surveyor to determine the apportionment for future years (paras 35).
"The LVT appears to have been in error, firstly, in concluding that there could be a liability to pay an amount in respect of insurance premiums in the absence of a determination by the lessor's surveyor of the fair proportion, and, secondly, in itself determining what proportion of the annual premium each tenant should pay."
He then stayed the appeal for 28 days on the grounds that the amount in issue is small and "there appears to me to be no reason why the fair proportion should not now be determined by the lessor's surveyor so as to give rise to liability on the part of the lessee." He reminded the parties of the Tribunal's power to award costs if agreement cannot be reached.
"But I think I should preface my explanation of my reasons with some general remarks about the principles by which contractual documents are nowadays construed. I do not think that the fundamental change which has overtaken this branch of the law, …., is always sufficiently appreciated. The result has been, subject to one important exception, to assimilate the way in which such documents are interpreted by judges to the common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life. Almost all the intellectual baggage of 'legal' interpretation has been discarded. The principles may be summarised as follows:
(1) Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.
(2) ….
(3) ….
(4) The meaning which a document (or any other utterance) would convey to a reasonable man is not the same thing as the meaning of its words. The meaning of words is a matter of dictionaries and grammars; the meaning of the document is what the parties using those words against the relevant background would reasonably have been understood to mean…
(5) The 'rule' that words should be given their 'natural and ordinary meaning' reflects the common sense proposition that we do not easily accept that people have made linguistic mistakes, particularly in formal documents. …"
"SECONDLY by way of further rent a fair proportion (to be determined by the Lessor's Surveyor for the time being) of the amount from time to time expended by the Lessor in insuring all the buildings on the Estate in pursuance of the Lessor's covenant hereinafter contained such sum to be paid within seven days after demand"
How is that provision to be interpreted in the light of the above guidance? What meaning would it convey to a reasonable person "according to the common sense principles by which any serious utterance would be interpreted in ordinary life"?
"… in Finchbourne … it was held that under a covenant … for the payment of service charges to be certified by the landlord's managing agent, the issue of a proper and valid certificate was a precondition to any liability, since it was only thus that the extent of any liability could be quantified."
In CIN Properties the Court of Appeal held that a proviso in a lease, requiring the landlords to submit to the tenants estimates or orders for repairs for approval before acceptance, was a condition precedent to the tenants' liability under the lease to contribute towards the cost of repairs.
"The short answer to the question is that the tenant's liability to reimburse the landlord for his expenditure on repairs is not a liability in damages for breach of his repairing covenant at all. The landlord's claim sounds in debt not damages; and it is not a claim to compensation for breach of the tenant's covenant to repair, but for reimbursement of sums actually spent by the landlord in carrying out repairs himself. I shall expand on each of these distinction in turn.
The law of contract draws a clear distinction between a claim for payment of a debt and a claim for damages for breach of contract. … a debt is a definite sum of money fixed by the agreement of the parties as payable by one party to the other in return for the performance of the specified obligation by the other party or on the occurrence of some specified event or condition; whereas damages may be claimed from a party who has broken his primary contractual obligation in some way other than by failure to pay such a debt."
"Thus, subject to the question of de minimis, we would allow a reduction from the claim of £8.57. In cases such as this tenants are looking to the court for decisions on matters which, although small in quantum, may be of considerable moment to the parties concerned. In our judgment, it must only be in very exceptional circumstances that the de minimis principle should be applied. We would not apply it here."
Mr Rigby is seeking a decision in principle, that the landlord is required under the lease to issue insurance demands containing his surveyor's determination as to the fair proportion payable by each tenant. It is a matter of principle, not amount, and properly the subject of appeal.
"26. In oral evidence Mr Wheatley confirmed that he had never instructed a surveyor for this purpose, but had followed the apportionment originally made by his late father in law who, in turn, had follow advice from his accountant. The Tribunal notes letters from Mr Wheatley's solicitors dated 7 September 2000 and a letter from a different firm of solicitors dated 24 April 2000, both of which confirmed that the apportionment of the premium had been determined by Mr Wheatley's surveyor. This was untrue. Mr Wheatley explained the purpose of the contents of his solicitors' letters was 'to snuff a fire out'.
27. Mr Wheatley pointed out that although the Applicant had written to him on 6 June 2001, there had not been at that stage any objection to the proportion of the insurance premium."
DATED: 30 June 2005
(Signed) P H Clarke